Audit of the Department of Energy\u27s Contracts with Envirocare of Utah, Inc.

The Department of Energy (Department) is responsible for protecting human health and the environment by providing an effective and efficient system that treats, stores, and disposes of Departmental waste. The Department disposes of some of its waste at Envirocare of Utah, Inc., (Envirocare) a commercial treatment and disposal facility in Clive, Utah. The audit objective was to determine whether the Department and its contractors were using the most favorable rates available for the disposal of waste at Envirocare. We found that the Department\u27s contractors did not always use the most favorable rates available. Although volume discounts were available under Departmentwide contracts, two of the Department\u27s contractors awarded subcontracts to Envirocare with rates that were higher than the Departmentwide rates. This occurred because the Department did no require contractors to use the most favorable rates available. As a result, the Department has incurred unnecessary costs to dispose of contaminated waste. During the audit, one of the contractors reopened negotiations with Envirocare and obtained a lower rate, thereby saving the Department about #3.w million over the next 3 years. We recommended that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Restoration distribute a list of available Departmentwide contracts and rates and direct field activities to require all contractors to use the most favorable rates available to the Department for the treatment and disposal of waste. Management concurred with the finding and recommendation and initiated appropriate action to correct the condition disclosed in the report

THE TREND TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN US REGULATION OF NANOMATERIALS

The precautionary principle provides a framework for regulating emerging technologies in general and nanomaterials in particular. It counsels action in the presence of uncertainties about risk instead of assuming that nanomaterials are safe unless proven hazardous. Nanomaterials are regulated under different statutory programs depending on whether they are drugs, pesticides or other commercial chemicals. Recent developments in the regulation of nanomaterials that are not drugs or pesticides have demonstrated a trend towards application of the precautionary principle. This is a paradigm shift away from the requirement built into past interpretations of the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”) that manufacturing, processing and use of chemical substances cannot be restricted unless the regulatory authority proves an unreasonable risk. This same paradigm shift is incorporated into recent legislative proposals to amend TSCA

Assessing Children’s Dietary Pesticide Exposure: Direct Measurement of Pesticide Residues in 24-Hr Duplicate Food Samples

Background: The data presented here are a response to calls for more direct measurements of pesticide residues in foods consumed by children and provide an opportunity to compare direct measures of pesticide residues in foods representing actual consumption with those reported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture Pesticide Data Program. Objective: We measured pesticide residues in 24-hr duplicate food samples collected from a group of 46 young children participating in the Children’s Pesticide Exposure Study (CPES). Methods: Parents were instructed to collect 24-hr duplicate food samples of all conventional fruits, vegetables, and fruit juices equal to the quantity consumed by their children, similarly prewashed/prepared, and from the same source or batch. Individual or composite food items were analyzed for organophosphate (OP) and pyrethroid insecticide residues. Results: We collected a total of 239 24-hr duplicate food samples collected from the 46 CPES children. We found 14% or 5% of those food samples contained at least one OP or pyrethroid insecticide, respectively. We measured a total of 11 OP insecticides, at levels ranging from 1 to 387 ng/g, and three pyrethroid insecticides, at levels ranging from 2 to 1,133 ng/g, in children’s food samples. We found that many of the food items consumed by the CPES children were also on the list of the most contaminated food commodities reported by the Environmental Working Group. Conclusions: The frequent consumption of food commodities with episodic presence of pesticide residues that are suspected to cause developmental and neurological effects in young children supports the need for further mitigation

