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The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy XV – 2017

Edmund Husserl between Platonism and Aristotelianism

Aim and Scope: *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.

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Edmund Husserl between Platonism and Aristotelianism

Edited by

Daniele De Santis

Emiliano Trizio

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Editors' introduction

Daniele De Santis and Emiliano Trizio

According to the so-called "Linati schema", produced by James Joyce in 1920 in order to help his friend Carlo Linati better grasp and understand the fundamental structure of *Ulysses*, Chapter 6 of the actual "odyssey" is dedicated to the two mythical sea monsters "Scylla" and "Charybdis". It is 2 p.m., Leopold Bloom is in the National Library and, as Joyce explains to his friend, those two sea monsters stand here for "Plato" and "Aristotle" or, better, they represent the "Scylla of Platonism" and the "Charybdis of Aristotelianism". Our Ulysses, Bloom, is being caught in the crossfire of Russell, who firmly believes that "the deepest poetry of Shelley, the words of Hamlet bring our mind into contact with the eternal wisdom, Plato's world of ideas", and Stephen, who harshly says that "that model schoolboy", i.e., the Stagirite, "would find Hamlet's musings about the afterlife of his princely soul, the improbable, insignificant and undramatic monologue, as shallow as Plato's".[1]

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It is precisely by keeping this section of the *Ulysses* in mind that we wrote the "call for papers" for the 2016 issue of the *Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*. Indeed, the essays published in the present volume should be taken as a first attempt to systematically raise and address the question as to the philosophical, more than just historical, relation between Edmund Husserl and the two fathers of Western philosophy *tout court*, namely, Plato and Aristotle; therefore as to the presence and influence of what are usually referred to as "Platonic" and "Aristotelian" tradition upon his thought. As the reader will immediately realize, the contributions cover a wide range of different problems and themes, running from ethical issues to history of logic, from pure theoretical topics (e.g., the notion of "analogy" in connection with more ontological concerns, or the status of the notions of essence and *eidos*) to those of practical philosophy and variations thereupon. Furthermore, they cover themes that were explicitly the object of Husserl's own reflection, as well as topics of original comparative analysis.

In a time in which the term "phenomenology" (regardless of its being Husserlian or other) seems to be characterized by what we would label "semantic indeterminacy", if not even "vagueness"; in which any and every philosophical position can be accompanied by the adjective *phenomenological* without any satisfactory explanation of why this should be the case; in which, in other words, *phenomenology* seems to be understood as a mere "method" or approach (e.g., as a "first-person approach"), or as a "style of philosophizing", the editors of the present volume firmly believe in the

1 J. Joyce, *Ulysses* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1993), 178–179.

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necessity of reading Husserl anew in order to explicitly recast his project and philosophical agenda. Faced with the difficulty of finding a place in the contemporary philosophical arena for Husserl's phenomenology, we have decided to try an alternative path. Indeed, rather than taking as a starting point the current debates about, say, philosophy of mind, new realisms, or cognitive sciences, we decided to approach a philosopher like Husserl in relation with traditional themes and historical figures (i.e., in relation to what philosophers used to refer to, and without guilt, as *philosophia perennis*). Accordingly, the present volume should be taken as the editorial expression of a deeper discontent with the *status quo* of Husserl scholarship, which tends to adopt a piecemeal attitude so as to single out such and such a specific, more digestible, or fashionable aspect of his philosophy that can "still" play a role in the current philosophical babel, which is granted the right to single out the legitimate philosophical questions as well as the methods to address them. By contrast, our concern was not, and has never been, whether Husserl can be still considered modern or "suitable": our main goal being to understand his profundity, even if by current philosophical standards it will turn out to be utterly *unzeitgemäß*.

The untimely character of Husserl's philosophy was in no way the result of intellectual isolation, anachronism, or even lack of interest for the historical trajectory leading to our philosophical present. Far from this, it was the mark of a radical attitude towards the historically situated character of philosophy: Husserl's thought was untimely because it was not lost in the present, subdued by it, just as much it disdained a purely exegetical attitude towards philosophy.

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It is of course well known that Husserl, also due to his intellectual biography, did not write much about past thinkers. It is also well known that his interest for history in general, and for the history of philosophy in particular, grew through the years. But, even without delving into the complex topic of the evolution of his relation to these fields, one is forced to acknowledge that Husserl never believed that the present academic interests had to dictate the philosophical agenda, nor, on the other hand, that the study of the history of philosophy could, by itself, pave the way to any real philosophical accomplishment. "History is an instructive book for the expert who knows how to read it. Who has no philosophy can also learn nothing from it,"[2] wrote Husserl back at the end of the nineteenth century. While, at the final moment of his career, he maintained that "we must understand past thinkers in a way that they could never have understood themselves" (Hua VI, 74). Between these two distant stages of Husserl's reflection, we find the more and more self-conscious attempt to develop philosophy as a radical enterprise that is possible only in virtue of one's embeddedness in a specific cultural tradition, namely, the philosophical one, and to view such philosophical tradition itself as transparent and meaningful only to those who are guided by the personal motivation of embracing it and responding to its internal, and often hidden, driving ideals.

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Because the tradition in question is the one initiated in Ancient Greek and culminating and in the conflicting figures of Plato and Aristotle, the task of situating Husserl's thought with respect to the legacy of these two thinkers is part of the effort of understanding phenomenology "from within", foregrounding its internal conception of

2 "Die Geschichte ist ein lehrreiches Buch für den Kundigen, der sie zu lesen versteht. Wer keine Philosophie hat, kann aus ihr auch nichts lernen" (Hua-Mat III, 228).

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philosophy and the enduring motives that define it. In other words, it is part of the effort to let phenomenology speak to the present in its own language, rather than forcing it to speak in the language of the present.

We are grateful to the editors of the journal, Burt Hopkins and John Drummond, for giving us such an opportunity, to all the contributors and their patience and, last but not least, to Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray (University of Guelph) for her translation of, and introduction to Reinach's fragment on the notion of essence that we publish here as an appendix.

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Part I

Essays

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1 Phenomenology's Platonic configuration[1]

Thomas Arnold

Abstract: How do we determine Husserl's proximity to Plato and Platonism? Any answer obviously depends on what we mean by "Platonism". The present paper represents an attempt at determining in what sense, and to what extent, Husserl's phenomenology as a whole can be considered a form of Platonism. Now, since the proximity of any thinker to Plato can never be determined by mapping just particular definitions, but only by mapping these as well as their connection, in order to answer the question as to how close Husserlian phenomenology is to Platonism we just need to look at all his theories in all areas of philosophy, see whether they map to Platonism, preferably Plato himself and whether the connection between the different particular theories and theses, i.e. their architecture, also correlates.
Keywords: Husserl, Plato, theory of Forms, philosophy, eidetics

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Configuration and transposition

How do we determine Husserl's proximity to Platonism? Any answer obviously depends on what we mean by "Platonism". In analytic philosophy for example, "Platonism" is almost exclusively used to refer to a certain family of realist positions in the discussion about universals and mathematical objects, vaguely related to the original theory of Forms (see Balaguer 2014, Linnebo 2013). "Platonism" in this usage is therefore an umbrella term for views regarding specific philosophical issues. It would appear that the debate on Husserl's Platonism in this sense is more or less settled, since Husserl's transcendental idealism prohibits casting him for either side straight away, but he exhibits a form of embedded or "constituted Platonism" (Tieszen 2010), i.e. Platonism translated into the transcendental register – a situation similar to that regarding the internalism/externalism divide (see Zahavi 2008).

Historically, "Platonism" has been also used as an umbrella term, but has been usually taken to denote a whole type or configuration of philosophy, i.e. a set of interconnected theses and arguments, ranging over all areas of theoretical and practical philosophy, forming a complete world-view and indeed a way of life – a philosophy in

1 This chapter presents some of the core ideas of my dissertation (entitled "Platon's Bastard. Systematische und historische Untersuchungen zu den Platonischen Elementen der Philosophie Edmund Husserl's") defended at Heidelberg University in July 2015, supervised by Prof. Dr. H.C. Jens Halfwassen and Prof. Dr. Alexander Schnell, and published as *Phänomenologie als Platonismus* (De Gruyter) in 2017.

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the eminent sense of the word. Cornerstones of Platonism as a philosophy seem to include an intellectualist ethics, a theory of forms and the idea of the absolute, as well as an enmity towards naturalism, relativism and scepticism (see Gerson 2013). Since Platonism is a configuration rather than just a set of regional theories, all theses of Platonism are connected. Platonic ethics, for example, is not just a form of intellectualism, demanding the rule of reason and thought before action, but qua being Platonic it implies Platonic ontology: being reasonable means organising one's life and soul in accord to the Form of virtue, a demand which in turn implies Platonic psychology as well as Platonic epistemology, since we need non-sensual faculties to gain insight into the Form of virtue if we are to live by it. And since the objectivity-claims inherent in Platonic ethics exclude scepticism, Platonic ontology and epistemology combat any train of thought liable to lead to a sceptical position. Platonism as a whole is therefore necessarily an anti-naturalist and anti-relativist undertaking.

The notion of Platonism as a configuration leaves enough conceptual leeway to accommodate several individual systems of thought within the fold of Platonism as long as they satisfy the cornerstone demands of Platonism, even though their details might contradict each other up to a certain point; Plato was a Platonist, but certainly not the only one (cf. Gerson 2013). In this way, Aristotle for example is a better Platonist than say, Arcesilaos or Carneades, both of whom, while being heads of the academy, endorsed scepticism.

The proximity of any thinker to Platonism as a configuration can never be determined by mapping just particular definitions or even arguments concerning a certain topic from the writings of a thinker to either the Platonic dialogues or the reconstruction of the unwritten doctrine or later Platonist texts, but only by mapping these as well as their connection. Put less technically this means there is no Platonism in regard to something, but just Platonism *tout court*, although in many different versions.

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So, to solve the question of how close Husserlian phenomenology is to Platonism we just need to look at all his theories in all areas of philosophy, see whether they map to Platonism, preferably Plato himself and see whether the connection between the different particular theories and theses, i.e. their architecture also correlates. But apart from the fact that this is not feasible within the constraints of an essay, is this idea of configurational analysis at all applicable to two thinkers so far apart, historically and systematically? Where, for example, Aristotle's philosophy might be considered to show a configuration similar to Plato's, transcendental phenomenology seems so far removed from Platonic metaphysics that any attempt of a global comparison instantly collapses on the border of modernity erected by Descartes, mined by Hume and fortified by Kant. Since Husserl is a self-proclaimed late child of all three, no leeway seems to be broad enough to fit the last grand transcendental theory of subjectivity into a Platonist framework.

Even though the antiquity–modernity divide is highly problematic in general and thinkers like Plotinus already used quasi-transcendental strategies to attack scepticism (see Gabriel 2009), it would indeed be mistaken to expect a complete and direct match between Husserl and Plato or any other ancient Platonist. Instead we should look for something else. Three metaphors might help to understand the seemingly paradoxical idea of a phenomenological Platonism. Just as textual configurations (essays, poems, whole books) can be translated and musical configurations (melodies, themes, whole pieces) can be transposed into a different key, so the philosophical configuration of Platonism might be transposed into a different philosophical key. To use a metaphor

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from geometry, the configurations of Platonism and phenomenology might appear orthogonal, but could turn out to be congruent – once seen from the right angle. Put in terms of yet another, genealogical metaphor, the seeds of Platonism might be sown in modern soil and its genes might express themselves differently in this modern context. This means we should not just expect identical theses from Plato and Husserl but look for programmatic, functional and architectural equivalences instead; should the cornerstones of Platonism really be inherent in Husserl's thought (alongside more modern ideas), they will appear in the guise of a "modern transformation" (Hopkins 2010, 1), partially translated into modern language, adapted and transposed to match the philosophical situation of Husserl's day.

Several researchers have found isolated strands of these Platonic traits in Husserl, yet I believe it can be shown that Phenomenology as a whole is at its core the expression of Platonic genes (or *genê*) in the environment of subjectivity-theory – and that Husserl knew this full well. And while I do not intend to prove these very far-reaching theses in this paper, I will try to show in rough outline how we might go about proving them by employing the ideas of configuration and transposition to make sense of the Platonic streaks embedded in Husserl's thinking. To this end, I will focus on six areas I hold to be of interest in these matters: 1. Philosophy and Science, 2. Philosophy and Culture, 3. Philosophy and her Enemies, 4. The Way Into Philosophy, 5. Eidetics, 6. The Elusive Absolute. Finally, I will point out how all these particular theses and theories are tied in to form a distinct gestalt of philosophy instead of merely a collection of thoughts.

Philosophy and science

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Husserl refers to Plato as the founder of philosophy proper as the one to turn towards questions of method and the onto-epistemological a priori of science, mathematics and philosophy itself (Hua XXVII, 80; cf. Hua VII, 296, 328; Hua VIII, 324, 362; Hua IX, 3; Hua XXIX, 156; Hua XXXII, 196; Mat. IX, 32 and elsewhere). And indeed Husserl develops the same constraints on science and philosophy, in the transcendental register.

Plato sketches his views on the relationship between philosophy and science, especially mathematics, mainly in the *Republic*, book 7 and the *Theaitetos*. His criticism concerns the fact that all sciences turn a blind eye towards their onto-epistemological conditions of possibility and never question their presuppositions (Rep. 510C). This blind spot is no contingent feature of science, but a necessary one, since all sciences need to make initial assumptions: Mathematics – the example used in the *Republic* – as a formal, axiomatic enterprise works from axioms and certain logical rules. Moreover, the questions concerning the ontological status of mathematical objects remain unasked, as well as the questions regarding the exact epistemological nature of mathematical method and mathematical knowledge. The former seems to be the main thrust of the passages in the *Republic*, the latter is apparent in the fact that the young and obviously gifted mathematician Theaitetos is not capable of answering the question of what knowledge is in the eponymous dialogue; he is also unable to give an account of being without the help of the unnamed stranger from Elea in the *Sophist*, thus portraying the onto-epistemological (not onto-epistemic) dependency of all sciences on philosophy.

At the core of these onto-epistemological charges lies the accusation that all sciences lack the understanding of (their) *archê*. This ultimate condition of possibility for all epistemic endeavours and all being in general is a presupposition that cannot be

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questioned any more (Phaed. 101D). It is the point at which no further reflection is possible, it is the ground for everything, itself ungrounded, i.e. the absolute. Only dialectic can reach it and become transparent to itself (Rep. 533C). And since this kind of transparency and understanding of the absolute seems to be a condition for true science and true knowledge for Plato, only philosophy can provide the basis for all proper epistemic enterprises; forming the "capstone (*thrinkos*)" (Rep. 534E) of all epistemic endeavours.

Husserl has read the relevant passages in the *Republic* as well as in the *Theaitetos* thoroughly, as can be learned from the markings in his Plato-editions (cf. BQ 366, 370 from his library at Leuven) and several quotes and references throughout his work. He credits Plato (rightly) not just for pointing these issues out and setting a quasi-transcendental programme for philosophy and establishing philosophical logic as a theory of knowledge, truth and method, but for actually doing some work toward our onto-epistemological understanding of the conditions of possibility for science and philosophical research. Husserl also sees his own work on formal ontology in line with Plato's considerations of the *megista genê* in the *Sophist*, the *Theaitetos* and the *Parmenides* (Mat. IX, 55; Hua XVII, 90). In general, he holds phenomenology to be the "historical connection to Plato, the creator of the idea of philosophy as a universal system of absolutely justified knowledge and the forerunner of an antecedent rational science of method" (Hua XXXV, 365). Phenomenology "realizes [. . .] the intention of Plato's dialectic. For this was the original idea of logic, it was supposed to be a doctrine of method preceding all true science" (Hua XXXV, 302; cf. 372) In short, Husserl believes his philosophy to be the "Endstiftung" of Plato's "Urstiftung" of philosophy as a science and as the foundation for all science, because phenomenology alone can meet the demands Plato initially formulated for any true science (Hua VII, 36, 42; Mat. IX, 23).

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The main difference between Husserl and Plato is therefore not so much programmatic in nature, but rather a systematic issue, since Husserl believes Plato's programme of an absolute onto-epistemological reflection can only be carried out by transposing all issues into a transcendental key through phenomenological reduction (Hua VIII 214): "All ontologies are idealist-transcendental ontologies" (Hua VIII, 482). Platonic metaphysics is in this sense naive or self-forgotten (Hua VIII, 227, 356).

Philosophy, the self and culture

Husserl and Plato both hold philosophy to be the power that brings out the telos and true self of every individual and – in analogy – mankind (see Drummond 2010). Their ethical and political thoughts aim toward a philosophical culture.

For Plato, the sciences are necessarily blind to ethical issues (Euthyd. 288A et seq.) Only philosophy offers understanding of virtues, since only philosophy gives us access to the Forms; in this way, true ethical justification is only possible as philosophy. At the same time, philosophy strives to awaken our 'inner man' and to give it dominion (Rep. 586E) so we might have true control over ourselves (Phaed. 108; Phaedr. 256B). Freedom is only achieved once we subdue our desires and orient ourselves towards the Forms; this process is the "likening to God (*homoiosis theo*)" (Theaet. 176B). Our orientation towards the Forms also allows us to constitute a stable self, since the Forms do not change – in contrast to our desires. This enterprise of making mankind more reasonable is obviously no private endeavour, but concerns the whole of society and also affects society as a whole, as the *Republic* tells us.

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According to Husserl, the inability of science to attend to ethical issues and give meaning to our lives is a consequence of their "crisis"(Hua VI, 4). This, again, is no contingent feature of science; anticipating Horkheimer and Adorno, Husserl sees not a "dialectic" but a "Tragik" at work in the development of the sciences as they need to become more specialised, technical, or mechanical to advance, while specialisation, technicalisation and mechanisation at the same time force the big ethical and metaphysical questions out of their reach: "So technicalisation and specialisation are necessary and at the same time – if the counter-motion of a clarification of our total horizon, i.e. the philosophical universe, is lacking – a deterioration" (Hua XXVII, 209; cf. Hua XXXII, 178). Only phenomenology is capable of enabling humanity to follow the "categorical imperative" to be "a true human, to lead a life thoroughly justifiable, a life based on practical reason" (Hua XXVII, 36). As with Plato, this "authentic" life (Hua XLII, 394) is a life of "self-government" (Hua XXVII, 39) oriented towards objective values and norms. And similarly to Plato (see Held 2010), Husserl also conceives of the teleological process of reaching our true selves as a path towards the divine (Mat. IX, 29; Hua XXVII, 33; Hua XLII, 168, 175–6): "The essence of the person is clarified by the telos of rational autonomy, or, to put it metaphorically, by the ideal of becoming God." (Welton 2000, 323)

Unlike Plato however, Husserl does not offer us any details of a pedagogical programme, although he sees the need for one (Hua XLII, 442), generally keeping fairly vague on his political ideas (Schuhmann 1988, 186). He also abstains from advocating the reign of a philosopher king (Rep. 473C); instead of particular philosophers, philosophy itself must reign, with the philosophers acting as "functionaries of mankind" (Hua VI, 15) and the "representatives of spirit" (Hua XXVII, 54), i.e. as the ones tasked with administering reason to each and all.

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Philosophy and her enemies

Philosophy fights on (at least) three fronts: a) unquestioned tradition, b) naturalism, and c) sophist scepticism. Husserl understands Plato's as the initial philosophical reaction to all three and sees phenomenology as the final (Platonic) answer to them.

a) Traditionalism is represented mainly by Anytos, whose behaviour, although he appears only twice, namely in the *Apology* and the *Meno*, serves as a stark contrast to Socrates' life, and to a philosophical life in general. As many of the dialogues contain confrontations with sophists, one might be inclined to think of them as philosophy's worst enemies. But on a closer look, the sophists at least enter the game of giving and asking for reasons; some of them are rather disagreeable people, like Kallikles, yet most of the sophists engage Socrates on an equal, if not actually friendly footing. Sophism is itself a reaction to earlier brands of philosophy, and most of the sophists make use of Heraclitean or Parmenidean ideas; in this sense they are on the side of reason, even if they employ their means for unethical ends. But Anytos never even enters the game. Especially in the brief episode of the *Meno* he shows himself to be utterly unwilling and seemingly unable to engage in rational debate (Men. 92B). He misunderstands Socrates, hears his values and beliefs belittled, gets angry, threatens him and leaves. And in the end, he is responsible for the judicial murder of Socrates. It is the way of life Anytos exemplifies that Socrates has in mind when comparing himself to a "barb", keeping the "noble, but lazy horse of Athens" awake (Apol. 30E).

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b) Naturalism is represented mainly by the "earth-born" of the *Sophist* (Soph. 248C), by Anaxagoras in the *Phaedo* and the atheists in Book X of the *Laws*. Naturalism in Plato basically means the denial of the existence of anything not accessible by the senses. This position is dangerous for two reasons. Firstly, it occludes important issues due to its one-sided ontology. Anaxagoras for example is unable to explain why Socrates stays in prison, speaking only about "bones and sinews" instead of the good (Phaed. 98B). I take this to mean that Anaxagoras lacks understanding of normativity and the space of reasons. The earth-born in the *Sophist* in turn miss the sphere of the ideal by clinging to that which can be perceived by the senses. So naturalism has – in Plato's eyes – no resources to do either ontology or ethics.

c) Sophist scepticism comes in two flavours, positive and negative. The relativism of Protagoras is a positive scepticism insofar as it generates too much truth: everything is true that appears to be true, even contradictory propositions, which in turn leads to doubts whether objective knowledge is attainable. Plato deals with this relativism in the *Theaitetos* by retorsion (Theaet. 170E). Gorgias' sceptical theses are negative insofar as they deny existence, knowability and the possibility to communicate truth. Plato never directly deals with this, but the *Sophist* might be read as an implicit answer to Gorgias, since it lays out a fundamental (positive) theory of being, logos and truth, thus de facto opposing Gorgias.

Husserl full-heartedly accepts these lines of conflict. It is a hallmark of philosophy never to accept any opinion without question and Husserl explicitly includes traditional beliefs and values in the scope of philosophical inquiry (cf. e.g. Hua VI, 333); as a philosopher "I divest myself of all tradition" (Mat VIII, 225). In fact Husserl believes that challenging merely "traditional validity" (Hua XXVII, 189) is the beginning of philosophy itself. This antagonism will play out in the political sphere (Hua VI, 335). And according to the motto "tolerance [. . .] for religions, but intolerance for theologies" (Cairns 1976, 52, 57), the fight against traditionalism includes defiance of religious authority as well (Hua XLII, 182).

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Naturalism, the reduction of everything to natural facticity, for Husserl is just the result of a methodological step gone down the wrong path, as natural science indeed needs to stick to that part of experience that can be idealised and expressed in mathematical models; naturalism however illicitly turned this into the only criterion for being, spawning the problems Plato discovered (Hua VI, 52), especially the "blindness towards ideas (Ideenblindheit)" (Hua III, 49; Mat. IX, 151 FN 2). The danger of naturalism lies in these and other consequences, namely scepticism and relativism.

Husserl's own personal relativistic enemy presents a slightly more refined version of relativism than the Protagorean one, yet psychologism actually exhibits the very same underlying structure (Hua XVIII, 130). The main difference between Husserl and Plato lies in how they deal with scepticism as a whole. Husserl accuses Plato of missing important transcendental impulses hidden in the sophistic arguments, thus missing the importance of subjectivity in general (Hua VII, 60; Hua XXV, 127). Then again, Husserl would say that, since he's unable to see the virtues of any ontology-first approach in philosophy.

The way into philosophy

Philosophy is not just an extension of ordinary thought, it has to interrupt it and turn or lead it toward the realm of philosophical inquiry through certain moves. This schema

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(interruption – reduction) is common to Plato and Husserl, even though the foils they use to illustrate it differ, as where Plato opposes philosophy to nihilist politics, Husserl mainly contrasts philosophy with positivist (natural) science (see Sokolowski 2008).

Philosophy initially is not characterised through a set of doctrines; when Socrates denies any activities of teaching in the *Apology* (Apol. 23C), we have to take him very seriously in that he doesn't impart some orthodoxy to students, but rather tries to exemplify a certain stance. This stance is one of radical justification, it calls for the ability to give reasons (*logon didonai*) for all judgements and actions. It also calls for absolute reflection, for the search of the *archê*. It is directed towards the Forms, not their mundane instances. Only this stance or attitude grants us access to real philosophical, i.e. eidetic knowledge; the change of attitude is therefore an essential precondition for gaining substantial insight and the systematic formation of knowledge. The philosophical stance is however unnatural or detached from ordinary life; Aristophanes' caricature of Socrates in the *Clouds* is mainly based on this otherworldliness of the philosopher. This raises the questions of motivation and methodos: why would anyone want to do philosophy and how can one even enter into it, i.e. what ways lead into philosophy?

Plato seems to think that the motivation for philosophy cannot be implanted from the outside. Either you are driven by Eros or not. All the "teacher" can do is to wake your desire, lead by example and engage in dialectical discussion with the hopeful soul, thus assisting in the birth of thought (Theaet. 148E). The most important technique to rouse souls is certainly to lead them into *aporia* (see Erler 1987). How someone reacts to such a situation determines whether he or she is philosopher-material: some get angry, some just don't get it and a precious few become thoughtful. The cognitive interruption of *aporia* finds expression in several powerful images throughout the dialogues, namely the paralysis caused by the electric ray (Men. 97E), the philosophical death of the *Phaedo* and of course, the unchaining of the prisoner in the cave (Rep. 515C).

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After the interruption has taken place, the confused philosopher-to-be is lead towards his or her proper dwelling, i.e. the cosmos of the Forms. This reductive philosophical ascent constitutes a radical change of the universe of discourse: while the non-philosophers still deal with mundane objects or mathematical objects at the most, the philosophers think solely about the Forms (Rep. 511C) and – finally – the absolute. The philosopher is led back (re-ducere) from the mundane instances to the ontologically prior Forms.

In its modern guise, philosophical reduction does not lead towards the cosmos of Forms but to the sphere of transcendental subjectivity; where the dialectical philosopher is potentially concerned with all essences, even that of the fisherman (Soph. 218E), the phenomenologist is only interested in the "eidetic study of transcendental subjectivity" (Hua VII, 183). Yet the way from the natural attitude into phenomenology shares the two-step structure of interruption and reduction with the Platonic way into philosophy. Similar to dialectic, phenomenology rests on a certain unnatural stance which is obtained through a radical "cognitive interruption" (Arp 2004, 225) of normal or ordinary thinking, i.e. the epochê (Hua III, 67), which is "a universal modification of naturalness" (Mat. VIII, 119). And just like the philosophical death in Plato this "act of rupturing" (Ricoeur 1967, 95) ends our "being children of the world (Weltkindschaft)" (Hua VIII, 123) and "de-humanizes" (Fink in Dok. II/1, 44) us. The universe of discourse then changes radically through the phenomenological reduction

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(cf. Rinofner-Kreidl 2003, 97). Husserl himself draws the obvious analogy between the Platonic ascent and the disclosure of the "sphere of transcendental experience" (Hua I, 29; Hua VIII, 301) several times by using Platonic imagery (Hua V, 140; Hua VIII, 167, 270; Mat. VII, 166, cf. Arp 2004, 222; Ricoeur 1967, 94).

While Husserl at some point held the epochê to be a free act that can be undertaken by anyone at any time (Hua III, 65), he later rejected this view. Being a philosopher is a "life from an absolute calling" (Hua VIII, 11); our "affinity" (Hua VIII, 16) to answer this call is however not in our disposition to choose: "The Daimon leading us to our true vocation speaks through love" (Mat. IX, 146 FN 1) The "hunting Eros" (Hua VIII, S. 336) is the inaccessible driving force of philosophy; we do it "'out of love'" (Hua VIII, 13).

Eidetics' due – Das Eigenrecht des Eidetischen (Hua III, 146)

Plato and Husserl both conceive of philosophy as the move from a vague, empty and implicit everyday understanding of certain abstract terms ("virtue", "being", "knowledge", "perception", etc.) to a clear, full and explicit philosophical understanding of the corresponding essence. Philosophy is thus a non-mathematical eidetic science, tasked to bring about the immediate understanding or presence of essences.

The term "theory of Forms" seems to imply that said doctrine is – qua theory – a substantial result of profound philosophical enquiry. I believe it is not. Rather it is the presupposition of profound philosophical enquiry, since you have to accept that there are ideal entities you can discover before engaging in dialectical discussion, because dialectical discussion is just discussion of Forms rather than singular mundane objects (Par. 135D). Also, the doctrine of Forms is hardly complex enough to be called a theory. I believe the doctrine of Forms to be part of Plato's methodology, not a result; only the onto-epistemological discussions in later works like the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* point toward a proper theory of Forms.

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Of more interest then is the question of access to the forms. They are ideal objects, so sensual perception can never reach them (Phaed. 78E); but at the same time we cannot calculate or compute them, as they are non-mathematical entities. So how do we gain access to them? On the one hand, Plato employs sensual metaphors, mostly visual: eidetic knowledge is vision of the Forms (Rep. 479E). On the other hand, he places a lot of weight on the ability to give accounts and explanations of the objects of knowledge; this ability is in fact a necessary condition for knowledge (Lach. 190C; Alc. I, 118D; Men. 98A; Rep. 534B). So conceptual, dialectical mediation and quasi-visual immediacy seem both to be features of our access to the Forms (see Heffernan 1998, 21). "Seeing" a Form means to understand it in a way that allows you to explain it, just as visual presence allows you to describe an object. So noetic vision conditions discourse. To gain noetic vision, however, you need to engage in dialectical discussions; if you don't discuss concepts, you will never get close to the Forms meant by the concepts. So discourse conditions noetic vision. Eidetic discourse is the only method available to philosophy and in its course one might gain insight into eidetic structures. Such a vision of Form in turn constitutes a resource to be used in discourse etc. Giving reasons (logon didonai) and "seeing" Forms are intertwined activities. At the same time, Plato offers a first theory of an onto-epistemological correlation in his analogy of the divided line: noetic vision and knowledge only take Forms as their proper objects (Rep. 511D).

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Husserl notoriously appropriates the Platonic vernacular of "Ideenschau (in more modern terms: in eidetic evidence)" (Mat. IX, 43; cf. Landmann 1941, 19), although he claims that his eidetic approach is free of any "metaphysical substructions" (EU, 411; Hua XX/1, 282) or "mythical confusions" (Mat. IX, 61); I believe this is true of Plato as well, as he thoroughly deconstructs any attempt to reify the Forms in the first half of the *Parmenides* and the "gigantomachia" (Soph. 246A) of the *Sophis*t. Platonic Forms and Husserlian essences are not real in the sense of material things but objects of thought (Hua III, 48). This in turn does not mean they are identical to thought, "noem" (Par. 132B), either; a proper understanding of essences steers clear of both the major misinterpretations (Hua XIX/1, 127) that eidetic philosophy has faced throughout its history, namely the Scylla of reification and the Charybdis of mentalisation or nominalism.

Husserl refines the Platonic approach by adding a detailed theory of evidence, which unifies perceptual vision, judgement and noetic vision under the structure of intentionality, and by developing his idea of eidetic variation – a technique Husserl finds to be at work already in Plato as Socrates "freely variegates" (Mat. IX, 25) examples, where this "modification of examples" (Mat. IX, 27) is lead by the essence intended (Mat. IX, 26). But while instances of eidetic variation can indeed be found in the dialogues (e.g. Io 533A; Lach. 191A; Gor. 490A), Plato employs it differently than Husserl, namely to generate counter-examples. From a Platonic point of view, Husserl puts too great a weight on the mere seeing or contemplation of essences via eidetic variation and tends to downplay or ignore the possibility or need of critique as well as "intersubjective corroboration" (Gallagher, Zahavi 2008, 28), while in fact the self-givenness of the eidos and the giving and receiving of logos are mutually dependent – in phenomenology as well as in dialectic.

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> The eidos's appearance is the origin of logos in so far as it is that which is referred to when logos makes sense and is therefore understandable. And this appearance is the goal of logos in so far as rendering it more apparent and thus clarifying the eidos is the aim of all logos.
>
> (Hopkins 2010, 21).

The phenomenological transposition of eidetics consists in the shift towards a theory of constitution, i.e. Tieszen's "constituted Platonism". It is important to stress the fact that this shift does not constitute an anti-platonic turn in Husserl's late writings, since the genetic theory on the constitution of essences is concerned solely with the givenness of the eidos instead of its ontic properties. Since anything given is necessarily given in the "form of temporality" (EU, 304), even an eidos has its "Gegebenheitszeit" (EU, 316), yet this has no import on its noematic sense of being a "transtemporal unity" (EU, 313). "Husserl's assessment of mathematical (and other categorial) objectualities in Erfahrung und Urteil does not lead to any sort of constructivism, but at most to a refinement of his platonistic conception" (Haddock 1987, 97).

The elusive absolute

Plato and Husserl equally demand an absolute foundation for philosophy that is at the same time a founding on the absolute, called '*archê*' by both (Rep. 511A, 533C; Hua VII, 169). It turns out that although their conceptions of the absolute are in a way

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orthogonal to each other (the One vs. the Ego), the absolutes of Husserl and Plato share important traits.

Philosophy needs to incorporate a theory of a first principle (Rep. 533C), since it is supposed to be foundational for all theoretical and practical purposes. This first principle is absolute, otherwise it would be conditioned by something else and therefore not the first principle. In the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* Plato develops the consequences of positing the One as absolute (cf. Krämer 1959, 1972; Gaiser 1998; Halfwassen 1992). The absolute One turns out to be – nothing. It has no features, no determinations, no name (Par. 141E). This should not be surprising, as the absolute is supposed to be the absolutely unconditioned origin of everything (Rep. 511B), transcending being (Rep. 509B).

As an unconditioned non-entity it also needs to be undetermined, but being undetermined means it has no determinate features. The One thus withdraws from objectualisation and indeed naming and is at the same time the source of all unity (see Halfwassen 2006, Part 2).

Husserl also calls for a theory or "science of the absolute" (Hua XLII, 248), since all sciences, currently nothing more than a "situational affair" (Cairns 1976, 81), "will only become absolutely grounded sciences once a descent is achieved from their beginnings and foundations towards the ultimate grounds, ultimate beginnings, towards the true archai" (Hua VII, 169). Phenomenology as "archaeology" (Mat. VIII, 356) is thus the attempt to uncover the "font" (Hua XXXVI, 70) of all being and all meaning. However, according to our transposition-hypothesis, the phenomenological absolute cannot be identical with the metaphysical absolute (cf. Boehm 1959, 216); Husserl's monadology is not Plato's henology. Transcendental (inter-)subjectivity differs in at least three ways from the transcendent One. Husserl's absolute is so to speak perspectival, it constitutes the world in its lived experiences and there are, in a way, many absolutes; in these regards, it is decidedly unplatonic.

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But like Plato's One, Husserl's Ego in its core withdraws itself. It is the basis for all "ontification or objectivation" (Mat. VIII, 198). "In this sense it therefore is not an 'entity', but the counterpart for everything that is, not an object, but that towards which every objectuality is projected [Urstand für alle Gegenständlichkeit]" (Hua XXXIV, 277) The Ego can never be fully objectified, determined, or even named (Mat. VIII, 2, 187), since all objectualisation and determination presuppose an Ego and names can only attach to fully formed entities:

> The Ego should not actually be called Ego, and not be named at all, for then it would be objectified. It is that which is nameless above all things conceivable, that which neither stands above or hovers above or is above, but that which "functions".
>
> (Hua XXXIV, 277)

As it constitutes time and experience, it is pre- or even non-temporal (Mat. VIII, 197, 446) and non-empirical. Thus Husserl's absolute, while not Platonic in some regards, is still the non-empirical, non-objectual, non-nameable, pre-temporal, unity-giving principle of philosophy – traits obviously shared with Plato's absolute One and its further conceptualisations in neo-platonism (see Derrida 2011, 12).

And unlike Descartes' *cogito*, but just like Plato's One, Husserl's absolute is not an axiom or "initial theorem" (Ricoeur 1967, 141), but the primordial well of all

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constitution and the epistemically last ground for all epistemic endeavours beyond which our questions lose any meaning.

Configuration and conclusion

Up to now, we have been mainly trying to sketch how Husserl more or less consciously translates, adapts and transposes certain core-ideas of Plato into the transcendental register. To see how they form phenomenology's Platonic configuration we need to understand how they are connected. The first two ideas are programmatic in nature, setting out the goals for philosophy, namely providing absolutely rational foundations for all theoretical (1) and practical (2) endeavours mankind might take on by securing the objectivity of values and logical norms through means of reflection. Which enemies philosophy has to fight (3) follows immediately from these goals, as any rationalist, objectivist and foundationalist world-view necessarily opposes scepticism and all positions potentially leading towards it. Since ordinary or mundane scientific and ethical thought can be shown to lack the conceptual resources to clarify and secure themselves, an interruption and a consequent realignment regarding the universe of discourse (4) are needed if philosophy is to succeed in attaining its goals. Philosophical work as pursued from this new stance aims at clarifying certain concepts used but not understood in the natural attitude, as well as at understanding the real world outside the cave or the "deep dimension" (Hua VI, 121) of constitution. For the rationalist however, only immediate eidetic evidence and a priori knowledge (5) will be clear and epistemically strong enough to suffice in these quests for explication and understanding. Finally, only a theory of the absolute (6) will satisfy the foundationalist demands laid out earlier, for only with the anonymous absolute can philosophical inquiry come to rest.

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Our results also allow us to view the big divide between Plato and Husserl, namely the concept and role of the transcendental subject or ego, in a different light. In view of the Platonic configuration of phenomenology, the transcendental-subjectivist design of phenomenology might still be the "point [en ce] que se situe l'opposition décidée de la phénoménologie au platonisme traditionnel" (Souche-Dagues 1974, 356), but it is not any longer to be considered a "point decisif" (Lowit 1954, 336) of absolute divergence, where Husserl's phenomenology and Plato's metaphysics become completely incompatible. Husserl rather tries to pick up Plato's "Leitidee" (Hua VIII, 30), giving it a "new meaning" (Hua VIII, 28) and fulfilling it through his phenomenology (Hua XXXV 362):

> We can interpret his turn to the subject not as an innovation but as a return, in a modern vocabulary, to the perennial philosophical issue. [. . .] If Husserl was to turn to first philosophy, he had to do so within the setting given him by his day and age. He had to think through the turn to the subject.
>
> (Sokolowski 2010, 8/20)

All cornerstones of Platonism mentioned in the introduction are present in Husserl's phenomenology, the particular theories map, at least in transposed form; they also connect in a similar way and even form a larger programmatic unit. Thus phenomenology should be considered Platonic in configuration, a "historical tie to Plato" (Hua XXXV, 365) and the proximity of Husserl to Plato as correspondingly close – as Husserl himself thought: "My life and that of Plato's are one. I continue his life's work, the

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unity of his efforts is an element of my efforts; his striving, his will, his designs perpetuate themselves within my own." (Hua XIV, 198) The problems this endorsement of Plato's (fundamentalist – normative – metaphysical) philosophy generates within Husserl's (critical – descriptive – metaphysically neutral) phenomenology need to remain the topic for another essay.[2]

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2 See §§ 6, 9, 13, 17, 22 and 25 of Arnold 2017 for critical reflections on the different elements of Husserl's Platonism.

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2 Husserl's reform of logic

An introduction

Carlos Lobo

Abstract: The aim of this chapter is to re-evaluate the position of Husserl in the history of logic and, without dismissing the most elementary rules of a historical critique, to argue in favour of a wider and deeper approach to history. Standing by the side of some major commentators such as Gödel or Rota, and following the contributions of others in recent decades (such as Jean-Yves Girard), and following the major steps of the framing of this project in Husserl, I endeavour to show that it has to do with the status of modalities, understood not as an extension of classical logic, but as its hidden core.
Keywords: Husserl, logic, Plato, modality, *eidos*

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The goals of this chapter are primarily historical and belong in the history of philosophy, but I hope that it could be taken also as a contribution to a revisionist history of logic. Whatever their success, Husserl's repeated attempts to delineate what he calls "pure logic" as a theory of ordinary and scientific knowledge could not be fairly excluded from the modern history of logic. Contrary to a majority statement, I argue in the following that Husserl was not only philosophically investigating *about* logic and mathematics, but had in fact a revisionist view if not on both, at least on logic and, which is still more, that he had given some achievements in that sense. Many commentators had started giving evidence not only of the direct influence exerted by Husserl on various logicians (from Łukasiewicz[1] to Per Martin-Löf[2]), but also of the spontaneous convergence between the tasks detailed by Husserl under this heading and some achievements from the part of working mathematical logicians, many times "unaware of Husserl's pioneering work". This minority view received in the 1990s support from Gian-Carlo Rota, who pointed explicitly at this project, in a key paper, "Husserl and the reform of logic", and reviewed some of the phenomenological concepts which should be integrated as logical, formal, radically new concepts. Among those fundamental concepts one should mention, the foundation (*Fundierung*) relation, "which ranks among Husserl's greatest logical discoveries", as well as concepts underpinning and veiled by the set theoretical relations $\subseteq$ and ϵ such as "a lacks b, a is absent from

1 As Richard Tieszen summarizes in is Husserl's logic, *Handbook of the History of Logic*. Volume 3, eds. Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods, 2004 Elsevier, p. 208. On Łukasiewicz, Lesniewski, see, for instance, Jean-Louis Gardies, *Esquisses d'une grammaire pure*, Paris, Vrin, 1975, pp. 21–24 (English version: *Rational Grammar*. Translated by Kevin Mulligan Munich Vienna, Philosophia Verlag, 1985).

2 Cf. "On the Meanings of The Logical Constants and the Justifications of the Logical Laws", in *Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 1, 1, pp. 11–60.

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b (one could describe in precise terms how this differs from the classical 'a r b'), a reveals b, a haunts b (as in 'the possibility of error haunts the truth'), a is implicitly present in b, 'the horizon of a', and so on, and so on", or else, the relation of object to past and future such as they are thematised in the lessons in *Time Consciousness*. Although partially formalised or informal in the usual sense of the term, they could with little effort meet and even surpass the standard of rigor of mathematical logic: "it falls to us to develop the technical apparatus of genetic phenomenology (. . .) on the same or greater a standard of rigor than mathematical logic."[3]

Commentators have failed to acknowledge this because they considered that the new logic to which Husserl referred had already been achieved (be it the sound part of Hilbert's logic or another form) and/or that phenomenology neither pretended to reform logic nor was it able to propose any new formal logic,[4] but occasionally restricted itself, at most, at founding, deriving, or elucidating it, in a new way, that is, with a reformed transcendental logic. This view is *hardly supported* by the reading of lessons supposedly developing the program set up in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. It is *compromised* if we draw the consequences from the theory of formalisation, which stems from the transcendental investigations.[5] And last it is contradicted by Husserl's clear statements: Formal logic is the "self contained discipline" and the universal investigation of the categorial realm, according to its forms, and the pure law determined by these forms, "laws of the true existence of states-of-affairs". Hence, it is not limited to categorial relations between objects whatever their type, but must be extended to all types of relations (inclusively non-categorial): such as *inversions* of categorial relations by application to empirical states-of-affairs, or as conversion of their apophantic form into normative or technical prescriptions, or *implications* of relations in second-level objectivations where the *terms* are implicit unarticulated states-of-affairs, which are also "analytical". The "formal classification of relations" applies to the very idea of "objectlike formation" and its "fundamental types", such as the "difference between *individuum* and *eidos*" or that "between categorial and non-categorial objectlike formations".[6] Consequently, the project of a *critique of formal logic* implies "its reform in order to obtain a complete universal (formal) ontology".[7] Be it considered from the set theoretical perspective or another one, "formal ontology" remains "as a problem". In order to cope with it, formal logic must be extended far beyond the

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3 "Rota, Husserl and the Reform of Logic. Discrete Thoughts", *Essays on Mathematics, Science, and Philosophy*, Mark Kac, Gian-Carlo Rota, Jacob T. Schwartz, Birkhaüser, 2008, p. 171.

