Expert Decision Making: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Perspective

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Routledge via the ISBN in this recor

From Meaning to Money: Translating Injury Into Dollars

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the American Psychological Association via the DOI in this record.Legal systems often require the translation of qualitative assessments into quantitative judgments, yet the qualitative-to-quantitative conversion is a challenging, understudied process. We conducted an experimental test of predictions from a new theory of juror damage award decision making, examining how 154 lay people engaged in the translation process in recommending money damages for pain and suffering in a personal injury tort case. The experiment varied the presence, size, and meaningfulness of an anchor number to determine how these factors influenced monetary award judgments, perceived difficulty, and subjective meaningfulness of awards. As predicted, variability in awards was high, with awards participants considered to be “medium” (rather than “low” or “high”) having the most dispersion. The gist of awards as low, medium, or high fully mediated the relationship between perceived pain/suffering and award amount. Moreover, controlling for participants’ perceptions of plaintiffs and defendants, as well as their desire to punish and to take economic losses into account, meaningful anchors predicted unique variance in award judgments: A meaningful large anchor number drove awards up and a meaningful small anchor drove them down, whereas meaningless large and small anchors did not differ significantly. Numeracy did not predict award magnitudes or variability, but surprisingly, more numerate participants reported that it was more difficult to pick an exact figure to compensate the plaintiff for pain and suffering. The results support predictions of the theory about qualitative gist and meaningful anchors, and suggest that we can assist jurors to arrive at damage awards by providing meaningful numbers.Preparation of this article was funded by National Science Foundation grant SES1536238: “Quantitative Judgments in Law: Studies of Damage Award Decision Making” to Valerie P. Hans and Valerie F. Reyna

Trial by Numbers

This is the final version of the article. Freely available from the publisher via the link in this record.Legal cases often require jurors to use numerical information. They may need to evaluate the meaning of specific numbers, such as the probability of match between a suspect and a DNA sample, or they may need to arrive at a sound numerical judgment, such as a money damage award. Thus, it is important to know how jurors understand numerical information, and what steps can be taken to increase juror comprehension and appropriate application of numerical evidence. In this Article, we examine two types of juror decisions involving numbers––decisions in which jurors must convert numbers into meaning (such as by understanding numerical evidence in order to determine guilt or liability), and decisions in which jurors must convert meaning into numbers (such as by understanding qualitative evidence and converting this into a numerical damage award amount). In each of these areas we analyze legal cases and research to examine areas in which dealing with numbers leads to sound or sub-optimal decision making in jurors. We then examine psychological theory and research on numerical decision making to understand how informed, fair, and consistent juror decision making about numbers can be promoted. We conclude that what is often most important is juror understanding of the meaning of numbers in context rather than technically precise numerical ability, supporting the role of the lay jury. We also suggest how to improve juror understanding, so that jury decisions better reflect considered community judgment.Preparation of this Article was supported in part by the Martha E. Foulk Fellowship awarded to Rebecca K. Helm, by National Science Foundation award SES-1536238: “Quantitative Judgments in Law: Studies of Damage Award Decision Making” to Valerie P. Hans and Valerie F. Reyna, by a grant from Cornell University’s Institute for Social Sciences to Valerie P. Hans and Valerie F. Reyna, and by National Institute of Health (National Institute of Nursing Research) award RO1NR014368-01 to Valerie F. Reyna

Brain activation covaries with reported criminal behaviors when making risky choices: A fuzzy-trace theory approach

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the American Psychological Association via the DOI in this record.Criminal behavior has been associated with abnormal neural activity when people experience risks and rewards or exercise inhibition. However, neural substrates of mental representations that underlie criminal and noncriminal risk-taking in adulthood have received scant attention. We take a new approach, applying fuzzy-trace theory, to examine neural substrates of risk preferences and criminality. We extend ideas about gist (simple meaning) and verbatim (precise risk-reward tradeoffs) representations used to explain adolescent risk-taking to uncover neural correlates of developmentally inappropriate adult risk-taking. We tested predictions using a risky-choice framing task completed in the MRI scanner, and examined neural covariation with self-reported criminal and noncriminal risk-taking. As predicted, risk-taking was correlated with a behavioral pattern of risk preferences called “reverse framing” (preferring sure losses over a risky option and a risky option over sure gains, the opposite of typical framing biases) that has been linked to risky behavior in adolescents and is rarely observed in nondisordered adults. Experimental manipulations confirmed processing interpretations of typical framing (gist-based) and reverse-framing (verbatim-based) risk preferences. In the brain, covariation with criminal and noncriminal risk-taking was observed predominantly when subjects made reverse-framing choices. Noncriminal risk-taking behavior was associated with emotional reactivity (amygdala) and reward motivation (striatal) areas, whereas criminal behavior was associated with greater activation in temporal and parietal cortices, their junction, and insula. When subjects made more developmentally typical framing choices, reflecting non-preferred gist processing, activation in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex covaried with criminal risk-taking, which may reflect cognitive effort to process gist while inhibiting preferred verbatim processin

