Mi a haszna a természettudományos tárgyak oktatásában a tudománytörténet és a tudományfilozófia diszciplínáinak? A Történelem és Filozófia a Tudomány Oktatásában (HIPST, avagy TöFiTO) projekt bemutatása

A természettudományos tárgyak oktatása esetén a történeti megközelítést általában szükségtelennek, sőt időt rablónak tekintik a tanárok. Ugyanakkor az utóbbi évtizedekben a (tudomány)történeti szempontokat is integráló megközelítések gyakran bizonyulnak sikeresnek problémás tananyagrészeknél

History of science in Hungary: Stewardship and audience in periods of institutional and political change

The paper introduces the development of history of science in Hungary, focusing on the status of the field in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, universities, and scientific societies, and the “local” output in Hungarian. The genres associated with the field became popular in the early 20th century, and the institutional framework was created in the 1970s. After 1990, constructivist methodologies for studying localizable patterns of science-related activities spread, somewhat more pronounced in histories of the human sciences. A PhD school was established, and the discipline thrived until the early 2000s. Attempts were made to develop an historically informed integrated science curriculum, and to start a Masters program in History of Science. In recent years some of the key institutions of the discipline were closed down, and the visibility and relevance of the field decreased. Although the field has a relatively stable position in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS), with dwindling institutional resources "History of science" in Hungary will most likely become—yet again—an accessory of the special sciences

THE JANUS FACES OF GOETHE: GOETHE ON THE NATURE, AIM, AND LIMIT OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION

First will be investigated the trichotomy put forward at the Round Table discussion held at a Harvard conference on Goethe and the sciences in December, 1982: is Goethean science an alternative to or within modern science, or no alternative at all? It will be pointed to a surprising common feature in the seemingly contradictory views: in all three cases, however critical of Newton, Goethe is taken to have no doubts about the epistemic status of his own research. It will be thus focused on this, broader category, as opposed to a view (strengthening in the last decade) that treats Goethe as a fundamentally reflexive, sceptical thinker. It will be argued for the existence of such a polarity in Goethe´s scientific and methodological writings. For want of a better labelling, it will be called the poles na\`\ive and sceptic (not alluding to Schiller´s dichotomy of na\`\ive and sentimental), meaning, respectively, a non-reflexive, realist, ahistorical, `scientific absolutist´ , as opposed to a reflexive, historicising, language-conscious one. The existence of this polarity challenges the validity and shows the weaknesses of many of today´s accepted narratives concerning Goethe´s scientific endeavours and methodological utterances