4 This view has been dominant in the French epistemological tradition since Cavaillès, *Sur la Logique et la théorie de la science* (1949), eds. Georges Canguilhem and Charles Ehresmann. Paris: PUF, 1946 (1960, Vrin, 1976, 1997, 2008) ["On Logic and Theory of Science", trans. Theodore Kisiel. In *Phenomenology and the Natural Sciences: Essays and Translations*, eds. Joseph J. Kockelmans and Theodore J. Kisiel. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970] and has diffused abroad, through Suzanne Bachelard, *A Study of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic*, tr. Lester Embree, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, 1990.

5 *Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, tr. Anthony J. Steinbock, Dordrecht/Boston, MA/London: Kluwer, 2001, pp. 2, 6–7.

6 *Formale und Transzendentale Logik, Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*, ed. P. Janssen, Husserliana, Vol. XXVII, M. Nijhoff, 1974 [hereafter: *FTL*], pp. 343–344.

7 See complementary Text VII to *FTL*, not already translated into either in English or French: "*Kritik der formalen Logik und ihre Reform zu einer vollen universalen Ontologie*" (*FTL*, p. 416). The manuscript proceeds from the Bernau investigations, and is presented in the following terms: "*Reflections completing the 1918 attempts to find a path to the analytic formal logic formal logic of individuation. – Introduction to the critique of formal logic and its reform into a fully universal ontology*" (p. 497).

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limited domain of modern classical logic. Although Husserl delivered rather few fully formalised or axiomatised logic, the first task of a coherent and not naive formal logic should be precisely to elucidate the very notion of *form* and discern between real and mere literal formalisation.[8] No sound reform of logic should be undertaken at a least cost.

Fostered by these remarks, we should pursue, looking for other under- or unexploited resources. These are not limited to the realm of genetic, and passive syntheses (such as that of evidence-making, modalisation, for-predicative determination, without forgetting association) or else to what Husserl calls sometime the "formal primordial constitution" (*die formale Urkonstitution*), by which he understands a formal stratum of his transcendental aesthetics: time and space consciousness and their manifold modifications. A perfect example of spontaneous exploitation of these resources is given by the history of geometry from Euclides and Thales to Riemann and Grassmann and beyond, from the constitution and development of the first accessible metric, topological, projective and affine structures to the enlarged and deeper view of modern mathematics. The real modifications of time consciousness have started to be tackled only recently, among others, with Einstein's relativity theory. Much more is still to be done.[9] It is not only in genetic phenomenology, that one can find analytical resources still largely underexploited, but already in the so-called "static phenomenology" (from which is borrowed the concept of *Fundierung*), amongst other "consciousness *functions*" and "consciousness *modifications*" which represent the *true elementary components* of the phenomenological analysis of the infinite variety of lived experiences (*Erlebnisse*) or acts of consciousness.[10] Other elements could be likely candidates to the status of logical concept, or at least of tools helping us eventually in entering into the fine and deep substructure of classical logical concepts such as *proposition*, *inference*, *deduction*, *demonstration*, *term*, *concept*, etc. as well as classical mathematical concepts such as *set*, *number*, *partition*, *inclusion*, etc. Once seized the relation between the phenomenological structures of acts and the morphology of meanings, propositions and syntactic connexions, it is evident that a proper and adequate formalisation of other structures of acts should lead to new logical forms.[11]

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8 "Die formale Arithmetik ist nichts als ein 'literaler Formalismus' (wie Du Bois es so treffend bezeichnete)" (Ms. K I 36, p. 37), quote from Vincent Gérard, in "*Mathesis universalis et géométrie*: Husserl et Grassmann", in *Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences, Essays in Commemoration of Edmund Husserl*, eds. Carlo Ierna, Hanne Jacobs and Filip Mattens, Springer, 2010, p. 274.

9 See, for instance, the suggestive approach of S. Livadas, "The Transcendence of Time in the Epistemology of Observation from a Phenomenological Standpoint", Manuscrito (Revista Internacional de Filosofia), 34, 2, pp. 435–469, especially, § 5. A deeper phenomenological view of the character of temporality, in *Contemporary Problems of Epistemology in the Light of Phenomenology, Temporal Consciousness and the Limits of Formal Theories*, College Publications, London, 2012.

10 Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Burch, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*, ed. W. Biemel, M. Nijhoff, 1950, The Hague, p. 212, p.[176]: "§. 86. Die funktionelllen Problem": "However the most important problem is the *functional problem*, i.e. that of the "constitution of objectities of consciousness" (. . .) 'Function', in this sense (which is totally different from the mathematical one), is something fully original, founded in the *essence* of the noeses." See also p. 219, pp. [181–182] ff. for the distinction between real intentional components of the *Erlebnisse*, functions as performances (*Leistungen*) (such as *Blickrichtungen der Ich*, *Erfassung*, *Festhaltung*, *Explizieren*, *Beziehen*, *Zusammengreifen*, *Stellungnahmen des Glaubens*, *Vermutens*, *des Wertens*, etc., and their non-real (*nicht reelle*) correlates: the so-called noemas.

11 E. Marbach, "Towards a Formalism for Expressing Structures of Consciousness", p. 57, in *Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science*, Springer, eds. Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Schmicking, Springer, 2010, J. Petitot points out, for instance, that the concept is explicit in Husserl (although not

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Another strategy could be to elucidate phenomenologically *logical spontaneous formations* and show that, "to some extent", they proceed from insights into some phenomenological substratum, i.e. into forms of subjective activity. From that point of view, it seems, as suggested by Rota, that some part of Husserl's explicit project of reform of logic has been carried out by him, or with him, but another (greater) part has been carried out, without him, or even without knowing him. This underground history of logic developing underneath, hidden from the daylight of the official history of logic, would be fully understandable in the frame of a phenomenological analysis of historical consciousness and historicity and the description of the subjective constituting logical activity. This is confirmed by recent contributions such as that of M. Okada or Stathis Livadas.[12]

I have already indicated elsewhere[13] the link between this reform of logic and the formal problem of individuation. In the following, I shall first focus on the eidetic and modal core of classical logic, such as it is understood and exposed by Husserl.

In a second instance, I shall show how this is met by recent contributions in logic, i.e. the light linear logic of Jean-Yves Girard. While doing so, I shall try to shed light onto the very special meaning of "platonic" associated with the eidetic claim in Husserl's work.

The modal composition of *eidos*

At least from 1913 onward and converging with Natorp, Husserl is led "to profess idealism",[14] i.e. a form of "Platonism". But if something like a "turning point" has taken place in between, around 1909, it is rather a "turn" *within* an idealistic or "Platonist" path than a conversion to it.[15] Or better, instead of a "turning point" or of a "turn", we should rather talk of an *inflection* and deepening, i.e. of a certain change in the *emphasis* (*Betonung*), which has something to do with the introduction of modalities (and probabilities) in the core of science and of pure logic considered as a theory of

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always formalized) [le "groupe est conceptuellement explicite chez Husserl (mais toujours non formalisé)"], "Géométrie et vision dans *Ding und Raum* de Husserl", *Intellectica*, 2004/2, 39, pp. 139–167, p. 155.

12 S. Livadas, "The Subjective Roots of Forcing Theory and Their Influence in Independence Results", *Axiomathes, Where Science Meets Philosophy*, Springer, 2013; Dordrecht, 25, 1, March 2015. As to the sustainability of certain Platonic claims, we can recommend the preprint: "Some Platonic ontological claims under a phenomenological point of view", February 15, 2013, http://stathislivadas.gr/images/livadas_Some_Platonic_NUOVA_CRITICA_9-38_20131.pdf.

13 "Phénoménologie de l'individuation et critique de la raison logique", *Annales de Phénoménologie*, 2008, pp. 109–142; "The Husserlian Project of Reform of Logic and Individuation", *Proceedings of the 41st Annual Husserl Circle Meeting*, New School for Phenomenological Research, NY, www.husserlcircle.org/HC_NYC_Proceedings.pdf, pp 86–102.

14 "Entwurf einer 'Vorrede' zu den *Logischen Untersuchungen*" (orig. 1913), *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 1 (1939), 106–133, 319–339 (cf. HUA XX/1, 272–329) p. [110].

15 The lessons on *Logik und allegemeine Wissenschaftstheorie from 1917/18* were first given in 1910/11 (*Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie Vorlesungen 1917/18 mit ergänzenden Texten aus der ersten Fassung von 1910/11*, Husserliana XXX, ed. U. Panzer, Kluwer, 1996) and proceeded from the materials published under the title *Alte und neue Logik*, from 1909 (*Alte und neue Logik*, Materialien, VI, Vorlesung, Wintersemester 1908/09, Springer, 2003). See particularly, on Platonism: ideas in Husserl's sense are "as common things as stones and streets" (*Logik und allegemeine Wissenschaftstheorie from 1917/18*, p. 34) and represent the foundation of logic (p. 36), a logic enlarged by integration of modalities of belief and believed: "This gives way to an enlargement of the Idea of a pure logic which includes now a logic of the possibilities and of the probabilities" (p. 29).

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science. I won't go through all the aspects of that inflection, for it would imply an historical and systematic survey of the main part of phenomenology: the theory of noetic modifications, among which the modalisations of belief but also of feeling and willing, and their correlates play a central role. Strangely enough, we find among very good specialists of Husserl a resistance in counting "modalisations" (and correlatively modalities) among modifications (*Modifikationen, Abwandlungen*). This point is nevertheless beyond any doubt, it occurs at least throughout *Ideas I*. Husserl talks explicitly of "thetic modifications" and considers "*Die doxischen Modalitäten als Modifikationen*".[16] The systematic exploration of real and intentional modifications belong to the functional (or "modificational") view point "which is the central view point of phenomenology"[17] and in it the sphere of position modifications (or thetic consciousness), or else the realm of positionality[18] which, combined with the neutrality modification,[19] constitutes the core of a phenomenology of reason (logical if we restrict this core to the doxic thesis or positions) and axiological and practical if we take into account as well the axiological and practical thesis, or positions, that is, if we take into account the fundamental types of positionalities corresponding to the different fundamental species of consciousness.[20] The conversion within his Platonist path is reflected at various levels. One of the most astonishing is plainly stated in the analysis around the intuitive presentational and representational acts, and is summed up in a short text entitled "Belief as impression" (*Glaube als Impression*). Since neutrality is a modification of belief, which leaves the other constitutive moments unchanged, the original act of objectivation is belief, the "free, not inhibited objectivation, the original objectivation (thus the not inhibited 'apprehension') = belief", states Husserl.[21] This must be translated into logical terms: denotation as belief.

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My point is only to naming and qualifying more precisely that new *emphasis* and showing how the scope of ideation itself and, correlatively, in which sense the status and the very nature of the *eidos* have been changed.

To put it briefly, we could present this change in the following way. In the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*, particularly in the *Prolegomena*, the *eidos* (species or essence) (which is not assimilated to a concept) is admitted, but conceived as non-modal (as a mere pole of identity and objectivity). In 1913, in the *Ideas*, a manifold

16 Title of § 104, of the *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Burch, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*, K. Schuhmann, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, Den Haag, § 104. In the following, unless otherwise specified, quotes are from this edition. Pages indicated in square brackets are from the original edition of the *Jahrbuch*.

17 *Ideen I*, 197, [176].

18 *Ideen I*, p. 304 [273], p. 333, [299].

19 *Ideen I*, p. 264 [237], p. 268, [241], p. 270 [242], p. 277, p. [249].

20 *Ideen I*, p. 269 [241–242]), p. 280 [252]), p. 287 [258–259].

21 *Phantasie, Bildbewusstseins und Erinnerung, Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen, Texte Aus dem Nachlass (1898–1925)*, Husserliana, Vol. XXIII, ed. E. Marbach, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1980, pp. 218, 228. The inversion is visible in the *problemata* formulated in Hume's terminology: "Die Probleme, welche den 'Überschuss über die Erscheinung' betreffen. Zunächst der Charakter der 'Setzung' und die parallelen Charaktere, die unter dem Titel Nichtsetzung stehen. Oder ist Setzung ein allgemeiner Charakter, der Glaube, Unglaube, Zweifel, Anmutung etc. betreffen müsste, und daneben die zu ihnen allen gehörigen Modifikationen: Impression – Idee?" (*op. cit*., p. 236). "The problems that concern the 'surplus beyond the appearance.' Above all, the characteristic of 'positing' and the parallel characteristics that lie under the title 'non positing.' Or is positing a universal characteristic that would have to touch belief, unbelief, doubt, deeming possible, and so on, and all of the modifications belonging to the as well: impression – idea?", in Husserl, *Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898–1925)*, in Collected Works, ed. R. Beret, trans. J. B. Brough, Springer, 2005, p. 289.

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modal dimension has been *integrated*, *incorporated*, so to speak, into the *eidos* as such. Correlatively, ideation is not limited any more to the mere evident, certain and apodictic grasp of the *eidos*, as it is the case in Bolzano's and Frege's Platonism. But above all, and this is the most striking and promising aspect of this inflection, this integration entails many immediate and deep epistemological and logical consequences: (1) a totally different definition of pure logic and a different determination of its tasks; (2) since philosophy and mathematics contribute each one in its own way to the elaboration of this logic, accordingly, this inflection gives way to a totally different division of labor between philosopher and mathematician. (3) One of the most remarkable results of this shifting of boundaries is undoubtedly the complete change of status of "probability". (In the *Prolegomena,* the logic of probability is explicitly referred to a treatise on probability calculus by Johannes von Kries, but falls out of the sphere of pure logic. From von Kries, Husserl adopts, among others, the probabilistic concept of range (*Spielraum*),[22] the distinction between ontological and nomologic disciplines,[23] and a theory of objective (i.e. physical) possibility and objective probability.[24])

This inflection is explicitly and publicly outlined, in the first lesson of *First Philosophy* (1923),[25] in the middle of developments on Plato, and in a note to the 35th paragraph of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929).

Having just set out the "pure ideas" ascribed to Plato and thus sketched the main features of Plato's *eidos*, Husserl interpolates, in this "critical history of ideas", an almost polemical digression, which indicates the main limits and failings of Platonism and platonic eidos thus conceived. As *eidos* means, according to Plato "the totality of all that really is"[26] as it is known and conversely the totality of what is knowable as it really is, the whole set of Plato's ideas suffers from an *essential lack* which the logical tradition inherits and which impedes it, whatever its claim, to be a "logic of truth". This gap, which Aristotle's analytic tried but did not manage to fill in, proceeds from the exclusion of modalities from the core of logic, and from the restriction, in the definition of truth, to the conditions of consistency understood as "preservation from

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22 Cf. note by K. Popper who notices it in his *Logic of Scientific Discovery*, significantly, but for opposite reasons, silences the name of Husserl as well as that of Wittgenstein and Reichenbach: "The concept of range (*Spielraum*) was introduced by von Kries (1886); similar ideas are found in Bolzano. Waismann (*Erkenntnis* 1, 1930, pp. 228 ff.) attempts to combine the theory of range with the frequency theory; cf. section 72. *Keynes gives (*Treatise*, p. 88) 'field' as a translation of '*Spielraum*', here translated as 'range'; he also uses (p. 224) 'scope' for what in my view amounts to precisely the same thing." A complementary view is proposed in "The Origins of the Logical Theory of Probability: von Kries, Wittgenstein, Waismann", Michael Heidelberger, *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 15, 2001, pp. 177–188.

23 Cf. Von Kries's *Principien der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung* (1886) are quoted twice in the *Prolegomena, Logische Untersuchungen, Erster Band*, *Husserliana*, Band XVII, ed. Elisabeth Ströcker, M. Nijhoff, 1975, pp. 234 and 235.

24 *Prolegomena, op. cit*., pp. 180–182. But later on their meaning will also change. And many other changes will follow which depend intimately on them: a different status of the *mathesis universalis*, enlargement and deepening of the theory of manifolds, new interpretation of the distinction between nomologic and axiomatic completeness (*Definitheit*), etc. Cf. *FTL*, pp. 101–102.

25 *Erste Philosophie, Erster Teil (1923/24)*, Husserliana, Vol. VII, M. Nijhoff; 1956, The Hague, p 24. 26 and 29

26 "Der Gesamtinbegriff aller in möglichem echten Erkennen zu erzielenden an sich gültigen Wahrheiten bildet notwendig eine theoretisch verbundene und methodisch ins Werk zu setzende Einheit, die *einer* universalen Wissenschaft. Das ist im Sinne Platons die Philosophie. Ihr *Korrelat ist also die Totalität alles wahrhaft Seienden*", *Erste Philosophie*, E. Ströker ed.,Husserliana, Vol. VII, M. Nijhoff, 1956, p. 13; emphasis added).

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contradiction". Since *ideation* is nothing more and nothing less than the apodictic, i.e. demonstrative knowledge of the known (*eidos*),

> [I]t follows [from that restriction] that the concept of truth and the *concepts of possibility*, *impossibility or necessity do not belong truly speaking to the formal discipline* which must be here delimited in its purity, i.e. the discipline which deals with the essential conditions of absolute non-contradiction and of thought carried out following the law of pure consequence.
>
> (*Erste Philosophie*. pp. [21–22]; emphasis mine)

This restriction is precisely what has ever since prevented logic from knowing "how judgements can reach material adequacy" and "how one can decide of truth and falsehood".[27] This strong assertion is repeated later on more explicitly. The formal logic which we inherited from Aristotle "does not at all include yet amongst its theoretical elements the concept of truth and its derivatives and modalities", i.e. "concepts such as possibility, necessity, probability, and so forth, with all their negatives". From this "very significant failing" (*sehr bedeutsamer Mangel*), ensue historically great imperfections in logic, especially "in its methodological procedures". Husserl declares therefore this "restriction" "inadmissible" (*unzulässig Beschränkung*).[28] Husserl's grievances against traditional formal logic also concern the most recent developments in logic (Natorp, Lotze, Bolzano,[29] Frege, Russell[30]).

It results from this limitation that modalities do not contribute in the constitution of "objective meaning", in the meaning of what must be understood as object and objective, but only intervene, and at most as secondary determinations, as mere "qualities" (*Qualitäten*) (of acts of judgement) or, which amounts to the same, as "modalities". In the "proposition as the logician understands it", objective meanings function only "as substrate for properties attributed to them (absolutely or hypothetically, or under conditions, with certainty, presumably, probably, and so forth)". And this same restriction prevails in "mathematical analytics (in set theory, in arithmetic, in manifold theory)". From this ensue "some *methodological altogether radical failings*" in the way in which logic deals "with the idea of truth and true being, as well as other essential ideas connected with them as their modal variants".[31] One among them consists in considering these modal variants as mere modes of *givenness*, and as such relegated in turn into the realm of subjectivity considered from a psychological and empirical point of view – the realm of sense data, of representation and opinion (*impressions*, *ideas* and *belief*, in Hume's sense).

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27 *Op. cit.*, p. 25.
28 *Op. cit.*, p. 26.
29 See respectively, for Lotze and Bolzano, *Vorrede*, Hua XX/1, pp. 296, 298.
30 Putting the dispute between Frege and Husserl in this light would be too lengthy for here. We can limit to the critique from Gödel's article from 1944, which sheds light both on this aspect. Concerning the existence of classes, concepts and propositions, the rules and syntaxe of definitions, the theory of denotation in Russell, before and after the no-class theory, and in comparison to Frege's conception, see K. Gödel, "Russell's Mathematical Logic", in *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, ed. P. A. Schilpp, The Library of Living Philosophers, Tudor Publishing Company, New York, 1944, pp. 125–153, re-ed. S. Feferman, in Gödel, *Collected Works, Vol. II, Publications 1938–1974*, eds. S. Feferman, J. W. Dawson, S. C. Kleene, G. H. Moore, R. M. Solovay, and J. van Heijenoort, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 120 *et seq*.
31 *Op. cit.*, p. 30; emphasis added.

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Henceforth, the *eidos* taken in its traditional sense is the traditional heading of a first and rather schematic determination of the "known" as such, restricted to the objective sense excluding every modes of givenness, taken for merely subjective and as such irrelevant. Yet, for want of taking into account these so-called "subjective modes" in all their components and performances (*Leistungen*) (i.e. productive modifications), and especially their intentional ones, the discovery of scientific knowledge is restricted to the "sole knowledge of apodictic truth", with the result that the transition from the imperfect subjective modes of apprehension to the evident grasp of truth, from vague distant *doxa* to *noesis* appear only as a mortal leap of an unheard-of violence, which leaves the reader of the Cavern Myth somewhat astounded. In Husserl's view, logic without becoming historical or empirical must explore "the immense diversity of concrete life unfolding in man in the course of his intellectual work", the immense diversity of "processes in which he lives without seeing them"[32], and this can't be achieved without taking into account modalisations.

For having failed until now in doing so, logic has always been facing a controversial and even puzzling question relative to the affective modes parallel to the modes of givenness afore mentioned, but at the same time intimately interwoven with them.[33] This is the second important aspect of Plato's failing in his discovery of eidetic. Quite rightly, he was fascinated by the predominance in theoretical and practical life of the doxic sphere. But for that reason, Plato's dialectic did not succeed in giving a satisfactory account of affective modes and, above all, of what is *constituted* in them (I didn't say, nor did Husserl, "objectified" by them): values in the broadest sense,[34] which can be subsequently objectified. For example: when I am hungry, the *eatable* or *worth eating* is not aimed at as an object, although it presupposes and is founded on a perception or an expectation of a certain meal. Surely, Plato did revolutionise the treatment of practical and political questions by disclosing the leading role of the *eidos* – and, correlatively, of authentic science.[35] They figure as foundations for norms, as constituents and criteria for every spiritual activity. Husserl agrees with Plato on that point: "eidos functions as an absolutely unassailable norm for the fact" (*als absolut unübersteigliche Norm fundiert*).[36] But he fails to see the contribution of the doxic subjective modes to the *constitution* of objective sense and did not see the contribution of the non-doxic modes (i.e. of the affective and practical subjective modes) to this same objective meaning either. This is why formal axiology and formal praxis have remained a *desideratum*.[37] This is all the more the case for the phenomenological clarification of the conditions of possibility of such extensions of objective meaning, and therefore of the roots of a practical and axiological reason.

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32 *Op. cit*., pp. 39–40.

33 The answer to such a "controversial question", related to the normative turn of pure logic, obviously depends on the solution of another controversial question concerning the expression of non-objectifying acts. (Cf. my paper, "L'*a priori* affectif (I), Prolégomènes à une phénoménologie de la valeur", *Alter*, 14, 2006, pp. 35–68.

34 *Op. cit*., p. 47. Cf. my paper, "Introduction à une phénoménologie des syntaxes de conscience", *Annales de phénoménologie*, 2010, Association pour la Promotion de la phénoménologie, pp. 117–163

35 *Einleitung in die Ethik, Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920/1924*, Husserliana, Vol. XXXVII, ed. Henning Peucker, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2004, pp. 36–38.

36 *Ideen* I, p. 335 (transl. mine).

37 *Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre*, *Husserliana*, Band XXVIII, ed. U. Melle, Kluwer, 1988, p. 11.

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But as it clearly appeared in 1929, this critic of Plato's logic is in fact an auto-criticism of his own Platonism in the *Logical Investigations*, for, on the other hand, Husserl reproaches this essay, and particularly the first volume, with having limited the idea of science to the only domain of deductive theories. And he adds in a note:

> It is a *fault* of the exposition in the *Logische Untersuchungen* that this thought was not made central by repeated *emphasis*, despite the fact that it continuously determines the sense of the whole exposition. A more serious fault of the *Prolegomena* is, by the way, the following:
>
> > In connection with the concept of truth the modalities of truth are not mentioned, and probability is not cited as one of them. When they are taken into account, an enlargement of formal logic becomes necessary; to the effect that, as universal formal possibilities, modal variants of judging and of judgements *enter into certainty – or truth-logic* – because any such variant can enter into the predicational content of the judgement and, when it does, it *must not be regarded as extra-formal*. In other words, *only the content that goes beyond anything-whatever is the 'matter' (Materie) of judgements*, in the sense proper to formal logic; all the forms in which one judges – not only with certainty but also in the mode of possibility, or in other modalities – *belong to anything-whatever*. A kindred enlargement results from taking into consideration *the fact that feelings and volitions also bring modalities of anything-whatever, which are introduced in the same manner into the doxic sphere*.
> >
> > (On this last point *cf. Ideen*, pp. 243 ff [English translation: pp. 531]. Also § 50, pp. 135 ff., *infra*.; emphasis mine)

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In order to understand these statements properly, and take the full measure of Husserl's *reform of formal logic*, let us sketch briefly the contrast between the *Prolegomena* conception of ideas and that of the *Ideas I*. The *eidos* in the scope of what Husserl in the *Prolegomena* calls "pure logic" is somewhat monolithic and akin to Natorp's essence of ideas (or ideality) in general and mathematical ideas in particular. Natorp writes in his *Logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften* (1910) that:

> (. . .) modality is the precise and definitive expression of the 'ideality' of the object of knowledge. As regards mathematics, it is worth noticing that this difference of modality does not prevail. Mathematician of course does talk about *existence* of concepts (for instance of irrational and imaginary numbers), but existence is here nothing more than possibility and necessity. That which is possible as a mathematical concept is thereby existent for mathematics and therefore necessary as well.
>
> (*Op. cit.*, p. 84)

Surely, the neo-Kantian assimilation of "ideas" to "concepts" rests on confusion. But Natorp nonetheless traces an important distinction between *modally insensitive ideas* and *modalisable ideas*, which is also at stake in Husserl's early writings. Husserl insists on the special way in which mathematical concepts acquire their (objective) "reality" (as a Kantian would have said), or, as he prefers to say, their "possibility", "validity", or "essentiality". But these expressions of "possibility" or "essentiality" of

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concepts are to be understood in a transferred sense, for what they meant in fact is the possibility and the existence of the objects that fall under them:

> If we now directly relate our question as to conditions of possibility, to theory in the objective sense and to theory in general, such a possibility can only have the sense, which applies to other objects or pure conception. From such objects, we are led back to concepts, and "possibility" means no more than the "obtaining" validity (*Geltung*) or rather essentiality (*Wesenhaftigkeit*) of the concepts in question. This is what is often called the "reality" as opposed to the "imaginariness" of concepts, which latter could better be called "essencelessness". In such a sense, one speaks of real definitions which guarantee the possibility, the "obtaining", the reality of defined concept, and again of the opposition between real and imaginary numbers, geometrical figures etc. Talk of possibility in regard to concepts becomes equivocal through a transfer. What is, in an authentic sense, possible is the existence of objects falling under the relevant concepts, a possibility guaranteed *a priori* through knowledge of conceptual essence, which flashes upon us, e. g., as the result of such an object's being intuitively presented. The essentiality of the concept is then likewise spoken of as a possibility in a transferred sense.[38]

Here is the source of the main epistemological delineations inside the field of science and thus of its theory, i.e. logic. The epistemological "division of labour" between philosophy and mathematics (viz. § 71) derives from a division within logic. On the one hand, mathematicians are presented as ingenious technicians, who, following their scientific and methodological instinct, managed in recent times to overcome traditional limits of arithmetic and geometry (numbers and quantity) to step into the realm of formal logic and became this way "formal mathematicians"; but, on the other hand, because of their particular skills for theoretical constructions, they are usually deprived of what is required for a logic to achieve its goal as a pure logic: the pure theoretical interest at work in essential insight (*ideation*). A philosophical logic is thus needed, conceived as a critic of science (including that of mathematical logic itself). The task of such a philosophical logician is neither to step into the field of construction by the side of the "technician of genius" (the mathematician), nor even to exercise censorship against the mathematician's claim to elaborate such logic. Nevertheless, the axiomatic determination of consistency and completeness lets aside another consistency, that of an "essentiality" (*Wensenhaftigkeit*) which can only be ascertained by means of pure theoretical reflection and insight (*op. cit.* § 96, p. 247)

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Evidence and essence in their pure logical sense are modally insensitive. Modalities and probability, understood as one of them, are thus let outside the scope of logic in both senses (philosophical and mathematical) and enter logic only by way of extension and annexation. Pure logic "does not at all contain the ideal conditions of possibility of *experimental sciences in general*, as special cases". For these reasons, theories in experimental sciences are only "supposed theories" (*supponierte Theorien*). *Of course*, fundamental laws from which empirical sciences draw their explanation "are *not* evidently certain, but only evidently probable". Here is the lack of emphasis. For, Husserl does remark that, at the same time, this "only evident probability" must be

38 *Logical Investigations*, § 66 [B 240].

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"ruled by ideal laws on which *possibility* of and in empirical science in general is *a priori* founded" – and that this "logic of probability" constitutes "a second important foundation of logical technology" (*en zweites großes Fundament der logischen Kunstlehre*) and belongs within the domain of pure logic "in a correlatively and suitably extended sense" (*op. cit.*, p. 257). But this is not already an enlargement of the foundations of pure logic itself.

The phenomenology of reason – in the last section of the *Ideas*[39] – begins with a statement on what constitutes its main axis and therefore on the very "essence of knowledge": the correlation between "truly or really being and being rationally provable (*ausweisbar*)".[40] Taken as a definition of the essence of knowledge, this correlation is reducible to a correlation between two *eidê*: "the eidos truly being" and the "eidos being adequately given and being able to be posited as evident" (§ 144). Now, Husserl adds, this correlation holds "for every doxic modalities of being and, correlatively, of position".[41] As a result, the hard core of Platonic *eidos* does not even constitute the nucleus of the *eidos* at stake in this correlation, but a *moment* of it, namely the "reference to something" (*Beziehung auf Etwas*) or else "reference to the object" (*Beziehung auf den Gegenstand*). We call it a *moment*, for it cannot remain without and outside the phenomenological element of meaning. This element, as Husserl insists, must be taken and analysed more explicitly than it has been done in the *Logical Investigations*, on both sides: noetic and noematic. Taken from the noematic side, this meaning is neither the envelope nor the pulp of the noematic nucleus, but enters the noematic nucleus itself. The *what* aimed at by science in its traditional Platonic determination represents of course the most inward moment of the noema, and even "the kernel of the nucleus".[42] Nonetheless *it owes* its objective "direction" to this sense or meaning. Without this meaning, the *what* is nothing but a pure and empty X, deprived of all determination, not even that which could posit it as really being; "every noema has a '*content*', namely its 'meaning', and through it, it is related to 'its' object".[43] In a way, Husserl already said that in the *L. I.*, *but without insisting enough* on the noematic (and ontological) implications of such a thesis.

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Husserl puts the focal distinction of the fifth *Logical Investigation* in a new light and underlies what has been emphasised once:

> In this respect a first and, as it would appear to me, a necessary step was tentatively taken through the phenomenological emphasis given to the terms "material" (*Materie*) and "quality" (*Qualität*), and through the idea of "intentional essence" as distinguished from "epistemological essence". The one-sidedness of the noetic orientation, within which these distinctions were first drawn and intended, is easily overcome by a proper regard to the noematic parallels. We can interpret the concepts noematically thus: "quality" (judgement-quality, wish-quality, and so forth) is nothing other than what we have hitherto treated *as "positing" character,*

39 *Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Husserliana III/1, ed. Karl Schuhmann, 1976, p. 314.

40 "*Prinzipiell* stehen in der logischen Sphäre, in derjenigen des Aussage, '*warhaft- '* oder *'wirklich-sein'* und *'vernünftig ausweisbar-sein'* in *Korrelation*" (ibid.)

41 "und das für alle doxischen Seins- bzw. Setzungsmodalitäten", *Ideen* I, p. 314.

42 *Ideen* I, p. 269.

43 *Ideen* I, p. 297; original emphasis.

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> *"thetic" character in the broadest sense*. The expression, which has its origin in contemporary psychology (that of Brentano), now appears to me little suitable; *every particular thesis has its quality, but should not itself be called a quality*. The "matter" [or "material"], which is in every instance the "what", which undergoes the characteristic of position from the "quality", this corresponds now to the "noematic nucleus".
>
> (*Ideen* I, p. 298; translation and emphasis mine)

That which was called "act quality" in the *L.I.*, and is now designated as thetic or positional character, is equivalent to the modal element of the noematic nucleus, which is no longer exclusively confined to the realm of psychological representation. A part of the *quomodo*, of the *how* of intention, contributes to the determination of the *what*, of the *content*.[44] And without this essential contribution, this *what* would only be a determinable but indeterminate X.[45] The *objective meaning* is the *object in the how of its determinations* (*in Wie seiner Bestimmtheiten*). It "is this *object-in-the-noematic-how*". Both are interdependent parts of the same whole. With the result that we can write down the strict equivalence: *no sense, no meaning without the "something" [which is meant], and conversely no "something" without a sense, without a "determinating content"*.[46] Correlatively, this "something", the bearer-X of the sense is enriched in determinations through the synthetic activity of consciousness, i.e. through a composition of thetic characters, through a modal composition which, as a result, gives a condensation of manifold X's into *one* synthetic X:

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> Through the sense-bearer which (as an empty X) belongs to sense, and the *possibility*, grounded in the essence of sense, *of concordant junction into unities of sense of any level whatever*, not only has every sense (*Sinn*) its "object", but different senses referring to *the* same object, just in so far as they can be organized into unities of sense, in which the *determinable X's of the united senses* become coincident *with one another and with the X of the total sense of the unity under consideration*.[47]

With that description of the noematic nucleus, we are only at the beginning of a very difficult and long-term phenomenological analysis, which might lead us to that of the *eidos*.

1. *On the one hand*, this noematic nucleus (bearer-X plus thetic characters) is an *abstract*: the meaning reduced to its reference function (*Signifikation, Beziehung*). The synthetic activity of consciousness constitutes larger and articulated unities wherein different moments of the noema are articulated. Husserl calls them *propositions in the broadest sense*, for there are not only "propositions of judgement", but also "propositions of pleasure", "proposition of wish", "proposition of command" and so forth – which may or may not, adequately or not, be expressed in propositions in the narrow sense, i.e. in logical statements. As Husserl insists, "the concept of proposition is certainly extended thereby in an exceptional way that may alienate sympathy, yet it

44 *Ideen* I, p. 301.
45 *Ideen* I, pp. 303–304.
46 *Ideen* I, p. 303.
47 *Ideen* I, pp. 443–444.

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remains within the limits of an important unity of essence" and he warns us that the concept of meaning and proposition in logical sense, i.e. conceptual meaning and conceptual propositions, belong as a sub-group to these extended notions of meaning and proposition.[48] In other words, the enlarged concepts of meaning and proposition include, as a (very) special case, *logical meaning* and *propositions*. More precisely, as we could learn from the theory of logical modification (since *expression* is phenomenologically speaking the generic logical modification), expression is strangely akin to the neutrality modification for it produces nothing, i.e. does not alter what it expresses, but simply expresses non or pre-logical meanings and propositions (cf. § 124 and § 127).

2. But on the other hand, and again, with this second enlargement, we have described nothing but an incomplete and abstract noematic nucleus, namely the *form* of the noematic nucleus. Yet, there is another dimension of the "object in its how", which is essential from an epistemological point of view: the "object in the how of its modes of givenness";[49] the sense, according to "its mode of fulfilling".[50] Only this sense dimension perfects the noema, and gives it its full concreteness. The concepts of proposition and sense are thereby enlarged anew. Since intuitions are also acts and synthesis of a special kind, we are entitled to talk of "intuitive sense" and "intuitive propositions":[51] "propositions of intuition, of representation, of imagination, of perception and so forth".[52] With this new dimension of sense, we have not stepped outside "the favoured sphere of positionality".[53] On the contrary, it is only by inserting "in the realm of positionality" (*im Reiche der Positionalität*)[54] the ideal and teleological line to which any intuitive act, and, correlatively, any intuitive sense or proposition, belong, that logic will be able to reach its goal and become truly a theory of truth in its fullest and broadest sense. The axiomatic procedures are surely necessary, but they require a wider theory of evidence than the Platonic one. There are in fact different modes of evidence: original or not, pure or not, adequate or not, etc.

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3. Eventually, the intuition of *eidos* in its ordinary sense, i.e. restricted to the sole apodictic/demonstrative evident intuition, appears now as too limited. We must accept the concept of assertoric evidences,[55] and consequently we must accept to take the word "insight" or "seeing", as well as "evidence", in their broadest sense. This generic

48 Ricoeur's and Gibson's translations are somewhat misleading. Husserl writes "Beständig ist ja im Auge zu behalten, daß die Begriffe Sinn und Satz für uns nichts von Ausdruck und begrifflicher Bedeutung enthalten, anderseits aber alle ausdrücklichen Sätze, bzw. Satzbedeutungen unter sich befassen" (ibid.).

49 *Ideen* I, p. 304.

50 *Ideen* I, p. 305.

51 *Ideen* I, p. 305.

52 "Nehmen wir diesen Sinn voll, mit seiner anschaulichen Fülle, so ergibt sich ein bestimmter und sehr wichtiger Begriff von *Erscheinung*. Diesen Sinnen entsprechen Sätze, Anschauungssätze, Vorstellungssätze, perzeptive Sätze usw. In einer Phänomenologie der äußeren Anschauungen, die es als solche nicht mit Gegenständen schlechthin, in unmodifiziertem Sinne, sondern mit Noemen als Korrelaten der Noesen zu tun hat, stehen Begriffe, wie die hier herausgestellten, im Zentrum der wissenschaftlichen Forschung", *Ideen* I, p. 306.

53 *Ideen* I, p. 304.

54 *Ideen* I, p. 333.

55 "Es ist als eine phänomenologische Erkenntnis von größer Wichtigkeit zu betrachten, daß beide wirklich von einer Wesensgattung sind und daß, noch allgemeiner gefaßt, Vernunftbewußtsein überhaupt einer oberster Gattung von thetischen Modalitäten bezeichnet, in der eben das auf originäre Gegebenheit bezogene 'Sehen' (im extrem erweiterten Sinne) ein festbegrenzte Artung ausmacht" *Ideen* I, p. 318.

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essence is that of "rational consciousness in general", i.e. the "*summun genus of thetic modalities*".[56]

Enlargement after enlargement, the former and original concept of *eidos* figures now as a trait of something much wider and much more moving. The *eidos* according to Plato is only a small part, or even the first presentation of a wider Idea, an Idea in Kantian sense, which covers the totality of the positional sphere and of all the modes of the "something".[57] Modalities are no longer relegated into the sphere of doxa. The *noesis* in the sense of Plato is in some way the same thing as what Husserl calls non-modalised primary certainty or *primary belief* (*Urdoxa*).[58] As every modality refers back to this original form of certainty, to each corresponds a form of rationality. Even conjectures, probabilities have their own form of evidence and certainty.

> Just to indicate the following: A presumption [conjecture] can be characterised as rational in itself, if we follow that in it which harks back to the corresponding primary belief; and if we adopt this in the form of a "supposing", "something then speaks for this". It is not the belief itself *simpliciter* that is characterised as rational, although it has a share in reason. We see that further rational distinctions of a theoretical kind need to be drawn and studied here. Essential connexions between the *different* qualities, connexions of a reciprocal kind, with themselves here, and *in the end all the lines of connexion converge back upon the primary belief* and *its primary reason*, upon the "truth".
>
> (*Ideas I*, pp. [289–290]; original emphasis)

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Because of its connexion with primordial rationality and primordial truth, every doxic modality can have its evidence and be rational. A "proposition of conjecture" or a "proposition of probability" can also be perfectly rational and evident. "Modal evidence" can exist. From a logical point of view, that means that an evident conjecture is strictly equivalent to "a proto-doxic evidence". But how do we know that a conjecture is evident, i.e. that we are justified in conjecturing something with a certain degree of uncertainty? The answer is: through a modification of its sense.[59] While the original and naive "proposition of conjecture" would be expressed in the following way: "it may be that S is P", the proto-doxic equivalent would articulate: "The fact that S is P is presumable (probable)". Or else: "There is something that talks in favour of the fact that S is P." All this is of course of great importance in the perspective of a critical theory of reason in experimental sciences.[60] All this holds in parallel for affective and practical propositions, for there is also an affective and a practical evidence and rationality.

56 *Ideen* I, pp. 318–319.
57 "Aber als 'Idee' (im Kantischen Sinn) ist *gleichwohl die vollkommene Gegebenheit vorgezeichnet* – als ein in seinem Wesenstypus absolut bestimmtes System endloser Prozesse kontinuirlichen Erscheinens, bzw. als Feld dieser Prozesse ein a priori bestimmtes *Kontinuum von Erscheinungen* mit verschiedenen aber bestimmten Dimensionen, durchherrscht von fester Wesensgesetzlichkeit" (*Ideen* I, p. 331).
58 *Ideen* I, p. 322.
59 *Ideen* I, p. 322.
60 *Ideen* I, p. 332. – Compare with *Prolegomena*, p. 257, B p. [256]: "Alle Theorie in den Erfahrungswissenchaften ist bloß supponierte Theorie. Sie gibt nicht Erklärung aus einsichtig gewissen, sondern nur aus einsichtig wahrscheinlichen Grundgesetzen. So sind *die Theorien selbst* nur von einsichtiger Wahrscheinlichkeit, sie sind nur vorläufige, nicht endgültiger Theorien."

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These are the fundamental elements for the new foundation of formal logic Husserl had been working at since the time of the *Prolegomena*. But instead of standing by the side of mathematics as a *pure critique*, phenomenological philosophy must contribute actively to a new foundation of formal logic. The increasing number of logical systems and the logical symbolic inflation (including that of modal and fuzzy logics) must appear sooner or later as drawing the lines of a new *Kampfplatz* which requires in turn a new critique of logical reason, which cannot be achieved once and forever, but is an endless task. Leaning on the dimension of sense and proposition *lato sensu*, phenomenology must also contribute to the constitution of a formal apophantic and ontology.

Naturally, we do not ignore that "the task of phenomenology lies *not* in the systematic elaboration of these formal doctrines", but in the analysis "in all directions" of "the *a priori* shown forth in *immediate* intuition" of the whole range of intentional essences. Of course, the elaboration of a formal ontology can only be carried out in an *axiomatic* way. But because of the one-sidedness of his interest, the (mathematical) logician is suspicious as regards the so-called "intuition" of essences, which he considers as necessarily vague and arbitrary. *Therefore*, the remaining intuitions, which lead him privately in his axiomatisation of formal ontology, are vague and arbitrary and one-sided.[61] One of the persistent symptoms of that limitation lies in the incapability of considering modal functions as ultimate logical constituents. At most, a few logicians did try to give right to some extensions by syntactic or semantic means. But the main stream of logicians went on and still goes on considering modalities as superfluous and consequently harmful complications which, by the way, are conveniently supplied by quantification functions.

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This seems to be the case for logic after Frege, Russell and Hilbert.[62] But, what about modal logics contemporary to Husserl's time? It seems that the modal dimension, as Husserl understands it, exceeds the traditional distinction between syntactical and semantic modalities.[63] The same would probably have occurred with modal semantic approaches such as that which Becker initiated before Kripke, in his articles from the *Blätter für Deutsche Philosophie* after Husserl's death. Many critics in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* hit the method of "possible worlds" and have important epistemological consequences on the setting of problems related to physics.[64] This method expresses the naive reference from formal logic to the world and its blindness vis-à-vis the phenomenological dimension of problems, which alone could clearly establish the "possibility of a distinction (. . .) between world (real and possible world

61 *Ideen* I, p. 309. Concerning the relations between axiomatic and phenomenology: "Jede schlichte axiomatische Aufweisung eines logischen Grundbegriffes wird zu einem Titel für phänomenologische Untersuchungen", *Ideen* I, p. 309.

62 Cf. for example, Ali Benmakhlouf, *Frege, le nécessaire et le superflu*, Mathesis, Vrin, 2002, particularly, pp.41 *et seq*.

63 For this reason maybe C. I. Lewis (*A Survey of Symbolic Logic,* Dover, 1917), and then Lewis and Langford (*Symbolic Logic*, Dover, 1932) which O. Becker studied in his article, *Zur Logik der Modalitäten,* and published in the *Jahrbuch* [*für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*] in 1930, pp. 498–548, did not arouse any interest in Husserl.

