Qualitative Theory and Chemical Explanation

Roald Hoffmann and other theorists claim that we we ought to use highly idealized chemical models (``qualitative models'') in order to increase our understanding of chemical phenomena, even though other models are available which make more highly accurate predictions. I assess this norm by examining one of the tradeoffs faced by model builders and model users --- the tradeoff between precision and generality. After arguing that this tradeoff obtains in many cases, I discuss how the existence of this tradeoff can help us defend Hoffmann's norm for modelling

New Approaches to the Division of Cognitive Labor

Scientists are not lone agents, cut off from the outside world, responding only to information generated in their own laboratories. Rather, they make decisions about what to investigate by integrating what they discover for themselves with what they learn from others. They also take into account external factors such as grants, prizes, and prestige. These sources of feedback lead scientists to coordinate and divide their resources among differing approaches to the research domain. This coordination seems to enhance the success of scientific communities, but this coordination is neither planned nor explicit. Philip Kitcher has called this fact about scientific communities the division of cognitive labor

The Key to Electricity

The name Benjamin Franklin often evokes the image of an avuncular man flying a kite on a stormy night. It is indeed a striking picture: one of the founders of our country, a successful businessman, a diplomat, and the public face of the American Revolution spending his time contributing to the advancement of science-and putting his life at risk in the process

Qualitative Theory and Chemical Explanation

Roald Hoffmann and other theorists claim that we we ought to use highly idealized chemical models (``qualitative models'') in order to increase our understanding of chemical phenomena, even though other models are available which make more highly accurate predictions. I assess this norm by examining one of the tradeoffs faced by model builders and model users --- the tradeoff between precision and generality. After arguing that this tradeoff obtains in many cases, I discuss how the existence of this tradeoff can help us defend Hoffmann's norm for modelling

Challenges to the Structural Conception of Bonding

The covalent bond, a difficult concept to define precisely, plays a central role in chemical predictions, interventions, and explanations. I investigate the structural conception of the covalent bond, which says that bonding is a directional, submolecular region of electron density, located between individual atomic centers and responsible for holding the atoms together. Several approaches to constructing molecular models are considered in order to determine which features of the structural conception of bonding, if any, are robust across these models. Key components of the structural conception are absent in all but the simplest quantum mechanical models of molecular structure, seriously challenging the conception’s viability

Qualitative Theory and Chemical Explanation

Roald Hoffmann and other theorists claim that we ought to use highly idealized chemical models (“qualitative models”) in order to increase our understanding of chemical phenomena, even though other models are available which make more highly accurate predictions. I assess this norm by examining one of the tradeoffs faced by model builders and model users—the tradeoff between precision and generality. After arguing that this tradeoff obtains in many cases, I discuss how the existence of this tradeoff can help us defend Hoffmann’s norm for modelling

Modeling

This article focuses on the methodology of modeling and how it can be applied to philosophical questions. It looks at various traditional views of modeling and defends the idea that modeling is a form of surrogate reasoning involving two distinct steps: indirect representation of a target system using a model and analysis of that model. The article considers different accounts of model/target representational relations, defending an account of similarity. It concludes by presenting several examples of the use of models in philosophy, suggestions for philosophers new to modeling, and an assessment of the relationship between thought experiments and models

Getting Serious About Similarity

Although most philosophical accounts about model/world relations focus on structural mappings such as isomorphism, similarity has long been discussed as an alternative account. Despite its attractions, proponents of the similarity view have not provided detailed accounts of what it means that a model is similar to a real-world target system. This article gives the outlines of such an account, drawing on the work of Amos Tversky

Understanding the Emergence of Population Behavior in Individual-Based Models

Proponents of individual-based modeling in ecology claim that their models explain the emergence of population-level behavior. This article argues that individual-based models have not, as yet, provided such explanations. Instead, individual-based models can and do demonstrate and explain the emergence of population-level behaviors from individual behaviors and interactions