The Welfare Evaluation of Primary Goods: A Suggestion

This paper presents a characterization of a welfare index for the evaluation of primary goods (to be understood as those goods that all agents should enjoy equally). The welfare associated with a given distribution of n primary goods among m agents is measured as the sum of n real-valued functions, one for each good, which are increasing in the aggregate consumption and decreasing in its dispersion (measured by Theil's first inequality index).Welfare evaluation, Inequality, Primary goods

A New Approach to Multidimensional Poverty Measurement

We present here a multidimensional poverty index that measures poverty as a function of the extent and the intensity of poverty. Extent is given by the share of the poor in the population. To measure intensity we start by defining individual unidimensional deprivation indices (one for each individual and each dimension) and then aggregating them as a geometric mean. Each individual deprivation index is simply the inverse of the share of individual achievements in the poverty thresholds. Our approach involves an elementary characterization, the determination of a specific formula, and the endogeneous identification of the poor.multidimensional poverty, ratio monotonicity, geometric mean, endogenous identification.

Distribution Sensitive Multidimensional Development Indices

This paper provides an elementary characterization of a family of multi-dimensional development indices that allows introducing distributive considerations. It consists of the generalized mean of the egalitarian equivalent values of the different dimensions. The key property that defines that family of indices is that of separability.multidimensional well-being, distribution sensitive indices, separability, human development.

Competitive Pricing

Competitive pricing is a pricing rule that combines two principles that are present in competitive markets. The profit principle (an action will be chosen only if it yields maximal payoffs), and the scarcity principle (markets make expensive those commodities that restrict production possibilities). It is shown that, under standard assumptions, these principles imply profit maximization at given prices. But also that they can be applied to economies with non-convex production sets (e.g. firms with S-shaped production functions). The chief properties of this pricing rule, as well as the existence and efficiency of the associated equilibria, are analyzednon-convex production sets, competitive pricing rule, competitive pricing equilibrium.

MULTIDIMENSIONAL INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL WELFARE

This paper provides a cardinal welfare measure for the allocation of a bundle of goods among a group of people. Social welfare is measured as the sum of n partial indices, one for each good, each of which consists of a function of the amount of the good availabe and its dispersion, measured by Theil's first inequality index. Some applications of this welfare measure are also suggested.Inequality and Welfare; Social Goods; Cardinal Welfare Measures.

AN INPUT-OUTPUT APPROACH TO THE MEASUREMENT OF PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES

This paper deals with the measurement of efficiency differences among countries within a federation. The key tool is the use of a suitable interpretation of the non-substitution theorem in order to get a natural technological standard. Two alternative indices are proposed. One provides a structural productivity measure, independent of consumption and prices. The other consists of a price index associated with the equilibrium aggregate demand.Input-Output Analysis; Nonsubstitution Theorem; Measurement of Productivity

Choosing High-Court Judges by Political Parties.

This paper proposes a mechanism to overcome the possibility that political parties may block the nomination of High-Court judges when the Parliament is involved in their nomination and their mandate expires on a fixed date. This possibility arises when the default option is that the judge whose mandate expires holds office until an agreement is reached. Our proposal consists of changing the default option by a weighted lottery. We show that this mechanism is capable of solving the problem and implementing the socially optimal solution.Negotiation, Political Competition, random protocols, legislative bargaining.

The Rights-Egalitarian Solution for NTU Sharing Problems

The purpose of this paper is to extend the Rights Egalitarian solution (Herrero, Maschler & Villar, 1999) to the context of non-transferable utility sharing problems. Such an extension is not unique. Depending on the kind of properties we want to preserve we obtain two different generalizations. One is the "proportional solution", that corresponds to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for surplus sharing problems and the solution in Herrero (1998) for rationing problems. The other is the "Nash solution” that corresponds to the standard Nash bargaining solution for surplus sharing problems and the Nash rationing solution (Mariotti & Villar (2005) for the case of rationing problems.Sharing problems, rights egalitarian solution, NTU problems.

- VALUATION EQULIBRIUM REVISITED

This paper extends the notion of valuation equilibrium which applies to market economies involving the choice of a public environment. Unlike some other recent work, it is assumed here that consumers and firms evaluate alternative environments taking market prices as given (hence this notion is closer to that of competitive equilibria). It is shown that valuation equilibria with balanced tax schemas yield eficient allocations and that eficient allocations can be decentralized as valuation equilibria, with tax schemas that may be unbalanced.valuation equilibrium, non-convexities, public goods

Education, Utilitarianism, and Equality of Opportunity

We analyze in this paper the impact of different policies on the investment of the families in the education of their children. Families make decisions on the level of human capital of their offsprings regarding the future income that this capital entails (under the assumption that higher education levels yield higher expected income). The families' optimal investment in education depends on their preferences (summarized by their time discount and risk aversion parameters) and their circumstances (initial wealth, parents' education, and children' natural abilities). The public authority designs a balanced tax/subsidy scheme in order to maximize aggregate welfare. We compare the case of a purely utilitarian planner with one that cares about the equality of opportunity.Equality of Opportunity, Investment in Education, Policy design