The split of reason and the postcolonial backlash

Let’s not forget that 1492, one of the first landmarks of Modernity, was both the year of the conquest of the Americas and of the fall or of the Reconquista of Granada, both of inner and outer ethnic cleansing of the nation state; that the national state was a colonial state and is now a securitarian state, that colonialism was the very form of Western Modernity, that the French Revolution itself was colonial, that the leader of the first Black revolutionary independence movement, Toussaint Louverture (Haiti), died in a French prison though inspired by the French Revolution. - No-one has access to reason as whole: there is no such thing as the whole of Reason, or Reason as a whole, or the Totality of reason. Reason is patched up of disconnected bits and pieces that reside at different addresses

(Re)Producing the Nation: The Politics of Reproduction in Serbia in the 1980s and 1990s

The dissertation looks at the struggle for hegemonic control over the meaning of reproduction and sexuality in Serbia, 1986-1997, in the context of the ideological and socio-economical changes created by the collapse of socialism. The dissertation focuses on changing meanings of reproduction and reproduction's intersection with the concepts of gender, sexuality and nation. Such a focus is determined by two considerations: 1) gender organization in patriarchal societies is based primarily on different roles that men and women are believed to play in reproduction; and 2) in almost all post-socialist societies, discourses and policies have been produced aimed at changing reproductive practices of specific targeted populations: not simply women, but women belonging to particular groups (ethnic, religious, class). During the fieldwork in Serbia, multiple methods for data collection were used: archival research, participant observation, semi-structured interviews and life histories. All material was subjected to discourse/textual analysis, while the interpretation combines economic, political and symbolic approaches.The population discourses and closely related abortion debates are at the center of the analysis. I argue that for the Serbian nationalism in the 1980s and 1990 demographic issues were associated with the concerns related to continuity of the nation in its temporal and special dimension. Demographic discourses also projected a specific vision of modernity recreating gendered images of the state and nation, of "self" and the "other". Finally, they contributed to the processes of the radical social change by redefining the meaning of reproduction and by reshaping gender roles. This research has also unrevealed common epistemological properties shared by population discourses; the dominant discourses on gender and gender relations; and nationalist discourses (about origin and development of nations, and about survival of and threat to the national 'stock'). Consequently, these discourses emerge as not only mutually dependent, but actually, mutually constitutive. Modernist bias that allowed demography to embrace 'scientific objectivity' in representation of population trends also allowed nationalist discourses to embrace images of 'backwardness' and 'progress'. An inherent gender dimension of this bias allowed both demographic and nationalist discourses to employ the same hegemonic images of masculinity and femininity

A growth model for a two-sector economy with endogenous productivity

A growth model is developed for an open dual economy. The economy expands due to a higher growth rate of labour productivity in the modern sector through the Kaldor-Verdoorn channel and higher effective demand through a Keynesian channel. The model incorporates a retardation mechanism affecting the slopes of productivity and output growth schedules as labour surplus and economies of scale diminish. A wage or profit-led regime and initial conditions may give rise to: de-industrialization in terms of both output and employment; a growth trap sustaining a situation of structural heterogeneity; or sustainable employment and adequate output and productivity growth.productivity growth; two sector growth models; demand-led growth

Empty Sources of Growth Accounting, and Empirical Replacements à la Kaldor with Some Beef

Standard sources of growth accounts are empty of content because they rely on neoclassical production theory. Rather, analysis can be based on productivity growth quations derived either from NIPA accounting conventions or algebraic identities. These complementary schemes impose valid restrictions on growth rates of the wage rate, profit rate, capital, labor, and their respective average productivities. A Solow-type growth model based on proper accounting can be shown to converge. Detailed results differ markedly from those of the standard model. Alternative, essentially Kaldorian supply-and demandbased alternatives to sources of growth based on a familiar output growth vs. productivity growth diagram with constant employment growth contours added in look like a useful alternative to the mainstream modelsSources of Growth Accounting, Total Factor Productivity Growth, Kaldorian Growth Model

The algorithm by Ferson et al. is surprisingly fast: An NP-hard optimization problem solvable in almost linear time with high probability

We start with the algorithm of Ferson et al. (\emph{Reliable computing} {\bf 11}(3), p.~207--233, 2005), designed for solving a certain NP-hard problem motivated by robust statistics. First, we propose an efficient implementation of the algorithm and improve its complexity bound to $O(n \log n+n\cdot 2^\omega)$, where $\omega$ is the clique number in a certain intersection graph. Then we treat input data as random variables (as it is usual in statistics) and introduce a natural probabilistic data generating model. On average, we get $2^\omega = O(n^{1/\log\log n})$ and $\omega = O(\log n / \log\log n)$. This results in average computing time $O(n^{1+\epsilon})$ for $\epsilon > 0$ arbitrarily small, which may be considered as ``surprisingly good'' average time complexity for solving an NP-hard problem. Moreover, we prove the following tail bound on the distribution of computation time: ``hard'' instances, forcing the algorithm to compute in time $2^{\Omega(n)}$, occur rarely, with probability tending to zero faster than exponentially with $n \rightarrow \infty$