Política sobre el cambio climático y sector manufacturero : la experiencia de "comercio de carbono"

Mitigar el cambio climático requerirá una reducción de las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero de todos los sectores económicos clave. La elección de políticas sectoriales adecuadas es esencial para minimizar el coste económico de estas reducciones dadas las tecnologías existentes (eficiencia estática) y para incentivar la innovación tecnológica que permita reducir los costes futuros de esta reducción (eficiencia dinámica). La regulación del sector manufacturero, que en conjunción con el sector primario es responsable de casi el 40% del total de emisiones a nivel mundial, es muy controvertida. Puesto que las manufacturas son bienes sujetos al comercio internacional, existe un riesgo evidente de que la empresa regulada pierda competitividad, reduzcan empleo e incluso abandonen el mercado. Estas consideraciones han provocado una oposición vehemente frente a regulación de emisiones que ha condicionado las políticas que se han implementado hasta ahora. El Programa de Comercio de Permisos de Emisión de la Unión Europea (European Union Emissions Trading Scheme EU ETS, el sistema internacional cap-and-trade de emisiones de carbono más grande del mundo, es una de las políticas más ambiciosas que se ha implementado. Este artículo examina el efecto de esta política sobre el sector manufacturero Europeo durante sus ocho años de existencia. En particular, se discute la evidencia empírica sobre el impacto del EU ETS en tres categorías amplias: emisiones de CO2, desarrollo económico y competitividad, e innovación. Además, se subrayan los temas abiertos en la literatura y se identifican los retos futurosAgradezco el apoyo financiero del Gobierno español, proyectos SEJ2007-62908 y ECO2012-3135

Still time to Reclaim The European Union Emissions Trading System for the European Tax Payer

The criteria proposed by the EU Commission to identify industries that will receive free emission permits in the third phase of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) are not restrictive enough. Evidence from interviews with almost 800 managers in Europe shows that most of the sectors entitled to free emission permits are not facing an increased risk of closure or relocation outside of the EU as a consequence of permit auctioning. Free permit allocation is therefore just a transfer of tax payers' money to industry without any additional social benefit. We propose a simple modification of the Commission's criteria for free permit allocation which could save European tax payers at least €7 billion annually.Environment

The Impacts of the Climate Change Levy on Manufacturing: Evidence from Microdata

We estimate the impacts of the Climate Change Levy (CCL) on manufacturing plants using panel data from the UK production census. Our identification strategy builds on the comparison of outcomes between plants subject to the CCL and plants that were granted an 80% discount on the levy after joining a Climate Change Agreement (CCA). Exploiting exogenous variation in eligibility for CCA participation, we find that the CCL had a strong negative impact on energy intensity and electricity use. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the tax had no detrimental effects on economic performance and on plant exit.

Anatomy of a Paradox: Management Practices, Organisational Structure and Energy Efficiency

This paper presents new evidence on managerial and organizational factors that explain firm level energy efficiency and TFP. We interviewed managers of 190 randomly selected manufacturing plants in the UK and matched their responses with official business microdata. We find that 'climate friendly' management practices are associated with lower energy intensity and higher TFP. Firms that adopt more such practices also engage in more R&D related to climate change. We show that the variation in management practices across firms can be explained in part by organizational structure. Firms are more likely to adopt climate friendly management practices if climate change issues are managed by the environmental or energy manager, and if this manager is close to the CEO. Our results support the view that the "energy efficiency paradox" can be explained by managerial factors and highlight their importance for private-sector innovation that will sustain future growth in energy efficiency.climate policy, energy efficiency, firm behavior, management practices, manufacturing,microdata, organizational structure

The impact of the EU ETS on regulated firms: what is the evidence after ten years?

This article reviews the recent literature on ex-post evaluation of the impacts of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)on regulated firms in the industrial and power sectors. We summarize the findings from original research papers concerning three broadly defined impacts: CO2 emissions, economic performance and competitiveness, and innovation. We conclude by highlighting gaps in the current literature and suggesting priorities for future research on this landmark policy

The Impact of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme on Regulated Firms: What Is the Evidence after Ten Years?

This article reviews the recent literature on ex post evaluation of the impacts of the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on regulated firms in the industrial and power sectors. We summarize the findings from original research papers concerning three broadly defined impacts: carbon dioxide emissions, economic performance and competitiveness, and innovation. We conclude by highlighting gaps in the current literature and suggesting priorities for future research on this landmark policy.We gratefully acknowledge financial support from DECC, the ESRC (grant ES/ J006742/1), the British Academy (Martin), the Leverhulme Trust (Muuˆ ls), and the SpanishMinistries of Science and Innovation, and Economics and Competitiveness, reference numbers SEJ2007 62908, ECO2012 31358 and RYC 2013 12492 (Wagner)

Industry compensation under recolation risk: a firm-level analysis of the EU emissions trading scheme

When regulated firms are offered compensation to prevent them from relocating, efficiency requires that payments be distributed across firms so as to equalize marginal relocation probabilities, weighted by the damage caused by relocation. We formalize this fundamental economic logic and apply it to analyzing compensation rules proposed under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, where emission permits are allocated free of charge to carbon intensive and trade exposed industries. We show that this practice results in substantial overcompensation for given carbon leakage risk. Efficient permit allocation reduces the aggregate risk of job loss by more than half without increasing aggregate compensationThe authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the British Academy (Martin), from the Leverhulme Trust (Muûls) and from the Spanish Government, reference numbers SEJ2007-62908 and ECO2012-31358 (Wagner).10.1257/aer.104.8.2482Publicad

Strategic uncertainty, indeterminacy, and the formation of international environmental agreements

Since the end of the Kyoto Protocol, global climate negotiations have shifted away from setting binding short-run targets on emissions towards placing long-term limits on global warming. We investigate how this alters the incentives for participation in a technology-centered international environmental agreement (IEA) where countries choose between conventional abatement and a breakthrough abatement technology that exhibits a network externality. When switching technologies is costly, we obtain that equilibrium adoption is indeterminate because the future adoption rate is subject to strategic uncertainty. Participation in an IEA that mandates the adoption of the breakthrough technology will be complete only if countries expect that all other countries will adopt eventually. Long-run temperature targets can be regarded as a device to coordinate countries' expectations on that outcome