Negations in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a heuristic–analytic conflict

An experiment utilizing response time measures was conducted to test dominant processing strategies in syllogistic reasoning with the expanded quantifier set proposed by Roberts (2005). Through adding negations to existing quantifiers it is possible to change problem surface features without altering logical validity. Biases based on surface features such as atmosphere, matching, and the probability heuristics model (PHM; Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1995) would not be expected to show variance in response latencies, but participant responses should be highly sensitive to changes in the surface features of the quantifiers. In contrast, according to analytic accounts such as mental models theory and mental logic (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Rips, 1994) participants should exhibit increased response times for negated premises, but not be overly impacted upon by the surface features of the conclusion. Data indicated that the dominant response strategy was based on a matching heuristic, but also provided evidence of a resource-demanding analytic procedure for dealing with double negatives. The authors propose that dual-process theories offer a stronger account of these data whereby participants employ competing heuristic and analytic strategies and fall back on a heuristic response when analytic processing fails

When to keep it simple - adaptive designs are not always useful.

Background Adaptive designs are a wide class of methods focused on improving the power, efficiency and participant benefit of clinical trials. They do this through allowing information gathered during the trial to be used to make changes in a statistically robust manner - the changes could include which treatment arms patients are enrolled to (e.g. dropping non-promising treatment arms), the allocation ratios, the target sample size or the enrolment criteria of the trial. Generally, we are enthusiastic about adaptive designs and advocate their use in many clinical situations. However, they are not always advantageous. In some situations, they provide little efficiency advantage or are even detrimental to the quality of information provided by the trial. In our experience, factors that reduce the efficiency of adaptive designs are routinely downplayed or ignored in methodological papers, which may lead researchers into believing they are more beneficial than they actually are.Main text In this paper, we discuss situations where adaptive designs may not be as useful, including situations when the outcomes take a long time to observe, when dropping arms early may cause issues and when increased practical complexity eliminates theoretical efficiency gains.Conclusion Adaptive designs often provide notable efficiency benefits. However, it is important for investigators to be aware that they do not always provide an advantage. There should always be careful consideration of the potential benefits and disadvantages of an adaptive design

Explaining Evidence Denial as Motivated Pragmatically Rational Epistemic Irrationality

This paper introduces a model for evidence denial that explains this behavior as a manifestation of rationality and it is based on the contention that social values (measurable as utilities) often underwrite these sorts of responses. Moreover, it is contended that the value associated with group membership in particular can override epistemic reason when the expected utility of a belief or belief system is great. However, it is also true that it appears to be the case that it is still possible for such unreasonable believers to reverse this sort of dogmatism and to change their beliefs in a way that is epistemically rational. The conjecture made here is that we should expect this to happen only when the expected utility of the beliefs in question dips below a threshold where the utility value of continued dogmatism and the associated group membership is no longer sufficient to motivate defusing the counter-evidence that tells against such epistemically irrational beliefs

The Search for Invariance: Repeated Positive Testing Serves the Goals of Causal Learning

Positive testing is characteristic of exploratory behavior, yet it seems to be at odds with the aim of information seeking. After all, repeated demonstrations of one’s current hypothesis often produce the same evidence and fail to distinguish it from potential alternatives. Research on the development of scientific reasoning and adult rule learning have both documented and attempted to explain this behavior. The current chapter reviews this prior work and introduces a novel theoretical account—the Search for Invariance (SI) hypothesis—which suggests that producing multiple positive examples serves the goals of causal learning. This hypothesis draws on the interventionist framework of causal reasoning, which suggests that causal learners are concerned with the invariance of candidate hypotheses. In a probabilistic and interdependent causal world, our primary goal is to determine whether, and in what contexts, our causal hypotheses provide accurate foundations for inference and intervention—not to disconfirm their alternatives. By recognizing the central role of invariance in causal learning, the phenomenon of positive testing may be reinterpreted as a rational information-seeking strategy

Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency’s “Consultation on proposals for legislative changes for clinical trials”: a response from the Trials Methodology Research Partnership Adaptive Designs Working Group, with a focus on data sharing

AbstractIn the UK, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency consulted on proposals “to improve and strengthen the UK clinical trials legislation to help us make the UK the best place to research and develop safe and innovative medicines”. The purpose of the consultation was to help finalise the proposals and contribute to the drafting of secondary legislation. We discussed these proposals as members of the Trials Methodology Research Partnership Adaptive Designs Working Group, which is jointly funded by the Medical Research Council and the National Institute for Health and Care Research. Two topics arose frequently in the discussion: the emphasis on legislation, and the absence of questions on data sharing. It is our opinion that the proposals rely heavily on legislation to change practice. However, clinical trials are heterogeneous, and as a result some trials will struggle to comply with all of the proposed legislation. Furthermore, adaptive design clinical trials are even more heterogeneous than their non-adaptive counterparts, and face more challenges. Consequently, it is possible that increased legislation could have a greater negative impact on adaptive designs than non-adaptive designs. Overall, we are sceptical that the introduction of legislation will achieve the desired outcomes, with some exceptions. Meanwhile the topic of data sharing — making anonymised individual-level clinical trial data available to other investigators for further use — is entirely absent from the proposals and the consultation in general. However, as an aspect of the wider concept of open science and reproducible research, data sharing is an increasingly important aspect of clinical trials. The benefits of data sharing include faster innovation, improved surveillance of drug safety and effectiveness and decreasing participant exposure to unnecessary risk. There are already a number of UK-focused documents that discuss and encourage data sharing, for example, the Concordat on Open Research Data and the Medical Research Council’s Data Sharing Policy. We strongly suggest that data sharing should be the norm rather than the exception, and hope that the forthcoming proposals on clinical trials invite discussion on this important topic.</jats:p

Analysing decision logs to understand decision-making in serious crime investigations

Objective: To study decision-making by detectives when investigating serious crime through the examination of Decision Logs to explore hypothesis generation and evidence selection. Background: Decision logs are used to record and justify decisions made during serious crime investigations. The complexity of investigative decision-making is well documented, as are the errors associated with miscarriages of justice and inquests. The use of decision logs has not been the subject of an empirical investigation, yet they offer an important window into the nature of investigative decision-making in dynamic, time-critical environments. Method: A sample of decision logs from British police forces was analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively to explore hypothesis generation and evidence selection by police detectives. Results: Analyses revealed diversity in documentation of decisions that did not correlate with case type, and identified significant limitations of the decision log approach to supporting investigative decision-making. Differences emerged between experienced and less experienced officers’ decision log records in exploration of alternative hypotheses, generation of hypotheses, and sources of evidential enquiry opened over phase of investigation. Conclusion: The practical use of decision logs is highly constrained by their format and context of use. Despite this, decision log records suggest that experienced detectives display strategic decision-making to avoid confirmation and satisficing that affect less experienced detectives. Application: Potential applications of this research include both training in case documentation and the development of new decision log media that encourage detectives, irrespective of experience, to generate multiple hypotheses and optimize the timely selection of evidence to test them

Rationality in context: An analogical perspective

At times, human behavior seems erratic and irrational. Therefore, when modeling human decision-making, it seems reasonable to take the remarkable abilities of humans into account with respect to rational behavior, but also their apparent deviations from the normative standards of rationality shining up in certain rationality tasks. Based on well-known challenges for human rationality, together with results from psychological studies on decision-making and from previous work in the field of computational modeling of analogy-making, I argue that the analysis and modeling of rational belief and behavior should also consider context-related cognitive mechanisms like analogy-making and coherence maximization of the background theory. Subsequently, I conceptually outline a high-level algorithmic approach for a Heuristic Driven Theory Projection-based system for simulating context-dependent human-style rational behavior. Finally, I show and elaborate on the close connections, but also on the significant differences, of this approach to notions of "ecological rationality"