The Telos of Consciousness and the Telos of World History

This article explores the way in which Husserl’s transcendental idealism reverses the thesisstemming from the naturalistic worldview, according to which the existence of humanity in the universe is a contingent fact. It will appear that the resulting teleological account of the world history does not interfere with the traditional explanations provided by the empirical sciences and that it is a consequence of the teleology inbuilt in the correlation between transcendental subjectivity and the world. The conclusion is reached by analyzing some of Husserl’s text concerning the transcendental role of embodiment and normality

Husserl's early concept of metaphysics as the ultimate science of reality

This article reconstructs the development of Husserl’s definition of metaphysics as the ultimate science of reality in the courses and lectures written up the year 1905. The analysis of these texts casts light on Husserl’s philosophical self-understanding in the wider context of late Nineteenth Century German philosophy as well as on the fundamental role that metaphysical interests played in the development of his thought from its earliest stage. A particular attention is devoted to Husserl’s early views of the relations between theory of knowledge and metaphysics, whose analysis is a necessary preliminary step to address the theoretical issue of the relation between transcendental phenomenology and metaphysics

The telos of consciousness and the telos of world history

This article explores the way in which Husserl’s transcendental idealism reverses the thesis stemming from the naturalistic worldview, according to which the existence of humanity in the universe is a contingent fact. It will appear that the resulting teleological account of the world history does not interfere with the traditional explanations provided by the empirical sciences and that it is a consequence of the teleology inbuilt in the correlation between transcendental subjectivity and the world. The conclusion is reached by analyzing some of Husserl’s text concerning the transcendental role of embodiment and normality

Scientific Realism and the Contingency of the History of Science

In section 2 I will reconstruct the antirealist motivations of the classic contingentist scenarios developed by James Cushing and by Andrew Pickering; in section 3, by taking into account some versions of scientific realism that are more sophisticated than those discussed by contingentists up to now, I will clarify the logical relations of compatibility and incompatibility existing between contingentism and inevitabilism on the one hand, and scientific realism and antirealism on the other; in Section 4 I will try to spell out the specific contribution of contingentist historical reconstructions to the critique of scientific realism; finally, in Section 5, I will recapitulate the results of the article and argue that the conflict between contingentist antirealism and scientific realism can be seen as a clash of inferences based on interpretations of the history of science. This article will thus consist of a philosophical meta-analysis of a controversy existing between different meta-scientific investigations

The Crisis of Philosophy and the Meaning of the Sciences for Life

Despite the significant number of critical analyses devoted to the subject, the precise definition of the famed crisis-notion that lies at the heart of Husserl’s last work remains controversial. The aim of this article is to defend and expand the account of Husserl’s notion of the crisis of philosophy and of the resulting crisis of the European sciences that I have developed in a number of publications. This will be done by further exploring the notion of the meaningfulness of the sciences for life as well as its relation to their scientificity. Based on this result, I will then respond to some objections advanced against my proposal, and I will present further arguments to the effect that the crisis of philosophy consists in the collapse of its pretension to be scientific, and the consequent crisis of the European sciences consists in the resulting enigmatic character of their scientificit

Philosophy’s Nature: Husserl’s phenomenology, natural science, and metaphysics

This book offers a systematic interpretation of the relation between natural science and metaphysics in Husserl’s phenomenology. It shows that Husserl’s account of scientific knowledge is a radical alternative to established methods and frameworks in contemporary philosophy of science. The author’s interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy offers a critical reconstruction of the historical context from which his phenomenological approach developed, as well as new interpretations of key Husserlian concepts such as metaphysics, idealization, life-world, objectivism, crisis of the sciences, and historicity. The development of Husserl’s philosophical project is marked by the tension between natural science and transcendental phenomenology. While natural science provides a paradigmatic case of the way in which transcendental phenomenology, ontology, empirical science, and metaphysics can be articulated, it has also been the object of philosophical misunderstandings that have determined the current cultural and philosophical crisis. This book demonstrates the ways in which Husserl shows that our conceptions of philosophy and of nature are inseparable

Husserl and the Truth of Hedonism

The question of the relationship between Husserl and hedonism is a broad one. One might be tempted to say that it is as broad as the question of a phenomenological ethics as such. Accordingly, the aim of this short paper cannot be that of providing a full account—be it historical or systematical—of such a relationship. Rather, we will try to reconstruct, as much as this is possible in the limited space allowed, the strategy behind Husserl’s appraisal and criticism of hedonism in his late Freiburg lectures. We will focus in particular on the way in which Husserl redefines some core tenets of ethical hedonism and unexpectedly integrates within the rationalistic framework of a phenomenological ethics revolving around the central notion of value

Edmund Husserl between Platonism and Aristotelianism

The volume contains the first collection of essays delaying with the relations between, on the one hand, Husserl's philosophy, and, on the other, the traditions of Platonism and Aristotelianism

Chapter Tracce stratificate sulle murature storiche. Tra interpretazioni e ipotesi ricostruttive

The 43rd UID conference, held in Genova, takes up the theme of ‘Dialogues’ as practice and debate on many fundamental topics in our social life, especially in these complex and not yet resolved times. The city of Genova offers the opportunity to ponder on the value of comparison and on the possibilities for the community, naturally focused on the aspects that concern us, as professors, researchers, disseminators of knowledge, or on all the possibile meanings of the discipline of representation and its dialogue with ‘others’, which we have broadly catalogued in three macro areas: History, Semiotics, Science / Technology. Therefore, “dialogue” as a profitable exchange based on a common language, without which it is impossible to comprehend and understand one another; and the graphic sign that connotes the conference is the precise transcription of this concept: the title ‘translated’ into signs, derived from the visual alphabet designed for the visual identity of the UID since 2017. There are many topics which refer to three macro sessions: - Witnessing (signs and history) - Communicating (signs and semiotics) - Experimenting (signs and sciences) Thanks to the different points of view, an exceptional resource of our disciplinary area, we want to try to outline the prevailing theoretical-operational synergies, the collaborative lines of an instrumental nature, the recent updates of the repertoires of images that attest and nourish the relations among representation, history, semiotics, sciences

Calibration: A Conceptual Framework Applied To Scientific Practices Which Investigate Natural Phenomena by Means of Standardized Instruments

This paper deals with calibration in scientific practices which investigate relatively well-understood natural phenomena by means of already standardized instrumental devices. Calibration is a crucial topic, since it conditions the reliability of instrumental procedures in science. Yet although important, calibration is a relatively neglected topic. We think more attention should be devoted to calibration. The paper attempts to take a step in this direction. The aims are two-fold: (1) to characterize calibration in a relatively simple kind of scientific practices; (2) to provide conceptual and taxonomic tools of broader scope that help to get a better understanding of calibration in more complex cases and other kinds of scientific practices. For this purpose, we first provide indications for why a conceptual framework is needed. Second, a bibliographic survey of works dealing with calibration is attempted. Third, we introduce different tools to enable a better understanding of calibration. Fourth, we turn to the elaboration of what we call a ‘‘simple exemplar’’ of calibration, illustrated through the case of the calibration of an equal-arm balance. Fifth, the tools previously introduced, and the framework of the simple exemplar, are applied to a more complex case of calibration: calibration procedures in X-ray experiments. This serves to show the work accomplished by the simple exemplar and to emphasize features of more complex cases of calibration. Eventually, we revisit and specify the nature, status, scope and value of the proposed framework