OMx-D: semiempirical methods with orthogonalization and dispersion corrections. Implementation and biochemical application

The semiempirical methods of the OMx family (orthogonalization models OM1, OM2, and OM3) are known to describe biochemical systems more accurately than standard semiempirical approaches such as AM1. We investigate the benefits of augmenting these methods with an empirical dispersion term (OMx-D) taken from recent density functional work, without modifying the standard OMx parameters. Significant improvements are achieved for non-covalent interactions, with mean unsigned errors of 1.41 kcal/mol (OM2-D) and 1.31 kcal/mol (OM3-D) for the binding energy of the complexes in the JSCH-2005 data base. This supports the use of these augmented methods in quantum mechanical/molecular mechanical (QM/MM) studies of biomolecules, for example during system preparation and equilibration. As an illustrative application, we present QM and QM/MM calculations on the binding between antibody 34E4 and a hapten, where OM3-D performs better than the methods without dispersion terms (AM1, OM3)

Notes on the Salamander, Eurycea longicauda guttolineata, in Florida

But little work has been published on this subspecies. This study is based on a collection made with Richard E. Etheridge in the summer of 1949. While Carr (1940) lists Eurycea l. guttolineata as uncom­ mon in Florida, we were able to collect some 180 specimens in the northern part of the State. These are now deposited in our private collections, or in the Tulane University collection

Foster Care and the Growing Tension Between the Religion Clauses: A Comment on Rogers v. HHS

In 2018, the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services and the State of South Carolina agreed to waive their requirements of religious non-discrimination by state-funded, licensed child placement agencies. The state had discovered that its largest provider, Miracle Hill, approved the applications of only those who shared its Evangelical Protestant faith. Eden Rogers and Brandy Welch, a Unitarian, married same-sex couple, applied to Miracle Hill to be certified as foster parents. After Miracle Hill refused on religious grounds to assess the couple’s fitness, the couple filed suit against various federal and state defendants, alleging that the waivers constituted an establishment of religion and violated the couple’s right to equal protection. The federal district court refused defendants’ motion to dismiss the couple’s Establishment Clause claim. In light of the Supreme Court decision in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021), Carolina renewed its motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that Miracle Hill’s right to the Free Exercise of Religion requires the state to waive its prohibition on religion-based discrimination by child placement agencies. This paper explores South Carolina’s argument that Miracle Hill’s purported free exercise rights render irrelevant constraints that the Establishment Clause might place on such accommodations. In this context, the state’s reliance on Fulton is misplaced. Here, the state should be deemed constitutionally responsible for the religion-based exclusion of prospective foster parents. More controversially, I argue that the state should also be held constitutionally responsible for the religious indoctrination of children placed with families approved by Miracle Hill. Such responsibility has long been and should remain a central concern of the Establishment Clause, and overcomes any countervailing free exercise interests of Miracle Hill or other faith-based providers. This focus on responsibility offers significant depth and nuance to conventional but vague Establishment Clause concepts about state support of religion. The author is the David R. and Sherry Kirschner Berz Research Professor in Law and Religion at the George Washington University Law School

Hon. John Alfred Poor, of Portland, Me.

A hand-bound copy of an article on John Alfred Poor published in New-England Historical and Genealogical Register and Antiquarian Journal, vol. XXVI, no. 4, October, 1872

Flight data display studies for real time computer flight evaluation Final report

Real time displays for in-flight monitoring of Saturn launch vehicle

Historic Preservation Grants To Houses Of Workship: A Case Study in the Survival of Separationism

Many states have historic preservation regulations that, as applied to properties owned by religious entities, have been challenged on free exercise grounds. Historic preservation programs, however, also include government grants for preservation efforts, and no court has yet been asked to rule on the permissibility of such grants. This Article analyzes the existing Supreme Court precedent on state financial support for the construction or preservation of places of worship or religious teaching. After briefly reviewing the movement from Separationists to Neutralism, this Article collects and appraises materials on historic preservation, which reveal a remarkable degree of disparity in preservation policies, as various levels of government struggle with changes in the relevant law. This Article concludes by invoking a principle of Religion Clause symmetry—what the government may regulate it may also subsidize—and by suggesting that the religionspecific line between permissible and impermissible subsidy (and regulation) should be drawn between the exteriors and interiors of houses of worship

Religious Exemptions and the Limited Relevance of Corporate Identity

Corporate religious liberty appears to be on the rise. The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Hosanna Tabor v. EEOC (2012) energized sweeping theories about “freedom of the church.” The Court’s more controversial decision in Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014) determined that for-profit entities may be legally entitled to claim a corporate religious character. Speaking in the language of rights, commentators have vigorously debated the foundations and meaning of these decisions. This chapter argues that these debates are misdirected. The special treatment of religion in American constitutional law does not properly rest on any theory that religious entities enjoy a distinctive set of rights. Instead, the relevant limitation on government arises from the Constitution’s Establishment Clause. The governing principle, deeply grounded in history, can best be understood as a prohibition on government involvement – through regulation or financial support – in “purely and strictly ecclesiastical matters.” That principle (developed at greater length in our book, Secular Government, Religious People) explains why the government may not decide, for example, who is fit for ministry or which faction within a church is acting in fidelity to its original teachings. The principle applies with equal force to the state’s relationship with houses of worship, religious non-profit institutions such as schools or charities, and for-profit businesses whose owners assert a corporate religious character. The only legally relevant differences among these types of organizations should be derived from the likelihood that the principle will be implicated in any particular case. After reviewing the 19th century underpinnings of this singular approach, and offering pertinent reminders of limits on state financial support for religious teaching, the chapter focuses primarily on the context of employment regulation. Along the way, the chapter addresses concrete questions, such as whether a for-profit business can ever successfully assert a ministerial exception with respect to any of its employees. The answer may surprise you