Vote Mirages in the 2020 Election: How Vote-By-Mail Policies Impact the Reporting of Election Results

As Americans went to bed on November 3rd, 2020, it appeared our country was heading towards a second term for President Donald Trump. He was leading in many of the important swing states that Joe Biden would eventually win. Trump\u27s disproportionate lead in these states early in the vote count, also called a red mirage, became the subject of scrutiny in the weeks and months following the election. In this thesis, I aim to understand how vote-by-mail (VBM) policies impacted the reporting of election results and caused vote mirages. To evaluate whether VBM policies had an impact, I analyzed timestamped vote reports in the week following the election as well as states\u27 policies regarding access to and counting of mail ballots. I show that states that began pre-processing ballots on Election Day were likely to have red mirages while states with universal access to mail voting were likely to have blue mirages. These results suggest that the misinformation and claims of fraud that were fueled by the mirages could be addressed by reevaluating the policies governing VBM – especially in swing states – or by better preparing the public for the potential for vote mirages in the future

Correlation between traffic density and particle size distribution in a street canyon and the dependence on wind direction

International audienceCombustion of fossil fuel in gasoline and diesel powered vehicles is a major source of aerosol particles in a city. In a street canyon, the number concentration of particles smaller than 300 nm in diameter, which can be inhaled and cause serious health effects, is dominated by particles originating from this source. In this study we measured both, particle number size distribution and traffic density continuously in a characteristic street canyon in Germany for a time period of 6 months. The street canyon with multistory buildings and 4 traffic lanes is very typical for larger cities. Thus, the measurements also are representative for many other street canyons in Europe. In contrast to previous studies, we measured and analyzed the particle number size distribution with high size resolution using a Twin Differential Mobility Analyzer (TDMPS). The measured size range was from 3 to 800 nm, separated into 40 size channels. Correlation coefficients between particle number concentration for integrated size ranges and traffic counts of 0.5 were determined. Correlations were also calculated for each of the 40 size channels of the DMPS system, respectively. We found a maximum of the correlation coefficients for nucleation mode particles in the size range between 10 and 20 nm in diameter. Furthermore, correlations between traffic and particles in dependence of meteorological data were calculated. Relevant parameters were identified by a multiple regression method. In our experiment only wind parameters have influenced the particle number concentration significantly. High correlation coefficients (up to 0.8) could be observed in the lee side of the street canyon for particles in the range between 10 and 100 nm in diameter. These values are significantly higher than correlation coefficients for other wind directions and other particle sizes. A minimum was found in the luff side of the street. These findings are in good agreement with theory of fluid dynamics in street canyons

The Foundations of Anglo-American Corporate Fiduciary Law

How does legal doctrine form, why does it change, and why do doctrines with a common starting point, in legal systems with a shared heritage, diverge? This essay reviews and critiques a book by David Kershaw that addresses these questions. The book charts the evolution of corporate fiduciary law in the United Kingdom and United States and, comparing the two systems, explains how and why the respective legal regimes evolved as they did. Kershaw weighs in on contested U.S. scholarly debates, confronting the common claim that doctrinal change is less the product of internal logic or strict precedent than a response to extra-legal factors, including interest group politics, policy concerns, and state competition for corporate charters. Kershaw rejects this claim, offering other, provocative accounts for the production of U.S. corporate fiduciary law and for Delaware’s lead in attracting incorporations

A Narrow View of Transnational Fiduciary Law

Fiduciaries frequently confront transnational situations. Yet, even as people, products, and capital have become more mobile, scholars have until recently given little attention to the transnational dimensions of fiduciary law.This chapter conceptualizes transnational fiduciary law, a term that marries the fields of fiduciary and transnational law. It identifies two primary understandings of the concept and explores their scope and possible content.Under the first interpretation of this composite concept, the term transnational qualifies what fiduciary scholars have conventionally understood as fiduciary law. Transnational fiduciary law, on this view, encompasses the application of fiduciary law to transnational problems and situations. Under the second interpretation, transnational fiduciary law refers not to fiduciary law as applied in transnational contexts but rather to transnational law governing the conduct of fiduciaries. Transnational law lacks a universally accepted definition. Nevertheless, here we seek some wider notion of a “legal order” that is said to govern the behavior of parties operating within it. As such, this second understanding largely encompasses the first interpretation but extends more broadly to include norms, contractual constraints, customary practices, official guidance, and assorted voluntary schemes all of which might achieve similar objectives to fiduciary law.In this chapter, I argue that scholarly attention to the transnational dimensions of fiduciary law ought in most instances to be bounded by the first interpretation. Fundamentally, I question whether transnational law governing fiduciaries generally can be equated with fiduciary law at all without causing significant confusion. Fiduciary duties are distinctive in ways that prevent non-fiduciary law—to say nothing of vague and shifting norms—from serving as substitutes. Another difficulty with the second interpretation is that legal norms and practices that appear to serve similar functions as fiduciary law may be rarely stated and therefore difficult to verify. When they are stated, they may be vague and provisional, making it hard to determine whether transnational fiduciary law in this second sense exists at all in practice. The chapter provides case studies illustrating the difficulty of isolating the second interpretation, except as it reduces to the first through its incorporation of fiduciary law applied in transnational contexts.I do not claim that the transnational dimensions of fiduciary law are irrelevant. Nor do I reject the importance of transnational law or transnational legal ordering. However, I suggest that we treat transnational fiduciary law as an application of fiduciary law rather than as a field deserving independent study, at least until we can establish that transnational fiduciary law—on the first interpretation—is itself distinct from fiduciary law