Limitations on the ability to negotiate justice: Attorney perspectives on guilt, innocence, and legal advice in the current plea system

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Taylor & Francis via the DOI in this recordIn the American criminal justice system the vast majority of criminal convictions occur as the result of guilty pleas, often made as a result of plea bargains, rather than jury trials. The incentives offered in exchange for guilty pleas mean that both innocent and guilty defendants plead guilty. We investigate the role of attorneys in this context, through interviews with criminal defense attorneys. We examine defense attorney perspectives on the extent to which innocent defendants are (and should be) pleading guilty in the current legal framework and their views of their own role in this complex system. We also use a hypothetical case to probe the ways in which defense attorneys consider guilt or innocence when providing advice on pleas. Results indicate that attorney advice is influenced by guilt or innocence, but also that attorneys are limited in the extent to which they can negotiate justice for their clients in a system in which uncertainty and large discrepancies between outcomes of guilty pleas and conviction at trial can make it a sensible option to plead guilty even when innocent. Results also suggest conflicting opinions over the role of the attorney in the plea-bargaining process

Guiding Jurors’ Damage Award Decisions: Experimental Investigations of Approaches Based on Theory and Practice

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the American Psychological Association via the DOI in this recordTheory and practitioner “scaling” advice informed hypotheses that guidance to mock jurors should (a) increase validity (vertical equity), decrease variability (reliability), and improve coherence in awards; (b) improve subjective experience of jurors’ decision-making (rated helpfulness, confidence, and difficulty); and (c) have the greatest impact when it includes both verbal and numerical benchmarks. Three mock juror experiments (N = 197 students, N = 476 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, and N = 391 students) tested novel scaling approaches and predictions from the Hans-Reyna model of damage award decision-making. Jurors reviewed a legal case and provided a dollar award to compensate plaintiffs for pain and suffering following concussions. Experiments varied injury severity (low vs. high) and the plaintiff attorney’s guidance (no guidance, verbal guidance, numerical guidance, and verbal-plus-numerical guidance) between subjects. Results support predictions that, even without guidance, mock jurors appropriately categorize the gist of injuries as low or high severity, and dollar awards reflect that gist. Participants gave a higher award for more severe injuries, indicating that they extracted the qualitative gist of damages. Also, as expected, guidance, particularly verbal-plus-numerical guidance, had beneficial effects on jurors’ subjective experience, with participants reporting that it was a helpful aid in decision-making. Numerical guidance, both with and without verbal guidance, reduced award variability in severe injury cases in all three experiments. Scaling guidance did not improve the already strong gist-verbatim correspondence or award validity. Both grasping the gist of damages and mapping that gist onto numbers are important, but jurors appear to benefit from assistance with numerical mapping

The effect of a supplementary ('Gist-based') information leaflet on colorectal cancer knowledge and screening intention: a randomized controlled trial.

Guided by Fuzzy Trace Theory, this study examined the impact of a 'Gist-based' leaflet on colorectal cancer screening knowledge and intentions; and tested the interaction with participants' numerical ability. Adults aged 45-59 years from four UK general practices were randomly assigned to receive standard information ('The Facts', n = 2,216) versus standard information plus 'The Gist' leaflet (Gist + Facts, n = 2,236). Questionnaires were returned by 964/4,452 individuals (22 %). 82 % of respondents reported having read the information, but those with poor numeracy were less likely (74 vs. 88 %, p < .001). The 'Gist + Facts' group were more likely to reach the criterion for adequate knowledge (95 vs. 91 %; p < .01), but this was not moderated by numeracy. Most respondents (98 %) intended to participate in screening, with no group differences and no interaction with numeracy. The improved levels of knowledge and self-reported reading suggest 'The Gist' leaflet may increase engagement with colorectal cancer screening, but ceiling effects reduced the likelihood that screening intentions would be affected