64 My paper based on manuscripts and texts from the Volume 41 of the *Husserliana*, *Zur Lehre vom Wesen und zur Methode der eidetischen Variation*, ed. D. Fonfara, Springer, 2012, "Unité de la physique, unité de la nature, unité de l'expérience et unité du monde, du point de vue de l'*a priori* corrélationnel", in preparation.

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in general) and transcendental subjectivity" (*op. cit.*, p. [237]).[65] For the elucidation of the concept of world and the foundation of the distinction between real and possible world require an investigation into the "*a priori* of inter-subjective intentionality and its production of inter-subjective unities and 'worlds'".[66]

Taking the exact opposite view, Husserl maintains that it is necessary to *incorporate* into the "material of judgement", hence into that of proposition, not only doxic and ontic modalities (those of conjecture, question, probability and so forth),[67] but also deontic modalities and more generally all the modalities of the affective and volitive sphere.[68]

The core of formal logic

The first text that demands our attention corresponds to the Beilage VII of the Husserliana edition of Formal and Transcendental Logic.[69] It aims at motivating the project of reconstructing the whole set of formal disciplines and it indicates the main trends for a renewal of formal ontology. Among the reproaches Husserl addresses to logic: its thoughtlessness as regard the fundamental operation of "logical idealisation", which represents its central condition of possibility, and, correlatively, "the given upon which this idealisation is carried on", and consequently the obscurity involving it.

Because of this thoughtlessness, the effective formal ontology of logic remained naive up to now. From an axiomatic point of view, naivety means that apparently trivial presuppositions about fundamental logical concepts exert a double negative effect of *limitation* and of *inhibition* upon its theoretical performances, hence upon the critical reflection, which should not only follow but also stimulate them. As a first consequence, formal logic did not manage until now to coincide with its very essence, and, correlatively, this is a second consequence, the field of formal ontology has been arbitrarily and excessively restricted.

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The most manifest symptom of the misunderstanding of logic about its essence lies in the "lack of clarity" of its realisations and, hence, in obscurities and confusions Husserl has been tracking down since his first articles on Ernst Schröder[70] and Alexander Voigt[71]

65 *FTL*, p. [237].

66 *FTL*, p. [218], p. 253. See also p. [225], p. 262. "Das von uns zu Anfang eingeführte Problem der Wahrheit an sich hat also in dieser Aufweisung der Voraussetzungen der traditionellen Logik einen näher bestimmten, auf wirkliche und mögliche Welt bezogenen Sinn gewonnen. Die Logik als in diesem neuen Sinne objektive, als *formale Logik einer möglichen Welt* ordnet sich damit in die Mannigfaltigkeit der *'positiven' Wissenschaften* ein ; denn für sie alle (. . .) ist die Welt eine im voraus fraglose Tatsache, deren rechtmäßiges Bestehen allererst in Frage zu stellen (oder gar das der Möglichkeiten von Welten) dem Stil positiver Wissenschaften zuwider ist" *Op. cit.*, pp. [234–235], p. 269.

67 *Ideen*, p. 308.

68 And Husserl goes on: "In ähnlicher Weise wie mit der Urteilsmodalitäten verhält es sich mit *fundierten Thesen*, bzw. Sinnen und Sätzen der *Gemüts- und Willenssphäre*, mit den spezifische zu ihnen gehörigen Synthesen und den entsprechenden Ausdrucksweisen. Es bezeichnet sich dann leicht das Ziel der neuen Formenlehre von Sätzen und speziell synthetischen Sätzen" *Ideen* I, p. 309.

69 Beilage VII, *Zur Kritik der formalin Logik und ihre Reform zu einer vollen universalen Ontologie*, in *Formal und transzendentale Logik*, Husserliana XVII, ed. P. Janssen, M. Nijhoff, 1974, The Hague, pp. 415–436.

70 Recension on Schröder's *Lessons on logical algebra*, p [264], *Göttinger Gelehrte Anzeigen*, 7, 1891, pp. 243–278.

71 *"Elementary Logic" of A. Voigt and my papers on the logic of logical calculus*, *Vierterjahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, 17, 1893, pp. 111–120.

Proof

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concerning, for instance, the differences between calculus and logic,[72] algorithm and language,[73] sets and varieties,[74] or between different concepts of content and form, or of individual names,[75] etc. Hence, it would be a mistake to think that the layers of formal disciplines belonging to apophantic *lato sensu* would describe fully constituted disciplines. Formal logic as it actually is does not coincide with any of the formal disciplines it is supposed to embrace: pure logical grammar, logic of consequence, and logic of truth. Taken in its strict and ideal sense, formal logic is an "analytic of propositions and meanings [which] leaves necessarily aside the ontological dimension", but consequently also "the concept of truth and of true being" are disregarded (Beilage VII, p. [415]).[76] This restriction of course does not represent a failing by itself, and Husserl does not pretend either that it should be avoided; for, as the "conditions of true being of an object in general", which are the main themes of "the analytic of formal ontology", are rooted in the analytic of meaning and consequence, the latter must necessarily precede the former. Of course, the sphere of meaning and proposition, considered as objects, are themselves a kind of "formal region", belonging as such to *mathesis universalis*. But the reverse holds as well, since "the universe of sense, in a certain way, encompasses the universe of objects", "in so far as precisely every object has an objective meaning and since, obviously, the *a priori* of meaning is of major importance for the knowledge of the objective *a priori*" (ibid.).

If the analytical sphere can indeed be set out in three disciplines, the necessity to take into account the ontological orientation complicates this distribution, for in each formal sub-sphere the logician should draw out the purely formal elements capable of founding this objective orientation, without exceeding the limits of analyticity. Hence, for instance, the scope and the limits of logic of sense, i.e. of purely logical grammar have been misunderstood. Although on this track, logicians finally managed to discern within the forms of judgement distinct moments of form such as *substantivity* and *adjectivity* (as predicate and subject), this exploration finally was stopped, on account of a restrictive and superficial conception of the terms, or in other words on the account of an insensitiveness to the non-syntactical formal dimension proper to the terms themselves: that of *core-forms*. The origin of this is to be found in an unjustified presupposition regarding the nature and content of the fundamental ontological concept, that of *the something whatever*:

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> The presupposition of analytical logic concerning the terms and finally their ultimate *cores* is that they are held as identical and different without questioning about any true essential identity or difference, henceforth without questioning the *quid* one is supposed to establish in its identity or difference – now this is already a question of truth. The intentions are not justified, demonstrated, elucidated. Although they are standing there disclosed in a more or less great clarity, the *quid* itself, the possible and the true are not questioned; one does not pay attention to them.
>
> (*FTL*, p. 431)

72 *Op. cit.*, p. 246.
73 *Ibid.*, p. 258.
74 *Ibid.*, p. 264.
75 *Ibid.*, p. 251.: "In the concept of proper name, maybe under the influence of Jevons, two concepts which should be separated are mixed up: the general concept of individual name and the particular concept of proper name in its usual sense, i.e. the name of individual without 'co-designation'."
76 Beilage VII, pp. 415–436.

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The resulting formal ontology, irrespective of its methodological intention, introduces a restriction in the understanding of its fundamental concept of *something or object whatever*.[77] From the start, the something whatever is understood following the things at hand in the environment. Having under the eye, the "example of the world and eventually of ideally existing worlds", "the former ontology (formal logic as well as mathematics)" has adopted as formal categories those corresponding to the sphere of naive mundane experience. Among these categories, we find the fundamental one that of individual, which has never been criticised, and has been adopted unchanged in first order logic as in set theory. The same would apply to the logic developed on the basis of a world with a substructure naively imposed on the basis of classical physics.[78]

At this stage, phenomenology intervenes on the ground of formal logic with two critical operations.

The *first critical operation* consists in a *reductive procedure* through which phenomenology exhumes the founding formal ontological concept carrying on the full weight of the restrictions just mentioned – that of individual whatever, of mathematical individual – in order to subject it to the *second critical operation*, that of *enlargement*. But these two operations seem problematic. Don't the final substrata belong to an empirical, inductive or "synthetic logic"? Isn't it natural and legitimate to proceed as ordinary formal ontology does, by restricting its theme to the *substratum whatever, to the variable matter of terms* as a support for any kind of iterations and modifications? And Husserl himself seems hesitant:

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> So (. . .) I can't say anything in the frame of formal analytic about individuality, except about what belongs in it to the formal, about the 'ultimate substratum of meaning' and about that which is implied in it as analytical consequence, which is something totally empty. – The ultimate substratum always entails something temporal. – Maybe. But analytically, we must ignore it, because this is no formal, analytically reductive determination of a something-ultimate-substratum. – Nevertheless, this is implied in the possibility of any object in general, of any ultimate substratum-object.[79]

If classical formal ontology keeps silent (as in set theory or in formal semantics) about such determinations (as temporal determinations), that does not mean that it has renounced every theory of individual, for it has since the beginning adopted one. With Leibniz's principle of identity of the indiscernible, modern formal ontology did try to correct and overcome the insufficiencies of the competing theory of individuation, that of individuation through location in absolute time and space. But this principle

77 Cf. §§ 23 a), 24 and 35 a) and the note (a) to this last one, in *FTL*.

78 "Phénoménologie de la réduction et réduction éthique", *Lectures de la* Krisis, eds. F. de Gandt and C. Majolino, Vrin, Paris, 2008, pp. 123 *et seq.*

79 "Ich kann also von Individualität in der formalen Analytic nichts aussagen, es sei denn, was zu dem Formalen 'letztes Meinungssubstrat' gehört und was in der analytischen Konsequenz davon liegt, was ein völlig Leeres ist. Das letzte Substrat <hat> immer Zeitlichkeit im Sinn enthalten. Das mag sein: Aber analytisch ist das nicht einzusehen, denn das liegt nicht in der formalen, analytisch reduktiven Bestimmung eines letzten Substrat-Etwas. Aber es liegt in der Möglichkeit eines Gegenstandes überhaupt und eines letzten Substrat-Gegenstandes", *op. cit.*, p. 427; dashes in the English translation are mine.

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has become a lock that the reductive procedure aims at opening in order to set a new formal ontology capable of assuming the role of a formal *first metaphysics*.[80]

In order to justify this reform, it is necessary to consider the other operation that underpins the first (that of reduction to the ultimate substrata) or at least is co-ordinated with it: that of enlargement by tracing logical activity back to the moving manifold of intentions and intuitions bearing it. Having arrived at that point, one meets the requirement of transcendental phenomenology. Its task is that of a critique of logical reason, which aims at exhuming a kind of possibility, which must be qualified of transcendental in so far as it enables the critique both to clarify and modify the grounds for the "axioms" of formal disciplines. It must enable, as Husserl insists, to inscribe the formal sphere in a larger formal ontological *a priori*, of which naive formal ontology represents a superficial and abstract stratum.[81] For that, the judgement must be situated in the general frame of the correlation of the judging subject and the being upon which the judgement is orientated. More generally, what is required is "another theory of method, more profound than that offered by the analytic", a method sensible in particular to the *modes of the something* involved in the diverse subjective modes.[82] The analytic in its actual state provides us only with "a fragment of the method of the practice of the knower and knowing which is much richer", and neglects in particular the modal and axiological dimensions of the activity of knowledge as well as their passive counterparts. Now, analytic should be the formal study of scientific production as such, i.e. of a "rational praxis of knowledge". The enlargement entails the import of doxic modalities inside the analytic of judgement and, correlatively, the import of ontic modalities, and of probabilities as one of them, inside ontology.

The task of exploring this modal manifold falls on phenomenology and not on formal logic. But the latter needs an enlargement in order to overcome the obscurity of its fundamental concepts, especially that of *possibility*, which is restricted to pure analytical possibility, i.e. to justifiable or justified, demonstrable or demonstrated

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80 Against short-sighted oppositions between phenomenology and ontology, and in order to understand Husserl's positive use of the term of "metaphysics", let us recall the the "great and vast perspective", which is according to Husserl common to his philosophical and Weyl's scientific work: of "a *mathesis universalis* philosophically founded", "in relation to a *new formal metaphysics* (the *a priori* and universal theory of individuation)", at which he has been working for years. Hence the rare profile of the book he is projecting to write : a "philosophical book for mathematicians" as well as a "mathematical book for philosophers", clearing the way from a *"formal (systematic) logic to a formal logic of individuation"*. This is no marginal or secondary project, since the phenomenological exploration of the manifold dimensions of inner time itself should take place in that perspective, as a part of the leading and fundamental task of solving the "huge problem of individuation, of constitution of individual (hence 'factual') being in general" (from the Letter from Husserl to Weyl, 10th April of 1918, quoted from "The Husserlian Project of Reform of Logic and Individuation", *op cit*.

81 This amounts to considering the formal sphere as a "region", the "region" of categories meanings and essences. Cf. *Ideas* I, § 17, already considered the task of an "analytic" in a quasi-Kantian sense to trace the general distinctions between and within the regions, and from that point of view, formal ontology appeared itself "in the same series as the regional (the strictly 'material', 'synthetic' ontologies)", its "regional concept 'object' determining the formal ('analytic') categories" (*Ideas* I, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson, Collier Macmillan Publishers, 2012, p. 70).

82 Among the modes referred to, as we learn in a closer reading of § 23 a) of *FTL*, are above all those proceeding from modal modifications, understood as operations exerted not only on the judgement but on the syntactical material, hence as constituting the logical matter of the judgement.

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being. The elucidation of this concept, so vital for logic of truth, depends on the acceptance of the full scope of modalities as constitutive of logical matter.[83]

The first act of a radical formal ontology consists in taking into account true being of every kind (following every species of subjective activity in every attitude, practical and theoretical). Despite of its privilege, true being in the sense of ultimate self-evidence has no meaning apart from the dynamic of modifications leading to it. Husserl insists on this point in many instances. The transition from logic of consistence (which is something less than consequence, restricted to the pure analytical possible) to a true logic of truth entails a deep modification of formal ontology, such that its corresponding ontology becomes an "authentic 'ontology'", "a formal science of possible individual being". The possible here at stake is not anymore the pure possible of analytics, for, instead of the something whatever supporting the poorer conditions of true being in general, we get now the "something possible in its possible modalities" (pp. 427–428).

The most delicate point, apparently for Husserl too, lies in the ambiguity of the concept of *morphology* involved in this new formal ontology.

The enlargement indicated before seems in fact to jumble the well-known delimitation between analytic and synthetic. Husserl denies it. It is still a question of formal ontology, except that the logical "matter" is from now on understood in its full extension, "and not only in the way of a mathematical variable". This means that the recasting of formal ontology goes with a promotion of a new concept of form.[84] Next to, or rather below, the usual concept of form, the "new concept of the formal" is significant in as much as it "applies at present to something possible in its possible modalities".[85]

This holds also for the upper forms, for the genera embracing all lower forms. Beside or below the standard categorial predicative productions, there is another form which "means rather a supreme generality", "stemming from the set of supreme generalities, in which every substratum, and so every possible objectivity must be situated". While taking into account those forms, we do not at all step into material

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83 We recognize here the phenomenological task of questioning "in its full scope, the reign of a priori necessities without which a true being could not exist for the knowing subject, the modes of knowledge and the modes inseparable from them of empty, blind, obscure intention (. . .) without which true being would be an empty concept deprived of any properly comprehensible signification, of any scientifically usable signification" (ibid.).

84 One will remember that in the *Ideas*, Husserl distinguished the individual as "ultimate syntactically formless substratum" (§ 12) (as *tode-ti* or "pure syntactically formless individual unit") (§ 14) from the individual as "ultimate formless essence", as "formless substantive (*sachhaltige*) essence", and insists on the fact that there is between them an essential predicative connection, since "every 'this-there' has *its* essential substantive quality possessing the character of a formless substantive essence" (ibid.), or in other words, since it is subsumed in a specific sense under the ultimate substantive essence, or *infima species*. This distinction is pushed further by taking into account the distinction between dependent and independent objects, or which is the same, between abstract and concrete (§ 15). We arrived at an absolute this-there the immediate substantive essence of which is a concretum, and represents an *individual* in the narrower sense. As soon as we inscribe [i] eidetic generalization in the realm of pure logic, and consider it as a kind of logical "modification" (*Abwandlung*) and [ii] conversely, formalization as a way of abstracting from every essence, and region of essences, the pure empty form common to all (§ 10), the individual taken in its last sense does not fall anymore outside the field of pure logic, and correspondingly, of formal ontology, but appears "on purely logical grounds" as the "logical absolute to which all logical modifications refer us back" (§ 15).

85 *Op. cit.*, pp. 427–428: "Bedeutsam ist der neue Begriff des Formalen und, wenn man will, noch des Analytischen, der also nicht mehr das Analytische der leeren Konsequenz betrifft. Das Formale betrifft jetzt mögliches Etwas in seinen möglichen Modalitäten. Wir stehen jetzt von vornherein in der Sphäre des 'Evidenten', sich durch Selbstgebung erfüllenden Substratsatzes und prädikativen Satzs und in der Sphäre von Doxa überhaupt als sich erfüllender bewährender Doxa – und ihren Korrelaten."

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ontology, since, remarks Husserl, it is still only question of the "quid of possible objectivities, and *not* of accessible genera or supreme genera". These generalities are "prescribed by the formal generality *something in general* and the ultimate substrate *something in general*".[86]

The possibility and justification of such a splitting of the concept of form (and consequently of all formal concepts) results from the operations describe previously: (1) reduction of the formal to its ultimate formal matter, i.e. to the fundamental category of individual and (2) incorporation of modalities into this logical matter.

The new formal ontology exceeds the opposition between modern and ancient logic. Ancient logic recognised the individual as fundamental category, and, especially in its Aristotelian form, dealt extensively with modalities, but it never admitted them as substantive (*sachhaltige*), i.e. as blended into the individual, and giving it its finishing touch. Modern logic inherited these limitations, and the question remains opened as to whether it has overcome them since the time of Husserl. According to Gian Carlo Rota, it was still in an impasse in 1975, and the only radical reform of logic since Aristotle is due to Husserl himself.[87] And he encouraged us to develop the program set before us or rather to dig it out from the material Husserl left us.

From that material, we learn which are the tasks of this new logic in its connection to ontology:

> It is absolutely necessary to get a full presentation of the inter-implication and of the systematic order of phenomenological and ontological matters. [i] Ontological logic as *mathesis universalis* says nothing about the categorial-being of individuality, but rather of the object in general as substrate for predications; it is the formal science of objects in general, of true being in general or, if you like, of determining truth in general. [ii] Ontology of individual being, formal ontology in the more specific sense of the term, formal and first "metaphysics", must develop the *a priori* of individuality. Of course, *all that which is mathematical holds also for the individual, and mathematical categories hold themselves for the scope* (*Umfang*) *of the categories of individuality.* But these categories, categories of the object and of modifications of the object, are modified in a peculiar way while applying in particular to individuality. Hence for the concepts of essence, genus, species, whole, part, etc. "Developing" this concepts and developing the whole ontology into the form of individuation as such (hence individuation of generalities into individual "things", into singularities) following *a priori* and formal legalities of essence: *such is the task*. Belong to it, the theory of time, still in a formal universality, i.e. even if we distinguish between time and its matter (the filling real content of time), the matter is introduced in a pure formal way (as a category of formal metaphysics), while we keep "variable" all concrete real particularisation. Aristotelian categories (after a small purification) become themselves categories of the individuality.
>
> (*Op. cit*., pp. 424–425; emphasis mine.)

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86 *FTL*, Husserliana XXVII, p. 423; original emphasis.
87 "Husserl and the Reform of Logic", in *Discrete Thoughts*, eds. M. Kac, G.-C. Rota, J. T. Schwartz, Birkhäuser, Boston, MA, Basel, Berlin, p. 173.

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If we take this program seriously, our first task should be now to endeavour to understand what would be the profile of a formal logic in which every formal concept would be purified and developed in the form of individuality.

Husserl and Girard on modal logic and Platonism

In order to ease this parallel, we must recall that it is motivated, if not fully justified, by Per Martin-Löf's contributions.[88] But because they are closely related to essential aspects of the Husserlian reform of logic, those of Mitsuhiro Okada must be mentioned here.[89] By spontaneous logical investigation akin to that of Husserl, I mean here more precisely Jean-Yves Girard's linear logic. After having proven wrong the ordinary use of Gödel's theorems to discard any relevance to phenomenology as far as logic is concerned,[90] Okada draw this parallel between Girard and Husserl on a fundamental point.[91]

Linear logic demonstrated that classical logic (as well as intuitionist logic) rested of a certain number of tacit assumptions underpinning and warranting the success of its fundamental "operations", and which, once brought to light, reveal their deep structure, which is not essentially characterised by the excluded middle principle but rather by the *duality principles*. This group of principles constitute as Girard phrases it the "*modal nucleus*" of classical logic, which could be expressed by means of the *necessity* operator or its dual: the possibility operator ◊. (Besides the explicit modal duality: $\Box A = \sim \Diamond \sim A$, we must also mention implicit modal dualities concerning the connectives: &, v, →.) Aware of its completeness, classical logic is entitled to consider modal operators as superfluous:

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> Are modalities necessary? One rare modal system, which is not ridiculous, S4, is affected by a serious defect: one can erase all modalities keeping logical correctness. One will object that it is possible to do the same with first order quantification. But quantifiers have a proper status defined by a detailed instructions manual, whereas the modality remains a superfluous artifact.
>
> (Girard, *De la syllogistique à l'iconoclasme*, p. 24; translation mine)

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For this very reason, one must keep in mind that what here is called "modal nucleus" has nothing to do with syntactical adjuncts or semantic extensions of modal logics. Because this modal core operator is never explicitly assumed by classical logic (nor by

88 Among the parallel which would be worth tracing, I think especially of Per Martin-Löf's randomness definition compared to the rigorous definition of "arbitrariness" performance (*Beliebigkeitsleistung*) as it is implemented in the eidetic, purely imaginary, variation and described in the lessons on *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, ed. Walter Biemel, M. Nijhoff, 1968, § 9, pp. 73, 76. Compare with *Erfahrung und Urteil*, ed. L. Landgrebe, pp. 412–413. My commentary in *Le phénoménologue et ses exemples*, Kimé, 2000, Chap. VIII.

89 See also, from a different perspective: Olav Wiegand, *Interpretationen der Modallogik*, 1998, Dordrecht, Kluwer.

90 In two papers: Okada, "Husserl and Hilbert on Completeness and Husserl's Term Rewrite-based Theory of Multiplicity", *24th International Conference on Rewriting Techniques and Applications* (RTA'13), ed. Femke van Raamsdonk, 1998, pp. 4–19, and "Husserl's 'Concluding Them of the Old Philosophico-Mathematical Studies' and the Role of the Notion of Multiplicity" (French translation, paper given in Paris, 22 March 2000, Meeting on Logic and Philosophy of Science).

91 In an article published simultaneously in English and in French, M. Okada, "Linear Logic and Intuitionistic Logic", *Revue internationale de philosophie*, 4, 230 (2004), pp. 449–481.

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intuitionist logic), it is necessary to make it manifest, to make use of a peculiar trick, consisting in taking the axiom proper to Lewis S4 system and applying it to the nucleus of classical logic, in order to reveal its fine substructure.[92] For this reason, the "sense of □ A ('A is necessarily valid') differs from that of traditional modal logic, which underlying logic is classical logic." As a result, the whole frame of classical logic appears as based on modal presuppositions, on modal assumptions taken to be so obvious that it seems pointless to try to formulate them. One and not the least of them, gives implication (and, consequently inference) its specific stableness. It could be formulated in the following way: "logical implication '→' is independent on any *consumption* relation, i.e. once the statement posited as hypothesis, it remains always valid and reusable", or else, in intuitionist terms, that *A* is "always necessarily constructible". The result is the demonstration of the equivalence of classical and intuitionist logic, which was in the first place conjectured by Gödel, in 1933, who employed the modal operator from S4 in order to account for the characteristic of "provability". In the system thus constructed, "□ A" is translated into *Bew* A ("A is demonstrable"), a demonstrability to which Gödel gives an intuitionist meaning.[93]

1 But Gödel maintains that the grounds of intuitionist logic remain classical logic, to which is added the S4 modality.
2 From the point of view of linear logic, Okada argues on the contrary that classical logic is based on linear logic amplified and reinforced by the adjunction of a kind of S4 modality.
3 Consequently, the semantic is split off into two different semantics: extensional or denotational.

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> Intuitionistic logic has two kinds of neat extensional or denotational semantics, [i] semantics *for provability of intuitionistic logic* and [ii] *semantics for proofs of intuitionistic logic*, for example, (i) Kripke's *possible world semantics* in which each possible world follows Tarski-Carnap style extensional semantics (and the intensionality is expressed by means of the accessibility relation among possible worlds) on the one hand, and (ii) *functional space semantics* for the typed *lambda calculus* on the other hand.[94] Our linear logical analysis of the traditional

92 The System S4 includes S3, S2 and S1, and the classical detachment and substitution rules. As in S1, S2 and S3, we have the axiom of S1: □ A → A, providing potentially the systems producing that which Becker calls a *modal slope*. S1 rule of necessitation is common too, but whereas it states in S1 that every analytically valid (tautological) formula A or every axiom can be posited as necessarily true S4 specifies, so to speak, that every valid formula can be posited as necessity; if ├A then ├ □ A., be it an axiom or a mere theorem. Consequently: we get an iteration axiom: for modalities if ├ □A, then ├ □(□A). S4 was exposed by C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford in *Survey of Symbolic Logic*, University of California Press, 1918. For a more recent and systematic survey, cf. E. J. Lemmon and D. S. Scott, *The "Lemmon Notes": An Introduction to Modal Logic*, Blackwell, 1977, and later, by G. E. Hugues and M. J. Cresswell, *A new introduction to Modal Logic,* Oxford, Routledge, 1997. See especially pp. 51–57.

93 M. Okada, *op. cit.*, p. 464. Gödel, *Ein Interpretation des intuitionistischen Aussagenkalküls*, *Collected Works*, Volume I, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, pp. 300–303.

94 The *lambda calculus* stems from Alonzo Church's seminal article from 1951, about which Rota writes: "The only instance of such a formalization I know of is Alonzo Church's 'A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation,' in *Structure, Method and Meaning, Essays in Honor of Henry M. Sheller*, New York, 1951, pp. 3–24. Unfortunately, Church's lead seems not to have been followed up, partly because the reading of his paper is a veritable obstacle course. We hazard the hypothesis that Husserl's Third Investigation could be subjected to similar formalization without excessive retouching."

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> intuitionistic logic, in author's opinion, provides us with a logical explanation as to how such extensional or denotational semantics are naturally derived from intuitionistic logic, by analysing the role of linear modality. In fact, the linear logical modality seems to play an important role in the objectivity interpretation on the logical semantics level".
>
> (Okada, "Linear Logic and Intuitionistic Logic", p. 465; emphasis added)

The modal operator □, or more precisely the equivalent modalities in linear logic (Girard's exponentials: ! and ?)[95] provides us with a bridge between " the interpretation in terms of dynamic process of changing states and the interpretation in terms of denotation and objectivity". More precisely, says Okada, they play the "same role as 'objectivisation' in Husserl's theory of signification, to a certain extent". Although we are dealing here with an operator, not an act, and with propositions rather than terms, the parallel holds, according to Okada:

> The modal operator □ makes a bridge between the purely linguistic activity level of logic and the objectivity understanding of logic. Hence, the modal operator seems to play a role of [an] objectification act (of the Logical Investigation of Husserl), although the modality ! is a logical operator rather than [a] phenomenological act. Another difference is that the modal operator acts on the propositions level while the Husserlian objectivisation (cf. 5th Investigation sec. 5) acts primarily on the terms level.
>
> (Okada, *op. cit.*, p. 467, note 40; minor corrections mine.)

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More precisely, one should say that the modal operator plays within the formal frame of linear logic the same role as "objectification" within phenomenological investigations of logical acts. Accordingly, the distinction between pure logical grammar (syntactical or "linguistic" level in Husserl) and what Husserl calls "logic of validity" (*Geltungslogik*, in 1909),[96] correspond respectively to the weakened and strengthened forms of linear logic.

There are strong motives to carry on this kind of comparison, not, of course, that Husserl exercised an influence on Girard as he probably did on other logicians such as Łukasiewicz, Lesniewski and Adjukiewicz. I don't say either that he anticipated linear logic. Independently from the growing interest in modal logics (as it is noticeable with Becker), Husserl discovered something like a modal core in traditional as in modern logic (that of Hilbert or Frege), which contrary to their own self-understanding were not totally alien to modalities. Following Okada's comparison and Husserl's own statements, it seems that the modal core corresponds to the sphere of meaning understood as a pure morphology of signification prior to any consistence, completeness,

95 "On sait que la partie purement linéaire doit être complétée par une partie modale, les exponentielles *!,?*, de façon à pouvoir parler de l'infini, ce dont le fragment précédent est rigoureusement incapable. *!A* énonce la pérennité de A, qui devient donc parfait et l'infini apparaît comme un attribut de la pérennité: l'infini, c'est ce qui ne s'use pas quand on s'en sert" (Girard, *Le point aveugle*, I, Hermann, Paris, 2011, p. 15).

96 Let us put aside the question whether the logic of validity from 1909 corresponds fully or partially to the logic of consequence and eventually the logic of truth from 1929.

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validity, or truth. The task of the morphology of significations or pure logical grammar is to explore the substructure of predicative and inferential forms.

In order to grasp the modal dimension inside meaning, this substructure must not be understood in a static and rigid way, as if terms were mere bricks waiting for the mortar of predication. Denotation or objective reference (*Beziehung auf Objekt*) is not naturally or arbitrarily stuck into the terms even when we are dealing with proper names. Turning now to the phenomenological side, correlative of this kind of expressions, we find *representations*, which are indeed "objectifying acts". But, even in their most primitive forms – that of representations – objectifying acts are never deprived of qualitative components (modal components), belonging to the general category: modes of *belief*. The modal components of meaning stem from qualitative modifications (modalisations), even though the latter consist in "a totally different 'operation' than the production of a representation referring to it". This last remark must not be taken as a contradiction or the first step of a *regressus in infinitum*. For one could raise the objection, that if representation as a primitive form of objectification implies a modification, which in turn presupposes a representation, we are at least and obviously moving into a vicious circle. What Husserl means here, is that the modalisation as an operation differs completely from the representation referring to the *result* of this operation, as much as an actually articulated proposition differs from its nominalised form. Imagine you know what is a mouse and what is a bird, but have never seen or even conceived of such a thing as a bat. On that basis, when encountering a "bat" for the first time, using the word *bird* or *mouse* to name that anonymous thing, you will not mean really and properly a bird or a mouse. Uttering those words you use it with an inner restriction, and a modalised denotation. What you mean is properly this: *something like a mouse but which is not a mouse, since mice don't fly, and something like a bird but which is not a bird, since birds have feathers and are furless*. This is not either a *quasi-bird* or a *quasi-mouse*, since it is perceivable, and experienced as real. But *what* is the object in the first instance before the discovery of a new zoological class? Answer: a *bird-almost* or a bird-rather. And you will carry one naming, and nominalising this modalised meanings, until at last you decide to give it a name or hear that it has already one. Without further observation or theoretical activity, the name *bat* will have as a denotation this *modalised meaning* which provides zoological and biological knowledge the indispensable frame of determinability of that thing called *bat*.

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This confrontation between Girard's linear logic and Husserl's projected formal logic would lead us to take into account the intersubjective constitution of logical forms.

On the Husserlian side, the phenomenological investigation of the passive and active syntheses are required to track down the transcendental genesis of the noematic character of repeatability *(Wierderholbarkeit)*,[97] availability (*Verfügbarkeit*),[98] identifiability

97 *FTL*, § 11, [36]).

98 "Die Logik bezieht sich nicht auf die Gegebenheiten in bloß aktueller Evidenz, sondern auf die bleibenden, in ihr zur Urstiftung gekommenen Gebilde, auf die immer wieder zu reaktivierenden und zu identifizierenden, als auf Gegenständlichkeiten, die hinfort vorhanden sind, mit denen man, sie wieder ergreifend, denkend operieren, die man als dieselben kategorial fortbilden kann zu neuen Gebilden und immer wieder neuen. In jeder Stufe haben sie ihre Weise evidenter *Identifizierbarkeit*, in jeder können sie verdeutlicht werden, können sie in Evidenzzusammenhänge der Konsequenz und Inkonsequenz gebracht, können aus ihnen durch Wegstreichung der Inkonsequenzen, bzw. durch entsprechende Umbildung, reine Zusammenhänge der Konsequenz erzeugt werden. Offenbar setzt die Logik mit ihren

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(*Identifizierbarkeit*). These are emerging traits of what Husserl calls the idealising subjective presuppositions of logic already present in the way logic traditionally addresses its thematic field.[99]

Once implemented, the radicalised form of reduction, which reduces every meaning to the proper or primordial sphere (excluding every strata of transcendent meaning, i.e. every meaning presupposing a kind or another of intersubjective constitution), we must introduce a distinction between two levels or strata in this constitutive genesis of meaning. More, we must divide the modes of passive synthesis into those which are sediments of a former activity bearing an intersubjective sense, and those which are not.[100] What is the contribution of intersubjective constitution for logic? Answer: the logical items acquire new noematical traits. They are not only available, repeatable in a solipsistic way, but become expressible and communicable between rational beings. Whatever their forms (meaning, predicate, word, proposition, theorem, rule, etc.) and whatever their status (truth, non-sense, contradiction, error, etc.), they become spiritually available possessions in the full sense of the term. But in order to become so, new idealising presuppositions come into play, which are related to configurations of the intersubjective sphere itself. Another level of modal substructure is thus revealed, corresponding to what Husserl calls in the *Cartesian Meditations* a system of incompossibilities.[101] The first level of genesis is that of solipsistic constitution of a pure nature of a proper world. This world is solipsistically thinkable and logically consistent. The second is that of intersubjective constitution, i.e. the setting of a *general system of equivalences* (similarity, congruence) between different viewpoints and different proper worlds. At each step, we must resist the *forcing* of classical logic imposing its *a priori* structure to any possible world and nature.

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formalen Allgemeinheiten und Gesetzlichkeiten Urteile, Kategorialien jeder Art und Stufe voraus, deren Ansichsein in Identität feststeht. Sie setzt voraus, was jedem Denkenden und jeder Denkgemeinschaft das Selbstverständliche ist: was ich gesagt habe, habe ich gesagt, der Identität meiner Urteilsmeinungen, meiner Überzeugungen kann ich jederzeit gewiß werden über alle Pausen meiner Denkaktualität hinaus, und ihrer einsichtig gewiß werden als *eines bleibenden und jederzeit verfügbaren Besitzes*" (*FTL*, § 73, p 164; emphasis mine).

99 "Demgemäß konnte sie als ihr erstes universales Thema nichts anderes finden als das Reich der thematischen Gebilde des wissenschaftlichen Denkens in Bezug auf irgendwelche, wie immer vorgegebenen objektiven Gebiete – also Urteile mit den in ihnen auftretenden 'Begriffen', Schlüsse, Beweise, geschlossene Theorien, *mit den zugehörigen Modalitäten und den normativen Unterschieden der Wahrheit und Falschheit*. Alle diese wirklichen und prätendierten Wissensgebilde nach ihrer Formtypik und den mit dieser verflochtenen Bedingungen möglicher Wahrheit zu erforschen, war die zunächst sich darbietende Aufgabe (. . .) *So hatte der Logiker also standhaltende Gegenstände als exemplarische Substrate für 'Ideationen'*; *es ergab sich die Möglichkeit für jene 'reinen Formalisierungen', durch die die Begriffe der analytisch-logischen 'Formen' erwachsen*. Diese Formen waren dann ihrerseits erst recht ein derart Festes und Standhaltendes, das nach seinen elementaren Formelementen beschrieben, aber auch unter operativen Gesichtspunkten betrachtet werden konnte. Es waren Weisen konstruktiver Formenabwandlung, Formenverknüpfung in *iterativer Wiederholbarkeit* als offene Möglichkeiten gegeben, durch die man aus vorgegebenen immer neue Formen erzeugen konnte; wie bei der kombinatorischen Bildung von komplexen Urteilsformen aus einfacheren oder der freien Bildung von Schlußformen aus Urteilsformen" (*FTL*, § 11, p. 36; emphasis mine).

100 "Das konstitutive Problem erweitert sich abermals, wenn wir daran denken, daß der von unserer logischen Betrachtung ausgeschlossene sprachliche Ausdruck *für ein intersubjektives Denken und für eine Intersubjektivität der idealiter seiend-geltenden Theorie Wesensvoraussetzung* ist, und somit auch *eine ideale Identifizierbarkeit des Ausdrucks als Ausdrucks* ein konstitutives Problem mit sich führen muß" (*FTL*, p. 166; emphasis mine).

101 *Méditations cartésiennes*, Kluwer, 1999, p. 74. Cf. my comment on this aspect in "Self-variation and self-modification", eds. D. Moran and R. T. Jensen, *The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity*, Springer, Collection, Contributions to Phenomenology, 2014.

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On the side of linear logic, Girard insists on the *reusability* of any formula (as opposed to the *consumption* clause) as well as on the preservation of truth through deduction.[102] This point of view is, as usual, exposed in a rather suggestive and provocative way in Girard's paper, "Truth, modality and intersubjectivity". The notion of intersubjectivity is thus introduced in the context of a polemic with IF-Logic (the so-called "epistemic logic"):

> This digression enables one to introduce the expression 'intersubjectivity'. In epistemic logic, this is called 'common knowledge' and corresponds to the exchange of information between *infallible and truthful* partners: think of *Big Brother* and, more recently, the network of secret services and secret dungeons organised by the CIA.
>
> Intersubjectivity has definitely nothing to do with this totalitarian nightmare. If we agree that a single subject is something like the *choice* of a commutative algebra, *intersubjectivity* is the gathering of several of them, provided they commute. What I called "viewpoint" is therefore the (ideal) building of a complete intersubjectivity, this completeness being only a convenience.
>
> Now, let us come to the paradoxical aspects of our definition of truth. The point is that truth depends on the viewpoint P; in particular, a theorem A may become false w.r.t. the 'wrong' viewpoint. This must not be taken as a sort of relativistic argument justifying the denial of various evidences.
>
> When thinking of this subjective paradox, one must take into account that the viewpoint is part of the meaning that we ascribe to A: as long as we respect this intended meaning, nothing unpleasant or really shocking can occur; and if we depart from it, where is the paradox?
>
> A theorem is not a decoration that one puts on a shelf, it is a tool, which can be used as a lemma to produce other theorems: the use of A through logical consequence is the actual meaning of A. Now, when I relate A and $A \multimap B$ to get B, I relate them w.r.t. their intended meaning; if distinct subjects have been in charge of A and B, then $A \multimap B$ makes sense only when these subjects A recognise each other B, i.e., commute as commutative algebras. In other terms, the meaning of A is determined by its intersubjective context, since it involves the creation of a common viewpoint.
>
> Indeed, the subjective paradox is not very different from the various paradoxes induced by the *arising of subjectivity* in modern science. For instance, after relinquishing the geocentric viewpoint, one could argue that speed, now relative to a Galilean referential, no longer makes sense; but, when studying the interaction of mechanical bodies, it is wise to choose a common referential!

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102 Girard calls it the "principe de pérennité" (*sustainability principle*), Cf. *De la syllogistique à l'iconoclasme*, in *Ouvrir la logique au monde*, eds. J-B. Joinet and Tronçon, Paris, 2009. Hermann: "in other words, *necessity holds as sustainability. Technically speaking, the duplication implies that the introspective coefficient be idempotent, i.e equal to 1. The principle, which governs sustainability is thus the same as that which governs truth. In fact, the functoriality requisite* (*from* $A \multimap B$, *deduce* $!A \multimap !B$) poses the problem of deductive stability of truth. In other terms, sustainability, making sustainable, are relative to a point of view. Evidently, it is hard to imagine two parallel and isomorphic uses of the view points, on for truth, the other for necessity/sustainability: they are necessarily two sides of the same operation of intersubjective affirmation: Truth = Intersubjectivity = Modality" (translation mine).

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> To sum up: *Subjective, but not subjectivistic*! And: *Truth = Modality = Intersubjectivity*.[103]

Neither Husserl nor Girard ever lose sight of the epistemological impact of logic, since for both logic is pointless if it does not render thinkable science, and is not relevant for the actual epistemological issues (among which, although not exclusively, those of modern physics). The logical "substruction" of modern naturalism diagnosed by Husserl in the *Crisis* must be understood in that perspective. Classical physics is thus characterised by a peculiar blindness to the intersubjective and modal presuppositions of its most elementary forms of objectivisation. Take for instance the notion of *observable*. Every physical item (event, process, particle, etc.), be it objectively repeated or not, is considered as objectively consistent if and only if it is ideally repeatable and available *in infinitum* for an ideal observer (for instance, that which considers our solar system from the viewpoint of the sun). The mathematical expression of this ideal observer is, to phrase it like Weyl, the coordinate system. Physicists have resisted for a long time the generalisation of the relativity principle. In special relativity, it meant the abandoning of absolute space; in generalised relativity, the abandoning of absolute mass, and the independence between the metric of space-time field and matter. The challenge with quantum physics is even harder since it forces us to abandon some essential structural proprieties of the space-time-matter field: geometric and etiological properties. The symbols of the hard modal logical nucleus have been in physics: absolute space and time, absolute mass, absolute event, absolute scales, etc. They are all different figures of the resistance of the absolute within the realm of scientific objectivity. The progresses of physics have consisted each time in the explicit thematisation of a tacit intersubjective substructural assumption, and thus the construction of a new mathematical language, which needed subsequently to be thought and understood, i.e. logically formalised. All those successive steps and theoretical development represent successive stages of manifestation of a constituted and constituting intersubjectivity, historically instantiated by the scientific community:

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> To be sure, they have proved to be changeable in the total style of their systematic theory-building and methodology. Only recently they overcame, in this respect, a threatening paralysis, under the title of classical physics – threatening, that is, as the supposed classical consummation of the confirmed style of centuries. But does the victorious struggle against the ideal of classical physics, as well as the continuing conflict over the appropriate and genuine form of construction for pure mathematics, mean that previous physics and mathematics were not yet scientific or that they did not, even though affected *with certain unclarities or blind spots*, *obtain convincing insights within their own field of endeavour*? Are these insights not compelling even for us who are freed from *such blind spots*? [Emphasis mine.] Can we not thus, placing ourselves back into the attitude of the classical theorists, understand completely how it gave rise to all the great and forever valid discoveries, together with the array of technical inventions, which so deserved the admiration of earlier generations? Physics, whether represented by a Newton or a Planck or

103 J.-Y. Girard, "Truth, modality and intersubjectivity", manuscript, January 2007, pdf: http://iml.univ-mrs.fr/~girard/Articles.html (emphasis mine).

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> an Einstein, or whomever else in the future, was always and remains exact science. It remains such even if, as some think, an absolutely final form of total theory-construction is never to be expected or striven for.
>
> (Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* David Carr, trans., Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 4)

We must face now an objection against this parallel. Girard defines its logical stance as *existentialist* and thus violently *anti-essentialist*. His battle against essentialism means obviously the strongest condemnation of any form of Platonism. Who are the essentialists according to Girard? Answer: Frege, Hilbert, and generally all logicians founding their semantics on set-theoretic assumptions or presupposing correlatively a hard modal intersubjective nucleus. Does anti-essentialism thus understood imply anti-Platonism? And eventually, *vice versa*?

On the other hand, is not Husserl's stance in mathematics currently assimilated to that of Hilbert, even that of Cantor? And to make it a bit more complicated, Husserl rejects also some anti-idealist assumptions of Hilbert, such as the nominalist and quasi-materialist reduction of mathematical and logical ideal objectivities to bare marks on the paper. But as I have argued above, Husserl's Platonism has something to do with the discovery that classical logic is "stuffed" with modalities. They belong in its logical "matter" (*Materie*) (FTL, § 35, note a) and primitively to that of terms, i.e. the semantic stuff (*Stoff*).

