Agents Play Mix-game

In mix-game which is an extension of minority game, there are two groups of agents; group1 plays the majority game, but the group2 plays the minority game. This paper studies the change of the average winnings of agents and volatilities vs. the change of mixture of agents in mix-game model. It finds that the correlations between the average winnings of agents and the mean of local volatilities are different with different combinations of agent memory length when the proportion of agents in group 1 increases. This study result suggests that memory length of agents in group1 be smaller than that of agent in group2 when mix-game model is used to simulate the financial markets.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figures, 3 table

Systemic risk and macroeconomic fat tails

We propose a mechanism for shock amplification that potentially can account for fat tails in the distribution of the growth rate of national output. We argue that extreme macroeconomic events, such as the Great Depression and the Great Recession, were preceded by significant turmoil in the banking system. We have developed a model of bank network formation and presented numerical simulations that show that, for the benchmark case, aggregate credit follows a random walk. When we introduce fire sales the model does not only produce larger variations in the growth of aggregate credit but also shows that there is an asymmetry between booms and busts that is also consistent with empirical evidence

Corporate governance compliance and disclosure in the banking sector: using data from Japan

Using regression model this study investigates which characteristics of a bank is associated with the extent of corporate governance disclosure in Japan. The findings suggest that on average 8 banks out of a sample of 46 disclose optimal corporate governance information. The regression model results reveal in general that non-executive directors, cross-ownership, capital adequacy ratio and type of auditors are associated with the extent of corporate governance disclosure. Of these four variables, non-executive directors have a more significant impact on the extent of disclosure contrary to total assets and audit firms of banks in the context of Japan. The findings of this paper are relevant for corporate regulators, professional associations and developers of corporate governance code when designing or updating corporate governance code

Privatization and State Capacity in Postcommunist Society

Economists have used cross-national regression analysis to argue that postcommunist economic failure is the result of inadequate adherence liberal economic policies. Sociologists have relied on case study data to show that postcommunist economic failure is the outcome of too close adherence to liberal policy recommendations, which has led to an erosion of state effectiveness, and thus produced poor economic performance. The present paper advances a version of this statist theory based on a quantitative analysis of mass privatization programs in the postcommunist world. We argue that rapid large-scale privatization creates severe supply and demand shocks for enterprises, thereby inducing firm failure. The resulting erosion of tax revenues leads to a fiscal crisis for the state, and severely weakens its capacity and bureaucratic character. This, in turn, reacts back on the enterprise sector, as the state can no longer support the institutions necessary for the effective functioning of a modern economy, thus resulting in deindustrialization. Using cross-national regression techniques we find that the implementation of mass privatization programs negatively impacts measures of economic growth, state capacity and the security of property rights.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40192/3/wp806.pd

The Re-Emerging Role of the State in Contemporary Russia

I examine ownership structure of Russian firms during the 1998-2006 period, where a greater emphasis is placed on motivations behind increased government ownership in the latter years, when oligarchs' opportunistic influence on the firm diminished as state ownership correspondingly increased. As this phenomenon is also correlated with improved corporate growth during the period, I argue that state participation in corporate governance acted as an effective substitute mechanism to constrain wealth-tunnelling behaviour of corporate insiders and local bureaucrats in a country defined by a weak property rights system. © 2012 Springer-Verlag