Time preferences: do they matter in bargaining?

Experimental studies of bargaining generally impose time preferences' on subjects, in the sense that in case of disagreement, the experimenter reduces the size of the surplus bargained over by imposing exogenously some monetary cost. Contrary to this practice, in this study time preferences are first elicited in a preliminary phase, and then bargaining begins. I show that although subjects are sensitive to the timing of a monetary reward, this plays no role in determining bargaining behaviour. To the contrary, when the bargaining game is played in conventional experimental setting with monetary cost of delay, these do have an impact on subjects? conduct in negotiations.Bargaining, time preferences, experiments

The historical dimension as a guide-tool identification and reading wine landscape character of Mendoza, Argentina

The wine landscape of the province of Mendoza is characterized by an integrating heterogeneity and active, own agricultural production activity dynamism. This is considered as a cultural heritage and a provincial collective redress. This has elements that clarify its nature, understood as the formal manifestation of identity, but others contribute to the trivialization of it. In this context, the research carried out, raised the reflection on how the historical dimension to identify and take a reading of the character of the landscape wine. The historical dimension allows detecting the elements of the character of the landscape and those which are trivializing in a dynamic landscape framework and heterogeneity. In response, resulting from the framework of cultural conservation, it was proposed that the historical dimension of landscape can be used as a guide - tool for analysis.Fil: Manzini Marchesi, Lorena Verónica. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Mendoza. Instituto de Ciencias Humanas, Sociales y Ambientales; Argentin

Divide et impera: Negotiating with a Stakeholder

In many kinds of bilateral negotiations the resolution of the issues at stake has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised, negotiations ought to account for the interests of such stakeholder, whose stake is linked to the original negotiations. This interplay of different interests may introduce a strategic incentive to delay agreement in order to win the maximum concessions from one's opponents.Stakeholders, Bargaining, War of attrition

Product Service Systems and Sustainability: Opportunities for Sustainable Solutions

Given that the concept of PSS is beginning to 'catch on' and gain attention, it is time for UNEP to contribute to, and influence the progress of PSS, to ensure that in concept and application it incorporates the idea of sustainability. In this context its potential is not generally understood by the public and private sectors or civil society. This booklet is intended to contribute to the dissemination and the discussion of the PSS concept as a promising approach to sustainability. The ultimate goal must be to achieve Sustainable Product-Service Systems. This UNEP publication is targeted at industry and government, academia and civil society to explain PSS – their potential benefits and limitations – in the sustainability context – using real company examples. To prepare this booklet, UNEP has drawn on the knowledge and experience of PSS experts to flesh out the concept of a sustainable PSS, to collect case studies of PSS in practice, to begin to document both its benefits and the hurdles which need to be overcome in its application, and to suggest ways forward in its development

Two-stage Bargaining Solutions

We introduce and characterize a new class of bargaining solutions: those which can be obtained by sequentially applying two binary relations to eliminate alternatives. As a by-product we obtain as a particular case a partial characterization result by Zhou (Econometrica, 1997) of an extension of the Nash axioms and solution to domains including non-convex problems, as well as a complete characterizations of solutions that satisfy Pareto optimality, Covariance with positive affine transformations, and Independence of irrelevant alternatives.Bargaining, Non-convex problems, Nash bargaining solution

Rationalizing Boundedly Rational Choice

A Rational Shortlist Method (RSM) translates into economic language some sequential choice heuristics studied in psychology. We show that the use of this boundedly rational procedure can be detected from observed choice data through tests that are very similar to those used to detect `rational' choice (such as Samuelson's WARP). Yet, RSMs are compatible with some highly `irrational' patterns of choice observed in experiments, such as pairwise cycles. We also provide partial results on a generalization of RSMs.rationalizability of choice, bounded rationality, intransitive choice, incomplete preferences, menu dependence

How vague can one be? Rational preferences without completeness or transitivity

What can it mean for preferences to be rational when transitivity or completenss are not assumed? In this paper we provide a framework and a set of conditions to deal with this question. We provide representation results in terms of a pair of functions, a utility function and a vagueness function.incomplete preferences, vagueness, sure-thing principle

Stakeholders in Bilateral Conflict

The resolution of a conflict often has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved in the confrontation (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised, models addressing negotiations in such situations ought to account for the role and interests of the stakeholder - a third party whose stake is linked to the original negotiations. In this paper we address the strategic role of stakeholders in bilateral confrontations that take the form of a war of attrition; we assume that the bilateral confrontation runs concurrently with the parties interaction with the stakeholder, that chooses strategically her timing to intervene and take action to promote agreement. We show that under complete information the interplay of different interests in this tripartite timing game results in delayed outcomes. We also explore the role of incomplete information and show that asymmetries of information do not necessarily translate in increased inefficiency.stakeholders, bargaining, war of attrition