Memory shapes judgments: Tracing how memory biases judgments by inducing the retrieval of exemplars

When making judgments (e.g., about the quality of job candidates) decision makers should ignore salient, but unrepresentative information (e.g., the person’s name). However, research suggests that salient information influences judgments, possibly because memories of past encounters with similar information are integrated into the judgment. We studied eye movements to trace the link between the retrieval of past instances and their influence on judgments. Participants were more likely to look at screen locations where exemplars matching items on a name attribute had appeared, suggesting the retrieval of exemplars. Eye movements to exemplar locations predicted judgments, explaining why names influenced judgments. The results provide insights into how exemplars are integrated into the judgment process when assessing memory retrieval online

How social information affects information search and choice in probabilistic inferences

When making decisions, people are often exposed to relevant information stemming from qualitatively different sources. For instance, when making a choice between two alternatives people can rely on the advice of other people (i.e., social information) or search for factual information about the alternatives (i.e., non-social information). Prior research in categorization has shown that social information is given special attention when both social and non-social information is available, even when the social information has no additional informational value. The goal of the current work is to investigate whether framing information as social or non-social also influences information search and choice in probabilistic inferences. In a first study, we found that framing cues (i.e., the information used to make a decision) with medium validity as social increased the probability that they were searched for compared to a task where the same cues were framed as non-social information, but did not change the strategy people relied on. A second and a third study showed that framing a cue with high validity as social information facilitated learning to rely on a non-compensatory decision strategy. Overall, the results suggest that social in comparison to non-social information is given more attention and is learned faster than non-social information

Adaptive behavior in optimal sequential search

Sequential decision making-making a decision where available options are encountered successively-is a hallmark of everyday life. Such decisions require deciding to accept or reject an alternative without knowing potential future options. Prior work focused on understanding choice behavior by developing decision models that capture human choices in such tasks. We investigated people's adaptive behavior in changing environments in light of their cognitive strategies. We present two studies in which we modified (a) outcome variance and (b) the time horizon and provide empirical evidence that people adapt to both context manipulations. Furthermore, we apply a recently developed threshold model of optimal stopping to our data to disentangle different cognitive processes involved in optimal stopping behavior. The results from Study 1 show that participants adaptively scaled the values of the sampling distribution to its variance, suggesting that the value of an option is perceived in relative rather than absolute terms. The results from Study 2 suggest that increasing the time horizon decreases the initial acceptance level, but less strongly than would be optimal. Furthermore, for longer sequences, participants more weakly adjusted this acceptance threshold over time than for shorter sequences. Further correlations between individual estimates in each condition indicate that individual differences between the participants' thresholds remain fairly stable between the conditions, pointing toward an additive effect of our manipulations

Change and status quo in decisions with defaults: The effect of incidental emotions depends on the type of default

Affective states can change how people react to measures aimed at influencing their decisions such as providing a default option. Previous research has shown that when defaults maintain the status quo positive mood increases reliance on the default and negative mood decreases it. Similarly, it has been demonstrated that positive mood enhances the preference for inaction. We extend this research by investigating how mood states influence reliance on the default if the default leads to a change, thus pitting preference for status quo against a preference for inaction. Specifically, we tested in an online study how happiness and sadness influenced reliance on two types of default (1) a default maintaining status quo and (2) a default inducing change. Our results suggest that the effect of emotions depends on the type of default: people in a happy mood were more likely than sad people to follow a default when it maintained status quo but less likely to follow a default when it introduced change. These results are in line with mood maintenance theory

Testing Learning Mechanisms of Rule-Based Judgment

Weighing the importance of different pieces of information is a key determinant of making accurate judgments. In social judgment theory, these weighting processes have been successfully described with linear models. How people learn to make judgments has received less attention. Although the hitherto proposed delta learning rule can perfectly learn to solve linear problems, reanalyzing a previous experiment showed that it does not adequately describe human learning. To provide a more accurate description of learning processes we amended the delta learning rule with three learning mechanisms-a decay, an attentional learning mechanism, and a capacity limitation. An additional study tested the different learning mechanisms in predicting learning in linear judgment tasks. In this study, participants first learned to predict a continuous criterion based on four cues. To test the three learning mechanisms rigorously against each other, we changed the importance of the cues after 200 trials so that the mechanisms make different predictions with regard to how fast people adapt to the new environment. On average, judgment accuracy improved from Trial 1 to Trial 200, dropped when the task environment changed, but improved again until the end of the task. The capacity-restricted learning model, restricting how much people update the cue weights on a single trial, best described and predicted the learning curve of the majority of participants. Taken together, these results suggest that considering cognitive constraints within learning models may help to understand how humans learn when making inferences.</p