Understanding the Effect of Information Presentation Order and Orientation on Information Search and Treatment Evaluation

Background. Past research finds that treatment evaluations are more negative when risks are presented after benefits. This study investigates this order effect: manipulating tabular orientation and order of risk–benefit information, and examining information search order and gaze duration via eye-tracking. Design. 108 (Study 1) and 44 (Study 2) participants viewed information about treatment risks and benefits, in either a horizontal (left-right) or vertical (above-below) orientation, with the benefits or risks presented first (left side or at top). For 4 scenarios, participants answered 6 treatment evaluation questions (1–7 scales) that were combined into overall evaluation scores. In addition, Study 2 collected eye-tracking data during the benefit–risk presentation. Results. Participants tended to read one set of information (i.e., all risks or all benefits) before transitioning to the other. Analysis of order of fixations showed this tendency was stronger in the vertical (standardized mean rank difference further from 0, M = ±.88) than horizontal orientation (M = ± 0.71). Approximately 50% of the time was spent reading benefits when benefits were shown first, but this was reduced to ~40% when risks were presented first (regression coefficient: B = −4.52, p <.001). Eye-tracking measures did not strongly predict treatment evaluations, although time percentage reading benefits positively predicted evaluation when holding other variables constant (B = 0.02, p =.023). Conclusion. These results highlight the impact of seemingly arbitrary design choices on inspection order. For instance, presenting risks where they will be seen first leads to relatively less time spent considering treatment benefits. Other research suggests these changes to inspection order can influence multi-option and multi-attribute choices, and represent an area for future research

The effects of numeracy and presentation format on judgments of contingency

Covariation information can be used to infer whether a causal link plausibly exists between two dichotomous variables, and such judgments of contingency are central to many critical and everyday decisions. However, individuals do not always interpret and integrate covariation information effectively, an issue that may be compounded by limited numeracy skills, and they often resort to the use of heuristics, which can result in inaccurate judgments. This experiment investigated whether presenting covariation information in a composite bar chart increased accuracy of contingency judgments, and whether it can mitigate errors driven by low numeracy skills. Participants completed an online questionnaire, which consisted of an 11-item numeracy scale and three covariation problems that varied in level of difficulty, involving a fictitious fertilizer and its impact on whether a plant bloomed or not. Half received summary covariation information in a composite bar chart, and half in a 2 × 2 matrix that summarized event frequencies. Viewing the composite bar charts increased accuracy of individuals both high and low in numeracy, regardless of problem difficulty, resulted in more consistent judgments that were closer to the normatively correct value, and increased the likelihood of detecting the correct direction of association. Findings are consistent with prior work, suggesting that composite bar charts are an effective way to improve covariation judgment and have potential for use in the domain of health risk communication

Diagnostic thinking and information used in clinical decision-making: a qualitative study of expert and student dental clinicians

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>It is uncertain whether the range and frequency of Diagnostic Thinking Processes (DTP) and pieces of information (concepts) involved in dental restorative treatment planning are different between students and expert clinicians.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>We video-recorded dental visits with one standardized patient. Clinicians were subsequently interviewed and their cognitive strategies explored using guide questions; interviews were also recorded. Both visit and interview were content-analyzed, following the Gale and Marsden model for clinical decision-making. Limited tests used to contrast data were t, χ², and Fisher's. Scott's π was used to determine inter-coder reliability.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Fifteen dentists and 17 senior dental students participated in visits lasting 32.0 minutes (± 12.9) among experts, and 29.9 ± 7.1 among students; contact time with patient was 26.4 ± 13.9 minutes (experts), and 22.2 ± 7.5 (students). The time elapsed between the first and the last instances of the clinician looking in the mouth was similar between experts and students. Ninety eight types of pieces of information were used in combinations with 12 DTPs. The main differences found in DTP utilization had dentists conducting diagnostic interpretations of findings with sufficient certainty to be considered definitive twice as often as students. Students resorted more often to more general or clarifying enquiry in their search for information than dentists.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Differences in diagnostic strategies and concepts existed within clearly delimited types of cognitive processes; such processes were largely compatible with the analytic and (in particular) non-analytic approaches to clinical decision-making identified in the medical field. Because we were focused on a clinical presentation primarily made up of non-emergency treatment needs, use of other DTPs and concepts might occur when clinicians evaluate emergency treatment needs, complex rehabilitative cases, and/or medically compromised patients.</p