Alien Registration- Lapierre, Zephirin Joseph A. (Brunswick, Cumberland County)

https://digitalmaine.com/alien_docs/31518/thumbnail.jp

05/15/1948 Letter from the Lewiston Fire Department

Letter from Zephirin F. Drouin, Chief Engineer of the Lewiston Fire Department, to Louis-Philippe Gagné.https://digitalcommons.usm.maine.edu/fac-lpg-letters-1948-01-06/1033/thumbnail.jp

04/20/1948 Letter from the Lewiston Fire Department

Letter from Zephirin F. Drouin, Chief Engineer of the Lewiston Fire Department, to Louis-Philippe Gagné.https://digitalcommons.usm.maine.edu/fac-lpg-letters-1948-01-06/1032/thumbnail.jp

Stable Allocations of Vaccines in a Political Economy

We develop a theory that addresses the problem of the existence of stable vaccine allocations in a political economy. These are allocation policies that a political leader can enforce without losing their popularity. Our analysis distinguishes between contexts where vaccination has positive externalities and contexts where it does not. We show that a stable allocation may not exist if vaccine supply is sufficiently low relative to the number of individuals eligible to receive a dose. We then fully characterize the minimum number of vaccine doses that guarantees the existence of a stable vaccine allocation, regardless of society\u27s preference heterogeneity level. The minimum dose number depends only on a society\u27s influence structure or voting rule. When individuals have unequal voting rights, stable allocations favor those with greater voting power. We generalize our main characterization result to economies where spatial proximity between individuals varies and preferences are unselfish due to positive vaccine externalities. Applying the theory, we find that a political leader can enforce stable vaccine allocation policies that are minority-inclusive only when the supply of vaccines is sufficiently high

Aminolysis Reaction of Glycerol Carbonate in Organic and Hydroorganic Medium

Aminolysis reaction of glycerol carbonate with primary amine in organic and hydroorganic media leads to the formation of two hydroxyurethane isomers and a partial decomposition of glycerol carbonate into glycerol. Aminolysis with a secondary amine promotes the condensation reaction and limits the formation of glycerol. The ratio of α versus β was determined by zgig 13C NMR. This technique permits computing the yield of α and β products in the medium. The quantity of glycerol was determined by GC analysis. The ratio of the isomers and the amount of glycerol depend on the amine and the solvent. Kinetic investigations reveal that, in hydroorganic medium, the more the alkyl chain of the amine increased, the less glycerol was formed. On the contrary, in organic medium, the alkyl chain of the amine does not play a major role in the formation of glycerol

Early Warning Indicators for HIV Drug Resistance in Cameroon during the Year 2010

BACKGROUND: Rapid scale-up of antiretroviral therapy (ART) in resource-limited settings is accompanied with an increasing risk of HIV drug resistance (HIVDR), which in turn could compromise the performance of national ART rollout programme. In order to sustain the effectiveness of ART in a resource-limited country like Cameroon, HIVDR early warning indicators (EWI) may provide relevant corrective measures to support the control and therapeutic management of AIDS. METHODS: A retrospective study was conducted in 2010 among 40 ART sites (12 Approved Treatment Centers and 28 Management Units) distributed over the 10 regions of Cameroon. Five standardized EWIs were selected for the evaluation using data from January through December, among which: (1) Good ARV prescribing practices: target = 100%; (2) Patient lost to follow-up: target ≤ 20%; (3) Patient retention on first line ART: target ≥ 70%; (4) On-time drug pick-up: target ≥ 90%; (5) ARV drug supply continuity: target = 100%. Analysis was performed using a Data Quality Assessment tool, following WHO protocol. RESULTS: THE NUMBER OF SITES ATTAINING THE REQUIRED PERFORMANCE ARE: 90% (36/40) for EWI(1), 20% (8/40) for EWI(2); 20% (8/40) for EWI(3); 0% (0/37) for EWI(4); and 45% (17/38) for EWI 5. ARV prescribing practices were in conformity with the national guidelines in almost all the sites, whereas patient adherence to ART (EWI(2), EWI(3), and EWI(4)) was very low. A high rate of patients was lost-to-follow-up and others failing first line ART before 12 months of initiation. Discontinuity in drug supply observed in about half of the sites may negatively impact ARV prescription and patient adherence. These poor ART performances may also be due to low number of trained staff and community disengagement. CONCLUSIONS: The poor performance of the national ART programme, due to patient non-adherence and drug stock outs, requires corrective measures to limit risks of HIVDR emergence in Cameroon

Alien Registration- Lestage, Zephirin (Westbrook, Cumberland County)

https://digitalmaine.com/alien_docs/20830/thumbnail.jp

Alien Registration- Gosselin, Zephirin (Lewiston, Androscoggin County)

https://digitalmaine.com/alien_docs/28394/thumbnail.jp

Imperfect information and financial liberalization in LDCs

This thesis examines the interest rate, market entry and credit decisions which banks are expected to make following financial liberalization. It uses analytic tools from information economics and industrial organization theory to consider the policy implications of behaviour which responds to the constraints of imperfect information. The financial markets of the Caribbean Commonwealth supply the stylized facts which inform the analysis. Chapter 1 introduces the topics treated. The financial liberalization hypothesis is based on the 1973 works of McKinnon and Shaw. Chapter 2 describes their characterization of market fundamentals and behaviour in LDCs. It discusses the descriptions of equilibrium, and the welfare implications of these equilibria, in models which analyze economies with similar fundamentals. Chapter 3 derives stylized facts from the descriptions of the economic institutions and financial systems of the four Caribbean countries whose banking behaviour we model. Chapter 4 analyzes deposit rate determination by banks in the long-run equilibrium of a search market. It posits that in long-run equilibrium depositors find it costly to switch banks because doing so requires that they forego improved service at their current banks. The inelastic deposit supply which results from these switching costs implies that monopsonistic deposit rates are a noncooperative equilibrium. It is argued that this facilitates tacit collusion among banks and that a deposit rate floor is the appropriate policy corrective. Chapter 5 argues that the enhancement of intermediation service responsible for depositor switching costs reflects the information banks acquire about customers and their ability to offer suitably tailored service. Chapter 6 considers bank entry into a market where established customers of certain value have switching costs. Entering banks attract new customers of lower expected value. If new banks are therefore unable to generate sufficient revenue to cover their fixed costs, they exit. This chapter argues that liberal entry policy is not sufficient to ensure competition. Chapter 7 develops a simple model of bank screening by loan size in one sector of an economy. It finds a sequential equilibrium in which low-risk borrowers , self-select by the choice of contracts with a loan size below that they demand at the interest rate for their risk class. In Chapter 8 the partial equilibrium model of Chapter 7 is embedded in a general equilibrium framework to demonstrate that the market equilibrium is not constrained Pareto efficient. It argues that subsidizing the highest interest rates will improve loan allocation while maintaining the separation induced by private contracts. Chapter 9 summarizes the main results and conclusions of the thesis