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To this objection, one can answer that Girard and Husserl are Platonists in view of the modal substructure of classical logic and that they are sound Platonists in as much as, instead of presupposing this *modal core,* all their theoretical efforts aim at articulating and explore as precisely as possible, the diverse operative possibilities of that 'stuff', the core-stuff (*Kern-Stoff*) as opposed to the core-form (*Kern-Form*) of terms. None of them is essentialist in the ordinary sense of the term, in as much as none of them presupposes a second or a third world of ideal entities (meanings, concepts, representations, propositions, theories, and correlatively, figures, functions, etc.) *existing actually and apart* from any subjectivity.[104] As one knows, in the battlefield of logic, every word, concept, theory can become a weapon. The term *Platonism* is one of them. And to make things worse, through its manifold usages, it has become a kind of modular and double-edged weapon.

Girard's dispute against essentialism as well as against modal logic is famous. But the faces and the name of essentialism as those of the devil are legion. Some quotes from the survey proposed in "*La logique aujourd'hui . . .*" will make this more explicit than any further comment:

> The opposition between essentialism *vs.* existentialism is firstly that of names: "Frege, Kreisel, Tarski *vs.* Brouwer, Curry, Gödel, Hilbert."
>
> More contemporary logicians are all more or less essentialists, specially Pier Martin-Löf. One can consider that Prawitz, while he was active (before 1970) was rather existentialist; I would count myself to this minority tendency.

104 Cf. *Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie. Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1917/18*. Mit ergänzenden Texten aus *der ersten Fassung von 1910/11*. Hrsg. von Ursula Panzer, Springer, 1996, pp. 34–36. That does not imply, of course, that they exist within subjectivity, in a real sense.

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> For essentialism, logic is not in need of any explanation, it is presupposed. Hence: the importance of the *meta*, synonym of essence. Such as in *2001, Space Odyssey*, this *deus ex machina* supposed to be the origin of intelligence. Although ridiculous, this is not insignificant: the notion of infinity is – as that of truth or necessity – essentialist.
>
> Essentialism impregnate (. . .) our occidental culture; including the opposition existence *vs.* essence, between which terms we are forced to choose. (. . .) *A pure existentialism because of its systematic critics is not easily sustainable. My position is, contrary to this disjunctive choice, that of a dialogue between existence and essence* (. . .) which confers no privilege to either of the terms.
>
> For example, modern logic, *born under violently essentialist auspices* (Frege) begins consequently with rules taken off from the hat [*sic*]; later, the formalist (thus non essentialist) examination of these rules reveals, under essence, existence as the geometry of these rules. Reciprocally, starting from a wild (non typified) geometry, typing disciplines reintroduces essence as a kind of superego.
>
> When looking at mathematical logic from afar, one is struck by its provincial aspect: it is a subculture which cultivates a feeling of superiority. (. . .) For example, while mathematicians were seriously studying continuity, some felt entitled to tinker with an *ad hoc* and lousy topology: Scott domains. This alternative topology is like the unconvertible currencies of the formerly so-called popular democracies: they have the status of legal tender only within the frontiers, here those of logic. Logicians pretend that Scott domains are superior to that of true topology. *By what right*?
>
> *Frege, creator of modern logic and frantic essentialist*, indulged himself to mock Riemann's genial insights which anticipated upon general relativity (Einstein, 1917), in 1855. "Nuts", said this admirer of Hitler. By what right?
>
> Let us think of the discussion about actual *vs.* potential. Logicians have invented a rotten trick, Kripke models: all the possibilities are aligned on a wall, like hunting trophies. (. . .) This is a childish vision of potentiality: if there were really a list of all possible worlds, there would be no more potentiality. It suffices to look at bi-dimensional quantum mechanics (spin, potential Boolean) to see the abyss between logic and the living science from the twentieth century. While physicists were developing a wealth of inventiveness in quantum mechanics, some felt entitled to explain the quantic by means of a quantic logic. By what right?
>
> The answer lies in the essentialist contempt based on a ruthless chain of sophisms: we know since Zeno how to refute the possibility of movement; we are dealing here only with immobility of thought.[105]

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We can read in Girard's handbook of linear logic (*The Blind Spot*),[106] a profession of Platonist faith, which Husserl would have agreed with, or at least would not have disapproved. In particular, against the epistemological paralysis and logical conservatism of many kinds of logical approaches of science, the Platonist attitude toward the idea of science means a constant attention to the evolutions of science, without

105 (*Logic today/La logique aujourd'hui . . .*), http://iml.univ-mrs.fr/~girard/Articles.html.

106 J.-Y. Girard. *The Blind Spot: lectures on logic*. European Mathematical Society, Zürich, 2011; original version: *Le point aveugle, tome 1: vers la perfection*. Visions des Sciences. Hermann, Paris, 2006. *Le point aveugle, tome 2: vers l'imperfection*. Visions des Sciences. Hermann, Paris, 2007.

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presupposing any posited item that we would not be able to explain genetically. Its question is: from which chains and systems of positing activity does it result?[107]

Against the *hidden essentialism* of classical logic, Girard affirms that Plato was himself an "existentialist" in that respect. Exactly the opposite of this "ossified epistemology" which is currently sold under the name of *formalism* in order to mask one's own epistemological rigidity or, conversely, to repel more easily classical logic in its soundness and open the highly speculative business of the by-products sold out under the name of modal logics. To be a Platonist – if one understands seriously the Cavern Myth – consists in taking seriously what one does:

> In any case if you followed this distinction, all good mathematicians (and all good scientists) should be considered as Platonists in as much as they believe in what they do. To believe in the 'reality' of what he does – without giving too precise meaning to this term – this is the *first* responsibility of the scientist. He *does not tell* nonsense or whatever he pleases, but he says 'something'. The opposite attitude would be solipsism. But should one create a new category for non-solipsism? To end up with the parallel essentialism/Platonism, let us observe that, by dint of invoking the heavens, essentialism can become an art of faint [*sic*, surely "feint"] and nonsense. Thus modal logics are the triumph of essentialism and at the same time the reign of absolute arbitrariness. One can legitimately bet that the mass manufacturers of modal logics don't believe too much in what they do, otherwise they would not be changing their system every quarter of an hour. This contrasts with the Platonic attitude which requires some honesty.[108]
>
> (J.-Y. Girard, *Le point aveugle*, I, p. 13)

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Now is Husserl an essentialist in Girard's sense of the term? Surely he talks frequently of essences, of law of essences, of ideas, "ideality", etc. Surely, he considers himself as a Platonist in mathematics as well as in logic. But he distinguishes also various forms of Platonism: Bolzano's Platonism posing subsisting units of signification (representations and propositions), Lotze's Platonism considering every ideal objectivity as "validity", and conversely every logical validity as an ideal unit, or else mixed forms such as Lotze-Bolzano's Platonism.

At this stage, a brief remark about the various forms, that this shameful and hidden Platonism has taken in the course of the recent history of logic according to Husserl: philosophising logicians, as well as partisans of logic of extension who see the extensional approach as the only way to render logic scientific by its inclusion into the set-theoretic frame, the rare logician seeking help from the mathematicians but who only

107 The understanding of such a "modally composed" *eidos* seems quite difficult, if I recall the brutal and total rejection he received from the panicked commentator of the paper I proposed on that subject at the Husserl Circle Meeting held in Paris, 21–26 June 2009.

108 Translation mine. This insistence on *logical* honesty is parallel to that of Husserl. See, for example, in his correspondence with Frege. Halle, 18/VII/1891, in *Correspondance Frege-Husserl*, trans. G. Granel, Mauvezin, T.E.R.; 1987, p. 31; Gottlob Frege, *Gottlob Freges Briefwechsel mit D. Hilbert, E. Husserl, B. Russell sowie ausgewählte Einzelbriefe Freges*, F. Meiner, 1980, p. 38: "Konnte ich auch Ihren Theorien in der Hauptsache Inch beistimmen, stets erfreute ich mich an der geistvollen Originalität, an der Klarheit, u. *ich möchte fast sagen: an der Ehrlichkeit Ihrer Forschung*, die nirgends fünf gerade sein lässt, kein Bedenken verschweigt, aller Verschwommenheit in Gedanken u. Wort abhold ist und überall bis zu den letzten Fundamenten vorzudringen sucht" (emphasis mine).

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guessed that something had to be found on this side (like Lotze) or simply succumbed to the prejudice that mathematicians had directly a clear understanding (*Einsicht*) of the logic they implemented. Here are some of the various epistemological profiles enumerated by Husserl. None of them considered it necessary to seriously investigate into the sources and conditions of validity of the fundamental concepts of formal ontology (*number, element, set, unity, individual, something, etc.*) and, correlatively, of formal apophantic. Every sound philosophical investigation about the substructure (hence the origin) of "fundamental concepts of mathematics considered precisely as subjectively constituted formations" (p. [73]) was considered as useless and fruitless. The same for the concepts of logic, taken in its narrower sense of apophantic: *meaning, concept, proposition, term, predicate, function, judgement-function, inference, deduction, demonstration, etc*. By fear of psychologism, one has fallen into another extreme and considered finally that subjectivity was totally irrelevant and, taken in its spontaneity, deprived of any structure. From that logical perspective, every investigation could be nothing but regressive and from the start condemned to err in the labyrinth of subjective and illusory speculations. But what can be expected from the careful study of the correlation between judging and judgement, counting and number? Pure tautology, as Jean Cavaillès said in his study?[109] In fact, each noetic relation is the title of a manifold of operations and operative characters respectively. What is called here *transcendental subjectivity* is the name of a domain opened to phenomenological description but also to a new formalisation. Traditional logic was based on a very small and crystallised part of this domain. The same holds for the new contemporary mathematical logic emerging at the end of the nineteenth century. But there is still a full potential of *operative forms* (*Leistungen*), a whole field of functions, a moving system of functions whose connections and structure are still waiting for an adequate formalisation.

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The radicalism of Husserl's reform of logic is in this respect a renewal of the "old Platonic idea":

> With a radicalness that cannot be surpassed and is, for that very reason, exemplary for philosophy, the idea of a genuine science as science grounded on an absolute foundation – the old Platonic idea – is renewed in full earnest; and the intrinsically primary basis already presupposed by any cognition, and therefore by the cognition belonging to the positive sciences, is sought. (. . .) Logic, which originated in the struggles of Platonic dialectic, had already, with Aristotle's analytics, crystallised off within itself a *rigidly formed systematic theory*, which has defied millenniums almost as successfully as Euclid's geometry.
>
> (*FTL*, trans. Cairns, pp. 6–8; *FTL*, pp. [6–7]; emphasis mine)[110]

It is indispensable to dominate all those proliferative ambiguities, if we want to make a proper use of the term and avoid misinterpretations of Husserl's Platonist position and terminology. If the slogan of conservative revolutions is that everything must

109 J. Cavaillès, *Sur la logique et la théorie de la science*, Vrin, Paris, p. 75.

110 "In einem nicht mehr zu übersteigenden und gerade darum philosophisch vorbildlichen Radikalismus wird die Idee echter Wissenschaft aus absoluter Begründung – die alte Platonische Idee – ganz ernstlich erneuert und nach dem an sich ersten Boden gefragt, den alle Erkenntnis, und so die der positiven Wissenschaften schon voraussetzt" (*FTL*, p. [6]).

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change in order to keep everything unchanged, the reform of logic initiated by Husserl consists in focusing on the most fixed and unquestionable points of the realm of logic and taking this stable state as the symptom of process of idealisation, and showing the feedback effects of this idealisation: denial of the genetic process, misinterpretation of the ideality, occultation of any productive subjectivity, etc. The most typical sign of logical conservatism consists in taking as *datum* that which is an idea, an ideal. Another sign consists in rejecting any implication of subjectivity in logical affairs. Any intentionality in phenomenological sense is considered as absurd. Hence: the artificial and superficial aspect of the conflicts between "logicism", "formalism", "intuitionism", etc. Each camp goes on manipulating "idealities" as if they were mere real data.[111] This illusion is that of the logician described by Husserl, not that of the phenomenologist. Although logical formations are data "exclusively from within", on which our thought can lean back, naïve modes of reflection fall necessarily into various kinds of specular illusion. This reflection is at work in ordinary considerations about language, the meaning of words, or in school contexts while teaching (natural or technical) languages. Normative and formalised grammar, and before that, writing itself stem from that kind of "wild" reflection. The secular habit of this reflection achieves the constitution of hyper-stable unreal objectivities which neater character is that of indefinite arbitrary repeatability (*beliebig Wiederholbarkeit*). Then and then alone does one "come back to them as remaining the same", "implementing them as in a kind of praxis", and "combining them" again and again, following certain rules, one produces "something new: new deductions, new demonstrations", etc.[112]

The second methodological phase consists in describing the various categories and forms of modifications (or *functions*) of consciousness responsible for the production of those fixed points. This phase is that of transcendental reduction properly speaking. The aim of such a systematic survey of the field of transcendental subjective presuppositions is not to gain a clearer and better taxonomy of already well-known acts (judging, counting, naming, inferring, deducing, etc.), but rather to transform eventually the most stabilised distinctions, not for the fun of creating new fuzzy logics, but in order to produce more deeply founded logical distinctions and concepts. Just as modern zoology, without endorsing physical reductionism, is based on deeper and more abstract descriptive features taken from genetics and molecular biology, modern logic is also seeking for foundations in the more abstract descriptive traits disclosed through a genetic and theory of a modally functioning subjectivity.[113] Natural understanding is limited and our understanding remains an open field of investigation. It is bi-dimensional so to speak, and has no feeling of heights or depths. Husserl's reform of logic aims first at surveying those dimensions of traditional logic; the surface-logic named "classical logic" is just a limiting case of it. One of the aspects and names of this third dimension is the modal dimension.

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111 *FTL*, p. [72].

112 "Also man geht doch mit ihnen um *wie mit realen Dingen, obschon von Realitäten hier keine Rede sein kann. So schweben sie unklar zwischen Subjektivität und Objektivität.* Sie als irreale Objekte ernstlich gelten zu lassen, den beiderseitigen, vielleicht doch unrechtmäßig gegeneinander ausgespielten Evidenzen genug zu tun und, was hier ernstlich problematisch ist, ernstlich als solches ins Auge zu fassen – das wagt man nicht, durch altererbte Ängste vor dem Platonismus blind gemacht für dessen rein zu fassenden Sinn und sein echtes Problem" (*FTL*, pp. 71–72).

113 We find a similar analogy at the beginning of the *Lessons on Alte und Neue Logik,* Materialien VI, pp. 5–6.

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3 Learning as recollection

Time and idealities in Plato and Husserl

Ignacio Quepons[1]

Abstract: The present chapter is an attempt at clarifying Husserl's "Platonism", notably the relation between "ideality" and "temporality". As we will strive to show, Husserl's "Platonism" doesn't express a kind of hypostatization of entities but describes a difference regarding the mode of givenness of ideal objects and the objects of sensuous experience. By resorting to some of Plato's most important dialogues (such as *Meno* and *Phaedo*), we will try to rely on the Platonic theory of "recollection" (*anamensis*) in order to approach Husserl's late theory of the genetic constitution of idealities.
Keywords: Husserl, Plato, ideas, anamnesis, time

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Husserl's affiliation to a certain kind of "Platonism" is a well-known aspect of his early logical thought, particularly in his *Prolegomena* and the *Logical Investigations*. In order to overcome the skeptical relativism of the psychological efforts to explain the fundamental logical concepts on the basis of empirical accounts, Husserl defended the necessity of founding a theory of pure logic on a set of fundamental propositions independent of empirical facts. The result is the foundations of "a theory of knowledge which recognizes the 'ideal' as condition of possibility of objective knowledge in general".[2] This position was called, according to some of Husserl's critics and even by himself, the Platonism of the *Logical Investigations*.[3] Husserl recognized that his study of Lotze's *Logik*[4] prompted him to move from a mathematical psychologism to a "platonic" interpretation of the doctrine of meaning [*Bedeutungslehre*].[5]

As to my concepts of "ideal" significations, and "ideal" contents of representations and judgments, to speak specifically, they originally derive, not from Bolzano at all, but rather – as the term "ideal" alone indicates – from Lotze. In particular, Lotze's reflections

1 National Autonomous University of Mexico, iquepons@gmail.com. I am grateful for the precious help and the wise comments and suggestions of Daniele De Santis and Elizabeth Behnke during the writing of this text, which did much to improve its previous versions. This chapter was written during my postdoctoral stance at the Philosophy Department of Seattle University with support of the National Council for Science and Technology (CONACY) of Mexico.

2 Hua, XIX/1,112.

3 Cf. Robin D. Rollinger, "Herman Lotze on Abstraction and Platonic Ideas", *Ponzan Studies in the Philosophy of the Science and the Humanities*, Vol. 82, pp. 145, 154–159. C. Beyer, "Von Bolzano zu Husserl", *Phaenomenologica*, 139, Springer, 1996, p. 52.

4 See, H. Lotze, *Logic*, ed. and trans. Bernard Bosanquet, Oxford, 1884. Bk. III, chap. II, pp. 433–449.

5 Cf. E. Husserl, *Husserliana Gesammelte Werke*, (Den Haag/Dortdrecht, Martinus Nijhoff/Kluwer/Springer, 1950 ff.), vol. XVIII, Editor's Introduction, p. xliv. Henceforth as Hua, volume/page number.

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about the interpretation of Plato's theory of forms [*Ideenlehre*] had a profound effect on me.[6]

However, there is also a repudiation of the charge of a kind of "Platonism" that supposes a sort of hypostatization and the renewal of a scholastic realism. This charge, Husserl argues in his 'Draft for a Preface to the *Logical Investigations*' "is totally unjustified; it stands in sharpest contradiction to the content of my presentations and is based upon the predominance of precisely those historical prejudices from which I once with great effort had to extricate myself."[7] Nevertheless, as Husserl explains, his position represents a "Platonism" with regard to the original givenness of the idealities.[8]

My so-called "Platonism" does not consist in some sort of metaphysical or epistemological substructures, hypostases, or theories but rather in the simple reference to a type of original "givenness" which usually, however, are falsely explained away.[9]

One of the most important aspects of the "Platonism" of Husserl's early position, especially in the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, consists in the defense of an understanding of idealities, and especially the ideality of truth, as "eternal" [*ewig*], that is, as supratemporal (or "beyond" time) [*überzeitlich*], in contradistinction to the empirical account of Logic performed through Psychology, which reduces the fundamental logical concepts to mere empirical rules subject to change.

Experiences are real particulars [*reale Einzelheiten*], temporally determinate, which come into being and pass away. Truth, however, is "eternal" [*ewig*] or, better put, it is an Idea [*eine Idee*], and so beyond time. It makes no sense to give truth a date in time, nor a duration which extends throughout time.[10]

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Even though Husserl mentions that such "ideal objects" should not be confused with traditional Platonism insisting that his own "ideal objects and Platonic Ideas (in the sense of the Aristotelian conception) are totally different",[11] his affiliation of Husserl to a sort of *Platonism* remains, as Rollinger argues, since "it is clear that on Husserl's view there is an undeniable "separation" (*chorismos*) between ideal objects ante their correspondent particulars."[12]

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This separation consists in the division between a realm of ideal objects from the individual or "real" objects, since, in order to "assure the basic foundations of pure logic and epistemology by defending the intrinsic right of specific (or ideal) objects to be granted, objective status alongside of individual (or real objects)".[13]

6 Hua XXII, 156.
7 Hua XX/I, 282
8 For the purposes of this text, I take the concept of "ideality" to include all the different kind of ideal objects we may find in Husserl, as ideal meanings, essentialities [*Wesenheiten*], *Eidē*, or even *Ideas*. Considering that Husserl himself uses a broad notion of ideas in "*the Platonic sense*" in Hua VII, 199, Hua IX, 75, and *Erfahrung und Urteil*, ed. L. Landgrebe, Hamburg Felix Meiner, 1938, p. 411, (henceforth cited as *EU*, page number) while comparing his own notion of "Eidos" or of idealities in general with Plato's philosophy, we consider also in the same generality notions that in a more specific context are to be distinguished in Plato's work as "Idea", "Form", or "Eidos". For a full consideration of the relation between Husserl and Plato on the notion of *Eidos*, see B. Hopkins, *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl*, Acumen, 2011.
9 Hua XX/282.
10 Hua XVIII, 134.
11 Hua XXII, 263.
12 R. Rollinger, "Husserl's position in the School of Brentano", *Phaenomenologica*, 150, Springer, 1999, p. 233.
13 Hua XIX/1, 112.

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This is precisely one of the points of Natorp's criticisms against Husserl, in his review to the *Prolegomena*: "Now while the author of the drama, in clear partisanship, sides with the 'Ideal' and this truly Platonic sense pays allegiance to 'Idealism', the 'real' remains alien, confused, and yet as a surd that cannot be done away with."[14]. Furthermore, right at the end of his review, Natorp also emphasizes the supratemporal character of the logical contents:

> A bond, a *logical* connection *must* be set up between the super-temporal being of the logical and its temporal actualization in the experience of the mind, if the words "realization" of the Ideal, are not to remain an enigma, a metaphysical locution of the most suspicious sort. If such a connection is to be possible, then that can only be from the side of the super-temporal and through the mediation of (in itself still super-temporal) the *Concept* of Time itself. The "realization" then means no more a mystical metaphysical act, but a strictly intelligible logical transition from one mode of consideration to another, which ultimately was already implicit in it.[15]

Indeed, perhaps it is not "the concept of Time" as Natorp claims, but a phenomenological consideration of temporality, rather than a descriptive psychology, will be the clue for Husserl in overcoming the risk of converting such "realization" in a mystical metaphysical act. This different register is nothing but reconsideration of the phenomenological program as a transcendental phenomenology, and within, the development of the analysis of the transcendental constitution. Moreover, the development of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology after *Prolegomena* will progressively show a profound emphasis not only on the understanding of subjectivity, but also on the role of time, and time-consciousness, with important consequences for his theory of idealities. In his 1917/18 Bernau Manuscripts he even suggests that every being "is" insofar as it "is" along the rise and fall of the temporal flow.[16] Therefore, in his late philosophy, rather than considering the idealities as "eternal" [*ewig*], in the sense of "independent of time" or "untemporal" [*unzeitlich*], as they seemed to be described in the *Prolegomena*, Husserl describes their temporal status, in *Experience and Judgment*, and other works as "omnitemporal" [*allzeitlich*].[17]

This subtle switch in Husserl's appreciation regarding the relation between time and the idealities is, nevertheless, coherent with his own remark on the *Draft for a Preface to the Logical Investigations*. Husserl's Platonism doesn't express a kind of hypostatization of entities but describes a difference regarding the mode of givenness of ideal objects and the objects of sensuous experience.[18] The idealities are in a way

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14 Natorp, "On the question of Logical Method", in J.N. Mohanty, *Readings on Husserl's Logical Investigations*, Martinus Nihjoff, 1971, p. 66.

15 Natorp, 1971, p. 66.

16 "Alles was ist, ist, sofern es *in infinitum* wird und das Kontinuum der entsprechenden Vergangenheiten verströmt. Es is Identisches im Fluss der Wandlung von Gegenwart in Vergangenheiten kontinuierlicher Abstufung. Und Dauern konstituiert sich im Fluss immer neuen Werdens, des Werdens immer neuen Seins; es ist in stetigem Entstehen und Vergehen", Hua XXXIII, 294–295.

17 Husserl, *EU* § 64.

18 Husserl emphasizes in different contexts the givenness of *Idealities* as objects [*Gegeständen*] (Hua VII, 129). Moreover, as already indicated, Husserl often uses as synonyms notions like essentialities [*Wesenheitein*], *Eidos*, or *Ideas* as synonyms, usually with the remark of "in platonic sense", but distinguishing this from "metaphysical" interpretation of Plato, and stressing their intuitive mode of their

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"temporal" as long as they appear as being always and every time as the *same*, *along* time rather than *beyond* time. In consequence, we can no longer consider the idealities as independent [*unabhängig*] of time; instead, they are essentially related to the temporality as the horizon of their manifestation.

This aspect of Husserl's thought was remarked by Miguel García-Baró, who claims that Husserl's initial position, expressed in the *Prolegomena* about the timeless character of idealities, can indeed be reconciled with the late presentation of the same issue especially in such works as *Experience and Judgment*. According to transcendental phenomenology, immanent time is the ground for the constitution of all lived experiences and their correlates; the time is then the form of givenness of every intentional object to referred by the lived experiences, even idealities. Following this idea, García-Baró suggests that the difference between the temporality of objects of understanding and "real" objects is a difference of degree: "the omnitemporality of the objects of understanding would not differ but in degree from the simple temporality of 'real' objects."[19] This means that instead of considering the former as out of time and the later as essentially temporal, Husserl would suggest that they are both temporal but in a different sense. The reason for such a change of perspective is grounded in the transcendental turn: as García Baró says "what is called in the naive attitude 'supratemporality'[20] or 'non-temporality' is revealed in the transcendental attitude as omnitemporality."[21]

Should we interpret, nevertheless, this switch in the theory as a departure from the Platonic insight that Husserl took from Lotze? The aim of this chapter is precisely to address the coherence between Husserl's early "Platonism" and his late dynamic or genetic phenomenological analysis with regard to the relation between temporality and idealities. In order to argue for such coherence, I will suggest a possible interpretation of Plato's account of Ideas, stressing the role of time, especially in *Meno* and *Phaedo*. I will also consider some remarks in *Phaedrus* and such late dialogues as *Timaeus* and the *Laws*,[22] with regard to the relation between the movement of the soul and Plato's account of time. The aim of such interpretation is to open the possibility of reconsidering the so-called *Platonism,* apparent in both the early and the late development of Husserl's philosophy.[23]

Besides the discussion regarding the "Platonism" of his early thought, Husserl himself recognizes his debt to Plato on several occasions and considered him as the "venerable forefather [*verehrungswürdige Urvater*] of the rigorous science and the scientific philosophy".[24] In his lectures of *Introduction to Philosophy*, Husserl attributed to

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apprehension: "Dieses algemeine Wesen ist das Eidos, die "*Idea*" im platonishe Sinn aber rein gefasst und frei von allen metaphysischen Interpretationen; also genau so genomen wie es in der auf solchem Wege entspringenden Ideenschau uns unmittelbar intuitiv zur Gegebenheit kommt" (Hua IX, 73). See, also Hua IX, 76; Hua VII, 129.

19 García-Baró, *La verdad y el tiempo*, Sígueme, Salamanca, 1992, p. 232.

20 As we have seen, Husserl himself does use the expression "*überzeitlich*" to refer to what has no place in time in the *Prolegomena*, (Hua XVIII, 134), but by the time of *Experience of Judgment*, the same expression is recast with the sense of "transtemporality" (§ 64c), that is, of a unity running "through" or "across" temporal multiplicity.

21 García Baró, 1992, p. 234.

22 *Meno,* 85d–86b; *Phaedo*, 73a–75e; *Timaeus*, 37d–38a; *Phaedrus*, 245a–245b; *Laws*, 898a–c.

23 Hua XX/1, 283–283.

24 Hua Mat IX, 28.

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Plato's philosophy the discovery of the *a priori*.[25] And these lectures, we even can confirm how Husserl kept following Lotze's interpretation of Plato.[26]

However, while comparing Husserl and Plato on this point we shouldn't forget that Husserl's project explicitly avoids considering the metaphysical status of ideas as objective in the sense of *real* independent objects. As André de Muralt suggests:

> Platonic ideality is so to speak subjectivized in Husserl as it is in a number of modern idealists. With this in mind, it can be said that Husserl both rejects Platonism and continues it. He rejects it insofar as he condemns the metaphysical reality of platonic ideas and the metaphysical dualism to which this thesis necessarily leads. He continues it insofar as he maintains the normation of the real by the (subjectivized) ideal.[27]

However, a point that de Muralt, and other Husserl scholars usually do not consider while comparing Husserl and Plato on this subject, is the importance that Plato himself gave to time in his account of Ideas, particularly in the so-called argument of *Anamnesis* and this is precisely the point I would like to stress in the following pages.[28]

In order to suggest this perspective which is not intended to provide a new interpretation of Plato but to point out, from the analysis of his *Dialogues*, a possible perspective on Husserl's thought, the chapter starts with a brief presentation of the topic of *Anamnesis* or recollection in the dialogues of *Meno* and *Phaedo*, followed by a consideration of the status of the time and a final consideration of the role of the movement of the soul with regard to the origin of motion and multiplicity. The aim of this presentation is to suggest how Plato's recollection can be understood as a process that involves a kind of temporal association[29] which is essential in the recognition of the existence of entities that are not subject to change: Ideas. Afterwards, we move toward Plato's account of time as the moving "image of eternity", in the *Timaeus* and consider the connection between this account and the description of self-movement of the soul as the ultimate source of understanding about motion and multiplicity in the Book X of the *Laws*. The argument of recollection, I will suggest, is entirely coherent with the way the soul's own temporal self-movement is involved in understanding time itself on one hand, and on the other hand, the Ideas as something that remain, *along time*, always and every time the same. Moreover, since in Plato, the performance of *Anamnesis*

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25 Hua Mat IX, 55 ff.

26 "Aber das was nur eine Line in der Denkwegung. Die andere ging von Leibniz aus, und seine Platonische Motiven, womit sich die Wirkung von Lotzes Interpretation der Platonisches Ideenlehre verband" Hua VII, 349.

27 de Muralt, *The Idea of Phenomenology, Husserlian Exemplarism,* Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 40.

28 Some Plato scholars such as Vlastos distance themselves from any kind of psychological interpretation of the notion of *Anamnesis*. See G. Vlastos, "Anamnesis in the Meno" in *Studies in Greek Philosophy*, Princeton University Press, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 155, n.14. In this sense, the *Anamnesis* constitutes a kind of inferential process rather a temporal association. On the other hand, more recently, scholars as J.L. Ackrill, ("Anamnesis in the *Phaedo*: remarks on 73c–75c" in *Essays on Plato and Aristotle,* Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 17) and D. Scott, *Plato's Meno*, Cambridge University Press, 2005, have emphasized the importance of recollection understood as a temporal association of present and prior experiences. Perhaps one of the scholars most strongly emphasizing the importance of time in the Plato's argument of recollection is J. Klein, *A commentary on Plato's Meno*, University of North Carolina Press, 1965, p. 109.

29 See Ackrill, 1997.

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involves the participation of others and presupposes a common understanding of language (Meno, 82b), it is possible to suggest a further hypothesis showing how Platonic recollection, now interpreted in the framework of transcendental phenomenology, might be understood also as the horizon that allows us to constitute the unity of such as ideal heritage as the result, in a certain sense, of former human activities and accomplishments.

Following this presentation of Plato, the next section of the chapter analyses Husserl's consideration of idealities in the context of the genetic analysis of transcendental constitution, emphasizing the transition from the consideration of idealities as "eternal" [*ewig*] to "omnitemporal" [*allzeitlich*]. The aim is to show how, far from being timeless, idealities are originally constituted with permanent reference to the flow of the temporal stream of the transcendental consciousness. Within this context, and considering the possible interpretation of the role of temporality in Plato's account of Ideas, I show how it is possible give an alternative view of Husserl's theory of idealities, especially in the context of his late concern with the temporal and historical constitution of Geometry, as a coherent evolution of a sort of *Platonism*. In a way then, this hypothesis may confirm Husserl's own insight regarding the Platonic heritage of the transcendental phenomenology. Perhaps, as Wilhelm Schapp's claims, it is only by grasping the essence of phenomenology that we can truly understand Plato.[30] Yet, such an assessment may also work the other way around, and in the present study: it is possible that only by grasping some crucial aspects of Plato's philosophy, we may truly understand Husserl's Phenomenology.

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Recollection and ideas in Plato

One of Plato's most important arguments in his account of ideal knowledge is the so-called "argument of recollection", which is, at the same time, one of the most interesting and even difficult topics we can find in his writings.[31] The subject appears particularly in *Phaedo* and *Meno*,[32] and it is unlikely that Plato had ever changed his mind on this topic.[33]

In the case of *Meno*, the argument appears in the context of Socrates' claim about the impossibility of teaching virtues. Socrates proves it by helping a young slave to realize that without any previous training in geometry he is able to explain some geometrical ideas. Learning, Plato famously claims, is nothing else but recollection, because every acquisition of knowledge presupposes ideas that come neither from the experience of this world nor from something that can be learned from someone else. Despite the explicit reference of Plato to the mythical origin of such prior knowledge in a time before coming into the world, some scholars have tried to interpret the passage by understanding *Anamnesis* as a sort of inferential enhancement of knowledge.

30 Quoted by D. De Santis "Wesen Eidos, Idea Remarks on the "Platonism" of Jean Héring and Roman Ingarden", *Studia Phaenomenologica*, 2015, p. 156.
31 D. Bostock, *Plato's* Phaedo, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 60.
32 Hackford mentions the importance of *Phaedrus* and *Republic* in *Plato's* Phaedo, Cambridge University Press, 1955, p. 77. Cornford's suggestion appears implicitly in *Theaetetus* (*Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, Harcourt Brace and Co., New York, 1935, p. 28).
33 Hackford, 1955, p. 75.

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Reduced to its simplest terms then, what Plato means by "recollection" in *Meno* is

> *any enlargement of our knowledge which* [156] *results from the perception of logical relationships*. [. . .] to recollect is to gain insight into the logical structure of a concept, so that when faced with its correct definition one will see that the concepts mentioned are analytically connected.[34]

The interpretation of Vlastos is correct only if we pay attention solely to the inferential argument performed during the dialogue between Socrates and the boy. Nevertheless, even though it is not the main argument of the dialogue, the importance of referring to a prior life and the consequent character of "recovering" a prior knowledge implied in the notion of recollection in *Meno* is missed by Vlastos. The knowledge of geometry, according to Socrates, does not come from teaching but from questioning. With reference to the slave boy, he claims: "He will recover it for himself"[35] through recollection. However, as we can observe in the following lines, Socrates explicitly relates such recovering of the knowledge of geometrical theorems to its acquisition "at some previous time":

SOCRATES: Either then he has at some time acquired the knowledge which he now has, or he has always possessed it. If he always possessed it, he must always have known; if on the other hand he acquired it at some previous time, it cannot have been in this life, unless somebody has taught him geometry. He will behave in the same way with all geometric knowledge, and every other subject. Has anyone taught him all these? You ought to know, especially as he has been brought up in your household.

MENO: Yes, I know that no one ever taught him.

SOCRATES: And has he these opinions, or hasn't he?

MENO: It seems we can't deny it.

SOCRATES: Then if he did not acquire them in this life, isn't it immediately clear that he possessed and had learned them during some other period?

MENO: It seems so.

SOCRATES: If then there are going to exist in him, both while he is and while he is not a man, true opinions which can be aroused by questioning and turned into knowledge, may say that his soul has been forever in a state of knowledge? Clearly he always either is or is not a man.

MENO: Clearly.

SOCRATES: And if the truth about reality is always is in our soul, the soul must be immortal, and one must take courage and try to discover – that is, to recollect – what one doesn't happen to know, or more correctly, remember, at the moment.[36]

This passage confirms the suggestion about the role of time in the process of learning as recovering knowledge through recollection. Nevertheless, and according to Jacob

34 Vlastos, 1995, p. 157; original emphasis.
35 Plato, *Meno*, 85d. From the English version of J.K.C. Guthrie, in Plato, *The Collected Dialogues*, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton University Press, 1989 (1961), pp. 353–384.
36 *Meno* 85d–86b.

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Klein, it is important to remark that *Anamnesis* might imply not only to look back into the past but also looking "inside" ourselves:

> Whatever else *anamnesis* might imply, it certainly connotes a looking *back,* not only back into the past but also back into oneself. It means a recovering or recapturing (*analambanein*) of something "within" or "inside" us, and this was stressed by Socrates throughout the dialogue.[37]

This happens because there belongs to the essence of the soul such a temporal form that allows not only that there is a time *before* coming into the world, a time that doesn't belong to the world but also that the soul is still able to realize this time as a sort of vision of something that *happened* in its past. Since knowing about Ideas is recollection, such recovering is actually a kind of movement, which means that the horizon of our understanding of the Ideas must have a certain relationship with certain sense of temporality as well. In order to be able to perform the *Anamnesis*, we shouldn't just be able to associate different objects through similarities or inferences, but also to call back objects from the past through our memory. Therefore, I must be able to recollect not only the ideas in the past *before* time, but myself, and this "recapturing something inside" of our soul involves the time of what is "always at all time" [*ton aei chronon*]. In the dialogue of *Phaedo*, recollection reappears in the context of proving the immortality of the soul. Here the argument of *Anamnesis* is related to the claim that the recognition of equal or similar aspects of sensuous perception presupposes the idea of equality or similarity itself. Such "equality" doesn't come from the experience, but is presupposed by the perceptual experience of the equal or similar:[38]

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SOCRATES: Suppose that when you see something you say to yourself, this thing which I can see has a tendency to be like something else, but it falls short and cannot be really like it, only a poor imitation. Don't you agree with me that anyone who receives that impression must in fact have previous knowledge of that thing which he says that the other resembles, but inadequately?

SIMMIAS: Certainly we must.

SOCRATES: Very well, then is that our position with regard to the equal things and absolute equality?

SIMMIAS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: Then we must have some previous knowledge of equality before the time when we first saw equal things and realized that they were striving after equality, but fell short of it.[39]

The soul itself recognizes such knowledge as something always present and given in advance. Nevertheless, as we already mentioned, in order to realize such knowledge as

37 Klein, 1965, p. 189.

38 An important remark of Vlastos that highlights a difference between recollection in *Meno* and in *Phaedo*, is that in *Meno* the sensitive experience plays no role in the geometrical explanation, it is a mere inferential process. However, since we may find in *Phaedo* itself an explicit retrospective reference to *Meno*, we have reasons to think that Plato is referring to the same concept. Regarding the discussion about the unity of the subject along the Dialogues, see Scott, 2005, pp. 93 ff.

39 *Phaedo*, 74e–75a. From the English version of Hugh Tredennick, in Plato, *The Collected Dialogues*, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton University Press, 1989 (1961), pp. 40–98.

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being prior experience, the soul must recognize its own unity as the same soul before and after coming into the world, otherwise it would make no sense to say that I am able to link experiences and their correlates along the passage of time.

According to this argument, as long as the Ideas appear identical and "always" present in the same sense at any time, we recall to them through recollection. Thus, the experience of the temporal continuity of the life, realized through recollection, is one of the conditions of possibility of the knowledge of Ideas as such. Therefore, the soul is immortal because it remains the same along the passage of the time and she is also able to recognize the Ideas as presupposed in every experience, and in this way as being known before the soul's coming to the world. Moreover, according to Plato, we must have learned the ideas before "we were born":[40]

SOCRATES: So before we began to see and hear and use other senses we must somewhere have acquired the knowledge that there is such a thing as absolute equality. Otherwise we could never have realized, by using it as standard for comparison, that all equal objects of sense are desirous of being like it, but are only imperfect copies.
SIMMIAS: That is the logical conclusion, Socrates
SOCRATES: Did we not begin to see and hear and possess our other senses from the moment of birth?
SIMMIAS: Certainly
SOCRATES: But we admitted that we must have obtained our knowledge of equality before we obtained them.
SIMMIAS: Yes
SOCRATES: So we must have obtained it before birth
SIMMIAS: So it seems.[41]

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According to Plato, we are able to realize the previous acquisition of this knowledge through recollection:

SOCRATES: If it is true that we acquired our knowledge before our birth and lost it at the moment of birth, but afterward, by the exercise of our senses upon sensible objects, recover the knowledge which we had once before, I suppose that what we call learning will be the recovery of our own knowledge, and surely we should be right in calling this recollection.

40 *Phaedo*, 75d. The topic of the *immortality of the soul* finds its analogy in Husserl's understanding of consciousness as an endless process; the explicit recognition of the immortality of primordial life is also in consonance with Plato's philosophy. Both Plato and Husserl relate the idea of the immortality of the soul to the claim of a strong sense of *a priori* knowledge. See Scott, 2005, p. 103), C. Kahn, "Plato on recollection", in *A Companion to Plato*, Blackwell, 2006, p. 119. For both philosophers, it is crucial to defend the coherence between self-knowledge and the knowledge of the *a priori*; however, my argument in this chapter is not to go deep comparing both ideas of subjectivity nor comparing the argument of immortality, but to point out how we find a certain notion of temporality implied in the experience of the self, which is necessary to understand in order to argue the knowledge of the idealities. For Husserl himself, as Inga Römer ("Das Zeitdenken bei Husserl, Heidegger und Ricœur", *Phaenomenologica*, 196, Springer 2010) suggests, the "I" is omnitemporal [*allzeitlich*] precisely in the sense we attribute to the omnitemporality of the ideas: "Das ich is allzeitlich weil es nicht in der Zeit, aber auch nicht losgelöst von der Zeit, sondern in jeder Zeit und für alle Zeit ist. Es ist der Subjektpol, Für den alle jemals zeitlich auftretenden Objekte und Verhaltungen sind. [. . .] Seine Allzeitlichkeit hat sich immer wieder durch die Konkretisierung der 'notwendigen Einheit' im Ich zu erweisen."

41 *Phaedo*, 75a–c.

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SIMMIAS: Quite so.

SOCRATES: Yes, because we saw that it is possible for the perception of an object by sight or hearing or any other senses to suggest to the percipient, through association, whether there is any similarity or not, another object which he has forgotten. So, as I maintain, there are two alternatives. Either we are all born with knowledge of these standards, and retain it throughout our lives, or else, when we speak of people learning, they are simply recollecting what they knew before. In other words, learning is recollection.[42]

This recalling of the recollection suggests the course of time in the sense of "before and after", but on the other hand, and because of the immortal nature of the soul, this "before we were born" refers to a "time," so to speak, "before time" because it doesn't belong to the realm of those things subject to change. Let's return to the passage in *Meno* where this idea appears as a time of the soul "before" coming into this world:

SOCRATES: This knowledge will not come from teaching but from questioning. He will recover it for himself.

MENO: Yes

SOCRATES: And the spontaneous recovery of knowledge that is in him is recollection isn't it?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Either then he has at some time acquired the knowledge which he now has, or he has always possessed it. If he always possessed it, he must always have known: if on the other hand he acquired it at some previous time, it cannot have been in this life, unless somebody has taught him geometry. He will behave in the same way with all geometric knowledge, and every other subject. Has anyone taught him all these? You ought to know, especially as he has been brought up in your household.

MENO: Yes, I know that no one ever thought him.

SOCRATES: And has he these opinions, or hasn't he?

MENO: It seems we can't deny it.

SOCRATES: Then, if he did not acquire them in this life, isn't it immediately clear that he possessed and had learned them during some other period?

MENO: It seems so.

SOCRATES: When he was not in human shape?

MENO: Yes.[43]

In order to be able to realize the existence of such idealities, we must understand a certain form of temporality that it is not attached to entities subject to change, and is nevertheless experienced still as "time", otherwise to speak about "recollection" would be nonsensical. The knowledge of the ideas then consists in recognizing them as given in advance, *before* our perception of real temporal objects; however, the very fact that we have recourse to recollection makes explicit the necessity of this knowledge being

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42 *Phaedo*, 75e.
43 *Meno*, 85e–86a.