Testing learning mechanisms of rule-based judgment

Weighing the importance of different pieces of information is a key determinant of making accurate judgments. In social judgment theory, these weighting processes have been successfully described with linear models. How people learn to make judgments has received less attention. Although the hitherto proposed delta learning rule can perfectly learn to solve linear problems, reanalyzing a previous experiment showed that it does not adequately describe human learning. To provide a more accurate description of learning processes we amended the delta learning rule with three learning mechanisms—a decay, an attentional learning mechanism, and a capacity limitation. An additional study tested the different learning mechanisms in predicting learning in linear judgment tasks. In this study, participants first learned to predict a continuous criterion based on four cues. To test the three learning mechanisms rigorously against each other, we changed the importance of the cues after 200 trials so that the mechanisms make different predictions with regard to how fast people adapt to the new environment. On average, judgment accuracy improved from Trial 1 to Trial 200, dropped when the task environment changed, but improved again until the end of the task. The capacity-restricted learning model, restricting how much people update the cue weights on a single trial, best described and predicted the learning curve of the majority of participants. Taken together, these results suggest that considering cognitive constraints within learning models may help to understand how humans learn when making inferences

Pillars of Judgment:How Memory Abilities Affect Performance in Rule-Based and Exemplar-Based Judgments

Making accurate judgments is an essential skill in everyday life. Although how different memory abilities relate to categorization and judgment processes has been hotly debated, the question is far from resolved. We contribute to the solution by investigating how individual differences in memory abilities affect judgment performance in 2 tasks that induced rule-based or exemplar-based judgment strategies. In a study with 279 participants, we investigated how working memory and episodic memory affect judgment accuracy and strategy use. As predicted, participants switched strategies between tasks. Furthermore, structural equation modeling showed that the ability to solve rule-based tasks was predicted by working memory, whereas episodic memory predicted judgment accuracy in the exemplar-based task. Last, the probability of choosing an exemplar-based strategy was related to better episodic memory, but strategy selection was unrelated to working memory capacity. In sum, our results suggest that different memory abilities are essential for successfully adopting different judgment strategies

Ecological Rationality: A Framework for Understanding and Aiding the Aging Decision Maker

The notion of ecological rationality sees human rationality as the result of the adaptive fit between the human mind and the environment. Ecological rationality focuses the study of decision making on two key questions: First, what are the environmental regularities to which people’s decision strategies are matched, and how frequently do these regularities occur in natural environments? Second, how well can people adapt their use of specific strategies to particular environmental regularities? Research on aging suggests a number of changes in cognitive function, for instance, deficits in learning and memory that may impact decision-making skills. However, it has been shown that simple strategies can work well in many natural environments, which suggests that age-related deficits in strategy use may not necessarily translate into reduced decision quality. Consequently, we argue that predictions about the impact of aging on decision performance depend not only on how aging affects decision-relevant capacities but also on the decision environment in which decisions are made. In sum, we propose that the concept of the ecological rationality is crucial to understanding and aiding the aging decision maker

Tracing the path of forgetting in rule abstraction and exemplar retrieval

People often forget acquired knowledge over time such as names of former classmates. Which knowledge people can access, however, may modify the judgement process and affect judgement accuracy. Specifically, we hypothesised that judgements based on retrieving past exemplars from long-term memory may be more vulnerable to forgetting than remembering rules that relate the cues to the criterion. Experiment 1 systematically tracked the individual course of forgetting from initial learning to later tests (immediate, 1 day, and 1 week) in a linear judgement task facilitating rule-based strategies and a multiplicative judgement task facilitating exemplar-based strategies. Practising the acquired judgement strategy in repeated tests helped participants to consistently apply the learnt judgement strategy and retain a high judgement accuracy even after a week. Yet, whereas a long retention interval did not affect judgements in the linear task, a long retention interval impaired judgements in the multiplicative task. If practice was restricted as in Experiment 2, judgement accuracy suffered in both tasks. In addition, after a week without practice, participants tried to reconstruct their judgements by applying rules in the multiplicative task. These results emphasise that the extent to which decision makers can still retrieve previously learned knowledge limits their ability to make accurate judgements and that the preferred strategies change over time if the opportunity for practice is limited