Proxy Advisor Influence in a Comparative Light

The reform of proxy advisors is on the U.S. regulatory agenda, with debate focusing on the extent of influence that these actors exert over institutional investors and corporate managers. But the debate examines the U.S. position in isolation from other systems. If we broaden our focus, we see that the factors usually cited for proxy advisors’ influence exist similarly in the United Kingdom but that proxy advisors there exert significantly weaker influence than they do in the United States. Why this difference when we would expect a similar role for proxy advisors in both systems based on the presence of the usual explanatory factors? This article examines this question, identifying other explanations — the role of institutional investor trade groups, the level of agreement on governance best practices, the strength of shareholder rights, and the role of the State — to help explain proxy advisors’ greater influence in the United States. The article then explores the implications of this analysis for proxy advisor reform in the United States

Introduction: The Rise of Fintech

The use of technology has long accompanied the provision of financial products and services. In the late 1950s, financial institutions turned to information technology to help settle and record transactions, a burden that had grown with the surging volume of securities trades. These changes have only accelerated in recent years. Technology giants—the likes of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google—are entering financial services, beginning to offer credit cards and currencies as they attempt to push more fully into retail banking. This volume of the Washington University Journal of Law and Policy examines fintech, focusing on the regulatory and other challenges it poses. The symposium benefits from contributions by prominent scholars of financial and securities regulation. These contributions examine the structure of firms and markets, considering fintech activities occurring within existing firms and regulatory perimeters and activities that spill over the boundaries we currently take for granted

M&A Advisor Misconduct: A Wrong Without a Remedy?

Merger and acquisition ( M&A ) transactions are among the most high profile of corporate transactions. They are also among the most contentious, with around eighty percent of all completed deals litigated in recent years. And yet investment banks—essential advisors on these deals—have generally succeeded spectacularly in avoiding liability, an anomaly considering the routine nature of deal litigation and the frequency with which they face lawsuits in their other activities. This article examines this anomaly, explaining the doctrinal and practical reasons why it arises. In doing so, it puts in context aiding and abetting liability, a recently-successful shareholder strategy to bring M&A advisors to heel. The article shows how this litigation strategy—a direct action by shareholders alleging secondary liability against the corporation\u27s M&A advisor based on the underlying wrong of directors—may delicately side-step the traditional obstacles. This strategy has succeeded on occasion, provoking widespread alarm in the investment banking community—but the strategy marks only a modest increase in liability risk for M&A advisors. In fact, the liability framework for M&A advisors remains piecemeal and unlikely to be effective in deterring M&A advisor misconduct. The article concludes by examining reform options, arguing in favor of greater industry self- regulation

Fiduciary Principles in Banking Law

When are banks fiduciaries of their customers and clients? This question is of more than theoretical interest given the organizational structure of modern financial institutions and the broad-ranging functions they perform. In this chapter of the Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law, I canvass fiduciary principles in banking law. I consider when fiduciary duties exist and what they require, the range of remedies available for breach, and the various techniques banks use to exclude or modify fiduciary duties. One puzzling feature of the legal landscape is that clients bring actions less often than banks’ size and conduct might suggest, which contributes to legal uncertainty. Fiduciary law nevertheless constrains banks’ activities: courts have cast banks as fiduciaries in all of the major commercial and investment banking functions, including making loans and accepting deposits, advising on merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions, and underwriting securities offerings, although banks face greater risk in some areas than others. Banks have responded by disclaiming fiduciary duties and using information barriers/Chinese walls, and yet recent judicial decisions refuse to accept these measures as automatically effective for avoiding fiduciary liability. Courts insist that they, rather than the parties themselves, determine whether fiduciary duties exist and what they require. The law thus diverges from some theoretical accounts of fiduciary doctrine, posing challenges for banks and new questions for scholars

Reassessing Self-Dealing: Between No Conflict and Fairness

Scholars have long disagreed on which of two rules is more effective when a fiduciary engages in self-dealing. Some defend the “strict” no-conflict rule, which categorically bans self-dealing. Others prefer the “flexible” and “pragmatic” fairness rule, which allows self-dealing if it is fair to beneficiaries. The centrality of this debate cannot be overstated: corporate law as a field is fundamentally concerned with self-dealing by fiduciaries. Yet a lack of firm data means that this debate has dragged on for decades, with no end in sight. This Article makes a simple but powerful point: the entire debate is somewhat misguided because, in operation, the difference between the two regimes is not as important as scholars generally assume. This is best seen by comparing the operation of the United Kingdom—which continues to employ the traditional no-conflict rule—with the United States, which adopted the fairness rule. The no-conflict and fairness rules share a common structure: they require strict loyalty but provide exceptions or cleansing devices that save fiduciaries from liability. Only the no-conflict rule allows companies to adopt their own exceptions. Based on this analysis, neither rule is self-evidently stricter or more pragmatic. In fact, examining the fiduciary rules in operation, including the exceptions that companies actually adopt and directors actually use, reveals that they are quite similar in operation. Both task neutral directors with policing directorial self-dealing. This finding underscores the need for scholars and policymakers alike to focus not on the choice between no conflict and fairness but rather on the best use of exceptions or cleansing devices. The availability of proof of fairness as a cleansing device in the United States occasionally matters—but far less than commentators have claimed. It is often irrelevant because of its severity, rather than relevant because of its leniency. More attractive exceptions are usually available to self-dealing directors. This finding also complicates the dominant narrative holding that U.S. law significantly weakened as it evolved from no conflict to fairness; far from rejecting a stricter U.K. law, U.S. law came more closely to resemble U.K. law in operation