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given through a temporal experience, as something that is "always" present or available to call back into presence. On the notion of *Anamnesis* David A. White remarks:

> The nature of recollection is cognitively complex: whenever we perceive something, we must then know it in such a way that this knowing initiates a connection to something else already present in the mind, the knowledge of which is different from the knowledge of the perceived thing.[44]

The context of the discussion where the problem of *Anamnesi*s emerges, is very important. In comparison to *Meno*, where the discussion is about the possibility of teaching virtues, the main subject under discussion in *Phaedo* is the immortality of the soul as such, and the topic of learning Ideas as a proof of such immortality arises within this context. After arguing about the opposition between life and dead, Socrates is reminded by Cebes about his claim that learning is nothing but recollection: "According to this argument, I suppose it's necessary that we've learned at some previous time what we now recollect. [. . .] But this is impossible if our soul was not somewhere before being born in this human form here."[45]

From the very beginning, and regardless of what *Anamnesi*s itself means, the issue involves time as a necessary condition for learning of Ideas. On the other hand, time is a "previous time" where the knowledge we learned happened, and on the other hand, it is a time before we were "born in this human form." This means that time goes not only beyond the limits of the event of being in this human form but is implied in the unity of the soul it was; in order to recollect such previous knowledge, the soul must remain the same soul before coming into this world. We may not always be able to recollect the knowledge we previously experienced during the course of our current life, but we may indeed recollect what happened before any "possible" before, that is, before entering into the limits of our human form.[46]

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Cebes recalls the argument and mentions that "When human beings are questioned, if somebody questions them well, they themselves tell everything as it is, although if knowledge and right account didn't happen to be within them, they wouldn't have been able to do this."[47] Cebes himself recalls the argument that appears in *Meno*[48] where Socrates questions a slave boy with the help of diagrams in order to get him to discover (recollect) mathematical truths within himself.

Afterwards, Simmias joins the discussion and Socrates explains to him what he means by recollection:

SOCRATES: If a person is to be reminded of anything, he must first know it at some time or other?

SIMMIAS: Quite so

SOCRATES: Are we also agreed in calling it recollection when knowledge comes in a particular way? I will explain what I mean. Suppose that a person on seeing or

44 D.A. White, *Myth and Metaphysics in Plato's* Phaedo, Susquehanna University Press, 1992, p. 85.
45 *Phaedo*, 73a.
46 Something interesting on this point is that Simias doesn't remember that argument, and he asks for help in order to recall it. "Remind me – I can't remember very well at the present" (73a). Plato uses similar discursive strategies at other moments.
47 *Phaedo*, 73a.
48 *Meno*, 82b.

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> hearing or otherwise noticing one thing not only becomes conscious of that but also thinks of a something else which is an object of different sort of knowledge. Are we not justified in saying that he was reminded of the object which he thought of?[49]

In this passage, Plato compares recollection to a sort of association,[50] the person becomes conscious of an object and in doing so thinks of a something else. From this first assessment, we may think the person associates a present object to a prior object already known in the past: "So by recollection we mean the sort of experience which I have just described, especially when it happens with reference to things which we had not seen for such a long time that we had forgotten them."[51]

In order to perform such association, we must be able to consider the associated objects in terms of their similarity.[52] Furthermore, in order to realize such similarities, we may need to understand in advance what similarity is, and since we don't learn about such similarity through the senses[53] we must learn about it by means of the recollection. Moreover, since we began to see and hear from the moment of our birth, we must have obtained such knowledge "before birth".[54]

Then, if we have obtained it before our birth, and possessed it when we were born, we had knowledge, both before and at the moment of birth, not only of equality and relative magnitudes, but of all absolute standards. Our present argument applies no more to equality than it does to absolute beauty, goodness, uprightness, holiness, and, as I maintain, all those characteristics which we designate in our discussions by the term "absolute." So we must have obtained knowledge of all these characteristics before our birth.[55]

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It is important to note that what grants *Anamnesis* its sense of "recovering", is the fact that according to Plato, we lost this previous acquired knowledge at the moment of birth. However, through the exercise of our senses upon sensible objects, we are able to "recover the knowledge which we had once before", so that what "we call learning will be the recovery of our knowledge, and surely we should be right in calling this recollection."[56]

Therefore, since *Anamnesis* is about something that happened before our coming into this world, time plays, indirectly, a certain role its performance. After this consideration, Plato will present an explicit distinction between two kinds of entities: those that are visible and subject to change, and those invisible and not subject to change.[57] The Ideas, as entities not subject to change, seem to be considered as beyond the boundaries of time. However, such idealities are discovered as such through a temporal experience: recollection. Since the soul belongs to the realm of those entities that are not subject to change, recollection is about recovering not only knowledge but, in a way, the very

49 *Phaedo*, 73c–d.
50 *Phaedo*, 76a.
51 *Phaedo*, 73e.
52 Cf. Ross's commentary on *Aristoteles Parva Naturalia*, 1975, p. 245. "This is the earliest general formulation of the laws of association" quoted by Ackrill, 1997, p. 25, n.9.
53 *Phaedo*, 75b.
54 *Phaedo*, 75c.
55 *Phaedo*, 75c–d.
56 *Phaedo*, 75c.
57 *Phaedo*, 79a.

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essence of what we are. Furthermore, since we came into this human form, and since this event belongs to our current situation, it is necessary for us to perform the recollection in order to realize the "eternity", so to speak, *in us*. Nevertheless, Plato does not give us his account of time in either *Phaedo* or *Meno*, but in the late dialogue known as *Timaeus*.

In *Timaeus*, Plato explains the origin of time by claiming that time is nothing but the image of eternity but considered through numbers[58], that is, succession:

> Now the nature of the ideal being was everlasting [*aionios*], but to bestow this attribute in its fullness upon a creature was impossible. Wherefore he resolved to have a moving image of eternity, and when he set in order the heaven, he made this image eternal but moving according to number, while eternity itself rests in unity, and this image we call time [*chronos*]. For there were no days and nights and months and years before the heaven was created, but when he constructed the heaven he created them also. They are all parts of time, and the past and the future are created species of time, which we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to eternal being, for we say that it "was" or "is", or "will be" are only to be spoken of becoming in time, for they are motions, but that which is immovably the same forever cannot become older or younger by time, nor can it be said that it came into being in the past, or has come into the future, nor is it subject at all to any of those which affect moving and sensible things and of which generation is the cause.[59]

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According to this passage, we might suggest that as temporal beings, in this human form and during our embodied life, we are not able to "represent" ideas as eternal but as everlasting: always and all the time the same.[60] This assumption doesn't compromise Plato's ontology of Ideas, because what is temporal is not the ideas but our experience of them. In this regard, Nicholas White, in his study "Plato's metaphysical epistemology", mentions that

> the timelessness of the Forms is more than just a matter of their being the same through all time (though Plato often says they are indeed always the same); it is that they lie "out-side" of time in the "eternity" of which time is only an "imitation".[61]

Nevertheless, it is at the time undeniable that such "moving image of eternity", the time, underlays the way we refer to the Ideas, and that is more important; it is coherent to our temporal and dynamic process of recovering knowledge, through the experience of recollection.

It is interesting, however, that for Plato the definition of time comes from the experience of motion and multiplicity. The temporal things are those that are multiple

58 "Time is the most perfect reflection of unchanging eternity in the world of change. It is related to eternity as number is related to the unity": J.J.A. Mooji, *Time and Mind, History of a Philosophical Problem*, Brill Academic, 2005, p. 20.

59 *Timaeus*, 37d–38a. From the English version of Benjamin Lowett, in Plato, *The Collected Dialogues*, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton University Press, 1989 (1961), pp. 1151–1211.

60 Cf. Cornford, 1935, pp. 102–107.

61 N. White, "Plato's metaphysical epistemology", *Cambridge Companion to Plato,* Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 289.

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and subject to change, in other words, subject to movement. In another sense, however, and perhaps this is precisely the importance of recollection, there is an internal movement of the soul that is essential both to the performance of recollection and to the realization of the unchangeable character of the Ideas, since our knowledge about them is given independently from our senses. In *Phaedrus*, Plato explicitly suggests that the source and principle of motion is nothing but the soul itself, by the distinction of self-motivated movement and externally motivated movement:

> All soul is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal. But that which while imparting motion is itself moved by something else can cease to be in motion, and therefore can cease to live; it is only that which moves itself that never intermits its motion, inasmuch as it cannot abandon its own nature; moreover, this *self-mover is the source and first principle of motion for all other things that are moved*. [. . .] The self-mover, then is the first principle of motion, and it is as impossible that it should be destroyed as that it should come into being: were, it otherwise, the whole universe, the whole of that which comes to be, would collapse into immobility, and never find another source of motion to bring it back into being.[62]

Since the soul has the capability of self-movement, in Book X of the *Laws* Plato suggests that in a certain sense the soul controls everything that is in motion; thus we are actually able to realize the movement of the earth and the sea through the self-motivated movement of our souls. We can divide the argument at different times. Since the movement of the soul is self- motivated movement, Plato concludes the priority of the movement of the soul against the movement of things:

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ATHENIAN: Well then, what is the definition of the thing for which *soul* is the name? Can we find any but the phrase we have just used in the motion which can set itself moving?

CLINIAS: You mean that the selfsame reality which has the name *soul* is the vocabulary of all of us has *self-movement* as its definition?

ATHENIAN: I do, but if this is indeed so, is there anything we can desiderate, anything further toward complete demonstration of the identity of soul with the primal becoming and movement of all that is, has been, or shall be, and of all their contraries, seeing it has disclosed itself as the universal cause of all change and motion?

CLINIAS: No, indeed. Our proof that soul, since it is found to be the source of movement, is the first-born of all things is absolutely complete.[63]

The primacy of self-movement agrees with a previous theory we may find in *Phaedo*, regarding the difference between soul and body, which situates the body, within the realm of things subject to change, entirely dependent on the soul and even derived from it in a certain sense:

62 *Phaedrus*, 245a–245e. From the English version of R. Hackforth, in Plato, *The Collected Dialogues*, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton University Press, 1989 (1961), pp. 475–525; emphasis added.

63 *Laws*, 896a–b. From the English version of A.E. Taylor, in Plato, *The Collected Dialogues*, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton University Press, 1989 (1961), pp. 1225–1513; emphasis added.

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ATHENIAN: Then must not the motion which, wherever it arises, is induced by something else, but never confers the power of self-motion on anything, come second in the scale, or as low down as you please to put it, being in fact, change in a truly soulless body?

CLINIAS: Rightly argued.

ATHENIAN: Consequently, it will be a right, decisive, true, and final statement to assert, as we did, that soul is prior to body, secondary and derivative, soul governing in the real order of things, and body being subject to governance.

CLINIAS: Indeed, it would.

ATHENIAN: But we have not, I imagine, forgotten our earlier argument that if soul could be proved older than body, the characters of soul must also be older than those of body.

CLINIAS: Not in the least.[64]

The soul is also described in terms of its activities, moods and habits of mind, wishes and judgments, which are prior to the physical features of nature, and this confirms its primacy in comparison to the body. This distinction may also allow us to point out also that the measure of time, the actual succession that makes possible the movement as such finds its origin in the self-movement of the soul. However, so far as the self-movement of the soul has priority, its movement and the idea of time it involves is also "prior" to the time of the things subject to change. Through such self-movement, the soul controls everything in the sky, earth, or sea. And such movement is expressed through such activities as wishing, thinking, reflecting, judging, and so on:

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ATHENIAN: And so moods and habits of mind, wishes calculations, and true judgments, purposes, and memories, will all be prior to physical lengths, breaths, and depths, in virtue of the priority of soul itself to body.

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CLINIAS: Inevitably so.

ATHENIAN: Hence we are driven, are we not, to agree in the consequence that soul is the cause of good and evil, fair and foul, right and wrong – in fact of all contraries, if we mean to assert it as the *universal* cause?

CLINIAS: Certainly we are.

ATHENIAN: Well then, if indwelling soul thus controls all things universally that move anywhere, are we not bound to say it controls heaven itself?

CLINIAS: Yes, of course.

ATHENIAN: And is this done by one single soul, or by more than one? I will give the answer for both of you. By more than one. At least we must assume not fewer than two, one beneficent, the other capable of contrary effect.

CLINIAS: Decidedly you are in the right of it.

ATHENIAN: So far, so good. Soul, then, by her own motions stirs all things in sky, earth, or sea – and the names of these motions are wish, reflection, foresight, counsel, judgment, true or false, pleasure, pain, hope, fear, hate, love – stirs them, I say, by these and whatever other kindred, or primary, motions there may be. They, in turn, bring in their train secondary and corporeal movements, and so guide all things to increase and decrease, desegregation and integration, with their

64 *Laws* 896b–c.

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attendant characters of heat and cold, weight and lightness, hardness and softness, white and black, dry and sweet. By these and all her instruments, when wisdom is her helper, she conducts all things to the right and happy issue, whereas when she companies with folly, the effect is entirely contrary. Shall we set it down that this is so, or have we still our doubts that it may be otherwise?

CLINIAS: Nay, there is no doubt whatsoever.

ATHENIAN: Then which manner of soul, must we say, has control of heaven and earth and their whole circuit? That which is prudent and replete with goodness or that which has neither virtue? Shall we, if you please, give the question this answer?

CLINIAS: What answer?

ATHENIAN: Why, my friend, if the whole path and movement of heaven and all its contents are of like nature with the motion, revolution, and calculations of wisdom, and proceed after that kind, plainly we must say it is the supremely good that takes forethought for the universe and guides it along that path.[65]

Through recollection the soul realizes its own essence as immortal and not subject to change, but at the same time, such recovering is a particular form of self-motivated movement.[66] This form, the recollection, is entirely coherent with the way the soul realizes that it is the origin and source of motion and succession. Since time is nothing but the image of eternity according to number, succession, and within, motion; and considering that the source of movement is an entity with the capacity of self-motion, the soul, then it follows that there exists an essential linkage between the origin of time and the movement of the self-recognition of the soul performed through *Anamnesis*.

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Time, then, doesn't seem to come from external causes but is inherent to life; it is, in a way, the expression of its own movement. However, this only happens while we are alive in this world. Recollection proves that the soul is both temporal and everlasting; it is the bridge between the eternal world of Ideas and the necessarily temporal course we must pass along in order to recover what we have forgotten. In this sense, the path of the philosopher, according to the dialogue of *Phaedo*, is to discover such eternity in us from the temporal movement of recollection, and setting aside any the interest in the material and contingent world subject to change.

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Plato is not proving that the ideas are innate but is claiming that we recollect a sort of knowledge given beforehand *in the past*. The Ideas are not subject to change, they are not temporal, but the way we realize such timeless aspects is carried out by a movement of the soul that implies time: recollection. Time, expressed in the self-movement of the soul, appears as the very possibility to think Ideas, disclosed to us as everlasting and independent of the realm of the entities subject to change: the ideas remain always and at all time (*along* time) the same.

65 *Laws*, 899c

66 Plato also addresses the movement of the soul with regard to the activity of learning also in *Theaetetus*. In order to learn something, the soul most be in motion. This appraisal is coherent with the notion of recollection as a sort of movement of the soul. "The soul acquires knowledge and it is kept going and improved by learning and practice, which are of the nature of movements. By inactivity dullness, and neglect of exercise, it learns nothing and forgets what it has learned" (*Theaetetus*, 153b–c, from the English version of F.M. Cornford, in Plato, *The Collected Dialogues*, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton University Press, 1989 (1961).

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Time, idealities and the "Platonism" of the late Husserl

As I have already mentioned, in his early *Logical Investigations*, Husserl defended the ontological character of idealities as independent and "eternal" (*ewig*) objects taking this as the point of departure for his criticism of the psychologistic foundations of logical knowledge. But after the transcendental turn of his phenomenology, Husserl suggests a subtle modification of his doctrine of idealities. According to his late philosophy, idealities are not anymore independent and "eternal", but in so far as the transcendental turn of his philosophy requires subjective and intersubjective foundations for all transcendent objects in the immanence of transcendental life, ideal contents become what he calls "irreal".[67]

The irrealities are objects essentially linked to the stream of consciousness; however, they are part of it not as moments, but as intentional correlates, noemas. Nevertheless, as correlates of actual thoughts, they are not entirely independent of the act of thinking and thus they are linked to the temporality of the act as appearing as the same along the passing of time.

In his *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, as already mentioned, Husserl affirms that the ideal character of truth is beyond time, and it makes no sense to give it a place or duration in time.[68] However, after the transcendental turn of his mature philosophy and the program of the transcendental constitution, every possible object become an intentional correlate, including idealities. The consequence of this change of perspective is that instead of the opposition between the real and the ideal, we have the distinction between the temporal stream of consciousness with its ingredient moments composing the internal flow of life and its immanent but not ingredient correlates appearing along the temporal flow in different degrees. In *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and especially in his posthumous work *Experience and Judgment*, the importance of time in the transcendental account of idealities is emphasized through the development of the dynamic method of analysis known as "genetic phenomenology".[69]

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In *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl claims that the logic of pure mathematical analytics presupposes for all the infinite range of possible judgments their ideal identity. However, what assures us of such identity?

> To be sure, while the evidence is alive we have the judgment itself, as the one judgment offering itself throughout change in the mental processes as itself. But, if the process of thinking progresses, and we, connecting synthetically, *turn back* to what was previously given as One, then this itself is no longer originally evident: We are conscious of it again in the medium of recollection and in a recollection that is not in the least intuitive. Recollection, succeeding as actual intuition proper, would indeed be restitution of each single moment or step of the original process. But, even if that takes place, even if a new evidence is thus brought about, is it sure that this evidence is restitution of the earlier evidence? And now let us remember that the judgments which, in living evidence, were constituted originally as intentional unities constituted in the mode, having something itself, are supposed to have a continuing acceptance as objects *existing for us at all times*,

67 Cf. Hua I, 111, Hua III/1, 7, Hua XVII, 162–163.
68 Hua XVIII, 134, 147.
69 Cf. EU, § 64 and Hua XVII, § 58.

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> available to us at all times – as convictions lasting for us from the time of their first constitution.[70]

In *Experience and Judgment*, Husserl points out that the analogy between the way of givenness of perceptive or "receptive" contents and the objects of understanding finds its better explanation by remarking its relation with time consciousness:

> The difference between the constitution of objectivities of the understanding and the constitution of objects of receptivity also finds expression in the difference of the temporality of the objectivities on both sides: indeed, the essential difference of their modes of being must ultimately be conceived as *a difference of their temporality*.[71]

For Husserl every lived experience is constituted by the synthesis of inner time-consciousness,[72] and likewise for their correlates. Nevertheless, the sense of the time we consider is not measurable like the objective time of the world, but is time considered in terms of the simultaneity, permanence and succession of the lived-experiences:

> [. . .] immanent time, in which lived experiences are constituted is thereby at the same time the form of givenness of all the objects intended in them; and, so far as it belongs originally to all objects, it is not something which we only add to them, as if there were an in-itself for them which was completely without relation to time. The necessary relation to time is always present.[73]

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If we now return for a moment to our assessment of Plato, we may observe that for him, in order to understand Ideas as true knowledge it is necessary to consider them as independent from the realm of visible things (*Phaedo*), but still as something we are able to think about and recognize as a knowledge we presuppose as already given before we come into the world.[74] In this context, Plato considered those ideas as the realm of beings that "never change" in contradistinction to the objects that are always becoming different. For Husserl the objects of understanding, in so far as they are correlates of conscious activity and find their constitution through our experience of them, are temporal as well.[75] But the mode of appearing of those objects is not "subject to change", and they don't find a specific "place" along time, but they always appear as "omnitemporal" [*allzeitlich*].

In § 55 of his *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl makes this point as follows noting that:

> Through the medium of recollective presentations [*erinnender Vergegenwärtigung*], the synthesis extends – within my stream of subjective processes (which always is

70 Hua XVII, §73, 183; emphasis added.
71 E.J. § 64a, 303; emphasis added.
72 E.J. § 64a 303–304.
73 E.J. § 64a 305; emphasis added.
74 However, something relevant to keep in mind is the importance of sensuous perception in the argument of recollection presented in *Phaedo*. Even though idealities do not belong to the world of visible beings, the way we realize their existence is given through recognition of perceptual similarities. Even for Plato, what we may call in modern terms sensible intuition is relevant in order to be able to apprehend what Husserl calls "categorial objectivities".
75 Cf. Hua XVII, 164.

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> already constituted) – from my living present into my currently relevant separate pasts and thus makes a *connexion* between my present and these pasts. With that, moreover, the supremely significant *transcendental problem of ideal objectivities* ("ideal" in the specific sense) is solved. Their supertemporality turns out to be *omnitemporality*, as a correlate of free / producibility and reproducibility at all times.[76]

During the course of Husserl's investigations, the emphasis on temporality and its importance in the explanation of the constitution of idealities, remains in force through his last manuscripts. One of those known under the title of *The Origin of Geometry*[77] is one of the most enigmatic and intriguing works of Husserl on this subject. This manuscript confirms the introduction of the historical reflection as a part of the phenomenological foundations of science. The idealities are themselves constituted not only in the transcendental field of pure consciousness, but refer to an open horizon of historical acquisitions given to us through the history, in this case, of geometry.[78] Nevertheless, the reference to the historical acquisition of geometrical knowledge does not make this knowledge the heritage of several abstractions performed originally by the "first geometers". So long as Husserl's analysis is carried out within a transcendental perspective, his approach to the historical development of geometry is not concerned about the empirical or factual history of geometry, but with the transcendental condition of its possibility.

According to our suggestion, recollection, understood in a broad perspective, may also include the intersubjective heritage of the knowledge developed along the history of science as the patrimony of humanity as a whole, as the horizon that allows us to constitute the unity of such an ideal heritage as a historical result of human activity, and moreover, universal knowledge.

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Plato usually presents the storytelling of his dialogues through the memories of someone else, who is asked to remember something that occurred a long time ago. This is the case in *Phaedo*, which also presents the history of Socrates' last hours. When Echecrates asks Phaedo if he could tell him this story, Phaedo answers that he has time to tell him the story and nothing gives him more pleasure than call into mind his friend Socrates.[79] In fact, memory plays an important but discrete role in Plato's writings.[80] It is because of recollection, that we can realize both the preexistence of the soul and the *a priori* knowledge presupposed in our concrete experiences; on the other hand, however, Plato also seems to be aware of how important it is to recall the memory of persons, especially those of the time of our apprenticeship.

Another and perhaps riskier suggestion would note the importance of the participation of Socrates in the process of the recollecting of the young slave. The slave himself might be not able to recollect the geometrical knowledge he has without the help of

76 Hua I, 155–156; original emphasis.

77 "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentionalhistorisches Problem" Eugen Fink (ed.), *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 1:2 (1939), pp. 203–225. The original manuscript was written in 1936 and published as complementary text of the *Husserliana* edition of *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Hua VI, 365 ff.

78 Hua VI, 366.

79 *Phaedo*, 58d.

80 In Timaeus, for instance, we may find the idea of the friends there available for helping to remember "and you will be there to remind us of anything which we have forgotten". (Timaeus 17b)

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Socrates. Of course Socrates is not teaching the young slave; nevertheless, we might inquire whether the slave alone would be able to reach such knowledge alone, as well as considering what the importance of language might be, following the Husserlian reference to horizons of language in *The Origin of Geometry*.[81] Actually, according to this rationale, it is important to remark that Socrates' only request was that the young slave would at least be able to speak Greek. When they brought the slave to him, his first question is: "Is he a Greek and speaks our language?"[82]

It seems to us that without the participation of intersubjectivity, along with the presupposed horizon of a common language, it is impossible to perform the recollection of ideas itself. Therefore, the role of temporality in the account of idealities is emphasized not only in the way the idealities are presented to an individual consciousness but, also in the way their givenness presupposes a horizon of intersubjective and historical accomplishments [*Leistungen*] as its condition of possibility. Far from being considered as eternal in the sense of "timeless" and, in consequence, independent of the historical development of thought, idealities are, essentially, revealed for both Plato and Husserl through a temporal (historical) and even intersubjective horizon of their manifestation without compromising their everlasting unity.

For Husserl, the realm of the *Ideal* is the result of a temporal and historical process of constitution, which doesn't mean building up abstractions from mere sensuous experiences, but requires a necessary reflection that takes the present as a point of departure and by explicating its horizons, recalls and returns to the necessary chains of implication and associative synthesis. Moreover, as Burt Hopkins points out, the recognition of such a historical process of constitution does not deny the universality of the *a priori*, rather Husserl even refers to such a relation as the *a priori* of historicity [*Apriori der Geschichtlickeit*]:[83]

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> Thus the *a priori* in Husserl's concept of a historical *a priori* is not rooted in the attempt to overcome the supposed opposition between the *a priori* status of the ideal meaning formations that compose the propositions and theories of a science such as geometry and the contingency of historical facts. Rather, it is rooted in the necessary connection between the very apriority of the ideal meaning formations in question and the actual history of both their origination and their historical development. It is precisely the latter state of affairs, or the being in question of the intelligibility of the ideal objectivity of these meaning formations, that motivates the need to extend the transcendental-phenomenological enquiry into origin of such intelligibility beyond the scope of the question of its epistemological grounding.[84]

The essential constitution of the idealities is both temporal, regarding the subjective aspect of its givenness, and historical, regarding the horizon of intersubjective accomplishments essentially presupposed in their givenness.[85] In this sense, it is possible to understand the transcendental reflection of Husserlian phenomenology as a sort

81 Hua VI, 368.
82 *Meno*, 82b.
83 Hua VI, 381.
84 Hopkins, 2011, p. 198.
85 Cf. Hua VI, 380.

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of *recollection*[86] because it consists in a reflective and retrospective account of the temporal constitution of idealities, rather than appealing to a process of an acquisition by abstraction from external experience.

Conclusions

For Plato, the realm of the *Ideas* is the realm of the unchangeable, which does not necessarily mean that it has no relationship with time. For Husserl, the revelation of those *Idealities* is related to the temporal flow of the stream of life, but in a particular way that it is possible to trace from Plato's argument of recollection. The idealities are not "timeless", but appear in the temporal horizon of experience precisely as those possibilities that always remain in the same sense at every time along history. However, our intuition of ideal entities is related to the experience of presence; the idealities are entities that always appear in the same manner, and it is possible, according to Husserl to have an intuition of them. This means that their mode of givenness is, in strict analogy with perception, an effective experience in the present. Consciousness does not apprehend ideality through a presentification [*Vergegenwärtigung*] but as an object itself present through direct intuition. Therefore, for Husserl, to recall an ideality cannot mean remembering in it the sense of having a present presentification of a past content that we cannot have in its presence. To recall or recollect something is to *call* for its presence,[87] and to recollect an ideality is to *call back* those elements that were always omnitemporally present, but not necessarily remembered at every moment.

Phenomenological reflection is a kind of Platonic *recollection* in this sense: the reflective procedure of phenomenology might be interpreted as a process of returning to sedimented experience and recovering the primary institution of sense, which is, nevertheless "ideal". The reflective and retrospective question [*Rückfrage*] penetrating the different levels of sedimentation refers to a transcendental idea of time "before" time.

Since Plato and Husserl both characterize access to ideality as a certain kind of experience that implies the trace of time, or even, as is the case with Husserl, of historicity, it is possible at least to suggest a kind of phenomenological reading of Plato's idea of "learning as recollection", in order to rethink the sense of Husserl's theory of ideality in a genetic context. In this way, the entire project of transcendental phenomenology is, in some sense a sort of *Anamnesis*, because phenomenological reflection is about recovering the original institution of all knowledge by recalling its primal and forgotten source, experience, while claiming at the same time for the universal validity of the idealities as *omnitemporal*, that is, as always, at all time and *along* time, remaining the same.

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86 Cf. Hopkins, 2011, p. 273.
87 Cf. Ackrill, 1997, p. 17.

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4 Husserl's aesthetic of essences

Critical remarks on phenomenology as an eidetic and "exact" science

George Heffernan

Abstract: In his *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, Husserl presents phenomenology as a "science of essences" or an "eidetic science" (*Wesenswissenschaft*). According to his account, practicing this new and exact science involves the performance of "graspings of essences" or "eidetic graspings" (*Wesenserfassungen*), the experience of "intuitions of essences" or "eidetic intuitions" (*Wesenserschauungen*), the determination of "relations among essences" or "eidetic relations" (*Wesensverhalte*), the establishment of "laws of essences" or "eidetic laws" (*Wesensgesetze*), the achievement of "knowledge of essences" or "eidetic knowledge" (*Wesenserkenntnisse*), the discovery of "essential" or "eidetic" "necessities" and "universalities" (*Wesensnotwendigkeiten*, *Wesensallgemeinheiten*), and the expression of "judgments about essences" or "eidetic judgments" (*Wesensurteile*). Yet there is an ambiguity here, and evidently so. Namely, according to one interpretation, the objects of phenomenology are essences intuitively apprehended, whereas, according to another interpretation, the objects of phenomenology are phenomena eidetically described. There also seems to be a tension here, because, according to the former interpretation, essences and relations of essences are the thematic objects of phenomenology, whereas, according to the latter interpretation, eidetic aspects, relations, and laws of objects are. I propose a solution to the problem in five parts. In the first part of this chapter, I delimit the context of the problem. In the second part, I outline the first way of understanding phenomenology. In the third part, I do the same for the second way. In the fourth part, I propose a resolution of the tension between the two ways of understanding phenomenology. In the fifth part, I suggest how phenomenology can benefit from a proper understanding of the difference between the two ways of understanding Husserl's new science, which are, after all, not mutually exclusive but mutually complementary.

Keywords: Husserl, Plato, Aristotle, essence, knowledge

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1. Husserl's phenomenology of essences or eidetic phenomenology

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), the founder of the phenomenological movement, attempts to develop philosophy as a rigorous science that he eventually characterizes as "transcendental phenomenology". This discipline is *phenomenology* because it describes objects in so far as they present themselves to subjects, and it is *transcendental* because it delimits acts and contents of consciousness in so far as they are intentionally and constitutionally correlative. Yet transcendental phenomenology is not empirical

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psychology, because the applicability of its method, the extent of its horizons, and the validity of its results depend not on sensuous perceptions of particular facts but on categorial intuitions of universal essences. Rather, it is a *pure* philosophy that aims to grasp the essence of consciousness, both its acts and its contents, by means of an eidetic method. In this sense, "pure" is the counter-concept to "empirical".

In accordance with his eidetic method, the texts in which Husserl carries out his pure phenomenological investigations are replete with references to "essence" (*Wesen*) and "eidos" (*Eidos*), where *eidos* is understood as *essence* in the pregnant and precise sense.[1] Indeed, he characterizes phenomenology as a "science of essences" or as an "eidetic science" (*Wesenswissenschaft*). As a "pure" (*rein*) or non-empirical (*nicht empirisch*) "discipline of essences" or "eidetic discipline" (*Wesenslehre*), it involves an "inquiry into essences" or an "eidetic inquiry" (*Wesens[er]forschung*), a "grasping of essences" or an "eidetic grasping" (*Wesenserfassung*), and an "analysis of essences" or an "eidetic analysis" (*Wesensanalyse*). In its full form, phenomenology applies the method of "eidetic variation" (*eidetische Variation*). In doing so, it enables "intuitions of essences" or "eidetic intuitions" (*Wesensanschauungen*, *Wesenserschauungen*, *Wesensschauungen*), displays "relations among essences" or "eidetic relations" (*Wesensbeziehungen*, *Wesensverhalte*), and establishes "laws of essences" or "eidetic laws" (*Wesensgesetze*). In its results, phenomenology presents "evidences of essences" or "eidetic evidences" (*Wesensgegebenheiten*), achieves "knowledge of essences" or "eidetic knowledge" (*Wesenserkenntnisse*), and yields "truths of essences" or "eidetic truths" (*Wesenswahrheiten*). These evidences, cognitions, and truths are governed, in turn, by "essential" or "eidetic" "necessities and universalities" (*Wesensnotwendigkeiten und Wesensallgemeinheiten*). Finally, insights into essences or eidetic insights are expressed in "judgments about essences" or "eidetic judgments" (*Wesensurteile*). For example, transcendental phenomenology aims to be the science that thematizes the essence of pure consciousness or the descriptive eidetic discipline that studies pure mental experiences.

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A major problem arises, however, because there are two different ways of understanding how the eidetic method works. In fact, depending on how one understands the application of the method, one is faced with two different accounts of the being and presence of the objects of phenomenology. On the first understanding, one is led to the inference that phenomenological investigation focuses on essences as its thematic objects. On the second understanding, one is led to the conclusion that it analyzes the eidetic aspects, relations, and laws of things. It is easy to show, for example, that in some passages of Husserl's *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (1913), the former approach, with its innumerable references to *Wesen*, dominates, whereas, in other passages, the latter approach, with its numerous references to *eidetisch*, prevails.[2]

1 Some form of the word *Wesen* appears on 237 and some form of the word *Eidos* appears on 103 of the 355 pages of *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die Phänomenologie* (Husserliana III/1). In many cases, it is a matter of multiple occurrences on one page. If one is not working with an electronically searchable version of the text, then a good way to gain an accurate sense of the extent of Husserl's language of essences or eidetic language, after having read the text itself repeatedly, is to peruse the detailed subject indices of Gerda Walther and Ludwig Landgrebe, pp. 360–427 and 428–466, respectively.

2 See the detailed documentation for this statement in my study "Understanding Husserl's Language of Essences: Hermeneutical Observations on Translation in Phenomenology" (Heffernan 2016), where I

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In this chapter, I argue that a failure to grasp the difference at issue leads to a misunderstanding of Husserl's eidetic doctrine by threatening (1) to hypostasize essences as ontological objects, or (2) to eliminate them as supposed obstacles. In doing so, I suggest that one is faced with a series of crucial decisions about how to understand the basic terms of the debate. Yet I also propose that in the end the two ways of understanding are not mutually exclusive but mutually complementary. The pivotal philosophical question throughout is: What are the thematic objects of phenomenological investigations? Are they essences themselves as objects? Or are they eidetic aspects, relations, and laws of things? In other words, what exactly does one "intuit" in one's "*Wesenserschauungen*", that is, then, when one "sees essences as objects" or "sees things eidetically"? As it turns out, this is a matter not of "either/or" but of "both/and".

With respect to its scope, this chapter is limited to what is generally accepted to be Husserl's most important work on transcendental phenomenology, namely, his *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. The work originally appeared in the first volume (1913) of the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, which was founded and edited by Husserl.[3] The series eventually included such classic studies of the concepts of essence, idea, and substance as Jean Hering's *Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee/Remarks on Essence, Essentiality, and the Idea* (vol. 4 [1921]), Roman Ingarden's *Essentiale Fragen: Ein Beitrag zum Wesensproblem/Essential Questions: A Contribution to the Problem of Essence* (vol. 7 [1925]), and Herbert Spiegelberg's *Über das Wesen der Idee: Eine ontologische Untersuchung/On the Essence of the Idea: An Ontological Investigation* (vol. 11 [1930]). With one exception, namely, the noteworthy absence of the key term "eidetic variation" (*eidetische Variation*), *Ideas I* may, as a rule, be regarded as a reliable exposition of Husserl's mature philosophy of eidetic phenomenology. Yet the implications of this study hold not only for Husserl's philosophy as expressed in *Ideas I* specifically, but also for phenomenological investigations as practiced generally.

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2. Phenomenology as a science of essences intuitively apprehended

In *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft/Philosophy as Rigorous Science* (1910/11), Husserl defines phenomenology as a rigorous science of the pure essences of psychic phenomena (XXV, 3–62).[4] Yet this slender monograph contains hardly more than the announcement of an ambitious program, the exposition and execution of which first emerge in *Ideas I*. In this work, Husserl argues that the only philosophy that can provide a rigorously scientific clarification of consciousness, its acts, its contents, and its

examine the hermeneutical and translational aspects of the philosophical problem that I address in the present chapter.

3 There have been two critical editions of the work in the Husserliana, the first by Walter Biemel (1950) and the second by Karl Schuhmann (1976). There have also been three English translations of the work, the first, as *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, by W. R. Boyce Gibson (1931), the second, as *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, by Fred Kersten (1983), and the third, as *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, by Daniel Dahlstrom (2014).

4 Roman numerals in the text refer to the Husserliana volumes listed under Husserl's name in the references at the end.

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structures, is transcendental phenomenology, and that it can only do so by means of descriptive eidetic analyses. Essences and eidetic analyses are indispensable to his philosophy because, as Husserl sees it, pure, that is, non-empirical, research into essences, their relations, and their laws, that is, eidetic analysis, is the only way to obtain universality and necessity, the classic characteristic features of genuinely scientific results.

The first section of *Ideas I*, "Essences and Knowledge of Essences" or "Essences and Eidetic Knowledge", presents phenomenology as a science of essences or as an eidetic science, that is, as a rigorous discipline that aims at systematically organized knowledge of essences or eidetic knowledge (III/1, 10–55).[5] There Husserl argues that an individual object is not merely a "this-here" (*Dies-da*), a spatially and temporally individuated something (thing or fact), but rather that it possesses qualitative determinations that make up its "essence" (*Wesen* or *Eidos*) (III/1, 12–13). Not only can essences be exemplified *in* different individuals, but they can also become the objects *of* "eidetic intuitions" (*Wesenserschauungen*) (III/1, 13–17). Eidetic intuitions make possible eidetic judgments about eidetic relationships, eidetic states of affairs, and eidetic laws (III/1, 17–20). There are both eidetic sciences and factual sciences (III/1, 20–23). There are also different kinds of eidetic sciences. For example, mathematics deals with ideal laws that govern exact essences, whereas phenomenology works with regional types that order morphological essences (III/1, 23–38, 148–156).

As a theory of knowledge, phenomenology seeks a mean between the extreme of Platonism and that of positivism (III/1, 47–49, 51–53, 53–55). While empiricism can reduce evidence to sensation and lead to skepticism (III/1, 41–45), idealism may misinterpret evidence as a "feeling" (*Gefühl*, *Evidenzgefühl*) involving an "index of truth" (*index veri*) and end in dogmatism (III/1, 46–47, 333–337). Both theories obscure the fact that not only facts but also essences can be given in evidence (III/1, 41–45). As an eidetic science, phenomenology requires a concept of evidence that fits not only facts but also essences: "eidetic evidence" (*eidetische Evidenz*: a turn of phrase that, one notes well, does not occur in *Ideen I*). Accordingly, Husserl argues that "no conceivable theory" can violate "the *principle of all principles*", which says

> . . . that *every intuition that presents [something] in an originary way is a legitimate source of knowledge*, that *everything* that *offers* itself to us *in 'intuition' in an originary way* (so to speak, in its actuality in person) *is to be accepted simply as what it presents itself as*, but also *only within the limits in which it presents itself there*.
>
> (III/1, 51; all emphases in quotations in this chapter are from the original).[6]

This principle, Husserl says, "holds in particular measure [. . .] for the general knowledge of essences [. . .]" (III/1, 51).[7] The point is that the phenomenological

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5 All translations of texts from Husserl's *Ideas I* are my own, though they are usually more or less modified versions of Dahlstrom's translations.

6 "Am *Prinzip aller Prinzipien*: daß *jede originär gebende Anschauung eine Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis* sei, daß alles, was sich uns in der *'Intuition' originär*, (sozusagen in seiner leibhaften Wirklichkeit) *darbietet, einfach hinzunehmen sei, als was es sich gibt*, aber auch *nur in den Schranken, in denen es sich da gibt*, kann uns keine erdenkliche Theorie irre machen."

7 "Das aber gilt in besonderem Maße von den generellen Wesenserkenntnissen dieser Art, auf welche das Wort Prinzip gewöhnlich beschränkt wird."

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concept of intuition is much more comprehensive than the positivistic notion, which does not get beyond sensible perceptions, and that the genuine concept of evidence must be able to accommodate intuitions of essences or eidetic intuitions (III/1, 51–55).[8]

In *Ideas I*, Husserl gives many examples of essences or of eidetic phenomena: sound (III/1, 13), material thing (13), shape (16), melody (16), social practice (16), color (18), nature (24), triangle (31), essence (34–35), soul (38), consciousness (69–71), act of consciousness (71–75), anger (146), psychic process (156–158), empathy (157), memory or remembering (157), willing (157), joy (182–183), house and perception of house (186–187), intentionality (187–189), perception (201), tree (233), picture (234), belief (263), hate (263), wish (270–271), value (271), and state, right, morality, and church (354). It seems that there is nothing that is not an essence or does not have eidetic aspects. Husserl hints, of course, that intuiting essences involves performing eidetic variation (III/1, 122–134, 145–148, 167, etc.). He does not, however, use the term "eidetic variation" (*eidetische Variation*) in *Ideas I*, where the word *Variation* itself occurs only once (III/1, 167). The term "eidetic variation" occurs for the first time in a text from 1912 (XLI, 57–76). In fact, *Formale und transzendentale Logik/Formal and Transcendental Logic* is the only work published by Husserl in which he uses the term (XVII, 254–256, 296–297). It emerges with full force only in *Erfahrung und Urteil/Experience and Judgment*, a very late collaborative effort between Husserl and his assistant Ludwig Landgrebe (*EU*, 410–420, 422–426, 432–436, etc.). In the end, eidetic variation emerges as an essential element of the method by means of which eidetic evidence is achieved (cf. Husserliana XLI, passim).

In connection with "the *principle of all principles*", Husserl argues (1) that "*the essence (eidos) is an object of a new kind*", (2) that, "*just as the given in the individual or experiential intuition is an individual object, so the given in the intuition of the essence is a pure essence*", and (3) that, because there is "not a merely external analogy but rather a radical commonality" here, "*the discernment of the essence is also precisely an intuition*, just as the eidetic object is precisely an object" (III/1, 14).[9] These and similar formulations convey the clear and distinct impression that essences themselves are the properly thematic or preeminently privileged objects of phenomenological investigations. Thus Husserl's phenomenology of essences would thematize, analyze, and clarify universal phenomena from the essence or eidos of color to the essence or eidos of consciousness.

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3. Phenomenology as a science of phenomena eidetically described

Yet Husserl soon suggests that all this may not be so, at least not without further ado, for he also argues (1) that "making judgments *about* essences and essential connections

8 Although Husserl indicates that he understands *perception* in a sense broad enough to encompass categorial and eidetic perceptions, the usual sense of the expression *Wahrnehmung* in *Ideen I* is restricted to sensuous (*sinnlich*) perception or perception of individual things (*Dingwahrnehmung*). The exceptions prove the rule. Cf., e.g., III/1, 15–16, 44, 314, 354, etc. The operative action word with respect to essences is *Intuition* or some form of the verb *Erfassen*, as in, e.g., *Wesenserfassung*. Cf., e.g., III/1, 144–145.

9 "*Das Wesen (Eidos) ist ein neuartiger Gegenstand. So wie das Gegebene der individuellen oder erfahrenden Anschauung ein individueller Gegenstand ist, so das Gegebene der Wesensanschauung ein reines Wesen.* [. . .] Hier liegt nicht eine bloß äußerliche Analogie vor, sondern radikale Gemeinsamkeit. *Auch Wesenserschauung ist eben Anschauung*, wie eidetischer Gegenstand eben Gegenstand ist."

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and making eidetic judgments in general are not the same thing, given the scope that we must give the latter concept", because "*essences are not the 'objects' that all the propositions of eidetic knowledge are 'about'*", (2) that "intuition of essence—taken so, as thus far—as a consciousness analogous to experience, to grasping existence, as a consciousness in which an essence is grasped *objectively*, just as something individual is grasped in experience, is not the only consciousness that, while excluding any positing of *existence*, contains an essence within itself", and (3) that "it is possible for there to be an intuitive consciousness of essences, in a certain way even a grasping of them, without them yet becoming '*objects that the consciousness is about*'" (III/1, 17).[10] According to these formulations, phenomenology does not focus, at least not thematically or exclusively, on essences as its proper objects, but rather judges, perhaps even mainly and mostly, about individuals considered purely as any particulars at all that happen to be subsumed under certain essences (III/1, 17).[11] Thus Husserl's eidetic phenomenology would focus on particular phenomena, from individual colors to individual consciousnesses, and provide eidetic descriptions of them in terms of their eidetic aspects, relationships, and laws.

With this shift Husserl generates a paradox. On the one hand, he insists that essences are objects just as things are objects, only that the former are universal objects of eidetic intuitions, whereas the latter are particular objects of sensuous intuitions. On the other hand, he indicates that in the usual course of eidetic analysis the objects about which one judges are not essences but the things that one describes in eidetic terms. Hence the question: Is there no "third hand" here to relieve the tension—which may be creative or destructive? After all, essences assume a kind of objectivity on the former interpretation that they do not presume on the latter reading.

