Incentive Effects of Peer Pressure in Organizations

This paper studies the effects of peer pressure on incentives. We assume that, in addition to the material payoff, each agent's utility includes the psychological payoff from peer pressure generated by a comparison of effort costs. We show that the optimal incentive schemes depend mainly on the degree of peer pressure and of the heterogeneity of agents. Furthermore, we examine the optimal organizational forms in terms of the principal''s intention to make use of the effects of peer pressure.Heterogeneity

Incentives, Identity, and Organizational Forms

Abstract This paper studies the optimal organizational form and the optimal type of manager by considering the nonmaterial (psychological) payoff as well as the standard material payoff for agents. I compare two organizational forms: T-form, where all agents have the same job title so that they are in a single reference group; and H-form, where one agent is appointed to be the manager and the others are subordinates who form a reference group. I show that the principal should appoint a more (less) able agent to be the manager when the effects of peer pressure are more (less) critical. In addition, I find the conditions under which H-form is more likely to be preferred to T-form. Finally, I discuss the phenomenon of the proliferation of job titles in the context of this model.Principal-agent Model, Multiagents, Moral Hazard, Reference Group, Peer Pressure, Identity, Proliferation of Job Titles.

Adaptation to synchronization in phase-oscillator networks

We introduce an adaptation algorithm by which an ensemble of coupled oscillators with attractive and repulsive interactions is induced to adopt a prescribed synchronized state. While the performance of adaptation is controlled by measuring a macroscopic quantity, which characterizes the achieved degree of synchronization, adaptive changes are introduced at the microscopic level of the interaction network, by modifying the configuration of repulsive interactions. This scheme emulates the distinct levels of selection and mutation in biological evolution and learning

Team Incentives and Reference-Dependent Preferences

This paper examines a multi-agent moral hazard model in which agents have expectation-based reference-dependent preferences `a la K˝oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The agents’ utilities depend not only on their realized outcomes but also on the comparisons of their realized outcomes with their reference outcomes. Due to loss aversion, the agents have a first-order aversion to wage uncertainty. Thus, reducing their expected losses by partially compensating for their failure may be beneficial for the principal. When the agent is loss averse and the project is hard to achieve, the optimal contract is based on team incentives which exhibit either joint performance evaluation or relative performance evaluation. Our results provide a new insight: team incentives serve as a loss-sharing device among agents. This model can explain the empirical puzzle of why firms often pay a bonus to low-performance employees as well as high-performance employees.Moral Hazard, Team Incentives, Reference-Dependent Preferences, Loss Aversion, Joint Performance, Evaluation, Relative Performance Evaluation

Dynamical systems with time-dependent coupling: Clustering and critical behaviour

We study the collective behaviour of an ensemble of coupled motile elements whose interactions depend on time and are alternatively attractive or repulsive. The evolution of interactions is driven by individual internal variables with autonomous dynamics. The system exhibits different dynamical regimes, with various forms of collective organization, controlled by the range of interactions and the dispersion of time scales in the evolution of the internal variables. In the limit of large interaction ranges, it reduces to an ensemble of coupled identical phase oscillators and, to some extent, admits to be treated analytically. We find and characterize a transition between ordered and disordered states, mediated by a regime of dynamical clustering.Comment: to appear in Physica

The Effects of Corporate Finance on Firm Risk-taking and Performance: Theory and Evidence

Some firms may exhibit better operating performance than others because they undertake riskier projects: risk-return tradeoff. We develop a model to examine the effects of financial contracts on a firmfs choice between safer (lower risk, lower return) and riskier (higher risk, higher return) projects. The model shows that, assuming a competitive capital market (i.e., financiers with no monopoly power), three types of financial contracts (rollover loans, non-rollover loans, and new share issues) can each be an equilibrium contract, depending on conditions. While firms undertake griskierh projects when using non-rollover loans or new share issues, firms undertake gsaferh projects when using rollover loans. The model emphasizes the role of rollover loans (with passive monitoring) as a potential disciplinary device to suppress a firmfs risk-taking. The model generates several predictions about the determinants of a firmfs risk-taking and its performance. One key prediction of the model is that (risk-neutral) firms with closer bank relationships are more likely to use rollover loans and undertake gsaferh projects, even with a contestable capital market. We find novel empirical support for the modelfs predictions.corporate finance, corporate governance, firm risk-taking, firm performance, loan rollover

The Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences

We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self-fulfilling prophecy, called the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to succeed). To this purpose, we extend a simple agency model with moral hazard and limited liability by introducing a model of reference dependent preferences (RDP) by Kõszegi and Rabin (2004). We show that the agent with high expectations about his performance can be induced to choose high effort with low-powered incentives. We then show that the principal’s expectation has an important role as an equilibrium selection device.self-fulfilling prophecy, Pygmalion effect, Galatea effect, reference dependent preferences, agency model, moral hazard

Organizational Modes within Firms and Productivity Growth

This paper develops a simple growth model with moral hazard contracting to examine the interactions between the organizational mode of firms and economic productivity growth. The organizational mode of firms differs in terms of the degree to which decisions of R&D investment are delegated to a manager. We show that the market size restricts the extent of delegation with respect to R&D, which in turn determines the productivity growth rate of the economy. We then show that there exist multiple equilibria: gpartial decentralization equilibriumh with a low growth rate and gfull decentralization equilibriumh with a high growth rate. Finally, we study the effects of social capital and competition on equilibrium organizational modes and show that, under some parametric conditions, these factors induce more decentralized organization and higher productivity growth while lowering the risk of the economy converging to a poverty trap.Centralization and Decentralization, Moral Hazard, Social Capital, Multiple Equilibria, Economic Growth, Competitive Policy