The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Limit-Average Games

We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is decidable, even if we put a constraint on the payoff of the equilibrium. Our undecidability result holds even for a restricted class of concurrent games, where nonzero rewards occur only on terminal states. Moreover, we show that the constrained existence problem is undecidable not only for concurrent games but for turn-based games with the same restriction on rewards. Finally, we prove that the constrained existence problem for Nash equilibria in (pure or randomised) stationary strategies is decidable and analyse its complexity.Comment: 34 page

Efficient Local Search in Coordination Games on Graphs

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, where the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy augmented by a fixed non-negative bonus for picking a given strategy. These games capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. Prior work shows that the problem of determining the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium for these games is NP-complete already for graphs with all weights equal to one and no bonuses. However, for several classes of graphs (e.g. DAGs and cliques) pure Nash equilibria or even strong equilibria always exist and can be found by simply following a particular improvement or coalition-improvement path, respectively. In this paper we identify several natural classes of graphs for which a finite improvement or coalition-improvement path of polynomial length always exists, and, as a consequence, a Nash equilibrium or strong equilibrium in them can be found in polynomial time. We also argue that these results are optimal in the sense that in natural generalisations of these classes of graphs, a pure Nash equilibrium may not even exist.Comment: Extended version of a paper accepted to IJCAI1

On Probabilistic Parallel Programs with Process Creation and Synchronisation

We initiate the study of probabilistic parallel programs with dynamic process creation and synchronisation. To this end, we introduce probabilistic split-join systems (pSJSs), a model for parallel programs, generalising both probabilistic pushdown systems (a model for sequential probabilistic procedural programs which is equivalent to recursive Markov chains) and stochastic branching processes (a classical mathematical model with applications in various areas such as biology, physics, and language processing). Our pSJS model allows for a possibly recursive spawning of parallel processes; the spawned processes can synchronise and return values. We study the basic performance measures of pSJSs, especially the distribution and expectation of space, work and time. Our results extend and improve previously known results on the subsumed models. We also show how to do performance analysis in practice, and present two case studies illustrating the modelling power of pSJSs.Comment: This is a technical report accompanying a TACAS'11 pape

PReMo : An Analyzer for P robabilistic Re cursive Mo dels

This paper describes PReMo, a tool for analyzing Recursive Markov Chains, and their controlled/game extensions: (1-exit) Recursive Markov Decision Processes and Recursive Simple Stochastic Games

MC-NN: An End-to-End Multi-Channel Neural Network Approach for Predicting Influenza A Virus Hosts and Antigenic Types

Influenza poses a significant threat to public health, particularly among the elderly, young children, and people with underlying dis-eases. The manifestation of severe conditions, such as pneumonia, highlights the importance of preventing the spread of influenza. An accurate and cost-effective prediction of the host and antigenic sub-types of influenza A viruses is essential to addressing this issue, particularly in resource-constrained regions. In this study, we propose a multi-channel neural network model to predict the host and antigenic subtypes of influenza A viruses from hemagglutinin and neuraminidase protein sequences. Our model was trained on a comprehensive data set of complete protein sequences and evaluated on various test data sets of complete and incomplete sequences. The results demonstrate the potential and practicality of using multi-channel neural networks in predicting the host and antigenic subtypes of influenza A viruses from both full and partial protein sequences.Comment: Accepted version submitted to the SN Computer Science; Published in the SN Computer Science 202

On Decidability of a Logic of Gossips

Gossip protocols aim at arriving, by means of point-to-point or group communications, at a situation in which all the agents know each other secrets, see, e.g., [11]. In [1], building upon [3], we studied distributed epistemic gossip protocols, which are examples of knowledge based prog

Constrained Pure Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Games

We study the problem of checking for the existence of constrained pure Nash equilibria in a subclass of polymatrix games defined on weighted directed graphs. The payoff of a player is defined as the sum of nonnegative rational weights on incoming edges from players who picked the same strategy augmented by a fixed integer bonus for picking a given strategy. These games capture the idea of coordination within a local neighbourhood in the absence of globally common strategies. We study the decision problem of checking whether a given set of strategy choices for a subset of the players is consistent with some pure Nash equilibrium or, alternatively, with all pure Nash equilibria. We identify the most natural tractable cases and show NP or coNP-completness of these problems already for unweighted DAGs.Comment: Extended version of a paper accepted to AAAI1

The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Multiplayer Games

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In particular, we prove that the following problem is undecidable: Given a game~$\mathcal{G}$, does there exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of~$\mathcal{G}$ where player 0 wins with probability~$1$. Moreover, this problem remains undecidable if it is restricted to strategies with (unbounded) finite memory. However, if randomised strategies are allowed, decidability remains an open problem; we can only prove NP-hardness in this case. One way to obtain a provably decidable variant of the problem is to restrict the strategies to be positional or stationary. For the complexity of these two problems, we obtain a common lower bound of NP and upper bounds of NP and PSPACE respectively. Finally, we single out a special case of the general problem that, in many cases, admits an efficient solution. In particular, we prove that deciding the existence of an equilibrium in which each player either wins or loses with probability~$1$ can be done in polynomial time for games where, for instance, the objective of each player is given by a parity condition with a bounded number of priorities