Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand

We study the impact of access regulation in a telecommunications market on an entrant's decision whether to invest in a network or ask for access when the regulator cannot observe its potential demand. Since the entrant has incentives to not compete vigorously right after entry in order to convince the regulator that it needs cheap access in the future, the regulator must set access prices which tend to be distorted (lower or higher) as compared to ?rst best. Still, this is better than committing to ignore ex post demand information. Consulting the entrant earlier about its expectations improves welfare and may help to achieve the first best.

Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction

We study the investment of a telecommunications incumbent in quality and in cost reduction when an entrant can use its network through unbundling of the local loop. We ?nd that unbundling may lower incentives for quality improvements, but raises incentives for cost reduction. Therefore, it is not true that all types of investment are crowded out with unbundling. If the regulator can commit to a socially optimal unbundling price before investment, the incumbent makes both types of investment. In the absence of commitment, the incumbent will not invest, so that unbundling regulation may lower welfare as compared to no regulation.

Improving consumer mobility in the mobile voice services market: a comprehensive set of remedies

Switching costs increase the rigidity of consumers demand and lessen competition between firms, effects that are particularly relevant in the mobile voice services market. This paper characterizes the most important mobility restrictive factors for consumers in this market, presenting specific examples and discussing their impact on competition. In addition, a survey was conducted to obtain data on consumption decisions by mobile voice customers in Portugal. The survey results suggest that switching costs represent more than 13 euros or 57% of the average monthly expenditure with these services. The disclosure of a new mobile phone number is the most difficult task in the switching process. Customers also showed high concern with respect to the possibility of losing quality of service. Compatibility costs also impose high restrictions to customer mobility. Following the identification of these restrictive factors, the adoption by policy makers of remedies to address the different search and switching costs is discussed and their implementation prioritized according to mobile customers' needs. --Switching costs,search costs,remedies

The race for telecoms infrastructure investment with bypass: Can access regulation achieve the first best?

We analyze the impact of mandatory access on the infrastructure investments of two competing communications networks, and show that for low (high) access charges ?rms wait (preempt each other). Contrary to previous results, under preemption a higher access charge can delay ?rst investment. While ?rst-best investment cannot be achieved with a ?xed access tari¤, simple instruments such as banning access in the future, or granting access holidays right after investment, can improve e¢ ciency. The former forces investment when it would happen too late, while the latter allows for lower access charges in order to delay the second investment when it would happen too early.

Investment, dynamic consistency and the sectoral regulator's obective

We explore the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branch of government as a way of overcoming the dynamic consistency problem of regulatory policy towards investment. We model the industry as a regulated duopoly. The incumbent is a vertically integrated firm that owns a wholesaler and a retailer. The entrant owns a retailer. Either retailer needs access to the input produced by the wholesaler to operate. The incumbent can make an investment that improves the quality of the input produced by the wholesaler. The regulator sets the access price and is unable to commit. The legislator sets the regulator's objective function and is able to commit. We derive general conditions under which having the legislator distort the regulator's objective function away from social welfare allows increasing the range of parameter values for which it is possible to induce socially desirable investment. --Investment,Dynamic Consistency,Regulator's Objective

Can Vertical Separation Reduce Non-Price Discrimination and Increase Welfare?

We investigate if vertical separation reduces non-price discrimination and increases welfare. Consider an industry consisting of a vertically integrated firm and an independent retailer, which requires access to the vertically integrated firm's wholesaler services. The wholesaler can degrade the quality of input it supplies to either of the retailers. Discrimination occurs if one of the retailers is supplied an input of lower quality than its rival. We show that separation of the vertically integrated firm reduces discrimination against the independent retailer, although it does not guarantee no-discrimination. Furthermore, with separation, the wholesaler may discriminate against the vertically integrated firm's retailer. Vertical separation impacts social welfare through two e¤ects. First, through the double-marginalization effect, which is negative. Second, through the quality degradation effect, which can be positive or negative. Hence, the net welfare impact of vertical separation is negative or potentially ambiguous.Vertigal integration; Vertical separation; Non-price discrimination.

Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction

We study the investment of a telecommunications incumbent in quality and in cost reduction when an entrant can use its network through unbundling of the local loop. We find that unbundling may lower incentives for quality improvements, but raises incentives for cost reduction. Therefore, it is not true that all types of investment are crowded out with unbundling. If the regulator can commit to a socially optimal unbundling price before investment, the incumbent makes both types of investment. In the absence of commitment, the incumbent will not invest, so that unbundling regulation may lower welfare as compared to no regulation.N/

Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand

We study the impact of access regulation in a telecommunications market on an entrant's decision whether to invest in a network or ask for access when the regulator cannot observe its potential demand. Since the entrant has incentives to not compete vigorously right after entry in order to convince the regulator that it needs cheap access in the future, the regulator must set access prices which tend to be distorted (lower or higher) as compared to first best. Still, this is better than committing to ignore ex post demand information. Consulting the entrant earlier about its expectations improves welfare and may help to achieve the first best.N/

The race for telecoms infrastructure investment with bypass: Can access regulation achieve the first best?