Why U.S. Efforts to Promote the Rule of Law in Afghanistan Failed

Promoting the rule of law in Afghanistan has been a major U.S. foreign policy objective since the collapse of the Taliban regime in late 2001. Policymakers invested heavily in building a modern democratic state bound by the rule of law as a means to consolidate a liberal post-conflict order. Eventually, justice-sector support also became a cornerstone of counterinsurgency efforts against the reconstituted Taliban. Yet a systematic analysis of the major U.S.-backed initiatives from 2004 to 2014 finds that assistance was consistently based on dubious assumptions and questionable strategic choices. These programs failed to advance the rule of law even as spending increased dramatically during President Barack Obama's administration. Aid helped enable rent seeking and a culture of impunity among Afghan state officials. Despite widespread claims to the contrary, rule-of-law initiatives did not bolster counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. experience in Afghanistan highlights that effective rule-of-law aid cannot be merely technocratic. To have a reasonable prospect of success, rule-of-law promotion efforts must engage with the local foundations of legitimate legal order, which are often rooted in nonstate authority, and enjoy the support of credible domestic partners, including high-level state officials

Public health management of antiviral drugs during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic: a survey of local health departments in California

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The large-scale deployment of antiviral drugs from the Strategic National Stockpile during the 2009 H1N1 influenza response provides a unique opportunity to study local public health implementation of the medical countermeasure dispensing capability in a prolonged event of national significance. This study aims to describe the range of methods used by local health departments (LHDs) in California to manage antiviral activities and to gain a better understanding of the related challenges experienced by health departments and their community partners.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>This research employed a mixed-methods approach. First, a multi-disciplinary focus group of pandemic influenza planners from key stakeholder groups in California was convened in order to generate ideas and identify critical themes related to the local implementation of antiviral activities during the H1N1 influenza response. These qualitative data informed the development of a web-based survey, which was distributed to all 61 LHDs in California for the purpose of assessing the experiences of a representative sample of local health agencies in a large region.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Forty-four LHDs participated in this study, representing 72% of the local public health agencies in California. While most communities dispensed a modest number of publicly purchased antivirals, LHDs nevertheless drew on their previous work and engaged in a number of antiviral activities, including: acquiring, allocating, distributing, dispensing, tracking, developing guidance, and communicating to the public and clinical community. LHDs also identified specific antiviral challenges presented by the H1N1 pandemic, including: reconciling multiple sources and versions of antiviral guidance, determining appropriate uses and recipients of publicly purchased antivirals, and staffing shortages.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic presented an unusual opportunity to learn about the role of local public health in the management of antiviral response activities during a real public health emergency. Results of this study offer an important descriptive account of LHD management of publicly purchased antivirals, and provide practitioners, policy makers, and academics with a practice-based assessment of these events. The issues raised and the challenges faced by LHDs should be leveraged to inform public health planning for future pandemics and other emergency events that require medical countermeasure dispensing activities.</p

