The Ship of Theseus Puzzle

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence

De Pulchritudine non est Disputandum? A cross-cultural investigation of the alleged intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgment

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross-cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

Collective References and Identity Threat among Lebanese and Lebanese-Armenians in the Context of Continuous Intergroup Conflict

How people deal with adversity, in terms of threats to their social or ethnic identity has been extensively investigated. However, most studies have focused on samples (e.g. minority groups) from prototypical Western contexts. It is unclear how individuals perceive and deal with identity threats within non-Western plural contexts characterized by intergroup conflict. We therefore assess whether self-affirmation by recalling a past success can buffer against identity threat in the plural, non-Western context of Lebanon. In two studies we investigate how threats are negotiated at a national (Lebanon) (Study 1) and ethnic minority (Armenian) level (Study 2). In Study 1, we show that in a context characterized by a history of intergroup conflict, a superordinate national identity is non-salient. When investigating the content of memories of a sectarian group in Study 2, we find a hypersalient and chronically accessible ethnic identity, a pattern specific to Armenian Lebanese. We suggest that this hyper-salience is employed as a spontaneous identity management strategy by a minority group coping with constant continuity threat. Our findings point to the importance of expanding the study of identity processes beyond the typically Western contexts and in turn, situating them within their larger socio-political and historical contexts

Collective References and Identity Threat among Lebanese and Lebanese-Armenians in the Context of Continuous Intergroup Conflict

How people deal with adversity, in terms of threats to their social or ethnic identity has been extensively investigated. However, most studies have focused on samples (e.g. minority groups) from prototypical Western contexts. It is unclear how individuals perceive and deal with identity threats within non-Western plural contexts characterized by intergroup conflict. We therefore assess whether self-affirmation by recalling a past success can buffer against identity threat in the plural, non-Western context of Lebanon. In two studies we investigate how threats are negotiated at a national (Lebanon) (Study 1) and ethnic minority (Armenian) level (Study 2). In Study 1, we show that in a context characterized by a history of intergroup conflict, a superordinate national identity is non-salient. When investigating the content of memories of a sectarian group in Study 2, we find a hypersalient and chronically accessible ethnic identity, a pattern specific to Armenian Lebanese. We suggest that this hyper-salience is employed as a spontaneous identity management strategy by a minority group coping with constant continuity threat. Our findings point to the importance of expanding the study of identity processes beyond the typically Western contexts and in turn, situating them within their larger socio-political and historical contexts

Behavioral Circumscription and the Folk Psychology of Belief: A Study in Ethno-Mentalizing

Is behavioral integration (i.e., which occurs when a subject’s assertion that p matches her nonverbal behavior) a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data fromover 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not.Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology

For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures

Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions

For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility?: Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures

Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one's actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one's actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions