Reaching unanimous agreements within agent-based negotiation teams with linear and monotonic utility functions

[EN] In this article, an agent-based negotiation model for negotiation teams that negotiate a deal with an opponent is presented. Agent-based negotiation teams are groups of agents that join together as a single negotiation party because they share an interest that is related to the negotiation process. The model relies on a trusted mediator that coordinates and helps team members in the decisions that they have to take during the negotiation process: which offer is sent to the opponent, and whether the offers received from the opponent are accepted. The main strength of the proposed negotiation model is the fact that it guarantees unanimity within team decisions since decisions report a utility to team members that is greater than or equal to their aspiration levels at each negotiation round. This work analyzes how unanimous decisions are taken within the team and the robustness of the model against different types of manipulations. An empirical evaluation is also performed to study the impact of the different parameters of the model.This work is supported by TIN2008-04446, PROMETEO/2008/051, TIN2009-13839-C03-01, CSD2007-00022 of the Spanish government, and FPU Grant AP2008-00600 awarded to Victor Sanchez-Anguix. This paper was recommended by Associate Editor X. Wang.Sanchez-Anguix, V.; Julian Inglada, VJ.; Botti, V.; García-Fornes, A. (2012). Reaching unanimous agreements within agent-based negotiation teams with linear and monotonic utility functions. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics. 42(3):778-792. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSMCB.2011.2177658S77879242

A framework for group decision-making: Including cognitive and affective aspects in a MCDA method for alternatives rejection

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019. With the evolution of the organizations and technology, Group Decision Support Systems have changed to support decision-makers that cannot be together at the same place and time to make a decision. However, these systems must now be able to support the interaction between decision-makers and provide all the relevant information at the most adequate times. Failing to do so may compromise the success and the acceptance of the system. In this work it is proposed a framework for group decision using a Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis method capable of identify inconsistent assessments done by the decision-maker and identify alternatives that should be rejected by the group of decision-makers. The proposed framework allows to present more relevant information throughout the decision-making process and this way guide decision-makers in the achievement of more consensual and satisfactory decisions.INCT-EN - Instituto Nacional de Ciência e Tecnologia para Excitotoxicidade e Neuroproteção(ANI|P2020 21958

Can We Reach Pareto Optimal Outcomes Using Bottom-Up Approaches?

Traditionally, researchers in decision making have focused on attempting to reach Pareto Optimality using horizontal approaches, where optimality is calculated taking into account every participant at the same time. Sometimes, this may prove to be a difficult task (e.g., conflict, mistrust, no information sharing, etc.). In this paper, we explore the possibility of achieving Pareto Optimal outcomes in a group by using a bottom-up approach: discovering Pareto optimal outcomes by interacting in subgroups. We analytically show that Pareto optimal outcomes in a subgroup are also Pareto optimal in a supergroup of those agents in the case of strict, transitive, and complete preferences. Then, we empirically analyze the prospective usability and practicality of bottom-up approaches in a variety of decision making domains.Comment: 2nd Workshop on Conflict Resolution in Decision Making (COREDEMA@ECAI2016

Intra-Team Strategies for Teams Negotiating Against Competitor, Matchers, and Conceders

Under some circumstances, a group of individuals may need to negotiate together as a negotiation team against another party. Unlike bilateral negotiation between two individuals, this type of negotiations entails to adopt an intra-team strategy for negotiation teams in order to make team decisions and accordingly negotiate with the opponent. It is crucial to be able to negotiate successfully with heterogeneous opponents since opponents' negotiation strategy and behavior may vary in an open environment. While one opponent might collaborate and concede over time, another may not be inclined to concede. This paper analyzes the performance of recently proposed intra-team strategies for negotiation teams against different categories of opponents: competitors, matchers, and conceders. Furthermore, it provides an extension of the negotiation tool Genius for negotiation teams in bilateral settings. Consequently, this work facilitates research in negotiation teams.Comment: Novel Insights in Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiation, 201