Z przewodnikiem po drogach filozofii umysłu

Autor dokonuje przeglądu zbioru artykułów polskich filozofów pt. „Przewodnik po filozofii umysłu”, który można zaklasyfikować jako obszerne i bogate wprowadzenie do tej dziedziny filozofii

Czy pierwotne ego ma charakter historyczny?

The article concerns the problem of time, and methodological grounds of investigating historicity in Husserl’s philosophy. The article has a polemical character, i.e., it discusses with theses presented by Saulius Geniusas in the Husserl’s Notion of the Primal Ego in Light of the Hermeneutical Critique. I argue, that the general tendency of Geniusas’ questions requires an enlargement, at least with regard to his analyses of Dieter Lohmar’s “functional reading” of the primal ego, because the problem itself leads one to the following question: Is it possible to reduce the hermeneutical critique of phenomenology to a mere question about the legitimacy of the analyses of the primal ego? I emphasizes that such a critique is not necessary, instead one has to understand the critique as being involved in the methodological status of historical questioning. Additionally, I claim that the question of history of the ego involves an another level of constitution than the level of temporalization, about which Geniusas in fact asks in his article. Lastly, I assert that the question about historicity of the ego presupposes a certain order of constitution; with regard to the order more “primal” level is “earlier” than the “later” level. The way of questioning, however, leads to the problem of regressus in infinitum. After the critical remarks, I enlarges Geniusas’ most interesting and promising aspect of the problem of the primal ego, viz., the problem of transcendental naiveté. By introducing the problem, as I argue, a phenomenologist is confronted with the necessity of redoing reduction

Czy działania opierają się na reprezentacjach? Kognitywistyka a praktyka

Are Actions Founded on Representations? Cognitive Science and PracticeThe article, by referring to the computational theory of thinking and Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind, argues that both theories presuppose an understanding of activity as a process reducible to a set of rules. The author rejects the presupposition and sketches an alternative view on action; the alternative view justifies a necessity of building connectionist models of neural networks and it leads to a formulation of hypothesis of extended, embodied and embedded mind

Konferencja „Husserl Circle” we Florencji

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Prolegomena do fenomenologii anomalii

Prolegomena to the Phenomenology of AnomaliesNowadays, phenomenology presents one of the paradigmatic ways of conducting research in the cognitive sciences. Referring to these studies and to considerations of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, this paper makes attempts to formulate the methodological foundations for the inquiry of anomalies. Phenomenological apprehension of anomaly does not only present it as a deviation from the norm, but – highlighting the roots of anomalies in the body of the acting subject – it considers anomaly in the context of experience, world and intersubjectivity as an optimum. Thus, phenomenology allows to inquire anomalies as the „other” normality