8 research outputs found
Harm: The counterfactual comparative account, the omission and pre-emption problems, and well-being
The concept of “harm” is ubiquitous in moral theorising, and yet remains poorly defined. Bradley suggests that the counterfactual comparative account of harm is the most plausible account currently available, but also argues that it is fatally flawed, since it falters on the omission and pre-emption problems. Hanna attempts to defend the counterfactual comparative account of harm against both problems. In this paper, I argue that Hanna’s defence fails. I also show how his defence highlights the fact that both the omission and the pre-emption problems have the same root cause – the inability of the counterfactual comparative account of harm to allow for our implicit considerations regarding well-being when assessing harm. While its purported neutrality with regard to substantive theories of well-being is one of the reasons that this account is considered to be the most plausible on offer, I will argue that this neutrality is illusory
Re-assessing Google as Epistemic Tool in the Age of Personalisation
Google Search is arguably one of the primary epistemic tools in use
today, with the lion’s share of the search-engine market globally. Scholarship on
countering the current scourge of misinformation often recommends “digital lit-
eracy” where internet users, especially those who get their information from so-
cial media, are encouraged to fact-check such information using reputable
sources. Given our current internet-based epistemic landscape, and Google’s
dominance of the internet, it is very likely that such acts of epistemic hygiene
will take place via Google Search. The question arises whether Google Search is
fit for purpose, given the apparent misalignment the general epistemic goal of
promoting true beliefs and the greater online commercial ecosystem in which it
is embedded. I argue that Google Search is epistemically problematic as it stands,
mainly due to the opacity related to the parameters it uses for personalising search
results. I further argue that in as far as an ordinary internet user is legitimately
ignorant of Google’s workings, uses it in an “ordinary manner”, and is generally
unable to avoid using it in the current information environment, they are not ep-
istemically blameworthy for any false beliefs that they acquire via it. I conclude
that too much emphasis is currently placed on individual epistemic practices and
not enough on our information environment and epistemic tools when it comes
to countering misinformatio
Haidt et al.’s Case for Moral Pluralism Revisited
Recent work in moral psychology that claims to show that human beings make moral judgements on the basis of multiple, divergent moral foundations has been influential in both moral psychology and moral philosophy. Primarily, such work has been taken to undermine monistic moral theories, especially those pertaining to the prevention of harm. Here, I call one of the most prominent and influential empirical cases for moral pluralism into question, namely that of Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues. I argue that Haidt et al.’s argument is not as strong as it is often made out to be, given significant problems with the design of one of the key experiments used to ground the claim that there are divergent moral foundations across cultures. The flaws that I point out pose a significant challenge to Haidt et al.’s findings and have a detrimental impact on subsequent work based on this immensely influential experiment. Accordingly, I argue that both empirical and normative claims made on the basis of Haidt et al.’s findings should be treated with caution. I conclude by making some suggestions as to how some of the problems that I point out might be addressed
How not to be a metaethical naturalist - Jesse Prinz on the emotional construction of morals
Jesse Prinz develops a naturalistic metaethical theory with which he purports to sidestep ‘Hume's law’ by demonstrating how, on his theory, in describing what our moral beliefs commit us to we can determine what our moral obligations are. I aim to show that Prinz does not deliver on his prescriptive promise – he does not bridge the is–ought gap in any meaningful way. Given that Prinz goes on to argue that (1) his moral psychology highlights fundamental shortcomings in ‘traditional’ normative ethical theories, (2) that moral progress is possible, despite the relativistic implications of his own position, and (3) that this undermining of the is–ought gap should hold true on any naturalistic metaethical theory, the extent to which his project succeeds becomes significant.http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02580136.2014.923689#.U8N7dvmSzy0Post-prin
Harm as Negative Prudential Value: A Non-Comparative Account of Harm
In recent attempts to define ‘harm’, the most promising approach has often been thought to
be the counterfactual comparative account of harm. Nevertheless, this account faces serious
difficulties. Moreover, it has been argued that ‘harm’ cannot be defined without reference
to a substantive theory of well-being, which is itself a fraught issue. This has led to the call
for the concept to simply be dropped from the moral lexicon altogether. I reject this call,
arguing that the non-comparative approach to defining harm has not been sufficiently
explored. I then develop such an account that avoids the difficulties faced by comparative
accounts whilst not presupposing a substantive theory of well-being. I conclude that this
definition renders a concept of harm that can be meaningfully employed in our moral
discourse
Peculiarities in Mind; Or, on the Absence of Darwin
A key failing in contemporary philosophy of mind is the lack of attention
paid to evolutionary theory in its research projects. Notably, where evolution
is incorporated into the study of mind, the work being done is often described
as philosophy of cognitive science rather than philosophy of mind. Even
then, whereas possible implications of the evolution of human cognition are
taken more seriously within the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of
cognitive science, its relevance for cognitive science has only been appreciated
relatively recently, and the approach still comes in for some major criticism
from prominent theorists within the field. This paper explores some of
the reasons for this state of affairs and finds that it might have less to do with
due consideration and well-founded scepticism about the relevance of evolutionary
theory to these disciplines and more to do with historical accident and
faulty assumptions on the part of key theorists in these disciplines. It is also
noted that where cognitive scientists are taking evolution into account in
their work on the mind, they straying more and more into domains that used
to fall exclusively under the purview of philosophy of mind as it is traditionally
conceived – qualia, consciousness, perception, intentionality and so
forth. The point is made that in ignoring the work being done on the evolution
of mind, philosophy of mind runs the risk of becoming obsolete
The Complex 'I'. The Formation of Identity in Complex Systems
The book is available from Amazon.CITATION: Cilliers, P & De Villiers, T. 2010. The complex I, Wheeler, W. (ed.), in the political subject: Essays on the self, art, politics and science. Lawrence and Wishart. 226-245.When we deal with complex things, like human subjects or organizations, we deal with identity – that which makes a person or an organization what it is and distinguishes him/her/it from other persons or organizations, a kind of “self”. Our identity determines how we think about and interact with others. It will be argued in this chapter that the self is constituted relationally. Moreover, when we are in the realm of the self, we are always already in the realm of engaging with and mediating differences – the realm of ethics. The position which will be developed argues that approaching identity as a complex system allows us to resist thinking of identity as an easily identifiable and static entity. Identity is always being constituted within a complex and contingent world, where we have to make choices based on contingent values rather than on universal knowledge or the outcome of rational calculations. As a result, we have to keep in mind that our daily practices always already have an ethical component, and our decisions need to be continually evaluated and re-evaluated in the light of our (and others’) varying identities.A previous version of this chapter appeared in The Political Subject. Essays on the self, Art, Politics and Science. W. Wheeler (ed.). 2000, London: Lawrence and Wishart, pp. 226–245