A Review of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election

The Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) undertook this review of various actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department in connection with the investigation into the use of a private email server by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Clinton served as Secretary of State from January 21, 2009, until February 1, 2013, and during that time used private email servers hosting the @clintonemail.com domain to conduct official Department of State (State Department) business. In 2014, in response to a request from the State Department to Clinton for “copies of any Federal records in [her] possession, such as emails sent or received on a personal email account while serving as Secretary of State,” Clinton produced to the State Department 30,490 emails from her private server that her attorneys determined were work-related. Clinton and her attorneys did not produce to the State Department approximately 31,830 emails because, they stated, they were personal in nature, and these emails subsequently were deleted from the laptop computers that the attorneys used to review them. In 2015, at the State Department’s request, the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) reviewed emails from Clinton’s private email server that she had produced to the State Department and identified a potential compromise of classified information. The IC IG subsequently referred this information to the FBI. The FBI opened an investigation, known as “Midyear Exam” (MYE or Midyear), into the storage and transmission of classified information on Clinton’s unclassified private servers in July 2015. Over the course of the next year, FBI agents and analysts and Department prosecutors conducted the investigation. Their activities included obtaining and analyzing servers and devices used by Clinton, contents of private email accounts for certain senior aides, and computers and email accounts used to back up, process, or transfer Clinton’s emails. The investigative team interviewed numerous witnesses, including current and former State Department employees. On June 27, 2016, while the Midyear investigation was nearing completion, then Attorney General (AG) Loretta Lynch and former President Bill Clinton had an unscheduled meeting while their planes were parked on the tarmac at Phoenix’s Sky Harbor Airport. Former President Clinton boarded Lynch’s plane, and Lynch, Lynch’s husband, and the former President met for approximately 20 to 30 minutes. Following the meeting, Lynch publicly denied having any conversation about the Midyear investigation or any other substantive matter pending before the Department. Nevertheless, the meeting created significant controversy. On July 1, 2016, Lynch publicly announced that she would accept the recommendation of the Midyear investigative and prosecutorial team regarding whether to charge former Secretary Clinton. The following day, Saturday, July 2, 2016, the FBI and Department prosecutors interviewed former Secretary Clinton at the FBI’s Headquarters building. Then, on July 5, 2016, without coordinating with the Department and with very brief notice to it, then FBI Director James Comey publicly delivered a statement that criticized Clinton, characterized her and her senior aides as “extremely careless” in their handling of classified information, and asserted that it was possible hostile actors gained access to Clinton’s personal email account. Comey concluded, however, that the investigation should be closed because “no reasonable prosecutor” would prosecute Clinton or others, citing the strength of the evidence and the lack of precedent for bringing a case on these facts. The following day, July 6, 2016, Lynch was briefed by the prosecutors and formally accepted their recommendation to decline prosecution. On October 28, 2016, 11 days before the presidential election, Comey sent a letter to Congress announcing the discovery of emails that “appear[ed] to be pertinent” to the Midyear investigation. Comey’s letter was referring to the FBI’s discovery of a large quantity of emails during the search of a laptop computer obtained in an unrelated investigation of Anthony Weiner, the husband of Clinton’s former Deputy Chief of Staff and personal assistant, Huma Abedin. The FBI obtained a search warrant to review the emails 2 days later, on October 30, 2016. Over the next 6 days, the FBI processed and reviewed a large volume of emails. On November 6, 2016, 2 days before the election, Comey sent a second letter to Congress stating that the review of the emails on the laptop had not changed the FBI’s earlier conclusions with respect to Clinton. The OIG initiated this review on January 12, 2017, in response to requests from numerous Chairmen and Ranking Members of Congressional oversight committees, various organizations, and members of the public to investigate various decisions made in the Midyear investigation. The OIG announced that it would review the following issues: --Allegations that Department or FBI policies or procedures were not followed in connection with, or in actions leading up to or related to, Comey’s public announcement on July 5, 2016, and Comey’s letters to Congress on October 28 and November 6, 2016, and that certain underlying investigative decisions were based on improper considerations; -- Allegations that then FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe should have been recused from participating in certain investigative matters; -- Allegations that then Assistant Attorney General for the Department’s Office of Legislative Affairs, Peter Kadzik, improperly disclosed nonpublic information to the Clinton campaign and/or should have been recused from participating in certain matters; -- Allegations that Department and FBI employees improperly disclosed non-public information; and --- Allegations that decisions regarding the timing of the FBI’s release of certain Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) documents on October 30 and November 1, 2016, and the use of a Twitter account to publicize the same, were influenced by improper considerations. The OIG announcement added that “if circumstances warrant, the OIG will consider including other issues that may arise during the course of the review.” One such issue that the OIG added to the scope of this review arose from the discovery of text messages and instant messages between some FBI employees on the investigative team, conducted using FBI mobile devices and computers, that expressed statements of hostility toward then candidate Donald Trump and statements of support for then candidate Clinton, as well as comments about the handling of the Midyear investigation. We addressed whether these communications evidencing a potential bias affected investigative decisions in the Midyear investigation. This review is separate from the review the OIG announced on March 28, 2018, concerning the Department’s and FBI’s compliance with legal requirements, and with applicable Department and FBI policies and procedures, in applications filed with the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) relating to a certain U.S. person. We will issue a separate report relating to those issues when our investigative work is complete at a future date