Naturalism and the Problem of Normativity

This dissertation explores the way in which normative facts create a problem for naturalist approaches to philosophy. How can lumpy scientific matter give rise to technicolour normativity? How can normative facts show up in the world described from a scientific perspective? In this context, I start by analysing Hume’s discussion of ’is’ and ‘ought’, Moore’s open question argument, and Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. I then look at the nature of philosophical naturalism in detail, arguing that is fundamentally an epistemological commitment to the norms governing scientific publications. I consider the particular examples of Penelope Maddy’s approach to naturalising logic and the instrumentalist accounts of epistemic normativity favoured by advocates of naturalised epistemology. I argue, however, that these approaches to naturalising normativity are unsuccessful. In the second half of the dissertation, I develop a novel account of the nature of normative facts and explain how this relates to and resolves some of the difficulties raised in the first half. The account I defend has Kantian foundations and an Aristotelian superstructure. I associate the right with the necessary preconditions for engaging in valuable activity and the good with the satisfaction of the constitutive ends of activities and practices. I explain how my theory can account for epistemic normativity and defend a virtue-based theory of epistemic evaluation. Finally, I argue against desire-based accounts of reasons and in favour of a role for the emotions in normative cognition. The view I defend is intended to be compatible with our best scientific theories. However, it is not naturalistic insofar as it is justified by distinctively philosophical methods and relies on extra-scientific considerations

The Cogito, Dreamt Characters, and Unreal Existence

Borges’ The Circular Ruins tells the story of a magician who turns out to be a character in a dream. Leibowitz (2021) argues that this scenario undermines the rational indubitability of Descartes’ Cogito. The magician, he argues, is an unreal appearance and therefore does not exist. I argue that Borges drew a distinction between reality and existence and that he was right to do so. There are various senses of reality and the sense in which a dreamt character is unreal poses no threat to their existence or to the indubitability of the Cogito. The magician is unreal because he is a mind-dependent, illusory and fake. Nonetheless, he can be certain that he thinks, therefore he is

The _Cogito_, Dreamt Characters, and Unreal Existence

Borges’ The Circular Ruins tells the story of a magician who turns out to be a character in a dream. Leibowitz (2021) argues that this scenario undermines the rational indubitability of Descartes’ Cogito. The magician, he argues, is an unreal appearance and therefore does not exist. I argue that Borges drew a distinction between reality and existence and that he was right to do so. There are various senses of reality and the sense in which a dreamt character is unreal poses no threat to their existence or to the indubitability of the Cogito. The magician is unreal because he is a mind-dependent, illusory and fake. Nonetheless, he can be certain that he thinks, therefore he is

Don’t Worry, Be Happy: The Gettability of Ultimate Meaning

Rivka Weinberg advances an error theory of ultimate meaning with three parts: (1) a conceptual analysis, (2) the claim that the extension of the concept is empty, and (3) a proposed fitting response, namely being very, very sad. Weinberg’s conceptual analysis of ultimate meaning involves two features that jointly make it metaphysically impossible, namely (i) the separateness of activities and valued ends, and (ii) the bounded nature of human lives. Both are open to serious challenges. We offer an internalist alternative to (i) and a relational alternative to (ii). We then draw out implications for (2) and conclude with reasons to be cheerful about the prospects of a meaningful life

Don’t Worry, Be Happy: The Gettability of Ultimate Meaning

Rivka Weinberg advances an error theory of ultimate meaning with three parts: (1) a conceptual analysis, (2) the claim that the extension of the concept is empty, and (3) a proposed fitting response, namely being very, very sad. Weinberg’s conceptual analysis of ultimate meaning involves two features that jointly make it metaphysically impossible, namely (i) the separateness of activities and valued ends, and (ii) the bounded nature of human lives. Both are open to serious challenges. We offer an internalist alternative to (i) and a relational alternative to (ii). We then draw out implications for (2) and conclude with reasons to be cheerful about the prospects of a meaningful life

Goodness: Attributive and predicative

There is little consensus concerning the truth or reference conditions for evaluative terms such as “good” and “bad.” In his paper “Good and Evil,” Geach (1956) proposed that we distinguish between attributive and predicative uses of “good.” Foot (2001), Thomson (2008), Kraut (2011), and others have put this distinction to use when discussing basic questions of value theory. In §§1-2, I outline Geach’s proposal and argue that attributive evaluation depends on a prior grasp of the kind of thing that is evaluated, which is another way of saying a prior grasp of a thing’s nature. In §§3-4, I discuss the evaluation of artifacts, which provide the clearest examples of attributive evaluation. This allows me to address a series of problems apparently facing the idea of attributive goodness. In §5, I consider the neo-Aristotelian idea that we can extend attributive accounts of goodness to human lives, and I pay attention to Foot’s account of natural goodness. This leads me to consider the goodness of human life as a whole in §6. At this point. I depart from Geach’s approach and argue that questions of attributive goodness finally give rise to questions of predicative or absolute goodness.Il y a peu de consensus sur la vérité ou les conditions de référence pour les termes évaluatifs tels que « bon » et « mauvais ». Dans son article « Good and Evil » (1956), Geach a proposé de distinguer les usages attributif et prédicatif du « bon ». Foot (2001), Thomson (2008), Kraut (2011) et d’autres considèrent qu’il faut utiliser cette distinction lorsqu’il s’agit des questions fondamentales de la théorie de la valeur. Dans les parties 1-2, je décris ici la proposition de Geach et je prétends que l’évaluation attributive dépend d’une compréhension préalable du genre de chose qui est évaluée, ce qui est une autre façon de dire une compréhension préalable de la nature d’une chose. Dans les parties 3-4, je discute de l’évaluation des artefacts, qui fournissent les exemples les plus clairs d’évaluation attributive. Cela me permet d’illustrer une série de problèmes apparemment liés à l’idée de la bonté attributive. Dans la partie 5, je considère l’idée néo-aristotélicienne voulant que nous puissions étendre notre compréhension de la bonté attributive aux vies humaines, et je me penche sur l’idée de bonté naturelle selon Foot. Cela me conduit à considérer la bonté de la vie humaine comme un tout, dans la partie 6. De là, je m’éloigne de l’approche de Geach pour affirmer que les questions de bonté attributive suscitent finalement des questions de bonté prédicative ou absolue