Tracking Subtle Stereotypes of Children with Trisomy 21: From Facial-Feature-Based to Implicit Stereotyping

Background: Stigmatization is one of the greatest obstacles to the successful integration of people with Trisomy 21 (T21 or Down syndrome), the most frequent genetic disorder associated with intellectual disability. Research on attitudes and stereotypes toward these people still focuses on explicit measures subjected to social-desirability biases, and neglects how variability in facial stigmata influences attitudes and stereotyping. Methodology/Principal Findings: The participants were 165 adults including 55 young adult students, 55 non-student adults, and 55 professional caregivers working with intellectually disabled persons. They were faced with implicit association tests (IAT), a well-known technique whereby response latency is used to capture the relative strength with which some groups of people—here photographed faces of typically developing children and children with T21—are automatically (without conscious awareness) associated with positive versus negative attributes in memory. Each participant also rated the same photographed faces (consciously accessible evaluations). We provide the first evidence that the positive bias typically found in explicit judgments of children with T21 is smaller for those whose facial features are highly characteristic of this disorder, compared to their counterparts with less distinctive features and to typically developing children. We also show that this bias can coexist with negative evaluations at the implicit level (with large effect sizes), even among professional caregivers

Depression, Rational Identity and the Educational Imperative: Concordance-Finding in Tricky Diagnostic Moments

It is well-documented, within most medical and much health psychology, that many individuals find diagnoses of depression confusing or even objectionable. Within a corpus of research and practical clinical guidance dominated by the social-cognitive paradigm, the explanation for resistance to a depression diagnosis (or advice pertaining to it) within specific interactions is bordering on the canonical; patients misunderstand depression itself, often as an output of an associated social stigma that distorts public knowledge. The best way to overcome corollary resistance in situ is, logically thus, taken to be a clarification of the true (clinical) nature of depression. In this paper, exploring the diagnosis of depression in UK primary care contexts, the social-cognitive position embedded in contemporary medical reasoning around this matter is critically addressed. It is firstly highlighted how, even in a great deal of extant public health research, the link between an individual holding “correct” medical knowledge and being actively compliant with it is far from inevitable. Secondly, and with respect to concerns around direct communication in clinical contexts, a body of research emergent of Discursive Psychology and Conversation Analysis is explored so as to shed light on how non-cognitive concerns (not least those around the local interactional management of a patient’s social identity) that can inform the manner in which ostensibly “tricky” medical talk plays-out in practice, especially in cases where a mental illness is at stake. Finally, observations are drawn together in a formal Discursive Psychological analysis of a small but highly illustrative sample of three cases where a depression diagnosis is initially questioned or disputed by a patient in primary care but, following further in-consultation activity, concordance with the diagnosis is ultimately reached—a specific issue hitherto unaddressed in either DP or CA fields. These cases specifically reveal the coordinative attention of interlocutors to immediate concerns regarding how the patient might maintain a sense of being an everyday and rational witness to their own lives; indeed, the very act of challenging the diagnosis emerges as a means by which a patient can open up conversational space within the consultation to address such issues. While the veracity of the social-cognitive model is not deemed to be without foundation herein, it is concluded that attention to local interactional concerns might firstly be accorded, such that the practical social concerns and skills of practitioners and patients alike might not be overlooked in the endeavour to produce generally applicable theories

Disloyal, Deluded, Dangerous: How Supporters of Violence or Separatism Discredit Their Political Opponents

Where there is conflict between groups, members argue with each other over the correct course of action. While some advocate increased violence or separation between the groups, others argue for peace, tolerance, or interdependence. Advocates of violence or separation engage in discursive strategies to discredit these ingroup opponents, in which they claim to represent the true interests and spirit of the group while their opponents are dismissed are selfish, disloyal, subservient, weak, or ignorant. Methods of discrediting opponents act as a form of social pressure, defining a set of social norms, punishing dissenters, and warning others against publicly adopting opposing positions. This chapter examines the discursive practices used to discredit opponents in a range of current and historical conflict situations. A distinction will be drawn between ‘mild’ and ‘strong’ discrediting practices