Real Knowledge Undermining Luck

Based on the discussion of a novel version of the Barn County scenario, the paper argues for a new explication of knowledge undermining luck. In passing, an as yet undetected form of benign luck is identified

Two Originals, One Artwork: On the Ontology of Originals and Improvisations

There is disagreement as to the ontological status of works associated with an original. Some hold that works like paintings are identical to the concrete particular the artist worked on while creating the artwork. Others suggest that works of this sort cannot be instantiated more than once. In this paper, it is argued that, even if artworks like paintings cannot be instantiated in reproductions, they are nevertheless possibly instantiated more than once. Moreover, it is tentatively suggested that the same holds for improvisations in music. Therefore, even the best candidates on offer do not allow for an identification of the work with a particular or for an identification of the work with a type that is instantiated maximally once. The argument rests on thought experiments, and an inference to the ‘best’ explanation. This inference is, of course, defeasible. Four alternatives, three of which are potentially fruitful, will be identified, and it will be argued that, on balance, these alternatives should be dismissed.11913

Philosophical Methods Under Scrutiny: Introduction to the Special Issue "Philosophical Methods"

This paper is the introduction to the Special Issue “Philosophical Methods”. The Special Issue will be published by Synthese

Philosophical Methods Under Scrutiny: Introduction to the Special Issue "Philosophical Methods"

This paper is the introduction to the Special Issue “Philosophical Methods”. The Special Issue will be published by Synthese

Philosophical Methods Under Scrutiny: Introduction to the Special Issue "Philosophical Methods"

This paper is the introduction to the Special Issue “Philosophical Methods”. The Special Issue is published by Synthese

From Water to H2O – What Reduction is About

In this paper I argue that an important notion of reduction depends on a four-place relation holding between expressions, concepts, properties, and events or states of affairs. I define this notion and argue against alternative accounts that are based on syntactic features of theories. Whilst these latter attempts fail to deliver a satisfactory explanation of why a certain theory or a certain expression reduces to another, the former can give a complete explanation of why, say, ‛human pain’ reduces to ‛C-fiber stimulation’ (if it reduces at all) or why the mind reduces to the physical. I briefly sketch the difference between the semantic approach that I favor, which is based on a particular notion of hyper-intensions, and classical model-theoretic versions of reductio

Mental Disorder and the Indirect Construction of Social Facts

In this paper, I argue for two claims, (i) that on a common conception of the second order property of being a mental disorder, some facts about mental disorders are the result of social constructions, and (ii) that the way facts about mental disorders are constructed differs from the received view on social construction. The difference is examined, a novel type of social construction is identified, and it is suggested that there are numerous other types of social facts that are constructed in a similar way