(Mock-)Thinking about the Same

In this paper, I want to address once more the venerable problem of intentional identity, the problem of how different thoughts can be about the same thing even if this thing does not exist. First, I will try to show that antirealist approaches to this problem are doomed to fail. For they ultimately share a problematic assumption, namely that thinking about something involves identifying it. Second, I will claim that once one rejects this assumption and holds instead that thoughts are constituted either by what they are about, their intentional objects, or by what determines their proposition-like intentional contents, one can address the problem of intentional identity in a different way. One can indeed provide a new solution to it that basically relies on two factors: a) what sort of metaphysical nature intentional objects effectively possess, once they are conceived as schematic objects à la Crane (2001, 2013); b) whether such objects really belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is. According to this solution, two thoughts are about the same nonexistent intentional object iff i) that object satisfies the identity criterion for objects of that metaphysical kind and ii) objects of that kind belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is, independently of whether they exist (in a suitable first-order sense of existence). As such, this solution is neither realist nor antirealist: only if condition ii) is satisfied, different thoughts can be about the same nonexistent intentionale; otherwise, they are simply constituted by the same intentional content (provided that this content is not equated with that intentionale). Third, armed with this solution, I will hold that one can find a suitable treatment of the specific and related problem of whether different people may mock-think about the same thing, even if there really is no such thing. Finally, I will try to show that this treatment can be also applied to the case in which different thoughts are, according to phenomenology, about the same intentionale and yet this intentionale is of a kind such that there really are no things of that kind. For in this case, such thoughts are about the same intentionale only fictionally

Cost estimation in initial development stages of products: an ontological approach

Cost estimation in the early stages of a product are fraught with uncertainties. The conceptual design of product development is characterized by the absence of data, the most critical being costs. The costs impact in the initial phases of the project is low, when discovered in later stages represent great risks. As there are no structured alternatives to obtaining costs in the conceptual phase, the reuse of data from past projects is an alternative discussed in the literature. Knowledge management approaches can search for data, nonexistent in the current phases, in successful earlier projects. The use of ontology is discussed as an approach in generating knowledge stored in a database. The proposed solution seeks to estimate costs based on previous projects. A query is formulated to describe the product function and settings. The ontological model searches the classes, instances, and properties in the database and generates a cost estimation. The costs of the previous project are reused to generate a new agile cost estimate without the need to consult other industry sectors. This dissertation project follows the methodological framework Design Science Research to make partial deliveries up to the final artifact, an ontological model. This proposal has great potential in the industry, considering there are no tools attending the initial phases with the same efficiency.Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)Estimativas de custos nas fases iniciais de um produto são repletas de incertezas. O projeto conceitual do desenvolvimento de produto e caracterizado pela ausência de dados, sendo os mais críticos os custos. O impacto dos custos nas fases iniciais do projeto e baixo, quando descobertos em fases posteriores representam grandes riscos. Como não existem meios estruturados de obtenção dos custos no projeto na fase conceitual, o reuso de dados de projetos passados e uma alternativa discutida na literatura. Abordagens de gerenciamento de conhecimento podem buscar dados, inexistentes nas fases atuais, em projetos anteriores bem sucedidos. O uso de ontologia e discutido como uma abordagem na geração de conhecimento armazenado em um banco de dados. A solução proposta busca estimar custos baseada em projetos anteriores. E formulada uma pergunta que descreva a função do produto e configurações. O modelo ontológico busca na base de dados classes, instâncias e propriedades e gera uma estimativa de custos. Os custos do projeto anterior são reutilizados para gerar uma nova estimativa de custos ágil sem necessidade de consultar outros setores da indústria. Este projeto de dissertação segue o framework metodológico Design Science Research para fazer entregas parciais ate a entrega do artefato final, um modelo ontológico. Esta proposta possui grande potencial na indústria, considerando que não existem ferramentas que atendam as fases iniciais com a mesma eficiência

Ontological Syncretistic Noneism

In this paper I want to claim, first, that despite close similarities, noneism (as developed in both Routley 1980 and Priest 20162) and Crane’s (2013) psychological reductionism are different ontological doctrines. For unlike the latter, the former is ontologically committed to objects that are nonentities. Once one splits ontological from existential commitment, this claim, I guess, is rather uncontroversial. Second, however, I want to claim something more controversial; namely, that this ontological interpretation of noneism naturally makes noneism be nonstandardly read as a form of allism, to be however appropriately distinguished from Quinean allism in terms of the different scope of the overall ontological domain on which the only particular/existential quantifier that there is ranges. This may orient a noneist towards a syncretistic view of existence, according to which, appearances notwithstanding, existence as a whole is captured both by means of second-order and by means of first-order related notions

