896 research outputs found
Financial contracts and contingent control rights
According to empirical studies of venture capital finance, the division of control rights between entrepreneur and venture capitalists is often contingent on certain measures of firm performance. If the indicator of the company’s performance (eg earnings before taxes and interest) is low, the venture capital firm obtains full control of the company. If company performance improves, the entrepreneur retains or obtains more control rights. If company performance is very good, the venture capitalist relinquishes most of his control rights. In this article, we extend the incomplete contracting model of Aghion and Bolton to construct a theoretical model that is consistent with these empirical findings.incomplete contracts; financial contracting; contingent contracts; control rights; joint ownership
An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting: a comment
We show that the principal result of Aghion and Bolton (1992) related to the optimality properties of contingent control allocations under incomplete contracting environment holds only if an additional condition is satisfied.
Bank safety under Basel II capital requirements
We consider the impact of mandatory information disclosure on bank safety in a spatial model of banking competition in which a bank’s probability of success depends on the quality of its risk measurement and management systems. Under Basel II capital requirements, this quality is either fully or partially disclosed to market participants by the Pillar 3 disclosures. We show that, under stringent Pillar 3 disclosure requirements, banks’ equilibrium probability of success and total welfare may be higher under a simple Basel II standardized approach than under the more sophisticated internal ratings-based (IRB) approach.Basel II; capital requirements; information disclosure; market discipline; moral hazard
Financial contracts and contingent control rights
According to empirical studies of venture capital finance, the division of control rights between entrepreneur and venture capitalists is often contingent on certain measures of firm performance. If the indicator of the company’s performance (eg earnings before taxes and interest) is low, the venture capital firm obtains full control of the company. If company performance improves, the entrepreneur retains or obtains more control rights. If company performance is very good, the venture capitalist relinquishes most of his control rights. In this article, we extend the incomplete contracting model of Aghion and Bolton to construct a theoretical model that is consistent with these empirical findings.incomplete contracts, financial contracting, contingent contracts, control rights, joint ownership
Are adverse selection models of debt robust to changes in market structure?
Many adverse selection models of standard one-period debt contracts are based on the following seemingly innocuous assumptions. First, entrepreneurs have private information about the quality of their return distributions. Second, return distributions are ordered by the monotone likelihood-ratio property. Third, financiers’ payoff functions are restricted to be monotonically non-decreasing in firm profits. Fourth, financial markets are competitive. We argue that debt is not an optimal contract in these models if there is only one (monopoly) financier rather than an infinite number of competitive financiers.security design; adverse selection; monotonic contracts; monotone likelihood ratio; first-order stochastic dominance
Banks' equity stakes in borrowing firms: corporate finance approach
In most countries, banks’ equity holdings in firms that borrow from then are rather small. In light of the theoretical literature, this is somewhat surprising. For example, according to agency cost models, allowing banks to hold equity would seem to alleviate firms’ asset substitution moral hazard problem associated with debt financing. This idea is formalised in John, John, and Saunders in a model where banks are modeled as passive investors and bank loans are the only source of outside finance for firms. In this paper, we argue that this alleged benefit of banks’ equity holding is small or non-existent when banks are modeled explicitly as active monitors and firms have access also to market finance.banks’ equity holdings; firms’ capital structure; social welfare
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Tieteen tori: Yksityiskohtainen metsävaratiet
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