We analyze the impact of mandatory access on the infrastructure investments of two competing communications networks, and show that for low (high) access charges firms wait (preempt each other). Contrary to previous results, under preemption a higher access charge can delay first investment. While first-best investment cannot be achieved with a fixed access tariff, simple instruments such as banning access in the future, or granting access holidays right after investment, can improve efficiency. The former forces investment when it would happen too late, while the latter allows for lower access charges in order to delay the second investment when it would happen too early.N/

Um percurso de reflexão sobre a Prática Pedagógica e de investigação sobre as brincadeiras e as interações das crianças na área do faz de conta “a caverna”

O presente relatório de Prática de Ensino Supervisionada relata o meu percurso no Mestrado em Educação Pré-Escolar, durante os anos letivos de 2021/2022 e 2022/2023. Está dividido em três partes: a primeira refere-se ao contexto de Creche, a segunda ao contexto de Jardim de Infância numa instituição privada e a terceira parte referente ao contexto de Jardim de Infância da rede pública. Na primeira parte apresenta-se a reflexão acerca do percurso e as aprendizagens vivenciadas em Creche, mais especificamente o contexto educativo e o grupo de crianças, a observação, a planificação, intervenção e avaliação e as relações entre criança e adulto. Na segunda parte apresenta-se a reflexão acerca de todas as aprendizagens em contexto de Jardim de Infância privado como, o contexto educativo e o grupo de crianças, o ciclo pedagógico, o portfólio e o brincar. A terceira parte, incide sobre o contexto de Jardim de Infância da rede pública e reflete-se sobre o contexto educativo e o grupo de crianças, e a intervenção educativa – dando espaço para a escuta e participação das crianças através da abordagem de trabalho por projeto (a área do faz de conta “a caverna”). Nesta terceira parte, é, ainda, apresentado um ensaio investigativo realizado neste contexto sobre as brincadeiras e interações das crianças na área do faz de conta “a caverna” que visou: i) identificar e caraterizar as brincadeiras de um grupo de crianças da rede pública da Educação Pré-Escolar na área do faz de conta “a caverna”, ii) identificar e caraterizar as interações de um grupo de crianças da rede pública da Educação Pré-Escolar na área do faz de conta “a caverna”, e, iii) refletir sobre a área do faz de conta como espaço transformador e promotor do brincar e aprender na Educação Pré-Escolar. Seguindo uma metodologia qualitativa, optou-se pela observação participante com recurso a registos audiovisuais e notas de campo para a recolha de dados. Os resultados obtidos revelaram que as crianças, na área do faz de conta “a caverna”, criaram enredos sobre a visa do homem primitivo (fazendo pinturas rupestres, cozinhando, caçando e pescando), interagindo verbalmente e não verbalmente. Os resultados parecem demonstrar a relevância da existência de um espaço faz de conta “a caverna” flexível, que não se limite ao espaço da casinha, mas que permita a criação de diversos espaços tendo em conta as necessidades e interesses dos grupos de crianças que os construam ou frequentem. Por último, apresentam-se a conclusão final, as referências bibliográficas e os apêndices.This Supervised Teaching Practice report describes my journey through the Master's in Pre-School Education during the 2021/2022 and 2022/2023 academic years. It is divided into three parts: the first refers to the nursery context, the second to the kindergarten context in a private institution and the third part refers to the kindergarten context in the public network. The first part presents a reflection on the journey and the lessons learnt in nursery school, specifically the educational context and the group of children, observation, planning, intervention and assessment, and the relationship between the child and the adult. The second part presents a reflection on all the lessons learnt in a private kindergarten setting, such as the educational context and the group of children, the pedagogical cycle, the portfolio and playing activities. The third part focuses on the public kindergarten setting and reflects on the educational context and the group of children, and the educational intervention - making room for listening to and participating with the children through the project-based approach (the make-believe "cave" area). This third part also presents a research essay carried out in this context on the children's play and interactions in the make-believe "cave" area, which aimed to: i) identify and depict the play of a group of children from the public Pre-School Education network in the make-believe area "the cave", ii) identify and portray the interactions of a group of children from the public Pre-School Education network in the make-believe area "the cave", and, iii) reflect on the make-believe area as a transforming and promoting space for playing and learning in Pre-School Education. Following a qualitative methodology, we opted for participant observation using audiovisual recordings and field notes for data collection. The results showed that the children, in the make-believe "cave" area, created plots about the life of primitive men (making cave paintings, cooking, hunting and fishing), interacting verbally and non-verbally. The results seem to demonstrate the importance of having a flexible make-believe "cave" space, which is not limited to the little play house, but which allows the creation of different spaces taking into account the needs and interests of the groups of children who build or attend them. Finally, the final conclusion, bibliographical references and appendices are presented