The Collective Action Problem: Within-Group Cooperation and Between-Group Competition in a Repeated Rent-Seeking Game

This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking activities in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking game between two groups of different size. We first investigate Nash reversion strategies to support cooperative behavior in a given group before analyzing double-edge trigger strategies which have the property that cheating on the cooperative agreement in a given group is followed by non-cooperation in this group and cooperation in the rival group. The main conclusion is that the set of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained within the larger group as a subgame perfect outcome is as large as that for which cooperation can be sustained in the smaller group. Hence, in contrast with Olson’s (1965) celebrated thesis but in accordance with many informal and formal observations, the larger group is as effective as the smaller group in furthering its interest

Barriers to Predicting the Mechanisms and Risk Factors of Non-Contact Anterior Cruciate Ligament Injury

High incidences of non-contact anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) injury, frequent requirements for ACL reconstruction, and limited understanding of ACL mechanics have engendered considerable interest in quantifying the ACL loading mechanisms. Although some progress has been made to better understand non-contact ACL injuries, information on how and why non-contact ACL injuries occur is still largely unavailable. In other words, research is yet to yield consensus on injury mechanisms and risk factors. Biomechanics, video analysis, and related study approaches have elucidated to some extent how ACL injuries occur. However, these approaches are limited because they provide estimates, rather than precise measurements of knee - and more specifically ACL - kinematics at the time of injury. These study approaches are also limited in their inability to simultaneously capture many of the contributing factors to injury

South African HIV-1 subtype C transmitted variants with a specific V2 motif show higher dependence on α4β7 for replication.

CAPRISA, 2015.Abstract available in pdf

Genomic epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2 in a UK university identifies dynamics of transmission

AbstractUnderstanding SARS-CoV-2 transmission in higher education settings is important to limit spread between students, and into at-risk populations. In this study, we sequenced 482 SARS-CoV-2 isolates from the University of Cambridge from 5 October to 6 December 2020. We perform a detailed phylogenetic comparison with 972 isolates from the surrounding community, complemented with epidemiological and contact tracing data, to determine transmission dynamics. We observe limited viral introductions into the university; the majority of student cases were linked to a single genetic cluster, likely following social gatherings at a venue outside the university. We identify considerable onward transmission associated with student accommodation and courses; this was effectively contained using local infection control measures and following a national lockdown. Transmission clusters were largely segregated within the university or the community. Our study highlights key determinants of SARS-CoV-2 transmission and effective interventions in a higher education setting that will inform public health policy during pandemics.</jats:p

Sunk Costs, Depreciation, and Industry Dynamics

Two of the most robust results from dynamic competitive models of industrial organization suggest that higher sunk cost industries should exhibit (1) higher intertemporal variability in the market value of their firms, and (2) lower intertemporal variability in the size of their industries. These predictions have done well empirically. This paper argues on theoretical and empirical grounds that depreciation generates countervailing effects

Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation

penal codes, security level, product differentiation, positivity constraints, C72, D43, L13,