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All these observations also generate a central set of questions for Husserl's philosophy: Is phenomenology analysis of essences? Or is it eidetic analysis of phenomena? Is it *either* the one *or* the other? Or is it *both* the one *and* the other? Does the one presuppose the other? Or not? And in what sense? These questions are concerns that must be addressed by any attempt to understand Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. These concerns are crucial because Husserl defines pure phenomenology as an exact science whose precision, validity, and legitimacy are supposed to stem from the fact that it deals not with particular matters of fact but with universal relations of essences. Finally, the entire set of questions posed leads to one particular pivotal question: Can one perform eidetic analyses of phenomena *without* performing analyses *of* essences as objects, and can one perform analyses *of* essences as objects *without* performing eidetic analyses of phenomena?

10 "Urteilen *über* Wesen und Wesensverhalte und eidetisches Urteilen überhaupt ist, bei der Weite, die wir dem letzten Begriff geben müssen, nicht dasselbe; *eidetische Erkenntnis hat nicht in allen ihren Sätzen Wesen zu 'Gegenständen-worüber'*; und was damit nahe zusammenhängt: Wesensanschauung—genommen wie bisher—als ein der Erfahrung, der Daseinserfassung analoges Bewußtsein, in welchem ein Wesen *gegenständlich* erfaßt wird, so wie in der Erfahrung ein Individuelles, ist nicht das einzige Bewußtsein, das unter Ausschluß jeder *Daseins*setzung Wesen in sich birgt. Wesen können intuitiv bewußt, in gewisser Weise auch erfaßt sein, ohne daß sie doch zu 'Gegenständen-worüber' werden."

11 "Genauer gesprochen handelt es sich um den Unterschied zwischen Urteilen *über* Wesen und Urteilen, die in unbestimmt allgemeiner Weise und unvermischt mit Setzungen von Individuellem, doch *über Individuelles*, *aber rein als Einzelheit der Wesen* im Modus des *Überhaupt* urteilen."

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

4. Focusing on essences and focusing on phenomena

To restate the issue in enhanced clarity: There appears to be a dilemma connected with Husserl's description of transcendental phenomenology as a science of essences or as an eidetic discipline. On the one hand, essences are supposed to be objects just as things are objects. On the other hand, the objects about which one judges in eidetic analyses are supposed to be not essences but the things that one describes in eidetic terms. How is one to resolve this paradox?

One should begin, as Husserl suggests, with judgments (*Urteile*) (III/1, 17). To put it more precisely:

> it is a matter of the distinction between judgments *about* essences and judgments that, in an indeterminately general manner and unmixed with positings of something individual, *none the less* are judgments *about something individual but purely as an instantiation of the essence* in the mode of [referring to it] '*in general*'. (III/1, 17)[12]

Thus, for example, one makes judgments in pure geometry, as a rule, "not about the *eidos* straight, angle, triangle, conic section, and the like, but instead about [any] straight [line] and [any] angle at all or 'as such', about individual triangles in general, conic sections in general" (III/1, 17).[13] As a result, "such universal judgments have the character of *essential universality*, of 'pure' or, as one also says, '*rigorous*', *simply 'unconditioned' universality*" (III/1, 17–18).[14] Something similar holds, but with easily understandable restrictions, to those disciplines whose subject matter does not lend itself to cognitive achievements *more geometrico demonstrata*.

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In this regard, Husserl's core concept of *Einstellung* also proves useful and fruitful. The word is most accurately translated as "attitude", "focus(ing)", or "orientation" (Cairns 1973: 37–38), and it is a basic concept in Husserl's phenomenology (Staiti 2009). Although the dominant meaning of the expression *Einstellung* in *Ideas I* is "attitude", "focus(ing)", or "orientation" as what distinguishes between the dogmatic, natural outlook and the critical, phenomenological, that is, genuinely philosophical, standpoint, it is also the decisive factor in the matter at hand.[15] For example, Husserl asserts that "the situation is essentially such" that the eidetic phenomenologist is free to shift from the one *attitude* or *focus* or *orientation* (*Einstellung*) to the other, that is, that the turning from 'making eidetic judgments' to 'making judgments about essences' and

12 "Genauer gesprochen handelt es sich um den Unterschied zwischen Urteilen *über* Wesen und Urteilen, die in unbestimmt allgemeiner Weise und unvermischt mit Setzungen von Individuellem, doch *über Individuelles, aber rein als Einzelheit der Wesen* im Modus des *Überhaupt* urteilen."

13 "So urteilen wir in der reinen Geometrie in der Regel nicht über das Eidos Gerade, Winkel, Dreieck, Kegelschnitt u. dgl., sondern über Gerade und Winkel überhaupt oder 'als solche', über individuelle Dreiecke überhaupt, Kegelschnitte überhaupt."

14 "Solche universellen Urteile haben den Charakter der *Wesensallgemeinheit*, der 'reinen', oder wie man auch sagt, der '*strengen*', *schlechthin 'unbedingten' Allgemeinheit*."

15 One finds another key application of *Einstellung* in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, §§ 37–54, where, in a phenomenological clarification of the double-sidedness of formal logic as formal apophantics and as formal ontology, Husserl employs the concept to clarify the distinction between objects and judgments as well as the distinction between apophantics as a doctrine of senses and as a logic of truth.

Proof

Proof

vice versa is always an essential possibility (III/1, 18).[16] The main points of his argument are (1) that "*every judgment about essences* can *be converted equivalently into an unconditionally universal judgment about instances of these essences as such instances*", (2) that, in this manner, "*pure judgments of essences* (purely eidetic judgments), *regardless of their logical form*, belong *together*", and (3) that what is common to them is "that they posit no individual being", even then when "they make judgments—precisely in terms of the pure universality of the essence—about something individual" (III/1, 18).[17] For example, one can judge that the essence *color* is different from the essence *sound*, or one can judge that several colors are *red* or that several sounds are *loud* (III/1, 18). Also, one can judge that the essence *consciousness* is different from the essence *intentionality*, or one can judge that all acts of *consciousness* are *intentional* (III/1, 73–75). Finally, one can judge that the essence *evidence* is different from the essence *horizon*, or one can judge that all *evidence* presupposes a *horizon* (III/1, 314–337). And so forth. Thus one can not only do "ideational" or "formal" analyses of the things themselves, but one can also look at their very "ideas" or "forms" as the things themselves (Plato 2006: bk. 4 and bks. 6–7).[18]

Yet the main point with respect to phenomenology of essences or eidetic phenomenology is that one can, at any time, and in a "zigzag" procedure (*Zickzack*: XIX/1, 22; IV, 336; XVII, 130; XXXV, 94, 391, 394), shift from the focus on the things that one is analyzing in eidetic terms to the focus on the essences themselves, and back again. Judgments about essences and eidetic judgments about particular individuals have something in common that renders them distinct but inseparable, namely, they claim universal and necessary validity without positing the existence of anything factual. This means that both (1) the interpretation that attempts to make phenomenology *only* about essences as objects and (2) the interpretation that tries to have phenomenology do *without* essences as objects are reductionist and untenable. Thus a failure to take the eidetic shift of focus (*die eidetische Umstellung*: another phrase that Husserl does not use) into account, or to do so but only inadequately, can be a source of misunderstanding of Husserl's phenomenology in general and of his doctrine of essences in particular.

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In any case, on Husserl's account of the phenomenological method, eidetic analysis is essentially dependent on intuitions of essences because it presupposes the possibility of then being able to recur to essences when the description of phenomena makes it a necessity. Indeed, Husserl argues:

(1) that "all other judgments lead back in a mediated justification to immediately evident judgments",
(2) that, "in so far as such judgments are made, as is here presupposed, about individual instances in the manner cited, the judgments require, for their noetic

16 "Zum Wesen der Sachlage gehört es aber, daß uns die Wendung zur entsprechenden objektivierenden Einstellung jederzeit freisteht, daß sie eben eine Wesensmöglichkeit ist."

17 "Umgekehrt kann *jedes Urteil über Wesen äquivalent in ein unbedingt allgemeines Urteil über Einzelheiten dieser Wesen als solche umgewendet werden*. In dieser Weise gehören *reine Wesensurteile* (rein eidetische Urteile), *welcher logischen Form immer* sie sein mögen, *zusammen*. Ihr Gemeinsames ist, daß sie kein individuelles Sein setzen, auch wenn sie über Individuelles—eben in reiner Wesensallgemeinheit—urteilen."

18 Yet one should resist the temptation to impute to Husserl a negative tension between a "Platonic approach", on which phenomenology focuses on essences as phenomena, and an "Aristotelian approach", on which it describes phenomena in terms of essences. Rather, Husserl is best understood as combining the best of both these approaches (XIX/1, 10): "Wir wollen auf die 'Sachen selbst' zurückgehen."

Proof

Proof

justification, that is, for them to be made insightful, a certain seeing of an essence, which one could also (in a *modified* sense) designate as a grasping of the essence", and

(3) that "this [grasping], like the intuition of the essence that makes it objective, rests upon a having of individual instances of the essences in one's sights but not upon an experience of them" (III/1, 18).[19]

Husserl must, of course, add the last qualification, so as not to be misunderstood to be positing any existent objects in the transcendental attitude, including essences, though it is not clear that he can totally avoid this consequence by resorting to phantasy, which is, after all, a form of experience in the broader sense (III/1, 16–17).

Thus one cannot defend Husserl's eidetic phenomenology on the grounds that it does *not* focus on essences as objects. Even taking into consideration the eidetic reduction (III/1, 125–130), by which belief in essences, or, more precisely, *eide*, is supposed to be suspended, the method of pure phenomenology in the precise and pregnant sense is a method of eidetic clarification that involves a clear and distinct grasping of essences (III/1, 141–148). To paraphrase Kant's statement that "thoughts without content are empty, [and] intuitions without concepts are blind" (Kant 1781/1787: A 48/B 75):[20] Intuitions of essences without eidetic analyses are empty, and eidetic analyses without intuitions of essences are blind. The point is that eidetic intuitions are not sensuous but *categorial* intuitions, and categorial intuitions are *founded* intuitions. In fact, essences, or, more precisely, *eide*, exemplify themselves in, and thus manifest themselves through, particular individuals (*sich exemplifizieren*: III/1, 15–16, 85).

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Therefore, Husserl's pure phenomenology is double-sided in so far as it *both* describes phenomena in eidetic terms *and* thematizes essences as objects in their own right. In doing so, it focuses on essences, but it does not fixate on them in such a way as to lose sight of its task of performing eidetic analyses of phenomena. In fact, it is easy to see that focusing on essences as such is a natural move in the usual course of performing eidetic analyses of phenomena. For example, one could attempt to describe (eidetically) particular works of art with a view to establishing what makes them works of art, but it would be hard to try to do this without raising the question of the (essence of the) work of art as such (what is art?).[21] In the end, then, the dual procedures of essential intuition and eidetic description, as distinct but inseparable parts (or "moments" in the sense of the *Third Logical Investigation*: cf. XIX/1, 227–300) of the eidetic method, are not mutually exclusive but mutually complementary tasks to be carried out on the basis of the zigzag approach that tightly binds them. On the approach of Husserl's *Ideas I*, then, essences are both phenomenological paradigms for eidetic analyses of phenomena and phenomena in their own right.

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19 "Der Einfachheit halber nehmen wir an, daß es sich um 'Axiome', um unmittelbar evidente Urteile handelt, auf welche ja alle übrigen Urteile in mittelbarer Begründung zurückführen. Solche Urteile—wofern sie, wie hier vorausgesetzt, in der angegebenen Weise über individuelle Einzelheiten urteilen—bedürfen zu ihrer noetischen Begründung, d.i. ihrer Einsichtigmachung, einer gewissen Wesensschauung, die man (in *modifiziertem* Sinne) auch als Wesenserfassung bezeichnen könnte; und auch diese, sowie die gegenständlichmachende Wesensanschauung, beruht auf einem Sichtighaben individueller Einzelheiten der Wesen, aber nicht auf ihrer Erfahrung."

20 "Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind."

21 Cf., e.g., Theodorou 2014, where this double-fronted strategy is employed in an exemplary fashion.

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5. Phenomenology as an eidetic and "exact" but not *exact* science

The present problem and the proposed solution are, of course, only one salient aspect of Husserl's doctrine of essences. It is not possible, however, to treat adequately the entire eidetic dimension of phenomenology here, even in so far as it is restricted to *Ideas I*.[22] This philosophical approach has had a long and strong *Rezeptions- und Wirkungsgeschichte*. From the beginning, there were several critical reactions to Husserl's essentialism (Hering 1921; Ingarden 1925; Levinas 1930; Spiegelberg 1930). Over time, numerous essays on phenomenological essentialism and eidetic phenomenology have appeared (Lanteri-Laura 1954; Levin 1968/69; Zaner 1973; Hoche 1983; García-Baró 1991). Some have laid out "how to intuit an essence" (Sokolowski 1974: 57–85; 2000: 177–184), while others have worked out how to do eidetic analyses (Sowa 2007, 2008, 2009). Still others have emphasized that it is hard to understand what exactly Husserl means by "essence" (Mulligan 2004), and that it is difficult to conceive of essences in Husserl's sense as paradigmatic instances of "self-evidence" (*Selbstgegebenheit*, *Selbstgebung*) (Heffernan 2013a, 2013b).[23] One must also take another look at the generally accepted but arguably false opinion that in Husserl's phenomenological descriptions the universal is "what is common" to particular individuals (Sowa 2010a, 2010b, 2012). Thus it is a shock but not a surprise that some have even preferred not to mention at all the role of essences in Husserl's phenomenology (Beyer 2013).

Yet, regardless of whether one emphasizes the objective focus on essences or the eidetic focus on phenomena, the problem of precision in phenomenology remains. Husserl claims, of course, that it is the descriptive character of phenomenology as an *eidetic* discipline, as distinguished from the experimental method of psychology as an *empirical* science, for example, that makes philosophy as genuinely rigorous science possible, and he argues that its scientific rigor derives from its capacity to generate exact concepts and not vague notions (XXV, 3–63, *passim*). One should not, however, think of the descriptive eidetic of experiences along the lines of established eidetic disciplines, for example, geometry and arithmetic, that is, as something like "a mathematics of the phenomena" of consciousness (III/1, 148–149). Rather, one must distinguish between formal and material essences and between formal and material sciences of essences, and recognize that phenomenology belongs not to the formal, mathematical disciplines but to the material, eidetic sciences, for it is not "a 'geometry' of experiences" that defines its domain exhaustively by deducing propositions from definitions and axioms according to principles (III/1, 149–153). Also, compared to geometry as the representative of a material mathematics, phenomenology belongs to the concrete, eidetic disciplines, because essences of experiences, for example, the stream of consciousness, form its scope, and they are not abstracta but concreta, so that to what extent "exact" essences are to be found within a domain of essences, and whether *exact* essences figure at all among all the essences that can be apprehended in intuition, is fully dependent upon the distinctiveness of the domain (III/1, 153–154). Moreover, the problem of the relative exactness of essences is connected with the problem of the relationship between descriptive sciences and exact sciences, whereby

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22 In this paragraph, I draw on formulations from Heffernan 2013a: 206–208.
23 Yet I have found De Santis 2014 very helpful in clarifying my thinking on the meanings of the expressions *Wesen* and *Eidos* in phenomenology.

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Proof

the former deal with morphological essences, whereas the latter deal with ideal essences, so that it is not a defect of the former essences that they are not contingently but essentially fleeting, flowing, typical, un-mathematical, and vague or inexact—for they must be taken as they are given (III/1, 154–156). Finally, as a descriptive science of the essences of transcendentally reduced pure experiences in the phenomenological attitude, phenomenology, with its field of countless, fluctuating, eidetic concreta that cannot be conceptually secured as particular individuals, for example, the phantasy of a thing, belongs to a basic class of eidetic sciences that are "exact" but totally different from that to which the mathematical sciences with their *exact* essences as ideal essences belong (III/1, 156–158). In this sense, Husserl specifies the rigor of phenomenology as descriptive science and with it the rigor of philosophy as rigorous science. In a word, phenomenology, an eidetic science, is an "exact", but not without further ado an *exact*, science. It all depends upon the meaning of the expression "exact".[24] In this respect, Husserl turns the traditional logic of essences on its head, for, whereas the question had once been how *exact* an "essence" must be in order to be an *essence*, the question has now become how *inexact* an "essence" can be in order to not be an *essence*.

One must realize that *Ideas I* is not the end but only a beginning. Fully developed phenomenology as practiced by Husserl involves an eidetic method that employs free variation, in a zigzag procedure, to intuit universal essences from particular examples and to apply encompassing *eide* to individual instances.[25] Thus it remains to be seen how to understand the eidetic method within the horizons that have been opened up by the recently published forty-first volume of Husserliana, namely, *Zur Lehre vom Wesen und zur Methode der eidetischen Variation: Texte aus dem Nachlass (1891–1935)/On the Doctrine of Essence and the Method of Eidetic Variation: Unpublished Texts (1891–1935)*.[26] The presentation of the texts in this volume suggests that one may distinguish five phases in the development of Husserl's eidetic method:

(1) observations on the concept of the universal (1891–1901: XLI, 1–28);
(2) elucidation of essences in the making of judgments and in the formation of concepts (1901–1917: XLI, 29–118);
(3) analysis of lowest essences as distinguished from specific and generic essences (exact vs. typical essences: XLI, 56–76) as well as of phantasy in eidetic variation (1917/1918: XLI, 119–200);
(4) investigation of eidetic intuition as pure thinking and delimitation of exact and typical essences (1918–1925: XLI, 201–260), and
(5) treatment of exemplary intuitions of essences of physical and morphological realities (1926–1935: XLI, 261–394).[27]

Given the distinctions between kinds of *essences*, for example, *exact*, *typical* or *morphological*, and perhaps even *individual* (cf., e.g., XLI, 366–372), it is evident that

24 For Husserl, as for Aristotle, *essence* (for Aristotle actually *substance* [*ousia*]) is said in several different senses (Aristotle 1984, bk. 5, chap. 8), and the precision that is to be anticipated and achieved in a discipline is primarily and ultimately a function not of the method applied but of the matter analyzed (Aristotle 1985/2000^2, bk. 1, chap. 3).

25 In this connection, one is reminded of Kant's distinction between the *reflective* function and the *determinative* function of judgment in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*/*Critique of Judgment*.

26 In this paragraph, I draw on formulations from Heffernan 2013a: 215–216.

27 This division reflects the view of the editor. Cf. XLI, xx–xxi.

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what "essence" and "eidos" mean depends on the context (cf., e.g., XLI, 1–21, 90–103, 119–125, 132–150, 212–219, 222–236, 244–251, 366–372, etc.). It is no wonder, then, that the philosophical understanding of Husserl's thinking about the aesthetic aspects of the eidetic dimensions of phenomena can seem like an "infinite task" (VI, 73, 319, 323–324, 326, 336, 338–339, 341).[28]

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28 Cf. in this regard Husserl's telling remark in a letter to Adolf Grimme of March 5, 1931 (*Briefwechsel/Correspondence* III, 90): "In der That, der größte u. wie ich sogar glaube wichtigste Theil meiner Lebensarbeit steckt noch in meinen, durch ihren Umfang kaum noch zu bewältigenden Manuscripten."

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5 Aristotelian echoes in Husserl's ethics

Character, decision, and philosophy as the highest good

Marta Ubiali

Abstract: What do Aristotle and Husserl's ethics have in common? The aim of this chapter is to highlight the Aristotelian heritage in Husserl's ethical reflections. Husserl carefully read the *Nicomachean Ethics* (as his personal copy of the text testifies) and in his phenomenological analyses there are clear affinities with some central Aristotelian concepts. I shall focus on three main issues: the notion of *hexis*/Habitus; the role of the will and voluntary deliberation; the acknowledgment of *bios theoreticos* as the highest form of ethical life. The analysis will uncover some main points of convergence: Husserl and Aristotle share (1) a conception of ethical identity as perpetual development of one's character, in which responsibility and the will play a central role; (2) the idea of philosophy/*sophia* as highest voluntary decision and as the supreme ethical *telos* of human existence.
Keywords: Husserl, Aristotle, Ethics, Habitus, Voluntary Deliberation, Responsibility, Telos.

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There is an ethical claim at the core of Husserl's phenomenology, although only in recent years has phenomenological ethics been the subject of adequate interest.

In the course of his work, Husserl never published texts specifically dedicated to ethical reflection, except for the five articles published in the Japanese magazine *Kaizo*. This might lead one to believe that this is not a field of problems he really cared about, but this is not the case. Husserl's lectures on ethics from the years 1908–14 and 1920–24 (published in volumes XXVIII, and XXXVII of the Husserliana series) demonstrate his commitment to the field of ethics. However, the ethical core of phenomenology is not limited to such explicit treatises, but is rather like a common thread throughout phenomenology's theoretical development. In the last two decades several studies have shown[1] that ethics is not a mere addition to the theoretical horizon of transcendental phenomenology, but is rather its reverse side, i.e. there is an ethical claim that drives Husserl's phenomenological reflection from within.

1 I mention only some of the most significant studies: Sebastian Luft, "Das Subjekt als moralische Person. Zu Husserls späten Reflexionen bezüglich des Personsbegriffs," in *Geist – Person – Gemeinschaft. Freiburger Beiträge zur Aktualität Husserls*, eds. Philip Merz, Andrea Staiti, and Frank Steffen (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2010), 221–240; Ullrich Melle, "The Development of Husserl's Ethics," *Études Phénoménologiques* 13/14 (1991): 115–135; Ullrich Melle, "Husserls personalistische Ethik," in *Fenomenologia della ragion pratica: L'etica di Edmund Husserl*, eds. Beatrice Centi and Gianna Gigliotti (Neaples: Bibliopolis, 2004), 327–356; Henning Peucker, "From Logic to the Person: An Introduction to Edmund Husserl's Ethics," *The Review of Metaphysics* 62 (2008): 307–325.

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The aim of the following is to point out and understand some key issues in Husserl's ethical perspective, in light of the contribution of Aristotle's ethics. The decision to establish such a comparison is not merely arbitrary, but rather—as will be clarified in the following—Husserl's ethics contain echoes of the central points of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Husserl carefully read the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as evidenced by the numerous annotations that we find in his personal copy of Aristotle's text, which is conserved in the Husserl-Archive of Leuven. At the same time, it has to be said that his interpretation of Aristotelian ethics is shaped by the intermediation of Franz Brentano and his ethical project.[2] However, beyond any historical reconstruction of Brentano's contribution to Husserl's reception of Aristotle, the purpose of this chapter is to shed light on three main theoretical aspects that are common to Aristotle's and Husserl's ethical conception.

The work will then be divided into three sections, each dedicated to one of the three issues.

First we will bring attention to the centrality of the category of habit (in Greek *hexis*; in Latin *habitus*). The concept of *Hexis* is—as is well known—one of the cornerstones of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and it is always at the centre of discussions concerning the formation of character and personality in the horizon of Aristotelian thought. Husserl also assigns the same centrality to the sphere of habit. The identity of the ego and ethical personality are progressively constructed on the basis of positions, attitudes that tend to persist, and on the basis of the emergence of new motifs that from time to time lead to further modifications of the previous positions. Each new voluntary decision is not isolated but closely linked to the chain of previous sedimented habits. The source of a truly ethical life consists, according to Husserl, in a constant decision that implies a voluntary deliberation but which at the same time has as its consequence the establishment of a permanent moral *habitus*.

I will then focus more closely on the role of the will in the constitution of the ethical personality, which is what we call in Aristotelian terms *prohairesis*. In fact, it is especially in the framework of ethical reflections that the central role of the will and self-determination emerges in Husserl's phenomenology. For Husserl, the will presides over the ethical dimension as it continually renews the possibility of the realization of an authentic life, and thus of the human teleological vocation to the exercise of rationality. The distinctions between voluntary actions and involuntary actions carried out by Aristotle in Book III of the *Nicomachean Ethics* will contribute to the understanding of the perpetual dialectic between necessity and self-determination, i.e. between habit and the will. Any talk of voluntary of actions—as we shall see—necessarily implies about a discussion of responsibility. We shall see that in Husserl as well as Aristotle there is responsibility *because* there is a teleology.

2 Without going into details, it is important to specify that Brentano is the reference point especially with regard to Husserl's earliest reflections on ethics, i.e. what is generally called his "pre-war ethics". Brentano's ethical project is outlined in *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* (Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1921), a lecture he presented in Vienna in 1889 under the title "Of the Natural Sanction of the Just and the Moral". Husserl openly recognizes that this "*geniale Schrift*" includes "the fertile germs that are called to a further development" (Edmund Husserl, *Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre: 1908–1914*, ed. Ullrich Melle, Husserliana XXVIII, The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988, 90. Henceforth cited as Hua XXVIII). What Husserl first of all shares is the goal that Brentano had set: a fight against scepticism and ethical relativism through the establishment of a scientifically based ethics, i.e. through the identification of moral laws of a formal, a priori and therefore non-empirical nature. This is the intuition that leads Husserl starting from 1902 up to 1914: to construct a formal ethics only on the basis of an analogy with logic and with the acts of judgment.

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The third and final part of the analysis builds on this strong ethical responsibility that the ego bears every moment of its life. If the will implies the possibility of self-determination, then what is the best, most ethical way of life? On this point, Husserl echoes a strongly Aristotelian conception. Specifically, Book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* provides a core for Husserl's reflections. Just as Aristotle holds that man's greatest happiness lies in the theoretical life, so Husserl holds that attaining the highest ethical value requires a radical and incessant exercise of self-consciousness and of voluntary self-determination. The only form of *vocation*—a term that we will discover is central in the framework of Husserl's ethical anthropology—that can embody this ideal is philosophy.

Hexis as permanent and dynamic possession

The first dimension we must deal with is therefore that of habit. It is a traditional philosophical concept that dates back to Aristotle. Passing through the Scholastic philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and through Brentano, it comes to Husserl's phenomenology, where it plays a central role. This concept requires more precise definition, especially since the meaning of the term "habit" runs the risk of being impoverished if we do not take its original etymology into account. First of all, it is necessary to admit that Husserl does not make use of a precise terminology. He runs through a broad spectrum of terms to express his concept of habit:[3] Sometimes he employs the term *Habitualität* or *Habitus*, sometimes instead *Gewohnheit* instead. On several occasions he uses terms such as *Besitz*, or *Habe*, or *bleibende Meinungen* that more precisely express the original Aristotelian meaning of the word *Hexis*. The term *Hexis* in its turn recurs on several occasions in Husserl's texts, e.g. when in the manuscripts collected in the three volumes of the *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins* Husserl asks: "Thus even in receptivity there is a law of habituality; every experience (active acquisition of knowledge) modifies the ego, impresses its own *Hexis* upon it. But what about my knowledge of this permanent *Hexis*?"[4]

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Let us return for a moment to the significance that the Greek term *Hexis* (*Hexeis* in the plural) has for Aristotle, since—regardless of the single word that Husserl uses from time to time—this is the more radical meaning to which Husserl tends to refer. This word derives from the intransitive use of the Greek verb *echein*, "to have" and for this reason it indicates a kind of "having", a constant and permanent holding. *Hexis*, in particular, refers to the perfect form of *echein* and therefore indicates the actual result of a past action. The difficulty of expressing the authentic Greek meaning in different languages is due to the mediation of Latin. The Latin term *habitus* indeed expresses the same significance, since it derives from the verb *habere*—to have—but the immediate shift from the Latin *habitus* into the English *habit* conceals the original meaning. "Habit" (as well as "habitude", "abitudine", "Gewohnheit") suggests an idea of mechanical routine, whereas *Hexis/Habitus* express a kind of having-and-holding that is not the

3 For the different connotations of the concept of "habit" in Husserl's terminology see: Dermot Moran, "Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology of Habituality and Habitus," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 42/1 (2011): 59–60.

4 Ms. A VI 30/7a: "Schon in der Rezeptivität liegt also ein Gesetz der Habitualität; jede Erfahrung (aktive Kenntnisnahme) modifiziert das Ich, prägt ihm eine eigene *Hexis* ein. Wie steht es aber mit meinem Wissen um diese bleibende *Hexis*? "

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same as a mere passivity. In order to avoid linguistic misunderstandings, the Aristotelian term has often been translated in several different ways, in order to convey more adequately the original Greek meaning: "state of character",[5] "disposition" (in the sense of a "stable or long-lasting disposition", which distinguishes it from the word *diathesis*), "characteristic"[6] or "active condition".[7] This is certainly not the place to support or criticize the different translations, but rather to understand more deeply what element or dynamics of the ego's life that the word *hexis* indicates.

Even before Aristotle, Plato had highlighted the category of *Hexis*, and he characterized it in a similar fashion to how the Stagirite later develops it. In the *Theaetetus*, Plato distinguishes between two different kinds of knowledge: On the one hand there is the *holding* (*hexis*) of knowledge, on the other hand the *possession* (*ktêsis*) of knowledge. During the dialogue with Theaetetus, Socrates states:

> Well, then, I don't think holding knowledge and possessing knowledge are the same thing. If someone buys a cloak he can do whatever he wants with it. But if he is not wearing it, we will say that he *possesses* the cloak but not that he is *holding* it.[8]

Plato too, therefore, understands the term *Hexis* to mean a sort of active condition, a self-possession in action, a "having" that springs from an initial event but that then belongs to the subject as something that acts in him. Another feature that Plato ascribes to *Hexis* and that will play a central role both for Aristotle and—one hundred years later—for Husserl, is the possibility of always being reactivated.[9]

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Why and in what way does *hexis* play a central role in Aristotle's ethics? The answer to this question arises in Book II[10] of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Aristotle opens his reflection about virtues with this well-known statement: "moral virtue comes about as a result of habit" (1103a17).[11] For Aristotle, a virtue of character is a *hexis* (the same, of course, can be said concerning any sort of vice), that is a long-lasting feature, continuously built up and established through a sort of exercise, as a result of a process of sedimentation of habits. Ethical character is thus, as it has been already said, not a habit in the mechanical sense but is rather dynamic as it is incessantly under

5 See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. William D. Ross (London: Oxford University Press, 1980).

6 See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2011).

7 See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Joe Sachs (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing/R. Pullins Co., 2002).

8 Plato, *Theaetetus*, 197b1; in *Reading Plato's Theaetetus*, trans. Timothy Chappel (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2004), 185.

9 Plato writes: "Just likewise, it may be a long time since a man came to learn a piece of knowledge, and first knew it. It's still possible for him to renew his knowledge of those same pieces of knowledge, each of which he came to possess long before, but did not have to hand in his thought" (Plato, *Theaetetus*, 198d1, 187).

10 Husserl's annotations on his personal copy of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*Die Nikomachische Ethik*, Leipzig, 1876) are particularly dense. With regard to Book II, there are many underlines and comments. For instance beside 1105b20 Husserl writes: "Auch *hexis* ist ein allgemeiner metaphysischer Begriff. Dürch Übung entsteht die Neigung. Durch vielfache Ausübung der *δύναμις*; Hier im spezifisch ethischen Sinn: Neigung zum guten oder schlechten Fühlen."

11 All quotes from the *Nicomachean Ethics* refer to the following English translation: *The Works of Aristotle*, Vol. 9, trans. William D. Ross (London: Oxford University Press, 1915).

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construction. There is a perpetual dynamics of reciprocity between actions and *hexeis*, since—in Aristotle's words—actions "determine also the nature of the states of character that are produced" (1103b31). Although *hexeis* cannot be considered as actions, every *hexis* arises from the reiteration of a certain action. In another well-known passage Aristotle states, quoting Evenus: "I say that habit's but long practice, friend—And this becomes men's nature in the end" (1152a30–33).

These last words contain some precious points for our understanding, especially since there is an explicit connection between habit/ethos and nature, that recalls another work of Aristotle, *On Memory and Recollection*, which is particularly famous since Felix Ravaisson (with good reason) chose a passage from it to open his work *De L'Habitude*:[12] "Habit here takes the role of nature."[13] What kind of concept of "nature" is Aristotle referring to? *Hexis* constitutes our *second nature*, that is, a state or a possession not innate but so long practised or acquired as to seem so, or a characteristic that has become so ingrained that it seems to be natural. Since *hexeis* arise from activities, they differ from capacities (*dunameis*), which belong by nature to a person: *hexeis* build up a "new nature" that can be defined as "second" since it develops over time, at a later stage than the original *dunameis*. From this perspective, individuals are not different from one another in their human nature or in their original nature, but they do diverge rather more and more in their second nature, in conjunction with several elements, such as education, cultural influences, and—as I will articulate in the second part of this chapter—especially personal, ethical choices. Our "second nature" is thus in a certain sense always up to us, it inevitably involves an element of personal responsibility, since—in Aristotle's terms—"not to know that it is from the exercise of activities on particular objects that states of character [*hexeis*] are produced is the mark of a thoroughly senseless person" (1114a9–10). First and second natures are structurally intertwined, since "[n]either by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit" (1103a23–25). Our first nature has a invariable character, and it is therefore beyond the sphere of responsibility, "for it is easier to change a habit than to change one's nature", but at the same time "even habit is hard to change just because it is like nature" (1152a29–31). Second nature becomes our own nature, that is, in other words, our dynamic nature for which we are responsible.

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Let us now turn to Husserl, in order to uncover the deep relevance of this Aristotelian inheritance in his thought. I have already given a brief overview of the varied terminology that Husserl uses in this semantic field, and I have already mentioned that in the manuscripts collected under the title *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins* (currently being prepared for publication in the archives of Leuven), he explicitly uses the term Greek *hexis*. In the above-mentioned manuscript, A VI 30/6a–8b, Husserl develops the Aristotelian theme in a way that can help up to go deeper into it. In these pages, he clearly connects the issue of a "*solchen bleibenden* Hexis" ("such permanent *Hexis*") directly with the crucial theoretical problem of every possible "modification within the identity of the ego".[14] Every modification is "of a special kind. The Ego as Ego keeps

12 Felix Ravaisson, *De L'Habitude* (Paris: Fournier, 1838).
13 Aristotle, *On Memory and Recollection*, 452a27, trans. David Bloch (Leiden: Brill 2007), 43.
14 Ms. A VI 30/7b: "Änderung innerhalb der Identität des Ich".

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its 'habitus', its peculiarity",[15] within the dynamic of an "incessant development, as long as [the ego] ever anew takes position".[16]

Every time the ego takes a position, or a voluntary decision, every time it is consciously or unconsciously motivated by something, all this affects the state of its character and possesses a self-determining potentiality. There is a progressive and constant development of our personal identity. Husserl argues that "the ego, while it wants in a certain way, thereby establishes a volitional disposition [*Willensgesinnung*], an habitual and permanent will, and generally at least, "remains" with its will. And it is understood as such."[17] It is fundamental, on this point, to take into consideration Husserl's analyses of inner time-consciousness. It is well-known that for Husserl, the temporal stream of consciousness is the transcendental condition for the progressive sinking-back of every living present, and the "continuously co-functioning retention" embodies the "primordial place of this accomplishment":[18] "Those retentions taking place *originally* do remain non-intuitive and sink into the undifferentiated general horizon of forgetfulness that has, as it were, become lifeless – provided that an associative awakening has not taken place."[19] As living experiences sink more and more toward this zero-level of consciousness, this does not necessarily mean that they do not exert affective force anymore: it is rather a gradual modification of affective force that ends up at an unnoticeable level. What is almost unnoticeable, however, is not to be considered nothing, since it remains in the retentional chain. In fact, nothing is lost in an absolute forgetfulness, or rather, nothing is lost without leaving a trace: every deliberation and every volitional behaviour tends to remain and thus shapes the ego, its personality, and—as we will come to see more profoundly—its ethical point of view. Husserl writes in this regard: "Today has in itself the memory of yesterday, yesterday of the day before and so on, but indirectly of all the previous wakeful moments."[20] The gradually fading past has a fundamental role in the configuration of the present.

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According to Husserl, the life of the ego is therefore progressively shaped by its (in Aristotle's words) *praxeis* and by the consequent establishment of a permanent and at the same time dynamic state of character. One of Husserl's texts that is especially relevant for the comparison with the Aristotelian concept of *hexis* is §29 of *Ideas II*, entitled "Constitution of unities within the sphere of immanence. Persistent opinions

15 Ms. A VI 30/7b: "eine Änderung ganz besonderer Art. Das Ich als Ich erhält seinen 'Habitus', seine Eigenheit".

16 Ms. A VI 30/8b: "Das Ich ist in beständiger Entwicklung, sofern es immer neue Stellungnahmen vollzieht."

17 Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil: 1921–1928*, edited by Iso Kern, Husserliana XIV (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 168–169: "[. . .] dass das Ich, indem es jetzt so will, damit eine Willensgesinnung, einen habituellen, bleibenden Willen stiftet und, im allgemeinen wenigstens, bei seinem Willen 'bleibt'. Und so wird es verstanden." Henceforth cited as 'Hua XIV' with page reference.

18 Edmund Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918–1926*, edited by Margot Fleischer, Husserliana XI (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 8; English Translation: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, trans. Anthony J. Steinbock (Dordrecht/Boston, MA/London: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 2001), 45. Henceforth cited as *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* with German and English page references, respectively.

19 Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, 80/123.

20 Edmund Husserl, *Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–1937)*, edited by Rochus Sowa, Husserliana XXXIX. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 587: "Das Heute hat die Erinnerung an das Gestern in sich, das Gestern an das Vorgestern etc., mittelbar aber (an) alle (früheren Wachperiode)". Henceforth cited as 'Hua XXXIX' with page reference.

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[*Meinungen*] as sedimentations in the pure Ego". These "opinions" are permanent formations of intentional units in the flow of monadic consciousness that "can, in a certain sense, be called 'habitual', though there is no question here of a *habitus* as what has become customary", since "the *habitus* that we are concerned with pertains not to the empirical, but to the pure, Ego."[21] The dynamics that this law identifies reminds us of what Aristotle says concerning the development of our "second nature", especially where Husserl states "I am even therein and a priori the same Ego, insofar as I, in taking a position, necessarily exercise consistency in a determinate sense: each 'new' position-taking institutes a persistent 'opinion' or a thema."[22] Every *praxis* therefore establishes in the ego something stable, permanent, or rather, something that tends to persist until new motivations arise that demand a modification of the previous disposition and thus alter the ego's attitude and personality itself. In the development of its disposition, the ego is "constantly the same, though in a changing stream of lived experience, in which new motives are often constituted".[23] This "consequential" dynamic is what determines the progressive formation of identity. Again we find the "mutual belonging" of the first and second natures that Aristotle already underlined: In every moment of its development, the ego keeps those potentialities that constitute its original nature and that are always at work whatever "state of character" has been developed in the intervening time. For this reason, there is always the possibility to modify its own second nature when some new motivations occur and when a voluntary *praxis* supports this modification.

The theoretical assumption of Husserl's ethical reflections is the recognition of motivation as the essential law of the ego's entire life. Every action or deliberation is motivated and, in turn, they motivate a new and permanent feature of the ego. This is the condition of possibility for the constitution of each person's ethical style. In this respect Husserl writes: "Each revelation of a will, and in the same way of an act is [. . .] a modification of myself", since I am not a "*tabula rasa*, on which the act-experiences come and then disappear".[24] The identity of the ego and its ethical personality are not merely the result of its *first nature*, but rather it is built progressively on the basis of the formation of its permanent "habits", i.e. its *second nature*. Each new voluntary action is not isolated but closely linked to the chain of precedent *hexeis*. Its own history, its own habitual style, its own permanent state of character constantly influences each new ethical decision. This does not go, however, in the direction of a sort of determinism, but rather—as we will see more clearly in the next steps—entails a greater emphasis on the ethical responsibility that weighs on every single decision.

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21 Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, edited by Marly Biemel, Husserliana IV (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), 112. English translation: *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1989), 119. Henceforth cited as *Ideas 2* with German and English page references, respectively.

22 Husserl, *Ideas 2*, 112/119.

23 Husserl, *Ideas 2*, 112/119.

24 Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1934–1937*, edited by Reinhold N. Smid, Husserliana XXIX (The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), 372: "So ist jedes Preisgeben eines Willens, und ebenso überhaupt eines Aktes [. . .], eine Änderung meines Ich als Ich, [. . .] tabula rasa, auf der Akterlebnisse kommen und wieder verschwinden". Henceforth cited as 'Hua XXIX' with page reference.

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These last reflections lead us to the second part of the present discussion, namely the role of the will, voluntary self-determination, and their relationship to *habitus* in the ethical reflections of Aristotle and Husserl.

Prohairesis and ethical responsibility

On several occasions Husserl goes so far as to define his phenomenology as a "universal voluntarism".[25] Already in the *Logical Investigations* Husserl examines the intentional character of the will, but during the development of Husserl's phenomenology, the questions on the status of voluntary acts multiply and become more radical. Especially from the 1920s onwards, it is not so much the problem of the relationship between objectifying and non-objectifying acts that structure Husserl's writings on this topic, but rather the role of the volitional dimension in the constitution of ego's identity and specific moments like decision, choice, and deliberation. Similar questions gradually lead Husserl to other issues that are structurally intertwined with the ego's identity and volition, such as the relationship between desire and will and the role of instincts and habits. Giving a little synopsis, we can say that the problem of the relationship between the voluntariness of decisions/deliberations and the involuntariness of *hexis* comes into play in Husserl's descriptions of the role of will in the constitution of ethical life.

Once again it is interesting to draw a parallel between Husserl's reflections on ethics and Aristotle's approach. In this case, a preliminary clarification is required. If, in the case of the term *hexis*, it was already necessary to clarify that the modern translation tends to take on a different meaning than the original Aristotelian one, such a need for clarification is even more pronounced in the case of the debate between what is voluntary and what is involuntary. If one takes into consideration Book III of the *Nicomachean Ethics*—which is dedicated to this issue—the adjectives "voluntary" and "involuntary" translate the Greek *hekousia* and *akousia*. This is not an incorrect translation: through the mediation of Latin (*voluntarium* and *involontarium*), the modern terms correctly reflect the Aristotelian distinction. The point is that the Greek terms embrace a broad spectrum of meanings and specifications, which in the modern debate, authors designate with other distinctions such as "willing" and "unwilling", or "intentional" and "unintentional". I mean only to point out that we cannot juxtapose Aristotle and Husserl's reflections on the will without taking into account that we are posing the question in a fundamentally complex vocabulary.

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25 Edmund Husserl, *Aufsätze und Vorträge. 1922–1937*, edited by Thomas Nenon, Husserliana XXVII (The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988). Henceforth cited as 'Hua XXVII', 94: "ein universaler Wille als Gemeinwille, eine Entelechie"; or—even more explicity: Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil. 1929–35*, edited by Iso Kern, Husserliana XV (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973). Henceforth cited as 'Hua XV', 378: "Dieser teleologische Prozess, der Seinsprozess der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität, trägt in sich eine universalen, zunächst in den einzelnen Subjekten dunklen ' 'Willen zum Leben', oder vielmehr, Willen zum wahren Sein".

In his famous text, Dorion Cairns reports a conversation with Husserl in 1931 in this regard: "Husserl said he has been working on the carrying out of a universal voluntarism. He objects to regarding such classifications of acts as Brentano's as representing true fundamental distinctions. Every act as carried out by the ego is a decision, a *Bejahung*, <affirmation> and there is furthermore a volitional aspect in the background phenomena of the mind. There is a sort of *Hintergrundsentscheidung* <background decision>, which is not a full egodecision," Dorion Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl und Fink* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 61.

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Beyond their proper differences, however, it is interesting to note a profound analogy between Husserl and Aristotle's thought. I refer to the fundamental role that voluntary decision or "purposive choice"[26] or *prohairesis* has in establishing moral virtues and to the constant element of responsibility that is always at work in the development of our state of character, that is, of our *hexis*. For this reason, Aristotle speaks of moral virtue as an *hexis prohairetiké*.

First, let us try to understand how Aristotle characterizes a voluntary act, since it is crucial from an ethical point of view. Only when a voluntary element is at stake does the problem of virtue come into play, since, in Aristotle's terms, "on voluntary passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on those that are involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity" (1109b31–33). According to the account given in Book III, an action is involuntary if it is performed "under compulsion [*bìa*] or owing to ignorance [*ágnoia*]" and something can be considered as compulsory when "the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is acting" (1109b35–1110a1–3). The English expression "moving principle" refers in this case to the Greek word *archè*, which here means "cause", "origin". An action is thus involuntary when it is the result of a cause that is external to the agent and when the agent does not make any contribution to it. A man acts voluntarily when the *archè* "is in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do" (1110a17–18). It is worthwhile to focus on this last statement. From the perspective of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *archè* of a voluntary action has to be interior to the agent both in the sense of the efficient and final causes, that is, in the sense of the agent's deliberation to perform it and of the aim for which this decision is undertaken. This twofold meaning is constantly co-present, since, as we can read in the Book VI, "[t]he origin [*archè*] of action—its efficient, not its final cause—is choice [*prohairesis*], and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end" (1139a32–34). On the one hand, the purposive choice is more immediately understandable as the efficient cause of a voluntary *praxis*, since it is its starting point; however on the other hand, it also embodies an element of finality, since, in Aristotle's words, "the originating causes of the things that are done consist in the end at which they are aimed" (1140b16—17).

Husserl describes in similar fashion the features of voluntary deliberation, which he designates with the expression "*fiat*",[27] which can be translated as "let it be done", or as Husserl says: "*Es soll sein!*"[28] This concept plays a fundamental role in Husserl's phenomenology; Husserl repeatedly attempts on several occasions and from different points of view, to determine the peculiarities of the moment of *fiat* in phenomenological description (once again it is proper to highlight in this regard the analyses that are collected in the third volume of the *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins*). In this context it is particularly interesting to observe the similarities between Husserl's concept of *fiat* and Aristotle's *prohairesis*.

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26 This is the translation adopted and endorsed by Anthony Kenny, in: *Aristotle's Theory of Will* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979).

27 Husserl inherits the term *fiat* from William James, who writes in his *Principles of Psychology*: "The bare idea is sufficient, but sometimes an additional conscious element, in the shape of a fiat, mandate, or express consent, has to intervene and precede the movement", William James, *Principles of Psychology* (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1890), 522. See Susi Ferrarello, "On the Rationality of Will in James and Husserl", *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* 2/1 (2010): 121–132.

28 Hua XXVII, 157.

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First of all, we find that for Husserl too the criterion for determining the voluntariness of an act is—as in Book III of the *Nicomachean Ethics*—that the principle of the action is internal to the subject. To describe this condition, Husserl uses on several occasions an expression adopted in turn by Alexander Pfänder[29] in his works *Phänomenologie des Wollens*[30] and *Motive und Motivation*:[31] an act is voluntary when it springs "*von seinem Ich-Zentrum aus*",[32] that is "from its own Ego-Centre". In describing the moment of deliberation, Husserl emphasizes in particular its spontaneous, free character, so as to differentiate the voluntary act from any mechanism or any process that has a moving principle external to the ego itself. At the moment of the *fiat* "the subject is in the strict sense a volitional-subject [. . .], an 'agent'-subject, the personal actor of his act."[33] Husserl stresses the self-determining power of voluntary decision, to which he ascribes a creative character.

The analysis of the *fiat* so far has put particular emphasis on the ego as the efficient cause of voluntary action; however, the final cause of the act is also present in the ego's moment of deliberation. There belongs to the moment of the *fiat* an essential feature of *Projektbewusstsein*. The consciousness of the possibility of realization of a goal is an indispensable condition for speaking of genuine voluntary acts. Husserl repeatedly stressed (for example, in the section on the phenomenology of the will from his 1914 lectures on ethics[34]) the importance of distinguishing between will and desire. The peculiarity of the voluntary act with respect to mere desire is the potentiality to achieve an aim through its own actions. Husserl states in this regard: "Only a practical possibility can become the theme of my will. I cannot want anything that I have not consciously before my face, anything that is not in my power, anything that falls outside of my capability",[35] whereas in the case of desire the desired goal is not conceived as something realizable. There belongs to the instant of decision a future horizon that is configured as yet-to-be-realized. The Husserlian *fiat*—as well as Aristotelian *prohairesis*—is not limited to just being a voluntary act's starting point (efficient cause), but rather as a creative beginning that is constantly led by the dynamic *archè* of its aim (final cause).

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What has been said so far about the nature of the resolution as *prohairesis/fiat* has not yet directly addressed the question that we posed at the beginning of this section: are we responsible for the establishment and development of our second nature? Of course it has to be said that it is absolutely not possible to voluntarily abandon our ethical *habitus*. A cowardly man cannot suddenly decide to stop being so and suddenly become brave. Aristotle states that in the case of an unjust man who wishes to become just "it does not follow that if he wishes he will cease to be unjust and will

29 Alexander Pfänder, student of Theodor Lipps and one of first phenomenologist of Munich, was the privileged interlocutor of Husserl during the first decade of the 1900s and his undisputed reference point for what concerns the phenomenology of the will. Testimony of this intense collaboration are the intense exchange of letters, the huge amount of notes that Husserl wrote in the margins of his personal copies of Pfänder's works of—first of all—the so-called *Pfänder-Konvolut*, i.e. the collection of manuscripts that Husserl himself classified as relate to the positions of Pfänder or simply the themes treated by him.

30 Alexander Pfänder, *Phänomenologie des Wollens. Eine psychologische Analyse* (Leipzig: Barth 1900).

31 Alexander Pfänder, *Phänomenologie des Wollens. Motive und Motivation* (München: Barth, 1963).

32 Hua XXVII, 24.

33 Hua XXVII, 24: "ist das Subjekt im prägnanten Sinne Willenssubjekt [. . .], 'handelndes' Subjekt, personaler Täter seiner Tat".

34 See Hua XXVIII, 102–125.

35 Hua XXVIII, 104.

Proof

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be just" (1114a11–13). It is nevertheless necessary to be clear that Aristotle does not conceive of *hexeis* and character as a chain that imprisons adult persons forever, as something fixed that negates our ability to change ourselves. If so, why in Book III.5 would Aristotle speak of the voluntariness of ethical *habitus*? These passages are particularly clear concerning this point. Here Aristotle states that "virtue [. . .] is in our own power, and so too vice" (1113b7) or that "man is a moving principle [*archè*] or begetter of his actions as of children" (1113b18–19),[36] or again that "it is activities exercised on particular objects that make the corresponding character" (1114a7–8). It is a complex issue, since the education and the progressive development of one's character continues to have an inescapable weight: a pure or absolute voluntary act does not exist, i.e. there is no pure *Prohairesis* which from time to time shapes the ego as if the ego would not have a history and a permanent *hexis*. At any rate, in these pages of the *Nicomachean Ethics* we read that we are "responsible for becoming men of that kind, and men make themselves responsible for being unjust or self-indulgent" (1114a4–5). As we described in the first section, *hexis* has to be considered as a dynamic dimension incessantly under construction, and we are always responsible for the development of this construction.

In Husserl this dynamic is even more pronounced. In his 1924 lectures on ethics he speaks of the "wonderful phenomenon of self-determination", in which "the ego voluntarily posits itself as an ego, that is as an ego that from now on wants only the Good, and eventually fully 'renews' itself 'inwardly', or at least determines itself in wanting to become a new Ego."[37] The moment of voluntary decision as an act of spontaneity, therefore, initiates a double horizon: we have on the one hand the horizon of a new voluntary action directed to a purpose (as we described before when discussing *prohairesis*) and on the other hand the horizon of a free and permanent self-determination of the ego. The voluntary dimension, therefore, represents the ethical sphere *par excellence*, since we can talk about an ethical ego only when it is understood as "*causa sui* seiner Moralität".[38] In his articles published in the Japanese magazine *Kaizo*, employing an expression inherited from Pfänder, Husserl emphasizes again that the man driven by an ethical tension "is both subject and object of his *Streben*, a work in progress *ad infinitum* of which he himself is the masterwork".[39]

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Husserl describes the life of the ego on several occasions through the metaphor of a *Wanderweg*: along the way the ego progressively discovers its capacities, its provisions, its peculiarities. What is the motor of this dynamism? Which human faculty presides over this constant possibility of "becoming-an-ethical-ego"? It is the will. According to Husserl, the will is the vital energy that moves every act and *prohairesis*. It frees the ego from the captivity of mechanisms and of the "again and again" of mere habit. The will

36 This expression will be then echoed by Paul Ricœur, who writes in his famous text *Le volontaire et l'involontaire* that during the moment of realization of the voluntary *fiat* "my relation to myself is like that of a younger and an older brother", Paul Ricœur, *Freedom and Nature. The Voluntary and the Involuntary* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 47.

37 Edmund Husserl, *Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920 und 1924*, edited by Henning Peucker, Husserliana XXXVII (Dordrecht/Boston, MA/London 2004). Henceforth cited as 'Hua XXXVII', 162: "[. . .] wunderbare Phänomen der Selbstbestimmung, [. . .] in dem das Ich sich selbst als Ich, und zwar als von nun ab rein das Gute wollendes Ich, willentlich setzt und sich eventuell 'innerlich' völlig 'erneuert', oder mindest sich dazu bestimmt, ein neues werden zu wollen".

38 Hua XXXVII, 163.

39 Hua XXVII, 37: "Subjekt und zugleich Objekt seines Strebens [ist], das ins Unendliche werdende Werk, dessen Werkmeister er selbst ist".

Proof

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enables us to discover and realize our own vocation to rationality, which is the *telos* of humanity. Husserl's ethics, by virtue of its absolute trust in the self-determining power of the will, appears as an optimistic rationalism.[40] Husserl is aware of the intrinsic imperfection of every human attempt to fulfil the Good, as "the mere will to become perfect does not create all of a sudden perfection, the achievement of which is related to the necessary form of a struggle without end, but also of a strengthening during the fight."[41] These words bring Aristotle immediately to mind, when he states that you cannot change your own *hexis* abruptly with a voluntary decision. The "utopic man" ("*paradiesischer Mensch*"[42]), that is, the totally innocent man, for Husserl is only an extreme case and it is not a realistic description of the human moral situation. On the contrary, man lives in a constant struggle to achieve his ethical aim.

But what is the highest goal of human achievement? What is the highest ethical *Prohairesis*?

Bios theoretikos as the supreme ethical aim

These last considerations show us another aspect that makes Husserl and Aristotle's ethics deeply similar. As already mentioned above, in Husserl's reflections it emerges that subjectivity lives in a constant teleological tension and that, embracing each particular purpose, it tends towards an ultimate *telos* of perfection. It is interesting to note that both thinkers—in spite of obvious differences of context and terminology—come to describe this ultimate end of human existence with very similar characteristics and both identified the supreme ethical value in the life of the philosopher .

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This ultimate goal—the *highest* good—can be designated in many ways. Aristotle uses the Greek term *eudaimonia*, namely happiness, beyond which desire cannot long for anything else. This supreme good has some precise characteristics, which emerge in Book I, Chapter 7. First of all, it is "always desirable in itself, and never for the sake of something else" (1097a33–34), and only happiness can be described as such, since "honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves [. . .] but we choose them also for the sake of happiness" (1097b2–4). Self-sufficiency is thus a criterion for defining the ultimate *telos*: happiness is self-sufficient since it is "lacking in nothing", in the sense that there is no other good which could further increase it. But in what does human happiness consist? Since happiness can be considered as a synonym for perfection or fulfilment, Aristotle points out that in order to discover the content of happiness, it is necessary first of all to discover the specific function of man, and he asks: "Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function [*ergon*]?" (1097b29–30). Aristotle identifies the peculiar *ergon* of the human being by exclusion: it is not the vegetable life, which consists in growth and nutrition, and that belongs even to the plants; it is also not the life of perception, which is common to every animal. All that remains is rational life, the activity of pure thought: this is the human peculiarity that can make us, as thinking beings, self-sufficient.

40 See Melle, "The Development of Husserl's Ethics", 124.

41 Hua XXVII, 38: "[. . .] aber der bloße Wille, vollkommen zu werden, macht nicht mit einem Male die Vollkommenheit, deren Realisierung an die notwendige Form eines endlosen Ringens, aber auch Erstarkens im Ringen gebunden ist."

42 Hua XXVII, 34.

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It is in Book X, however, that Aristotle comes to define in detail what kind of life that uniquely embodies life's highest good. In Chapter 6 he makes a particularly relevant remark:

> [happiness,] "the end of human nature [. . .] is not a disposition [*hexis*]; for if it were it might belong to some who was asleep throughout his life, living the life of a plant, or, again, to someone who was suffering the greatest misfortunes" (1176a33–35)

Happiness is instead an activity and—in accordance with the features of happiness mentioned above—specifically an activity that is desirable in itself and not for the sake of something else. The activity most worthy activity of being chosen, is the one most consonant with the specific and highest function of man, namely, the contemplative life (*bios theoreticos*). It represents the supreme happiness which human beings can long for. It concerns that which is most divine in us, that is the *nous*, the intellect. In Chapter 8 Aristotle identifies two different degrees of happiness. Activities according to moral virtue (for instance just and brave acts) are happy in a secondary way (*deutéros*) (1178a9), since they are typically human and for this reason too they are conditioned by the passions and by the instinctive part of the soul. Perfect happiness is obtainable only through contemplation. The two happinesses do not exclude one another; one is higher than the other but both are compatible.

We can trace a deep affinity for these Aristotelian positions in Husserl, especially in his ethical reflections that mark the years after the First World War. After the end of the war, Husserl's faith in the possibility to devise an universally valid ethic re-emerges. In this he aims at clarifying the meaning and the purpose of human life. The aim that motivates him is the same one that guided his 1914 attempt to build a formal ethics, in the wake of Brentano's ethical reflections. However, after the war, the horizon of his reflections extended, bringing into question the whole fate of European humanity. He relentlessly insisted on the necessity of renewing oneself and that this self-renewal coincides with becoming aware of one's own rational nature, that is, of the *telos* that is inscribed in every egological act. "The essence of human life" Husserl writes, "unfolds continuously in the form of striving",[43] because, starting from the teleological tension that animates the life of the ego moment by moment, the person lives constantly in the struggle for a life "full of value". According to Husserl, what motivates this urgency of renewal is the deep disappointment that arises from a very frequent existential experience that he describes in his lectures on "Fichte's Ideal of Humanity": "a life, that loses itself in illusory satisfactions, is itself lost, it is an illusory life, an empty and self-negating life."[44]

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For Husserl, as for Aristotle, man is in a constant tension with and tendency toward a supreme happiness [*Seligkeit*]. Husserl stresses that this struggle between a life of lower and upper value is the mark of humanity, the peculiarity which distinguishes man

43 Hua XXVII, 25: "Zum Wesen des Menschenlebens gehört es ferner, daß es sich beständig in der Form des Strebens abspielt."

44 Edmund Husserl, *Aufsätze und Vorträge. 1911–1921. Mit ergänzenden Texten*, edited by Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, Husserliana XXV (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986). Henceforth cited as 'Hua XXV', 285: "[E]in Leben, das sich in Scheinbefriedigungen verliert, verliert sich selbst, ist Scheinleben, ist ein leeres, sich selbst negierendes Leben."

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from all other living beings: "Every life is desire, drive toward satisfaction. This drive passes through each of our still incomplete satisfactions; the ideal goal is therefore always pure and complete fulfilment, in a word: beatitude [*Seligkeit*]."[45] The *telos* of our own humanity, then, needs to be recognized in a self-conscious way in order to become aware of the purpose of our actions. Again, as in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, happiness is not a disposition but rather an activity. There is a personal responsibility toward our *telos* and thus one must make a voluntary decision. Husserl often describes the inaugural moment of this supreme ethical *prohairesis* in terms of the discovery of a real vocation (*Berufung*), that is, in terms of a personal calling that invites one to live oriented towards the *telos* of reason, to follow "the voice that resonates from its practical Reason: 'Act according to your purpose!' [. . .] And in this the true man finds his beatitude, it is the beatitude of moral autonomy in the liberation from all sensuous slavery."[46] The perception of this inner voice is what signals the urgency of ethical self-renewal. The categorical imperative that Husserl, following Brentano, had formulated in his early courses on formal ethics[47] now becomes the content of the vocation of every man:

> What matters here, however, is that I say to myself, that I recognize, that I found a universal rule-will, that raise once and for all in front of me this categorical imperative: from now on, and without uncertainty do the better, always do your best, grasp it in a knowledge [that] conforms to rules, want the best in a consciously normative will.[48]

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The urgent need for an ethical renewal leads Husserl to identify—like Aristotle—the form of life that embodies the ethical ideal in the theoretical life, that is, in philosophy or, more precisely, in phenomenology. From this point of view, those passages where Husserl describes the phenomenological *epoché* as the supreme voluntary decision that embodies the culmination of the human practice of deliberation are particularly relevant. We could say that in Aristotelian terms the *epoché* is the supreme *prohairesis*. He writes in *Erste Philosophie*: "Reflection takes place, originally, in the will. The subject, as it determines itself as a philosophical subject, takes, in fact, a voluntary decision, which invests its entire future life of knowledge."[49] According to Husserl,

45 Hua XXV, 285: "Alles Leben ist Streben, ist Trieb nach. Befriedigung. Durch alle noch unvollkommene Befriedigung geht dieser Trieb hindurch, das ideale Ziel ist also immerfort reine und volle Befriedigung, mit einem Wort Seligkeit. Seinem Wesen nach will also alles Leben seliges Leben sein."

46 Hua XXV, 280: "der aus seiner praktischen Vernunft ertönenden Stimme [folgt]: Handle nach deiner Bestimmung! [. . .] Und darin findet der echte Mensch seine Seligkeit, es ist die Seligkeit der sittlichen Autonomie in der Befreiung von aller sinnlichen Sklaverei."

47 Hua XXVIII, 70–101. See. Brentano, *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis*, 24–30. Husserl deepens and expands Brentano's formulation. Brentano focuses particularly on the determination of the concepts of 'good' and 'better'. He writes in this regard that "the better [. . .] is the one that is loved more rightly, that pleases more rightly" (Brentano, *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis*, 25).

48 Hua XXXVII, 253: "Aber darauf kommt es an, dass ich mir das sage, dass ich es erkenne, dass ich einen universalen Normwillen stifte, der ein für alle Mal diesen kategorischen Imperativ vor mir aufrichtet: Tue von nun ab und ohne Wanken das Beste, dein Bestes für immerdar, ergreife es in normgerechter Erkenntnis und wolle es in normbewusstem Willen."

49 Edmund Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923–1924). Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologische Reduktion*, edited by Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana VIII (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959). Henceforth cited as 'Hua VIII', 7: "Die Reflexion ist ursprünglich eine solche im Willen. Das Subjekt faßt ja, indem es sich zum philosophischen Subjekt bestimmt, einen auf sein gesamtes künftiges Erkenntnisleben gerichteten Willensentschluß."

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there is then the possibility of a real "universal ethical epoché" that has as its purpose the overall determination of the will, that is, [the decision to convert its own existence to authenticity] [the precise meaning of this is unclear to me]. The ego can distance itself from the world to get back to itself and focus on its own actions and its own personal horizon of life.[50]

Starting from the observation of the teleological tension that characterizes the life of the subject, Husserl aims to outline the various ways in which the personal subject can respond to its ethical vocation, that is "the specifically human *forms of life* or the *personal types of men* [*persönliche Menschentypen*] that raise us up to the highest form of value of an ethical man and that culminate in it".[51] This itinerary of the different "personal types" presupposes the possibility of the practice of the ethical *epoché*. This is very close to Aristotle's notion of *phronesis*, that is, practical wisdom: each person, because of the essential possibility for self-reflection, can "take a panoramic view of its life, and, as free, consciously aspire in various possible ways to shape his life into a satisfying, 'happy' form".[52] The different forms of life—the various professions—correspond therefore to the different outcomes that the human exercise of free will can reach, depending on the class of values or goods that one identifies as the supreme good. These may be prosperity, personal glory, greedy possession of riches and so on. Within the infinite variety of possible forms of life, there are cases of the "life of vocation [*Berufsleben*]" in a higher and more meaningful sense, as for instance that of the artist, the scientist, or the statesman. But Husserl does not consider any of these "lives of vocation" to be authentic ethical life.

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In order to speak of an absolute ethical value, a practice of constant and radical self-determination is necessary, and the only form of life that can embody such an ideal is that of the philosopher.[53] The peculiarity of the philosophical life compared with any other is immediately clear, since, for example, in the case of the artist:

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> [T]his love and personal life-decision may develop unnoticed [. . .]. For someone a pure love for the art can emerge early, already in his youth, [. . .] making it inadvertently into a profession, without–so to speak—a solemn decision having taken place.[54]

This cannot be so in the case of a philosopher, because "he needs an authentic decision that originally establishes himself as a philosopher. He needs the original institution, which is an originary self-creation. No one can 'get roped' into philosophy."[55] The voluntary *fiat* that inaugurates philosophy is a totally self-conscious step and for this

50 See Ashraf Noor, "Individualité et volonté", *Études phénoménologiques* 13–14 (1991): 137–164.
51 Hua XXV, 26: "[. . .] spezifisch menschliche *Lebensformen* bzw. *personale Menschentypen*, die uns zur obersten Wertform des *ethischen* Menschen emporleiten und in ihr kulminieren."
52 Hua XXV, 26: "Es überschaut sein Leben, und als freies strebt es bewußt, und in verschiedenen möglichen Formen, sein Leben zu einem befriedigendem, einem 'glückseligen' zu gestalten."
53 See also Donn Welton, *The Other Husserl. The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 315.
54 Hua VIII, 19: "diese Liebe und die ihr folgende persönliche Lebensentscheidung unvermerkt [. . .] es kann in jemand frühzeitig, schon in Jugendjahren, eine reine Kunstliebe erwachen [. . .] und so mag er unvermerkt in den Beruf hineingeraten, ohne eine sozusagen feierliche Entscheidung."
55 Hua VIII, 19: "Er bedarf *notwendig* eines eigenen, ihn als Philosophen überhaupt erst und ursprünglich schaffenden *Entschlusses*, sozusagen einer Urstiftung, die ursprüngliche Selbstschöpfung ist. Niemand kann in die Philosophie hineingeraten."

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reason philosophy is the only form of life that has a perfect ethical conscience of responsibility. This point is particularly relevant here because we can see that for Husserl too the achievement of the highest good is not a disposition, a *hexis*, but rather the activity most worthy of being chosen.

The philosopher is one who commits himself and his entire existence to an infinite task:

> To be interested in philosophy, to reflect occasionally on issues related to truth, and even to work on it continuously, does not mean to be a philosopher [. . .]. What is missing in these cases is the radicalism of a will directed to that which is ultimate, whose eyes are directed towards the infinity of pure idea and towards the infinity of a whole world of ideas.[56]

The condition of possibility of a true self-realization is an exercise in self-reflection so radical that it arrives at a form of life that Husserl calls "*Panmethodismus*", that is, a life lived in a constant voluntary "Selbstüberwachung"[57] (self-control).

Concluding remarks

Let us review the path we have followed so far and gather some of the main observations. In short, it is possible to observe that Husserl and Aristotle share two aspects that I now express in very general terms: (a) the conception of the dynamics of the development of personal and ethical identity, and (b) the idea of supreme fulfilment and *telos* of human existence.

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(a) This first aspect can be perfectly summarized by a statement from Husserl's Lectures on Ethics of 1924: "Das *Ich-Sein* ist beständiges *Ich-Werden*. Subjekte sind, indem sie sich immerfort entwickeln"[58] (Being-an-ego is constantly Becoming-an-ego. They are subjects, as they constantly develop themselves). In Aristotelian thought and in Husserl's phenomenology, the self is not a static structure but rather a becoming in constant development: the ego becomes itself as its own personality—its own *hexis*—is shaped. Everything influences this development: education, culture, attitudes, and behaviours undertaken voluntarily or in that *chiaroscuro* of the will that Husserl indicates with the deliberately paradoxical expression "Willenspassivität".[59] The identity of the ego (its virtues and its vices) is its own *habitus*, not in a deterministic or mechanical sense, but rather in the sense that in every moment the ego—with the growing burden of its permanent possession—is walking toward its own truth, its own *telos*. There is no "pure" voluntary decision, i.e. disconnected from history, from *habitus*, from the culture of the individual. But, and here lies the incessant dialectic between passive and active aspects of the development, there is no moment in which I am not taking a position: I decide to join again to the direction already started by my

56 Hua VIII, 17: "Sich für Philosophie interessieren, gelegentlich über Wahrheitsfragen nachdenken und selbst daran fortlaufend arbeiten, ist noch nicht Philosoph sein [. . .] Was da fehlt, ist der Radikalismus des Willens zum Letzten, der die Unendlichkeit der reinen Idee und die Unendlichkeiten einer ganzen Ideenwelt vor Augen hat."

57 Hua XXVII, 39.

58 Hua XXXVII, 104.

59 See for instance: Ms. A VI 12 I/131b; Ms. A VI 27/24a.

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hexis, or decide to implement a change. For this reason, the respective notions of *prohairesis* and *fiat* play a central role in the framework of Aristotle's and Husserl's ethical reflections: at the core of their positions (taking of course into account their differences) is the insight that what we are and what we become is up to us.

(b) This incessant development aims at an ultimate *telos*, a supreme fulfilment, in which the human specific *ergon* finds its supreme expression. For both Aristotle and Husserl, this highest Good is reached through the practice of that peculiarity that distinguishes human beings from plants and animals, i.e. rationality or the ability to think. True happiness consists in the *bios theoreticos*. This *eudaimonia/Seligkeit* cannot be considered as a mere disposition or state of character. Only a voluntary deliberation, or even the highest ethical deliberation, can open the path of *sophia*. Philosophers live a life of "*panmethodismus*" in Husserl's words, since their inaugural *fiat* has to be continuously renewed: that is the only way in which philosophy can become a permanent *hexis*, a stable possession of the ego. Those who answer to this supreme vocation, those who listen to the inner calling to "act according to our own destination!" live in a perpetual voluntary tension with truth and first principles; their identities are constantly shaped by a voluntary deliberation that they have to take up at any given moment.

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6 On the Aristotelian underpinnings of Husserl's ethics of vocation

William Tullius

Abstract: The degree to which Husserl's ethics borrows from Aristotle has not been sufficiently appreciated within the current literature on Husserl's ethical theories. Without seeking to challenge the important roles played by other thinkers, like Hume, Kant, Brentano, and Fichte, in the development of Husserl's ethics, this chapter attempts to chart the foundational ways in which Husserl's later ethical philosophy comes to be structured along noticeably Aristotelian lines. Focusing on Husserl's account of motivation and the parallel distinctions between active/passive and rational/irrational motivation, position-taking and the development of habitual moral virtue, and finally the Husserlian theory of the ethical vocation to the 'true self', the chapter attempts to show the respect in which each of these structural elements of the Husserlian account of the moral life and ethical calling are ultimately based upon Aristotelian insights and motifs, placing Husserl strongly within the Aristotelian tradition of ethical inquiry.
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Keywords: Edmund Husserl, Aristotle, ethics, phenomenology, motivation, virtue

Significant attention has been paid to the important ways in which Husserl's ethical thought and its development arise out of Husserl's critical engagement with the ethical doctrines of such figures as Hume, Kant, Fichte, and Brentano.[1] However, significantly less attention has been paid to the decidedly Aristotelian elements of Husserl's ethical thought.[2] This omission in Husserl scholarship is striking considering that, in spite of the infrequency with which Husserl explicitly refers to Aristotle, the force of Aristotle's thought in giving shape to Husserlian ideas is well known in other dimensions of his philosophy, and even in areas closely related to his ethics.[3] However, this omission is

1 See, for example, Christopher Arroyo, "Humean and Kantian Influences on Husserl's Later Ethics," *Philosophy Today* 50 (2006), 57–73; Michael Gubser, "An Image of a Higher World: Ethical Renewal in Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl," *Filosofia* 17 (2009), 39–49; and Henning Peuker, "Husserl's Critique of Kant's Ethics," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 45 (2007), 309–319.

2 A notable exception is to be found in Henning Peucker's article, "From Logic to the Person: An Introduction to Edmund Husserl's Ethics," *The Review of Metaphysics* 62 (2008), 307–325, in which he depicts Husserl's ethics as in certain respects a melding of a Kantian deontological theory with an Aristotelian virtue ethics. I am indebted to Peucker's suggestions in this regard; however, Peucker's introductory investigation does not go into any comprehensive detail in elucidating the lines of congruence between Husserl and Aristotle's thinking here, but rather serves as an invitation for further inquiry.

3 For example, Husserl leans heavily upon Aristotle in his explicit attempt to defend, in *Ideen II* in particular, a teleological world-view, which bears directly upon his idea of an ethical teleology towards the realization of the so-called 'true self', as well as in the development of his phenomenological metaphysics and philosophical theology. For the latter, see James G. Hart, "Entelechy in Transcendental Phenomenology:

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also striking to the extent that an argument can be made, as I will attempt to show, that fundamentally Aristotelian elements serve to form much of the structural underpinnings of Husserl's ethical thought in general, to such an extent that Husserl's ethics would be practically unthinkable without his heavy use of Aristotelian motifs. While much of the motivation for Husserl's development of his ethical philosophy as it evolves into an ethics of renewal and vocation has much more to do with his appropriation of various ethical concepts borrowed from his intense reading of Fichte, as well as his reading of Kant, during the latter half of the 1910s, and particularly during the War years, than it does with any close reading of Aristotle on Husserl's part, I would argue that the outlines of this theory rely heavily upon his invocation of important Aristotelian ethical and metaphysical themes.

It will be the aim of this chapter to draw out and to explore the Aristotelian dimensions of Husserl's ethics of vocation by paying close attention to the structural role played by the closely related themes of activity and passivity, rational and irrational motivation, position-taking and habituation, and the development of virtue and a virtuous character in the workings of both Aristotle and Husserl's ethical theories. To achieve this goal, it will be necessary to discuss Husserl's development of a theory of ethical motivation and the interplay here of the concepts of rationality/irrationality and activity/passivity in both Husserl and Aristotle. On the basis of this discussion, it will then be possible to understand Husserl's use of Aristotelian themes in the development of his theory of the acquisition of virtue or vice in a personal character constituted in habitual acts of position-taking. Next, it will be necessary briefly to discuss the extent to which Husserl's ethics of vocation, with its theory of the 'true self', draw upon Aristotle's metaphysics and theology in fundamental ways. Finally, it will be necessary to discuss the ways in which these structural elements of Aristotle's thought contribute to the development of a coherent ethical picture.

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1. Ethical motivation in Husserl and Aristotle

Husserl discusses the phenomenology of motivation in general in the analysis of the constitution of the spiritual world in Section Three of *Ideen II*. In this context, Husserl begins with a discussion of the relationship between the spiritual ego, or the 'I' of intentionality, and the surrounding world towards which it comports itself.[4] Husserl claims that, in comporting itself towards its surrounding world, such comportment and the both intentional and real-causal relationships which emerge in each I-act towards the surrounding world are in need of some degree of explanation. Every position-taking with respect to an object, and, founded upon it, every real relation to that object in real, physical activity—e.g. my deciding to go swimming and the actual activity of swimming which follows upon the decision—does not take place in a void, as it were, but are in some sense the results of a kind of 'causality' which serves as its

A Sketch of the Foundations of Husserlian Metaphysics," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 66 (1992), 189–212.

4 Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophy. 2. Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, ed. Marty Biemel, Husserliana IV (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991); English translation: *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Book II*, trans. and eds. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989). Henceforth cited as '*Hua* IV' with German and English page references respectively, 215/226–227.

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principle, or the *terminus a quo* of the intentional and real comportments. Nevertheless, Husserl is careful to describe the 'causality' at issue here not in the sense of a real, or *natural*, causality, but rather as a specifically 'spiritual causality', which he terms 'motivation'.[5] Motivation stands necessarily at the 'origins' of all spiritual activity and provides such spiritual activity with an essential lawfulness in some sense analogous to, but also necessarily different from the lawfulness of natural causality.[6] Motivation is analogous to natural causality to the extent that, just as within the domain of nature in which a natural effect requires a cause to bring it about, according to Husserl, the spiritual ego requires some motivation to elicit its spiritual activity as a kind of 'effect'. Nonetheless, motivation is at the same time disanalogous to natural causality to the extent that nature is, for Husserl, as a domain of purely mechanical causal laws, "a domain of unintelligibility",[7] in complete contrast to the intelligibility of personal, spiritual action. Whereas the performance of a natural cause's function is not imbued with sense as it gives rise to its effect, the 'spiritual causality' of motivation is distinctive in that the bringing about of its effect is pregnant with sense.[8] That is to say, by disclosing its motivational basis, spiritual activity can be made intelligible in ways in which natural causality simply cannot. The natural cause is a mere brute fact having no 'reasons' informing it; the motive, however, is thoroughly intelligible.[9]

As the subject of intentional lived experiences, then, the spiritual ego lives its conscious life as the subject of intentional acts of motivation. A phenomenology of motivation thus becomes possible, then, along the lines of an intentional analysis of motivating acts. In this connection, Husserl writes:

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> From the properly subjective (the Ego itself. . .) we must now distinguish, on the one hand, the objective, that *over and against* which the Ego comports itself. . .and, on the other hand, the *material substratum of 'stuff'* upon which this comportment is built. For in any life of consciousness whatsoever the stratum of position-taking, of acts in general, is built upon substrata.[10]

Ultimately, for Husserl, it is value as the objective correlate of subjective acts of valuation that forms the so-called 'substrata' of spiritual comportment and position-taking. For there to be a spiritual act, then, or, what is the same thing, for there to be a motivated act, there must be some value affecting the subject and, in this way, serving as the basis for the subject's being-motivated. Moreover, to the extent that motivation represents a kind of 'spiritual' causality rather than a natural causality, the laws of motivation always leave me free to take up or to deny that which is motivating me,[11]

5 *Hua* IV, 216/227.
6 Edmund Husserl, *Einleitung in die Ethik: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920 und 1924*, ed. Henning Peucker, Husserliana XXXVII (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 2004). Translations of this and other Husserlian texts are my own unless otherwise noted. Henceforth cited as '*Hua* XXXVII', 105: "Natur ist das Reich der Unverständlichkeit."
7 *Hua* XXXVII, 107.
8 *Hua* XXXVII, 106.
9 *Hua* XXXVII, 107.
10 *Hua* IV, 214/22; all emphases in this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, are from the original.
11 This is true at least so long as motivation does not remain purely unconscious. We will have to leave unanswered the question of whether or not unconscious or subconscious motivation allows any space for freedom so long as the unconscious and subconscious sources of motivation undergone by any individual are not brought to the light of full consciousness.

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although, if denying, always according to whether or not there is some other value as the source of motivation for my act of denial. The presence of some value is, then, a basic condition for any spiritual act in general. However, motivation does not determine my act in the way that a natural cause does but is merely the *sine qua non* of my free act and provides for a kind of lawful tending in a particular direction on the part of the will and on the part of desire. If there is no value present and affecting me in some way, then there is no motivation to act and thus there is no act at all. However, motivation can be further distinguished in terms of two different types of motivation, those which are passively, on the part of the subject, undergone and those in which the subject participates actively. Inasmuch as this distinction will concern the subject precisely as a free, rational agent, it is this distinction which will allow us to differentiate between moral and immoral motivations and, further, between moral and immoral acts and standards of activity. We will have opportunity to discuss this distinction in greater detail presently. However, to the extent that it is clear from his *Nicomachean Ethics* that Aristotle thinks of the activity of the rational agent in similar terms, we should take a moment to discuss the shared account of motivation on Aristotle's part.

Aristotle begins his *Nicomachean Ethics* with the classic account of the essential framework of human activity: "Every craft and every line of inquiry, and likewise every action and decision, seems to seek some good; that is why some people were right to describe the good as what everything seeks."[12] For Aristotle, just as for Husserl who in many respects seems to be reechoing Aristotle here,[13] human activity in general is always intentionally directed towards some object intended as a good. That is to say, every action and decision can be explained—that is, made intelligible—for Aristotle, to the extent that it is always ordered necessarily towards some good, since, as Aristotle writes, "everyone in every action aims at something fine or pleasant."[14] This, however, does not determine the human agent's action absolutely, as Aristotle is careful to note. Rather, Aristotle develops a robust account of the movement from the most basic motivational level—a being ordered or directed, fundamentally by way of desire, towards a good—to deliberation and deliberative choice which indicates the (morally significant) freedom of the human agent constituting itself in virtue or vice. Nonetheless, for Aristotle as much as for Husserl, there is simply no action without some reason for performing it, and this reason will always be, to invoke modern terminology, some 'value' or 'good'.

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Aristotle's account, then, is fundamentally structured by intentionality and teleology, i.e. it is object-directed as the condition of its possibility, and the object towards which it is directed is the realization of a goal of action. Aristotle distinguishes several essential moments of the motivational structure of a single human activity. On the one hand, Aristotle understands that there can be no activity without a decision to act; thus, as Aristotle writes, "[t]he principle of an action—the source of motion, not the goal—is decision."[15] However, Aristotle recognizes that decision is not a sufficient

12 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 2nd ed., trans. and ed. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1999). Henceforth cited as *NE*, 1094a1–3.

13 This should be unsurprising given Husserl's debt to the earlier work of Brentano on the psychology of motivation and valuation, which borrowed heavily from Aristotle. See, for instance, Franz Brentano, *The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, trans. and ed. Cecil Hague (Westminster: Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd., 1902), 12–13 and 47.

14 *NE*, 1110b10.

15 *NE*, 1139a30.

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explanation for itself, but rather requires its own principle of explanation or motion. Thus, while decision may be the principle of action, for Aristotle, "the principle of decision is desire and goal-directed reason."[16] Without a desire for a particular good, then, Aristotle holds that no decision, and thus no activity, would be possible.

Mark Brown further distinguishes the additional complexities of Aristotle's theory of motivation as it is related back to Husserlian phenomenology. Brown characterizes the Aristotelian teaching on volitional action in terms of Aristotle's distinction between the three essential moments of volitional activity in the transition from *boulesis* to *prohairesis* to *phronesis* and the *phronimos*.[17] He understands *boulesis*, or deliberation, as analogous to the Husserlian concept of a mere 'wish', which essentially depends upon and contains an element of value-motivating, emotive desire, which is the basis of all further volitional activity. *Prohairesis*, or decision, is understood as, "the dynamic process by which the dictates of reason exert influence upon the ('non-rational') desire in order to both change and achieve that desire".[18] *Prohairesis* involves three moments of activity: 1) the formation of a judgment concerning a state of affairs, 2) deliberation about how to achieve a goal, and 3) the adjustment of the original desire or wish to the reasoned choice.[19] Brown argues that Husserl shares this three-fold structure of intentionality involved in *prohairesis*. He begins with a moment of doxic intentionality, of emotive or evaluative intentionality, and finally of actual willing or volitional activity. For Husserl as for Aristotle, each layer is foundational for the final reasoned choice.[20] To that extent, it is clear, then, that Husserl shares with Aristotle a common understanding of the necessary motivational structure necessarily undergirding any higher-level intentional act of wishing, deliberation, or decision. However, for Husserl at the very least, it is necessary to draw further distinctions with respect to the motivational under-layer of human action. This will have to do with a distinction between what he refers to as, following along Aristotelian lines, active and passive motivations.

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A) Active and passive motivation

Having distinguished motivation as opposed to a pure, naturalistic causality by pointing to its sense as a spiritual 'causality' that is understandable or comprehensible [*verstehbare Kausalität*], in his 1920/24 lecture course, *Einleitung in die Ethik*, Husserl proceeds to develop a distinction between two senses of motivation characterized along the lines of the either passive or active role played by the ego in the motivation's genesis in valuation.[21] As Husserl writes, "[m]otivation still has, however, a *pregnant sense*, which does not embrace all such causality and has its place only in the sphere of thus specifically named I-acts."[22] The distinction which Husserl has in mind here

16 *NE*, 1139a30.
17 Mark Brown, "The Life-world as Moral World: Vindicating the Life-world en route to a Phenomenology of the Virtues," *Bulletin d'analyse phénoménologique* 6 (2010), 1–25, here 12.
18 Brown, "The Life-world as Moral World," 13.
19 Brown, "The Life-world as Moral World," 13–14.
20 Brown, "The Life-world as Moral World," 16.
21 *Hua* XXXVII, 110.
22 *Hua* XXXVII, 110: "Motivation hat aber noch einen *prägnanten Sinn*, der nicht all solche Kausalität umspannt und nur in der Sphäre der spezifisch so zu nennenden Ichakte seine Stelle hat."

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revolves around what he describes as the 'question of the origin' [*Ursprungsfrage*] from which the 'why', or the intelligible sense or value, of my acts arises.

Husserl attempts to disclose the general sense of this distinction by means of an analysis of subjectivity and its various layers. Falling back upon his earlier analysis of the distinction between the psychic and the spiritual from *Ideen II*, Husserl writes that, "[w]ithin spirituality, we have two levels, inseparable from one another on account of their essential relationship to one another: the lower level, which is the level of the *merely psychic*, and he higher, which is *spirituality* in the eminent sense."[23] In the context of *Ideen II*, the psyche or 'soul' can be treated as a reality intimately connected with the living body and its living being, by means of which it is founded as a mundane reality.[24] As such, it participates in nature to the extent that it is interdependent upon the body, yet at the same time cannot be identified with the realm of nature inasmuch as it is not a unity of real causal interconnections or of the properties of such interconnections.[25] Rather, the soul is over and above nature; yet it is intimately associated with nature as the primal sensibility of the higher life of spirit. As Husserl writes:

> We distinguish here *sensibility* and. . .*reason*. In sensibility we distinguish *primal sensibility*, which does not contain any sediment of reason, and secondary sensibility, which arises through a production of reason. Accordingly, we distinguish also within reason between *original reason*, *intellectus agens*, and reason which has been degraded into sensibility.[26]

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The distinction that Husserl has in mind here is a distinction between reason, or spirit—the ego as *personal*—in its most proper sense as essentially a subject of active intentionalities—of intentionalities in which the ego is self-consciously, personally active—and sensibility as characterized by its passivity, or by the relative or absolute absence of an active intentionality operative within it. Sensibility can be either totally devoid of active intentionality as primal sensibility, or it can be the passive sedimentation of active intentionalities habitually carried out by the personal subject, that is, 'second-natures'. As Husserl goes on to argue, primal sensibility is the psychic basis of all spiritual acts, consisting of all sensuous data in their proper fields of sensation, feeling, or instinct.[27]

This distinction between the active life of the personal ego and the passive life of its psychic basis sets out the framework for Husserl's understanding of the various types of motivation. As Husserl argues, within the life of primal sensibility, there are certain tendencies, "which are directed to the Ego-subject as *affections*".[28] These affections, or also paths of affections implicit in the tendencies of primal sensibility, provide the pathways by means of which an intentional object can function for the personal ego as

23 *Hua* XXXVII, 110: "Innerhalb der Geistigkeit haben wir zwei voneinander unabtrennbare, weil wesensmäßig aufeinander bezogene Stufen: die niedere Stufe, die des *bloß Seelischen*, und die höhere, die der Geistigkeit in einem ausgezeichneten Sinn."

24 *Hua* IV, 343.

25 *Hua* IV, 344–345.

26 *Hua* IV, 334.

27 *Hua* VI, 334.

28 *Hua* VI, 337.

