Google Search is arguably one of the primary epistemic tools in use
today, with the lion’s share of the search-engine market globally. Scholarship on
countering the current scourge of misinformation often recommends “digital lit-
eracy” where internet users, especially those who get their information from so-
cial media, are encouraged to fact-check such information using reputable
sources. Given our current internet-based epistemic landscape, and Google’s
dominance of the internet, it is very likely that such acts of epistemic hygiene
will take place via Google Search. The question arises whether Google Search is
fit for purpose, given the apparent misalignment the general epistemic goal of
promoting true beliefs and the greater online commercial ecosystem in which it
is embedded. I argue that Google Search is epistemically problematic as it stands,
mainly due to the opacity related to the parameters it uses for personalising search
results. I further argue that in as far as an ordinary internet user is legitimately
ignorant of Google’s workings, uses it in an “ordinary manner”, and is generally
unable to avoid using it in the current information environment, they are not ep-
istemically blameworthy for any false beliefs that they acquire via it. I conclude
that too much emphasis is currently placed on individual epistemic practices and
not enough on our information environment and epistemic tools when it comes
to countering misinformatio