Why the Mark of the Dispositional is not the Mark of the Intentional

In this paper, first of all, I will try to show that Crane’s attempt at facing Nes’ criticism of his two original criteria for intentionality (of reference), directedness and aspectual shape, does not work. Hence, in order to dispense with Nes’ counterexample given in terms of dispositions, there is no need to strengthen such criteria by appealing to representationality, Moreover, I will stress that such criteria are perfectly fine when properly meant in mental viz phenomenological terms that appeal to the possible nonexistence and the possible apparent aspectuality of the object of a thought, its intentional object. For once they are so meant, dispositions clearly lack them

The Nothingness of (the) Nothing

In recent years, in the analytic philosophical community various people have focused their attention again on (the) Nothing, in order to say that, pace Carnap (1932/1959) and pro Heidegger (1929/1977), there are occurrences of the corresponding phrase “(the) Nothing” in which it works as a singular term, not as a quantified expression (e.g. Casati‐Fujikawa 2015, 2019, Costantini 2020, Jacquette 2013, 2015, Oliver‐Smiley 2013, Priest 2014a,b, Simionato 2017, Voltolini 2015). First of all, I will stress again that, if those occurrences are referentially successful, as most of the previous people proposes, they denote an object that is paradoxical. For it is inconsistent because of its contradictory behavior with respect to a certain universal first‐order property, what I call the genuine existential property, i.e., Russell’s (1903) being. After reviewing and assessing such proposals, I will moreover try to show why the antecedent of the above conditional is false. In a nutshell, there cannot, even impossibly, be such a thing as (the) Nothing, not because this would make the overall totality of beings contradictory as well (by both including and not including (the) Nothing), but because (as Twardowski 1892/1977 somehow intuited) it would prevent that totality from being determined at all and (pace Costantini 2020) once for all. Finally, therefore, the only things that there legitimately are à propos of (the) Nothing are significant propositions, depending on the fact that the phrase “(the) Nothing” yields a contextually meaningful contribution to them qua Russellean definite description, even though it does not denote at all. Possibly, this position is similar to what Severino (1957, 2013) maintained on this subject.In recent years, in the analytic philosophical community various people have focused their attention again on (the) Nothing, in order to say that, pace Carnap (1932/1959) and pro Heidegger (1929/1977), there are occurrences of the corresponding phrase “(the) Nothing” in which it works as a singular term, not as a quantified expression (e.g. Casati‐Fujikawa 2015, 2019, Costantini 2020, Jacquette 2013, 2015, Oliver‐Smiley 2013, Priest 2014a,b, Simionato 2017, Voltolini 2015). First of all, I will stress again that, if those occurrences are referentially successful, as most of the previous people proposes, they denote an object that is paradoxical. For it is inconsistent because of its contradictory behavior with respect to a certain universal first‐order property, what I call the genuine existential property, i.e., Russell’s (1903) being. After reviewing and assessing such proposals, I will moreover try to show why the antecedent of the above conditional is false. In a nutshell, there cannot, even impossibly, be such a thing as (the) Nothing, not because this would make the overall totality of beings contradictory as well (by both including and not including (the) Nothing), but because (as Twardowski 1892/1977 somehow intuited) it would prevent that totality from being determined at all and (pace Costantini 2020) once for all. Finally, therefore, the only things that there legitimately are à propos of (the) Nothing are significant propositions, depending on the fact that the phrase “(the) Nothing” yields a contextually meaningful contribution to them qua Russellean definite description, even though it does not denote at all. Possibly, this position is similar to what Severino (1957, 2013) maintained on this subject

EFPU roundtable: ‘EU Foreign Policy: The view from the Mediterranean’

On 19 January 2012 the LSE’s European Foreign Policy Unit hosted the third roundtable on ‘EU Foreign Policy after Lisbon’, entitled ‘EU Foreign Policy: The View from the Mediterranean’. The panellists were Professor Atila Eralp (Middle East Technical University, Ankara), Professor Richard Gillespie (University of Liverpool) and Dr Claire Spencer (Chatham House). The roundtable was chaired by Professor Karen E. Smith of the LSE

EFPU roundtable: ‘Influencing the EU foreign policy process’

In a world where the presence of non-state actors (e.g. multinational corporations, NGOs, international organisations, etc.) has increased exponentially, it has become a burning issue to investigate the influence that they have on the EU. While much ink has been spilled analysing lobbying and advocacy activities in several EU policy areas, EU foreign policy, meaning all EU external relations, has not received particular attention