The Failure of Operation Barbarossa: Truth versus Fiction

As of July 1940, the European phase of what would ultimately become the Second World War had been underway for some ten months. Having defeated Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Holland, Belgium and France in a series of swift, decisive campaigns, Nazi Germany reigned supreme in Europe west of the Soviet Union. Yet, all was not well in the Nazi camp. Despite the enormous military successes won by Germany's armed forces since September 1939, Adolf Hitler faced a strategic dilemma, a strategic dilemma caused by Great Britain's obstinate refusal to make peace. Ultimately, Hitler--believing that Britain's refusal to come to terms was based, in large part, on the hope that Russia would eventually enter the war as an ally--chose to solve Germany's strategic dilemma with an invasion of the Soviet Union. Codenamed Operation Barbarossa, the German attack on soviet Russia commenced on 22 June 1941. Achieving complete tactical and strategic surprise, German forces, numbering more than three million men, quickly penetrated Soviet defenses, scored a series of impressive victories, and advanced rapidly into the heart of European Russia. By the beginning of December 1941, German forces had conquered approximately five hundred thousand square miles of territory, had inflicted several million casualties, and sat in position to capture Moscow. In the end, however, a quick, decisive victory over soviet Russia, which had been the chief strategic objective of Barbarossa, eluded Hitler, the result being a war of attrition that Germany, in retrospect, had little chance of winning. In the years following the Second World War, numerous German soldiers, officers in particular, who survived Barbarossa spent a considerable amount of time trying to explain why the Wehrmacht failed to achieve victory over soviet Russia in 1941. These explanations pinpoint, among other things, tactical and strategic mistakes committed by Hitler, the harsh nature of Russia's climate, Soviet numerical superiority, and even the seemingly superhuman nature of the Russian peasant soldier. In the pages that follow, I will examine Operation Barbarossa and the German failure to win the expected quick, decisive victory in 1941. Special attention will be devoted to German explanations of this defeat and how these explanations have influenced the historiography of Barbarossa and the fighting on the Eastern Front. Finally, I will offer my own analysis of why Hitler's military machine failed in its endeavor to defeat the Soviet Union in 1941

Escape of the German Army Across the Westerscheldt, September 1944

The writing of this article was made possible by Mr. K. Schacht (Steinkirchen), former officer of the Bundesmarine, who gave me the unpublished script of Mr. F. Roher. Mr. Roher belonged to the Kriegsmarine and took part in operations in the Dutch waters in 1944. He put together a captivating document. Some additional research had to be done to put it in a clear and complete perspective. The fact that a specially formed unit of the Kriegsmarine was able, in 15 days, to ferry across the Westerscheldt 100,000 men, 6,000 vehicles, 6,000 horse-drawn wagons and 750 pieces of artillery, undoubtedly lengthened the war and the occupation of a large part of the Netherlands. The evacuation across the Wester-Scheldt surely can be found in literature. The role of the Kriegsmarine, however, forms a forgotten chapter, even more so because the event was overshadowed by the long battle for the mouth of the Scheldt. Now, 50 years after the event, through examination of the facts gathered by Mr. Roher, we will have to admit this was a remarkable logistical operation that was perfectly executed under the most difficult conditions

Ein Fall von Melaena neonatorum, hervorgerufen durch Blutung aus angeborenen Phlebektasien des Oesophagus

n/

The Defence and Evacuation of the Kuban Bridgehead, January – October 1943

This thesis examines German and Soviet operations in the Kuban area of southern Russia during January – October 1943. As the bulk of German Army Group A withdrew from the Caucasus in early 1943 to avoid encirclement following the Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad, Seventeenth Army was ordered to hold a bridgehead on the Kuban Peninsula as a jumping-off point for a future resumption of the German offensive into the Caucasus. In early February, the Soviets attempted to eliminate the German bridgehead through a combined amphibious and ground operation. The ground operation did not achieve any significant gain, and the main amphibious landing operation was a catastrophic failure, but a secondary landing succeeded in gaining a foothold in the southern suburbs of the port city of Novorossiysk that was quickly expanded and became known as Malaya Zemlya (The Small Land). Early April saw the launch of Operation Neptune, a German effort to eliminate the Malaya Zemlya beachhead. This failed utterly due to the weakness of the German assault groups and the tenacious Soviet defence. The Soviets then launched a series of attempts through the spring and summer to break the German line, with minimal success. The final phase of operations in the Kuban was the withdrawal of Seventeenth Army by sea and air across the Kerch Strait to the Crimea. Almost a quarter of a million men and the bulk of their equipment were successfully evacuated, with very light losses. The thesis examines some factors that contributed to the success or failure of these operations and also considers why a region that was of key strategic interest in both German and Soviet planning in the first period of the war quickly diminished in importance and has been largely neglected in the published history of the war

D-Day and the future of amphibious operations

The commemorations of the 80th anniversary of D-Day serve to remind us what an extraordinary operation it was, not only in its planning and execution but also in the good luck which accompanied it. Such conditions are not easily reproducible, certainly not at scale. The technologies of modern anti-access/area denial operations make an amphibious operation of the size of Operation Overlord, particularly if launched over much greater distances than those of the English Channel, unlikely to succeed, argues Hew Strachan. Contemporary amphibious warfare and its related doctrine are therefore focused on raiding, not amphibious assault.Peer reviewe

Types of the prostate blood supply during super-selective embolization of prostatic arteries

Introduction. Pelvic arteries have various anatomy and anastomoses with other branches of the internal iliac artery (IIA). This explains the technical complexity of identification and catheterization of prostatic arteries (PA), as well as the possibility of complications associated with non-target embolization of prostatic artery anastomoses.Purpose of the study. To analyze the most common variants of prostate blood supply and evaluate the effectiveness of methods for identifying prostatic arteries.Materials and methods. The study included 168 patients treated from 2013 to 2021. For catheterization of the prostatic arteries, 4 – 5 Fr microconductors and 2 – 2.8 Fr microcatheters were used. For embolization, hydrogel microspheres with a diameter of 100 – 300 µm and 300 – 500 µm were used, as well as PVA microparticles with a diameter of 100 – 500 µm. Preoperatively multi-sliced computed tomography (MSCT) angiography of the pelvic organs was performed to determine the type of prostatic angioarchitectonics.Results. The use of preoperative MSCT angiography in combination with intraoperative digital subtraction angiography made it possible to determine the variations of prostatic artery divergence and identify their anastomoses in 100% of patients (336 pelvic sides). One prostatic artery was detected in 91.4% (307) of the pelvic sides. two independent pAs in 8.6% (29) of cases. Symmetrical anatomy of the prostatic arteries on both sides was revealed in 14.3% (24) patients, the remaining 85.7% (144) patients showed asymmetry on both sides. The absence of prostatic arteries anastomoses was detected in 75.5% (254) of the pelvic sides, and in 24.4% (82) of the pelvic sides, anastomoses were detected. Interlobar intraprostatic anastomoses were found in 10.1% (34) of the pelvic sides, communication with a. dorsalis penis was detected in 8% (27) of cases, with rectal arteries in 5.3% (18) of the pelvic sides and with urinary bladder arteries in 3.6% (12) of cases. Based on the analysis of the small pelvis angioarchitectonics in 168 patients, an anatomical classification of the prostatic arteries anatomy was proposed.Conclusion. Super-selective embolization of the prostatic arteries is a contemporary minimally invasive method of prostatic hyperplasia treatment with a high safety profile. The pelvic arteries have extremely various anatomy, as well as anastomoses with other branches of the internal iliac artery, which complicates the implementation of super-selective embolization of prostatic arteries. The combination of preoperative MSCT and intraoperative digital subtraction angiography makes it possible to identify the prostatic artery and its anastomoses in most cases

"Mit dieser Fahne in der Hand": materielle Kultur und Heldenverehrung

'Militärtechnische Entwicklungen im 19. Jahrhundert führten zu wachsenden Gefechtsverlusten und trugen in der Folge zu einem neuen Bild von Heldentum bei. Der vorzeitige Tod avancierte dabei zu einem Leitmotiv der Gedenkkultur. Dieser Aufsatz behandelt verschiedene, mit diesen Prozessen verbundene Objektgruppen, wie Flaggen, Denkmäler, Orden, Plakate und Gemälde sowie Trophäen, die auf Formen der Heldenverehrung und auf ihre Rolle in der Erinnerungskultur hin untersucht werden.' (Autorenreferat)'The development of warfare technologies during the 19th century and the resulting losses in battle contributed to a new image of heroism, which centered around the common soldier. Premature death was considered a supraindividual ideal and served as a leitmotif for the commemoration of those killed in action. Albeit this indicates a mass phenomenon, there are still attempts to reintegrate and highlight individual performances. This article pro-vides a close look at different groups of objects relating to these processes, i.e. flags, monuments, medals, posters and paintings as well as trophies, all of which evoking a positive image of premature death.' (author's abstract

Tearing the Guts Out of the Wehrmacht: A Re-Examination of the Russo-German War

Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. Hitler’s plan to annihilate Germany’s Eastern neighbor and populate the vast Russian expanse with his own people was as ambitious as it was adventuristic. Although it began successful, the Russo-German War quickly devolved into a quagmire as Russian troops outfought their German opponent and beat them back to Berlin. Contrary to prevailing historiography, the Wehrmacht’s loss on the Eastern Front cannot be solely attributed to a failure to equip German troops with proper winter clothing, an inadequate logistics network or Hitler’s interference in military decisions. For an army that had enjoyed rapid gains during late 1930s and 1940, only an enhanced tactical revolution, superior armor and a more aggressive martial ethos explains how the vaunted German military suffered ignominious defeat at the hands of what many consider a third-rate adversary