4,575 research outputs found

    Rent-seeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information

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    We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing different informational settings we find that if players are uncertain about the costs of all players, aggregate effort is lower than under both private and complete information. Yet, under additional assumptions, rent dissipation is still smaller in the latter settings. Numerical examples illustrate that there is no general ranking between private and complete information. The results depend on the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function

    Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests

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    We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies

    Rent-seeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information

    Get PDF
    We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing different informational settings we find that if players are uncertain about the costs of all players, aggregate effort is lower than under both private and complete information. Yet, under additional assumptions, rent dissipation is still smaller in the latter settings. Numerical examples illustrate that there is no general ranking between private and complete information. The results depend on the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function.Rent-seeking; Contest; Asymmetric Information; Private values

    Technical Report: Using Loop Scopes with for-Loops

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    Loop scopes have been shown to be a helpful tool in creating sound loop invariant rules which do not require program transformation of the loop body. Here we extend this idea from while-loops to for-loops and also present sound loop unrolling rules for while- and for-loops, which require neither program transformation of the loop body, nor the use of nested modalities. This approach allows for-loops to be treated as first-class citizens -- rather than the usual approach of transforming for-loops into while-loops -- which makes semi-automated proofs easier to follow for the user, who may need to provide help in order to finish the proof

    Signaling in Auctions among Competitors

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    We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms. This provides an opportunity for signaling. Whether there exists an equilibrium in which bids perfectly identify the bidders’ costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the bid announcement policy

    Signaling in Auctions among Competitors

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    We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms. This provides an opportunity for signaling. Whether there exists an equilibrium in which bids perfectly identify the bidders’ costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the bid announcement policy.Auction; Oligopoly; Signaling

    Atomic oxygen between 80 and 120 km: Evidence for a rapid spatial variation in vertical transport near the ionosphere

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    Analysis of OGO-6 OI green line photometer results was carried out for 8 cases when the alignment of the spacecraft was such that local emission rates could be determined below the altitude of maximum emission and down to about 80 km. Results show a variation on a scale of 6 deg to 8 deg in latitude between regions where the emission rate increases rapidly between 90 and 95 km and regions where it increases slowly from 80 km to 95 km. Latitude-altitude maps of iso-emissivity contours and iso-density contours for oxygen concentration are presented. The latter are computed under 3 assumptions concerning excitation mechanisms. Comparisons of the spatial variations of oxygen density with the results of a time dependent theory suggest the regions of strong downward transport alternate on a scale of about 1000 km with regions of weak transport near 90 km. In the first case conversion of O to O3 at night appears to be overwhelmed by downward transport of O

    Psychoanalyse als Theorie autopoeitischer Systeme

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    Der Artikel vertritt die These, daß es möglich ist, die Freudsche Psychoanalyse als systemtheoretische Psychologie zu rekonstruieren. Im Vordergrund steht dabei der Versuch, psychische Systeme als codierte, in Teilsysteme differenzierte Systeme zu verstehen. Die Freudsche Unterscheidung bewußt/unbewußt ist allerdings nur dann kompatibel mit dieser Theorie der Codierung, wenn man sich von der Vorstellung trennt, psychische Systeme seien ĂŒber den Operationsmodus "Bewußtsein" geschlossen
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