Free Riding and Collective Action: An Experiment in Public Microeconomics

The well-known free-rider hypothesis is examined experimentally to see (i) whether individuals behave systematically as free riders when systematic incentives to do so are created, and (ii) the extent to which free riding actually occurs. Though the experiment's participants behaved in accordance with the hypothesis, the quantitative extent to which such behavior occurred was rather modest. From this it may be concluded that the free-rider hypothesis as presently stated indicates an incompleteness in standard public microeconomics rather than providing a description of the real worl

Public vs private production efficiency: A theoretical and empirical comparison

The relative efficiency of private and public production of a public service (in particular households' refuse collection) is studied using the theory of property rights and the economic theory of bureaucracy. Both kinds of institutional organization of production result in inefficiencies if realistic conditions are considered. The empirical analysis of refuse collection of 103 Swiss cities shows evidence that private production may be more efficient. If refuse collection were turned over to private enterprise on the basis of some such evidence, the government's task does not end but rather is shifted, only. It has to find ways and means to set the conditions such that private producers function efficiently in the long run. In particular, it must insure that competitive pressure on costs persists

Bureaucratic behavior in democracy: A case study

This paper analyzes bureaucracy within the context of the politico-economic framework using the rational choice approach. Bureaucracy interacts with various groups of decision-makers, and its influence depends on institutional differences, in particular representative democracy with or without referendum. Theoretical and empirical analysis for Swiss cities suggests that (1) there is little evidence for any significant influence on policy outcome by bureaucrats qua voters; (2) there is evidence that bureaucracy has a direct influence on the supply side; (3) it is not useful to view bureaucracy to be in an isolated position of a monopolist

Valuation of aircraft noise by time of day: a comparison of two approaches

This paper reports an innovative application of stated preference techniques to derive values of aircraft noise by time of day and day of week. Revealed preference techniques cannot provide such segmentations which would clearly be of use in policy development especially relating to airport operations. Given the lack of research on this issue the work reported here is highly experimental. Two stated preference experiments were designed. The first focussed on a single time period whilst the second asked respondents to trade between time periods. Both approaches yielded results that are plausible and mutually consistent in terms of relative values by time period. We conclude that stated preference techniques are particularly useful in this context where the use of aggregated values may lead to non-optimal policy decisions

Introducing willingness-to-pay for noise changes into transport appraisal: an application of benefit transfer.

Numerous research studies have elicited willingness-to-pay values for transport-related noise, however, in many industrialised countries including the UK, noise costs and benefits are still not incorporated into appraisals for most transport projects and policy changes (Odgaard et al, 2005; Grant-Muller et al, 2001). This paper describes the actions recently taken in the UK to address this issue, comprising: primary research based on the city of Birmingham; an international review of willingness-to-pay evidence; development of values using benefit transfers over time and locations; and integration with appraisal methods. Amongst the main findings are: that the willingness-to-pay estimates derived for the UK are broadly comparable with those used in appraisal elsewhere in Europe; that there is a case for a lower threshold at 1 45dB(A)Leq,18hr1 rather than the more conventional 55dB(A); and that values per dB(A) increase with the noise level above this threshold. There are significant issues over the valuation of rail versus road noise, the neglect of non-residential noise and the valuation of high noise levels in different countries. Conclusions are drawn regarding the feasibility of noise valuation based on benefit transfers in the UK and elsewhere, and future research needs in this field are discussed

Inherited Institutions: Cooperation in the Light of Democratic Legitimacy

We experimentally investigate whether the procedural history of a sanctioning institution affects cooperation in a social dilemma. Subjects inherit the institutional setting from a previous generation of subjects who either decided on the implementation of the institution democratically by majority vote or were exogenously assigned a setting. In order to isolate the impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical evidence, we observe that in the starting generation cooperation is higher (lower) with a democratically chosen (rejected) institution, as compared to the corresponding, randomly imposed setting. In the second generation, the procedural history only partly affects cooperation. While there is no positive democracy effect when the institution is implemented, the vote-based rejection of the institution negatively affects cooperation in the second generation. The effect size is similar to that in the first generation