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a motivational stimulus.[29] There is no ego-activity if there is no motivation, i.e. no ego-*affection*. However, the origin of the ego-affection and the type of lawfulness which it manifests in its serving to motivate the ego becomes ethically crucial at this point, for Husserl, within the context of the 1920/24 lectures on ethics. Here, Husserl argues that "in the lower, sub-egoic sphere of consciousness the *geneses* now run, the bands of a motivation interweave themselves, but in an entirely *passive way*; the I does nothing with it. It joins nothing; here everything takes place *of itself*."[30]

An example of one such form of passive motivation, in which the ego plays no role and for which it bears no active responsibility, for Husserl, would be association and the workings of passive synthesis.[31] In this connection, for example, one can begin to think of a place and subsequently ask oneself why that particular place came to mind. Thinking one's way back, one realizes that one has had recent contact with a person who was one's companion on some prior visit there; it was this contact with one's companion, thought about whom is closely associated with memories of a specific location, that reawakened an earlier memory.[32] In this example, the ego does not spontaneously go out in search of the memory; rather, the memory springs to mind of its own accord. The association providing this connection is the passive motivational framework of this given lived-experience and its structure. This becomes ethically significant to the extent that, for Husserl, within this psychic underground of the life of spirit, non-egoic feelings and drives come to the fore which are likewise passive sources of motivation for the acting personal ego in its active personal life.[33] To the extent that one allows one's actions to be passively motivated by the sub-egoic life of the pure passivity of one's psychic drives and feelings, according to Husserl, one is not acting freely. Already in supplementary texts to *Ideen II*, Husserl recognized that, "I am entirely free if I am not motivated passively, that is, if I do not carry out the consequence through affection but through 'rational motives'."[34] Husserl's understanding of the essential unfreedom of such passively motivated activity points, on the one hand, to a concern on Husserl's part to respect the Kantian worry with respect to the danger of moral heteronomy,[35] while on the other hand points to Husserl's recognition that moral values are only realized in connection with a personal subject

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29 *Hua* VI, 337.
30 *Hua* XXXVII, 110: "In der unteren, unter-ichlichen Bewusstseinssphäre verlaufen nun *Genesen*, flechten sich Bande einer Motivation, aber in völlig *passiver Weise*, das Ich tut dabei nichts, es verbindet nichts, *von selbst* geht hier alles vonstatten."
31 *Hua* XXXVII, 111.
32 *Hua* XXXVII, 111.
33 *Hua* XXXVII, 111–112.
34 *Hua* IV, 339.
35 See, for instance, Edmund Husserl, *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie: Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte. Metaphysik. Späte Ethik. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908–1937)*, eds. Rochus Sowa and Thomas Vongehr, Husserliana XLII (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014). Henceforth cited as *Hua* XLII, 265–267. In spite of the agreement between Husserl and Kant here on the importance of moral autonomy with respect to moral comportment and motivation, as Henning Peucker argues, Husserl makes it patently clear that he nonetheless rejects Kant's account of the foundation of ethics and of ethical normativity (See Peucker, "Husserl's Critique of Kant's Ethics", 12). What this disagreement comes down to is a rejection of the, as Husserl depicts it, rigid formalism of the Kantian foundation of ethics (see for instance, *Hua* XLII, 266–267) which fails to recognize the need for a non-heteronomous material, or affectively given value-content, given as the determining ground of the volitional activity. As Sophie Loidolt argues, the ethical call is not one which reaches the person as a purely formal universality, but rather as 'absolute *affection*' (see, Sophie Loidolt, "Husserl and Fact of Practical Reason – Phenomenological Claims Toward a Philosophical Ethics", *Santalka. Filosofija* 17 (2009), 50–61, here 56.

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who actively strives in their favor, i.e. who actively values them, because it is only at this level that one can begin to ask the question concerning the practical rationality of one's action. As Husserl puts it, "[i]n the act-sphere, the sphere of the emerging *intellectus agens*, its own motivations are *motivations of reason*; that is, these motivations themselves stand under questions of rationality or irrationality, rightness or wrongness."[36] It is precisely on account of the rationality of one's actions that one is acting freely, personally. It is instructive, here, that Husserl consistently uses the Aristotelian term *intellectus agens* whenever describing the domain of spirit and its sphere of rational freedom. In this connection, it seems evident that Husserl, to the extent that it is precisely by acting as *intellectus agens*, in the sense of at least certain traditions of the interpretation of this Aristotelian concept, that one acts as a free, moral individual and thus fully realizes one's practical possibilities as a personal ego. To understand this fully, it will be necessary to investigate here the structural importance of the concept of the *intellectus agens* as Husserl uses it under the two conceptual dimensions which seem to stem from it: on the one hand, the importance played here by the Aristotelian ontological preference for activity over passivity which has found its way into Husserl's ethical and personalistic thought, and on the other hand, the systematic role played in both Husserl and Aristotle's ethics of the identification of the rational with the moral. We shall postpone our discussion of the *intellectus agens* as rational until the following section and turn instead to a brief consideration of the Aristotelian ontology at work in Husserl's basic assumptions here.

In distinguishing the *intellectus agens*, or the personalistic domain of spirit, from the soul and the living body, Husserl is following closely in the footsteps of Aristotle's anthropology. As is well known, Aristotle compares the distinction between body and soul to the distinction between matter and form, identifying soul with the form, or the actuality of the body.[37] Through an investigation of its powers and activities, Aristotle further develops a complex understanding of different types of souls, or of different parts of the soul in the human being, including the nutritive soul, the sensitive or animal soul, and the rational soul. By and large, the soul here is interpreted along purely hylomorphic lines, as inseparable from the body and as intimately bound to the body's structure and activities (as that which gives form to the hylomorphic composite). However, certain passages give evidence of the distinctive nature of the *intellectus agens* from this basic hylomorphic picture.[38] Within the context of these passages, it becomes clear that, for Aristotle, the agent intellect is neither identical with nor a mere part of the soul in any straightforward sense.[39] It is, rather, something over and above the soul of which the soul and the composite creature have use. Aristotle makes this clear when he argues that the *intellectus agens* is separable from the hylomorphic composite and unmixed with the composite on account of its having

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36 *Hua* XXXVII, 112: "Die in der Aktsphäre, der Sphäre des *intellectus agens* auftretenden neuartigen, ihr spezifisch eigenen Motivationen sind *Motivationen der Vernunft*, das sagt, diese Motivationen stehen selbst unter Fragen der Vernünftigkeit und Unvernünftigkeit, der Rechtmäßigkeit oder Unrechtmäßigkeit."

37 Aristotle, "On the Soul", in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, trans. and ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 2001). Henceforth cited as *DA*, 412a20–25.

38 Jonathan J. Sanford, "Aristotle's Divided Mind: Intellectual Virtue and Aristotle's Occasional Dualism", *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 80 (2007), 77–90, here 81–83.

39 Lloyd P. Gerson, "The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle's *De Anima*", *Phronesis* 49 (2004), 348–371, here 349.

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"its essential nature [in] activity (*for always the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force to the matter which it forms*)."[40] Expressing a similar point within the context of a discussion of the distinction between potency and act, Aristotle indicates the close connection between being as 'actuality', understood as 'complete reality', and activity, which is identical with a kind of motion.[41] Understanding potency as prior to actuality, and moreover understanding the actualization of a passive potency in its actually being-acted-upon as in one way or another dependent upon an active principle,[42] Aristotle comes to subordinate all being axiologically, so to speak, as well as ontologically to activity.[43] Therefore, inasmuch as the *intellectus agens* is characterized as activity, superior to and separable from the soul precisely on account of its nature as self-reflexive activity,[44] Aristotle thus ontologically and axiologically isolates the intellect from the soul.[45]

The Aristotelian separation and prioritization of the agent intellect, precisely on account of its agency, is further developed in the context of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In Book X of this work, Aristotle argues that theoretical study, or philosophy, constitutes the perfect happiness of man. This is the case, for Aristotle, on the one hand because theoretical study and understanding takes the highest objects, particularly God, as its primary objects of study, but on the other hand because, as Aristotle writes, "it is the most continuous activity, since we are more capable of continuous study than any continuous action."[46] As Aristotle expresses it, the life of the *intellectus agens*, in this connection, is a kind of approximation to the divine life, or even contains a share of the divine life within it.[47] Aristotle makes it clear in the *Metaphysics* that this is the case precisely inasmuch as the intellect is *active* rather than merely passive or receptive; it is in its actuality, i.e. its activity, that thought is living, and this living actuality is God active within the intellect.[48] In addition, then, to the supreme value of the objects of study as well as in addition to the value of study as continuous activity, and thus as *actuality*, Aristotle further argues that theoretical study is the true happiness of man because theoretical understanding, as an activity of the agent intellect, "more than anything, is the human being".[49] To that extent, for Aristotle, the metaphysical priority of activity over and above both potentiality as well as passivity becomes ethically charged and involves an ethical requirement to lead the fully active life of the *intellectus agens*.

To the extent, then, that Husserl's account of motivation operates on the basis of an understanding of a distinction between activity and passivity which implies the ethical necessity of preferring the active life of the *intellectus agens*, Husserl's ethics embodies an essential element of Aristotelian theory. It is only by way of the active rather than passive character of ethical motivation that the personal ego acts fully from out of itself

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40 *DA* 430a15 (emphasis mine).
41 Aristotle, "Metaphysics," in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, trans. and ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 2001). Henceforth cited as *Meta*, 1047a30 and 1050a20.
42 *Meta*, 1050a35.
43 *Meta*, 1051a5.
44 Gerson, "The Unity of Intellect," 365.
45 Gerson, "The Unity of Intellect", 351.
46 *NE*, 1177a20.
47 *NE*, 1177b25–30.
48 *Meta*, 1072b20–25.
49 *Meta*, 1178a5.

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just as much as for Aristotle it is only to the extent that the human being engages fully in active study that he or she lives out the ethically required preference for that in them which they most truly are. Having understood, then, the structural importance of the Aristotelian preference for activity over passivity which serves to structure Husserl's ethics of motivation, it is now necessary to turn to the way in which Husserl identifies this distinction between active and passive motivation with the distinction between rational and irrational motivation, thus identifying, with Aristotle, the morally right with the rational.

B) Rational and irrational motivation

Husserl makes it clear that the distinction between active and passive motivation corresponds to a distinction between motivation which is rational and motivation which is irrational respectively. For Husserl, the interpretation of the distinction between the active and the passive as identical to the rational and the irrational is justified inasmuch as rational motivation and irrational motivation give themselves in the investigation of motivation in general along the lines of "the motivation of the higher, active spirituality and the motivation of the lower, passive or affective spirituality".[50] As Ullrich Melle writes, passive motivation comes in the form of an association which "founds the pre-egoic contexts of consciousness",[51] indicating the respect in which passive motivations include such things as are given to the subject as values by means of non-rational drives, whether bodily or psychic, whims, desires for pleasure, pressure imposed upon the will from outside—e.g. coercion—un-reflected habitualities, and the passively acquired convictions of one's community, culture, and historical era. These motivational sources can be called 'non-rational' or 'irrational' inasmuch as in them one does not reflect upon the source of one's motivations, nor does one reflect upon whether or not the value which motivates them in each case is a true or authentic value to be considered normative for moral action. Also, inasmuch as this form of motivation is merely psychic, and to that extent operates at the merely natural level of the soul, in the sub-egoic sphere of passive consciousness, and not at the level of the active freedom of spirit, what motivates the subject affectively, or passively, is also clearly non-rational in character.[52] In the passivity of the will's giving way to such motivation, free reason is not determinative of one's personal activity. Rather, the will is determined passively from without. However, for Husserl, in many respects following Kant here, human agents are to be self-regulating, not externally regulated; that is, one must possess a rational insight into the validity of a particular value or into the authentic value of a particular endeavor and actively strive to bring this value about. To that extent, passive, irrational motivation comes to be identified, in Husserl's thought here, with the immoral or at the very least with that which is not the morally optimal.

In contrast to this sort of motivation, Husserl describes active motivation as a conscious and active position-taking and habituation towards authentic material values.[53] Active motivation is, as Husserl writes, "a matter of the connections of reasons

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50 *Hua* XXXVII, 107–108: "die Motivation der höheren, der aktiven Geistigkeit und die Motivation der niederen, der passiven oder affektiven Geistigkeit."
51 Ulrich Melle, "Husserl's Personalist Ethics", *Husserl Studies* 23 (2007), 1–15, here 6.
52 *Hua* XXXVII, 110.
53 *Hua* XXXVII, 108.

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between the positings and position-takings of the I".[54] Rather than allowing the course of one's actions to be determined by passively giving way to various sub-egoic affections, active motivation is a matter of actively striving for values in their authenticity and a conscious struggle for the realization of true values. What this means is that active motivation, by means of its active striving to coincide with the true value of a thing, supplies the connection between the volitional act of the ego, in the 'I will to do such and such', and the rational reason actually to perform the given act, i.e. the value in its essential validity as a value. Active motivation is thus a case of actively seeking values in and for themselves and as such. Husserl finds in this form of motivation the epitome, on the one hand, of the wholly free volitional act and, what is the same thing, of the act performed 'with reason'. It is, for Husserl, then, the capacity for acting fully autonomously. As Husserl writes, "herein the true man finds *his salvation*, it is the salvation of moral autonomy in the liberation from all sensuous slavery."[55]

In his identification of rational motivation with morality and his rejection of irrational motivation as a kind of 'sensuous slavery', Husserl is certainly inspired by Kant's ethics and its focus on moral autonomy in the figure of the unconditioned moral ought. Without challenging the explicitly Kantian elements of Husserl's ethics here, which nonetheless would certainly have to be qualified in certain respects inasmuch as Husserl remains highly critical of the Kantian categorical imperative and what he describes as his one-sided ethical formalism, a case nonetheless can and should be made that Husserl's identification of active, rational motivation with morality has an important basis in Aristotle's own ethics, and to that extent retains Aristotelian insights into the ethical life as an important structural element of Husserl's ethical vision. We must now turn to an investigation of these issues.

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Aristotle makes it clear in the context of Aristotle's discussion in the *Nicomachean Ethics* concerning the chief good towards which all moral life does and ought to strive, viz. *eudaimonia*, that there is a close connection between moral goodness and rationality. For Aristotle, arguing that the life of the human agent, inasmuch as it is distinctively human, is characterized by way of an activity which is determined by reason, he concludes that, morally speaking, "the human function [according to which the highest moral good is defined] is activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason."[56] While pursuing the actualization of this specifically human function, the moral agent acquires either virtues or vices in proportion to the extent to which the human being does or does not engage in activities of the soul which accord with reason. However, as Aristotle is also careful to note, it is not simply any kind of rational activity that defines morality. While reason can certainly be placed in the service of the realization of goals that are essentially vicious, doing so represents, for Aristotle an incorrect use of reason. Virtue, then, corresponds to rational activity only to the extent that such activity is directed at an understanding of moral truth, i.e. it corresponds to what Aristotle defines as 'right reason'.[57] To put this another way, Aristotle writes of virtue, defining it as, "a state that decides, consisting in a mean . . .

54 Melle, "Husserl's Personalist Ethics", 6.

55 Edmund Husserl, *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911–1921)*, eds. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, Husserliana XXV (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 280: "darin findet der echte Mensch *seine Seligkeit*, es ist die Seligkeit der sittlichen Autonomie in der Befreiung von aller sinnlichen Sklaverei."

56 *NE*, 1098a.

57 *NE*, 1114b20.

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which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it".[58] Prudence, or *phronesis*, is a deliberative activity concerning the means of living excellently.[59] Aristotle notes that, as deliberative, prudence is specifically an intellectual act to the extent that it is directed towards uncovering the truth with respect to moral action and the determination of what is good or bad in that action. Moreover, to the extent that Aristotle understands prudence not only as that by means of which we identify what is right or wrong in a moral context, but as also prescriptive and thus as imposing a moral obligation, Aristotle begins to solidify the connection between rationality and morality.[60] Moral virtue, then, is activity in conformity with the demands of prudence, or reason deliberating rightly upon means to the end of moral excellence.

To the extent that reason and morality are so closely identified in this way in Aristotle's thought, one can begin to understand the extent to which Husserl's own identification of rational, active motivation with the sources of moral activities in the subject is already an appropriation of Aristotelian insights. However, the extent to which Husserl's insistence that rational motivation is moral precisely because it provides the grounds for moral activity proceeding from direct personal insight into the genuine moral value of particular moral tasks is also based upon Aristotelian foundations will also be clear inasmuch as Aristotle makes a similar move in his understanding of the distinction between natural virtue and moral virtue and the role played by understanding and prudence in the development of the latter.

Aristotle argues that at least some element of one's individual character seems to be a product more of nature than of personal, conscious activity.[61] To the extent that each person is endowed by nature with certain impulses and character traits that anticipate and contribute towards moral virtues like justice, bravery, etc., Aristotle can argue that each person possesses certain natural virtues. These natural virtues, however, while they do genuinely represent certain types of human excellences, are nonetheless not yet fully moral. Rather, as Aristotle writes, "still we look for some further condition to be full goodness, and we expect to possess these features in another way."[62] The further condition which such natural virtuous states require to be genuinely morally good, Aristotle argues, is understanding or prudence. It is only to the extent that one possesses understanding that one knows how or when such actions corresponding to one's natural virtues ought to be performed, morally speaking. Without such rational insight, providing the condition of completeness to the virtue, one cannot, for Aristotle, speak of full-fledged moral goodness. Speaking to this issue, then, Aristotle further clarifies the relationship between prudence and moral goodness, arguing that virtue is "not merely the state in accord with the correct reason, but the state involving the correct reason, that is virtue. And it is prudence that is the correct reason in this area."[63] It is clear, then, that for Aristotle, it does not suffice to be moral merely to depend passively upon the natural virtues or character traits which nature has bestowed upon oneself; rather, one must deploy one's rational powers in order to understand

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58 *NE*, 1107a.
59 *NE*, 1140a25.
60 *NE*, 1143a5.
61 *NE*, 1144b.
62 *NE*, 1144b5.
63 *NE*, 1144b25.

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consciously how and why one must act in particular ways, and thus pursue virtuous activity in a manner which is mindful of the rightness and the conditions of rightness of one's activity. To the extent that Husserl shares a similar position concerning the interpretation of rational motivation as moral motivation precisely for the same reasons, demanding active, personal insight into the moral grounds of one's active and motivational life in order to fulfill the conditions of morality, it is evident that Husserl is treading an intellectual path in many respects already forged by Aristotle.

2. Virtue, habit, and position-taking

Having discussed the extent to which Husserl's ethical account of the motivational life of the moral subject depends upon certain Aristotelian insights concerning the relationship between moral goodness and rational activity, which provide the basis for Husserl's distinction between passive and active motivation and for his parallel distinction between rational and irrational motivation in the ethical life, it is now necessary to turn to yet another dimension in which Husserl's ethical thought is structured by Aristotelian motifs. As I shall argue, to the extent that Husserl bases his understanding of the moral becoming of the subject along the lines of the acquisition of virtue, understood as an enduring *habitus*, on the basis of one's habitual acts of position-taking with respect to the domain of value, Husserl very clearly invokes important elements of Aristotle's philosophy, upon which his own discussion is patterned in important ways, in spite of important differences in the way in which each thinker focuses on very different thematic elements in their distinctive investigations into virtue. It will be necessary to consider these issues now.

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As is well known, Aristotle frames his discussion of the particular virtues and of virtue in general with the understanding that, whatever else virtue might be, it is always the mean state between the extremes of excess and deficiency in acting.[64] Much of the work of characterizing each moral or intellectual virtue, for Aristotle, takes the form of providing some indication of the lines of distinction between what might count as a state of excess or deficiency with respect to a certain region or thematic type of activity, e.g. wastefulness, or ruining one's own property or means of living, and miserliness, or taking one's wealth too seriously, as the excesses and deficiencies characteristic of the types of activity associated with one's comportment towards others where the use of one's personal resources are concerned.[65] Being generous, then, will involve sharing one's resources with others in a way that both avoids the tendency to focus too much on one's personal possessions and invest in them too high a value to the negligence of the needs of others, while also avoiding the tendency to harm one's own interests by squandering one's resources on others. It is likewise the case with the other virtues, for example courage as the mean between cowardice and overconfidence or excessive fearlessness,[66] magnanimity as the mean between pusillanimity and vanity,[67] etc. Moreover, Aristotle is largely concerned not only with the essential distinction between the specific virtuous states and their correlative vices, but is also concerned to establish essential distinctions between the particular virtues themselves and to establish an

64 *NE*, 1104a10.
65 *NE*, 1119b25–30.
66 *NE*, 1115b25–34.
67 *NE*, 1125a15.

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understanding of their overall interrelation by way of prudence and wisdom. This, however, is largely not Husserl's main concern in the development of his theory of virtue, and this represents an important difference between Aristotle and Husserl's respective ethical philosophies.

While Aristotle wants to understand in very specific ways *how* to be virtuous by avoiding excesses and deficiencies in particular moral settings while pursuing a unified life of virtuous comportment, Husserl is more concerned with developing a generic theory concerning the nature of virtue as such, rather than in specific regional studies of individual virtues, in order to understand the relationship between virtuous activity and its prior basis in a theory of ethical motivation, as we have already discussed. Nevertheless, there is at the same time nothing essentially incompatible between the Aristotelian and Husserlian approaches to a study of virtue; rather, their differences represent mere differences in emphasis or interest concerning a study of morality in general rather than genuine philosophical disagreement concerning the nature of virtue as such. Indeed, one might genuinely serve to supplement the other.[68] Moreover, Husserl, in developing the theory of virtue from his distinctive perspective remains heavily dependent upon Aristotelian motifs inasmuch as his discussion revolves around an understanding of virtue as habit arising from active, rational insight into the demands of true values. It will now be necessary to pay some degree of attention to this issue.

Husserl provides a basic answer to the question concerning the genuine character of virtuous comportment in an unpublished manuscript on virtue dated to 1920. Virtuous comportment, for Husserl, is activity in which the subject does the good purely out of a will to do the good for the good's sake.[69] As he writes, the virtuous individual

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> . . . wills what he wills because he finds it to be good in itself, values it as good in itself, and 'because' he so values it, he wills it and realizes it. Therefore, he is purely motivated through the positive value, *'rationally' motivated through the self-valuing of the good*.[70]

With this understanding of the nature of virtue, Husserl inserts the concept of virtue definitively within his understanding of moral motivation as active, rational motivation. Moreover, Husserl further clarifies that such rational motivation and an act constituted as virtuous, i.e. doing the good for the sake of the good, has the specific character of an 'act of love' (*Liebestat*), as a particular type of position-taking concerning a particular value which is one of an affirmation of the motivating value itself on account of its evident value to the subject. Where such an act of love is directed at an

68 The difference might even be expressed in terms of Aristotle's own distinction between virtue in the sense of a mean state and virtue in the sense of an extremity where the best condition and good result are concerned (*NE*, 1107a5). One might argue that Aristotle tends to focus his discussion on consideration of virtue as a mean (or that this is the Aristotle with which we are perhaps most familiar) while Husserl tends to focus his on virtue as an extremity, interested in depicting what is foundational to virtue's being as the best condition of the moral subject.

69 *Hua* XLII, 278.

70 *Hua* XLII, 278: "Er will, was er will, weil er es als in sich gut findet, als in sich gut wertet, und 'weil' er es so wertet, es will und realisiert. Rein also motiviert durch den Gutwert, '*rational*' *motiviert durch das Selbstwerten des Guten*."

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authentic value, one which is truly valuable in and for itself, this represents, for Husserl, the *Urstiftung* of the specifically moral characteristic of the moral subject.[71]

Husserl further clarifies the concept of virtue as constituted not only as an act of love for value, but also as taking place upon the backdrop of a struggle between

> . . . *a practical striving* (a tendency of the will) which thus opens a holding-for-good, *and a bare inclination*, that is a tendency, a desideratum, perhaps ardently to will something sought after, which is not known as a good or held for good.[72]

To be an act of love in the proper sense, or a holding-for-good or valuing-as-good, for Husserl, the act which constitutes virtue must be one which is actively willed, as opposed to passively striven for as the goal of a merely psychic or sensuous inclination. Husserl is here again invoking the notion of activity and rationality as constitutive of the specifically moral, as we have already seen. However, Husserl's distinction here sets the stage for a further development of the notion of virtue as flowing from this basic understanding of the conditions of morality. Every holding-for-good or every valuing-as-good is, for Husserl, a position-taking act which serves to set the subject along a certain normatively conditioned course of action arising out of the position-taking itself. As Alejandro Arango argues concerning Husserl's discussion of position-taking in general, Husserl's concept of position-taking "gives us reasons to think that our *nature* goes beyond our species-common biological nature".[73] What we are as individual persons or subjectivities is conditioned and shaped by the constellation of position-takings characterizing our intentional life. The concept of position-taking allows us to study the second nature which goes beyond our first nature in characterizing who and what we are.

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Position-taking is essentially an act of *orienting* oneself towards an object or range of objects in the world. What we are as individual persons or subjectivities is conditioned and shaped by the constellation of position-takings typifying our intentional life. Each individual position-taking, repeated or reaffirmed again and again over time, serves as the basis of a process of habituation, or the development of what Husserl, following Aristotle, describes as a kind of second nature, or a way of acting according to now normative, habitual types.[74] Inasmuch as position-taking, with respect to values in particular, forms the basis for the establishment of a second nature, or as Husserl also describes it, of a *habitus* or habituality, position-taking also forms the basis of one's moral character as typified by either virtue or vice. That is to say, for Husserl, virtue and vice are nothing other than habitualities constituted by the repetition of characteristic position-takings with respect to certain positive or negative values arising from either active, rational motivation as acts of pure, genuine love, or from out of irrational, passive motivations constituted by sensuous or psychic inclinations or drives

71 Hua XLII, 278.

72 *Hua* XLII, 279: "Wenn ich von 'tugendhaft' spreche, habe ich vor Augen den Kampf *zwischen einem praktischen Streben* (einer Willenstendenz), das so auf Für-gut-Gehaltenes geht, und *einer bloßen Neigung*, das heißt einer Tendenz, ein Erwünschtes, eventuell leidenschaftlich Begehrtes zu wollen, das nicht ein als gut Erkanntes oder für gut Gehaltenes ist."

73 Alejandro Arango, "Husserl's Concept of Position-Taking and Second Nature", *Phenomenology and Mind: The Online Journal of the Research Centre in Phenomenology and the Sciences of the Person* 6 (2014), 169–176, here 169.

74 *Hua* XLII, 282.

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respectively. The habitual character of virtue and vice is important, for Husserl, in order to understand not only how the subject acquires an overall moral characteristic as an either virtuous or vicious person, but is also important for an understanding of the moral task itself. For Husserl, morality is not limited to individual acts of the performance of one's moral duties, but is constituted in and of itself precisely by the habituation of the moral orientations towards values in one's position-takings in love for the highest values. Thus, he writes, conscious of the nature of position-taking with respect to value as also a certain kind of self-determination in one's intentional relationship towards values, "in the stream of the true moral life, in the going on of the activity of true moral acts, this self-determination is and must be habitual."[75] It is precisely, Husserl goes on to argue, the habituality of moral acts that imprints the stamp of morality upon the subject in a phenomenologically significant way.

Husserl distinguishes the phenomenological character of virtue by characterizing, on the one hand the way in which morality arises primordially out of instituting acts in which the moral I itself determines itself by way of specific acts of position-taking with respect to value according to the conditions of explicitly moral motivations as already outlined. On the other hand, the phenomenological character of virtue is characterized by such moral acts of self-determination towards value becoming the subject's habitual possession.[76] However, it is not enough for moral position-takings to become merely habitual for us to begin speaking of virtue, as Husserl is quick to clarify, inasmuch as habituation, for Husserl, is always understood primarily as the sedimentation of the sense of an originary position-taking, which as such implies a sinking of an original activity into passivity.[77] The further removed they are from spirit, the more passivity there is in them. It is, however, possible to relate to them actively. With respect to the habits formed by position-takings, this active relation is characterized to the extent that all habits are the

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> . . . passive formations that underlie our acquaintance with objects (instincts and habitus), and specific repetitive behaviors (habits) that, while a form of activity, are more like end-products or peaks of action, in which the subject yields to fixed ways of doing things.[78]

Thus, if a habituality is ultimately to count as virtue, its habitual character must be accompanied by acts of moral reflection by means of which the originary sources of the habituality are continually reiterated and reaffirmed. As Husserl writes, "[t]hese acts [of reflection] are the *true acts of virtue*, whereby language concerning virtue refers to a certain typology of such acts, to certain virtues to be typically defined."[79]

Virtue, then, must be understood as a complex structure whereby certain active position-takings take on the role of a primal institution (*Urstiftung*) of a characteristic way of taking a position towards value, are subsequently sedimented within the

75 *Hua* XXXVII, 163: ". . . im Strom des eigentlich moralischen Lebens, in der fortgehenden Betätigung der eigentlich moralischen Akte, habituell ist und habituell sein muss."
76 *Hua* XXXVII, 163–164.
77 Arango, "Husserl's Concept of Position-Taking", 171; see also, *Hua* XXXVII, 165.
78 Arango, "Husserl's Concept of Position-Taking", 171.
79 *Hua* XXXVII, 164: "Diese Akte sind *die eigentlichen Tugendakte*, wobei die Rede von Tugend auf eine gewisse Typik solcher Akte verweist, auf gewisse typisch zu umgrenzende Tugenden."

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habitual life of the subject, and are continually reawakened out of their passivity by way of a constant renewal of their primal instituting sense. If one lives one's life in this way, actively in accordance with certain morally constituted constellations of habitualities, habitual practical tendencies operative on the basis of rational insight come to form the basis of one's life in a comprehensive way. Husserl argues that such activity ultimately gives rise to what he refers to as a 'harmonious soul' (*harmonischen Seele*), understood as an individual who has tempered the passivities of his or her life and ordered possible conflicts within one's position-takings through critical reflection and the reiteration of the normative, rational sources of one's life and habits.[80]

In developing his theory concerning the nature of virtue and its origin in position-taking, Husserl, I wish to argue, is following a certain trajectory of thought concerning the concept of morality already well-worn by the Aristotelian tradition. Aristotle, as is well known, asserts at the beginning of Book II of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that moral virtue [*ἦθος*] is the direct result of habit [*ἔθος*], and it is for this reason that the very name of the science of morals [*ἐθικε*] is derived from the concept of the habituality of moral action.[81] This has a lot to do with Aristotle's classification of moral character or virtue as a state [*ἕξις*] of the soul in contradistinction to feelings or psychic capacities or faculties inasmuch as, with this classification, virtue must be something non-original to the soul and also not passively affected like a feeling. Rather, virtue must be gradually acquired through the repetition of similar actions in accordance with virtue.[82] By means of such repetition, and thus habituation, for Aristotle, one gradually acquires the increased ability to perform virtuous actions and thus to remain in a state of virtue; this accounts for the moral necessity of habituation.[83] Moreover, it is evident, for Aristotle, that virtues, as habits, involve a certain taking-a-position with respect to the goodness or badness of a particular end or the means to that end, as he indicates when he writes that, "the virtues are decisions of some kind, or [rather] require decision."[84] As has already been indicated concerning the nature of decision in Aristotle's thought, decision is that which sets action in motion by realizing a desire. This requires an opting for the object of desire as an object worthy of desire and pursuit. In other words, it requires taking a position, in Husserlian terms, towards the object. Habit, then, for Aristotle, just as much as it is for Husserl, is a product of a kind of decision-making which takes a position towards objects of desire or valuation which has become typical of the moral agent by way of repetition.

Moreover, Aristotle makes it clear that habit, in spite of its habitual character as an enduring possession of the moral agent, is not for that reason a passive state of the soul. Rather, whereas feelings are understood as passive affections, it belongs to the nature of a state to be a kind of activity, or, as he writes, "insofar as we have feelings, we are said to be moved; but insofar as we have virtues or vices, we are said to be in some condition rather than moved."[85] Virtues are activity, rather than passivity or affection, for Aristotle, on the one hand because this is a requirement of their being distinguished from feelings, but also because, unless virtues are in some sense always enduringly

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80 *Hua* XLII, 283
81 *NE*, 1103a15.
82 *NE*, 1103b20.
83 *NE*, 1103b30–1104a.
84 *NE*, 1106a.
85 *NE*, 1106a.

Proof

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active possessions or characteristics of the soul, it is impossible for us to speak of them as virtues in the first place. This is the case because virtues, as voluntary products, are states in which we participate by actively constituting them. Our decisions and the actions in accordance with those decisions which repeat them time and again have a cumulative effect in the form of virtue and vice as a moral character and as the formative background out of which all future actions emerge (unless there is some break from one's past moral habits, e.g. moral conversion or reversion).[86] By remaining in a virtuous state by continuing, in accordance with one's fixed moral habit, to perform virtuous actions, for Aristotle, virtue is enduringly active, rather than sinking into passivity. Similarly to Husserl, Aristotle understands that this implies that one maintain a rational awareness of the need to reflect upon one's actions for them to continue to count as morally virtuous activities inasmuch as being virtuous in a comprehensive, or complete way, requires prudence, which Aristotle understands as a state of grasping the truth about the goodness or badness of a certain course of action.[87] The prudent person, then, will be one who performs virtuous actions not out of merely mindlessly reflexive habit as the result of well-worn pathways of activity constituted by way of repetition, but rather is one who maintains the virtuous habit and engages from out of it on account of his or her continuing to understand, to affirm, and to decide in accordance with the goodness of his or her ends and the means to those ends.

To that extent, while there may be differences of emphasis in the way in which both Aristotle and Husserl approach the problem of virtue, which, as has been said, are by no means incompatible, to the extent that Husserl develops his theory of virtue following the conceptual outlines which Aristotle had already laid out in his understanding of virtue as habit having particular requirements as arising out of a kind of position-taking with respect to the good from the perspective of prudent insight, it is evident that Husserl's theory of virtue is dependent in a strong sense upon Aristotelian insights. It remains to be seen, then, the extent to which what is arguably the most important theme of Husserl's phenomenological ethics, namely the theory of vocation, also incorporates systematically important Aristotelian themes.

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3. Husserl's theory of the 'true self' and its Aristotelian background

Within the context of Husserl's 1920/24 lecture course, *Einleitung in die Ethik*, explicit discussion of the concept of the individual ethical vocation emerges out of a consideration of Kant's ethics and its struggle against hedonism and the hedonistic identification of the ethical life with a false notion of the aesthetic ideal. In this context, Husserl argues that the goal of universal ethical striving and self-formation ought to be guided by the idea of a 'true self' and of a 'true human community'. Here, Husserl argues, the moral I ought to aim towards a total, all-encompassing self-regulation according to the demands of reason imposing a rational, moral goal for human development and self-formation.[88] He argues that

86 *NE*, 1115a.
87 *NE*, 1140b5.
88 *Hua* XXXVII, 240. In this respect, Husserl sees himself as consistent with the Kantian insight into the demands of moral autonomy as a subjection of human motivational life to the regulations of reason. However, the character of this self-regulation will, as already said, lack the rigid formalism of the Kantian approach, admitting the necessity of the 'absolute affection' already mentioned by way of material values and the understanding of one's ideal self as itself a material value-essence.

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> . . . in his natural existence busying and developing himself, man seeks, knows, and sees in himself the idea of a new man; he sees himself, if he has fulfilled himself as man, over-against the idea of his true I, which he is not, but which he should be; he sees in the comparison with his actual living a genuine and true human life, which he is not really living, but which he should be living.[89]

Husserl makes it clear that this is not some general, or merely formal, idea of a true self which is equally applicable to all human individuals. Rather, it is an "*individual idea* of the true and genuine man".[90] As such, it is an idea with genuine material content that is fully individual and specific to each unique self. Moreover, this idea of the individual, true self is the correlate, as Husserl also argues, of a true or genuine act of self-love, and as such ought to be understood within the order of values, to the extent that value, for Husserl, as we have seen is the correlate of acts of love or hate standing at the origin of the motivational framework of human activity. In this connection, the true I as a value-idea becomes, for Husserl, the unique, individual principle of self-regulation and self-formation aimed at the renewal of the individual moral I which calls the empirical I absolutely towards the realization of this value-idea in itself.[91] The notion of ethical vocation expressed in this way as the vocation to the realization of the true self is the high point of Husserl's ethical theory. While it certainly borrows important elements from Kant, particularly the importance of the notion of autonomous reason here, as well as from Fichte,[92] it should be noted the extent to which this idea also invokes and depends upon important Aristotelian themes.

Husserl understands the vocation to one's true self as delimiting a specific range of moral activities unique to each person, but nonetheless teleologically ordered to the ultimate fulfillment of the individual person according to their unique, individual calling. By following out the lines of one's unique idea of the 'true self' which I am called to realize, Husserl argues that ethical striving leads to a kind of ethical self-satisfaction (*Selbstzufriedenheit*) to the extent that one has reached a state of completeness within oneself, a state of union with one's ideal self, and no longer lives in the tension between passive and active motivations and strivings.[93] Husserl describes this here as a kind of 'reflective joyfulness' (*reflektive Freudigkeit*) in oneself and one's genuine value as well as the genuine value of one's actions in reference to the axiological structure of the world. Husserl elsewhere describes this reflective joy and self-satisfaction as the result of one's having attained, at least to some limited extent, the ideal end of ethical striving, which he describes using the various terms '*Glückseligkeit*', or 'happiness', '*Seligkeit*', or 'salvation', and even *eudaimonia*.[94] The happiness, or *eudaimonia*, at issue here, Henning Peucker interprets as explicitly Aristotelian in

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89 *Hua* XXXVII, 240: "In seinem natürlichen Dahinleben sich betätigung und entwickelnd, sucht, ahnt, erschaut der Mensch in sich die Idee eines neuen Menschen, er sieht, wenn er sich als Mensch vollendet hat, sich gegenüber die Idee seines wahren Ich, das er nicht ist, sondern das er sein soll, er sieht im Vergleich mit seinem wirklichen Leben ein echtes und wahres Menschenleben, das er nicht wirklich lebt, sondern das er leben sollte."

90 *Hua* XXXVII, 240: ". . . *individuelle Idee* des wahren und echten Menschen . . . ."

91 *Hua* XLII, 283.

92 James G. Hart, "The Absolute Ought and the Unique Individual," *Husserl Studies* 22 (2006), 223–240, here 234.

93 *Hua* XLII, 331.

94 Peucker, "From Logic to the Person," 320.

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character,[95] corresponding to the notion of happiness as identical with virtue.[96] It is the self-satisfaction arising from a complete life of ethical perfection as the realization of one's true self.

However, in order to fully justify this idea, Husserl feels the need to incorporate the concept of the true self as well as the idea of happiness within a teleological and theological structure. As mentioned earlier, the true self is understood as an ideal value which is the correlate of genuine self-love. It is as ideal value that the true self calls to me, and it is by realizing this ideal that I come to self-perfection and completeness, and thus to happiness. Husserl understands the character of the value of one's true self as being fully objective, as opposed to being 'merely subjective', that is, objective value as a genuine truth-content.[97] It is precisely because the true self is an objective value and not a merely subjective value that striving after the realization of this value leads to harmonious subjective living characterized by completeness, perfection, and ultimately happiness. Understanding the I within this context as a subject of development towards a particular teleological goal—the true self—requires that we also think of the world of other I's like me, the community of monads, in terms of a similar teleologically ordered development. This leads Husserl to posit the Aristotelian idea of the world as a system of harmonious development.[98] The justification of this viewpoint requires the development, for Husserl, of the Aristotelian teaching concerning the concept of *entelecheia* from within a transcendental standpoint.

In this connection, Husserl argues that every hyletic datum within our intentional acts is always already a product of a particular development carrying within it a hidden intentionality.[99] In this respect, everything is said to lead back, for Husserl, to some '*prote hyle*' understood as totally undifferentiated 'stuff' which serves as the basis of primordial constitutive processes with their accompanying intentional motivations. As Husserl writes at this point

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> . . . leading 'ideas' run through all development. The final leading idea is the complete idea of complete development. That would be the system of ideas of formal 'mathesis' in the widest sense (spanning the axiological and practical etc.). The system of principles and the ideal unity of all forming.[100]

This ideal system of the unity of all formations within the context of the development of the *prote hyle* present within all intentional acts and as the basis of all intentionality, for Husserl, ultimately points back to God as the ground of this development. God in this context is, for Husserl, the entelechy of all such forming and development. As Husserl writes:

> God is the entelechy and outside of him 'nothing' is; he is the all-forming, and the irrational stuff is not something made, but just stuff. And the world has its being

95 Peucker, "From Logic to the Person," 320.
96 *NE*, 1098b25.
97 *Hua* XLII, 334.
98 *Hua* XLII, 336.
99 *Hua* XLII, 336.
100 *Hua* XLII, 336: "Durch alle Entwicklung gehen aber leitende 'Ideen'. Das Letztleitende ist die Gesamtidee der Gesamtentwicklung. Das wäre des Ideensystem der formalen 'Mathesis' im allerweitesten Sinn (Axiologisches un Praktisches etc. umspannend). Das Prizipiensystem und die ideale Einheit aller Formung."

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> out of God and is otherwise 'nothing'. And God is only as the leading and 'besouling' principle of perfection, etc.[101]

By invoking the Aristotelian concept of God as a transcendental entelechial principle of perfection and formation, i.e. God as final cause, Husserl is thus able to provide some justification for the idea of the true self as essentially related to perfection and ultimately to happiness. Individual ethical self-formation in light of the true self is a movement towards perfection and happiness precisely because God is the entelechy of that development. To that extent, it is evident that the pinnacle of Husserl's ethics as terminating in a philosophical theology, much of the details of which we have had to pass over here, rests explicitly upon an Aristotelian foundation.

4. Conclusion

I have attempted to develop an account here of the various ways in which Aristotelian thought, even where not explicitly invoked on Husserl's part, serves to structure Husserl's ethical thought in significant ways. Without also seeking to undercut the important systematic influence of, among others, Brentano, Kant, and Fichte upon the overall structure of Husserl's ethical philosophy, it has been possible to determine the extent to which Husserl's ethics has a definable Aristotelian foundation which serves to shape much of the arguments and conclusions at which Husserl's ethics arrives. Within the context of Husserl's theory of motivation, it was possible to uncover the extent to which Husserl's characterization of genuinely ethical motivation ultimately hinges upon an Aristotelian distinction between activity and passivity corresponding to a distinction between rationality and irrationality within the motivational framework of human activity and grounding Husserl's understanding of the conditions of moral motivation. Moreover, at a more fundamental level, we saw the ways in which Husserl's theory of activity as grounded upon some motivational nexus reechoes Aristotle's psychology in important ways, reaffirming the primacy of the *intellectus agens* within moral activity. Moreover, it has also become evident that Husserl's ethics, inasmuch as it hinges upon a phenomenological account of virtue as the sedimentation of acts of position-taking with respect to value made habitual, yet nonetheless the object of active, rational reflection hinges upon an Aristotelian concept of virtue as habit unified in the manner of activity of the prudent individual. Finally, we have seen the respect in which Husserl's theory of the true self is ultimately unified in a notion of *eudaimonia* as the end of ethical striving guided by the idea of God as the entelechy of moral activity and development, grounding Husserl's ethics within an Aristotelian metaphysical theological account interpreted from within the standpoint of transcendental phenomenological metaphysics. Each one of these points of Husserl's ethical thought are, and must necessarily be, crucial to the systematic integrity of his account of the moral life. To that extent, finally, Husserl's ethical philosophy can be seen as a product of fruitful, if unacknowledged, engagement with the Aristotelian tradition, which is itself further developed in particular ways from within Husserl's phenomenological standpoint.[102]

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101 *Hua* XLII, 336–337: "Gott ist die Entelechie und außer ihm ist 'nichts'; er ist das All-Gestaltende, und der irrationale Stoff ist nicht ein gemachtes Ding, sondern eben Stoff. Und die Welt hat ihr Sein aus Gott und ist sonst 'nichts'. Und Gott ist nur als leitendes und 'beseelendes' Vollkommenheitsprinzip etc."

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7 A twist of history

Analogy, being and Husserl's unexpected proximity to Aristotle

Emanuele Mariani

Abstract: Was Husserl an Aristotelian? Of course not. The question sounds almost like a provocation and there is no shortage of reasons explaining the distance between Husserlian phenomenology and Aristotle. Nevertheless, a comparative reading is possible without necessarily surrendering to a Heideggerian inspired speculation. How? Following the vicissitudes of a metaphysical fundamental concept, the "analogy": starting from Brentano's Aristotelianism, passing by descriptive psychology up to the *Logical Investigations.* The very analogy, to which Aristotle confers the possible solution for the problem of being; that Brentano transforms into *analogia entis*, following the medieval exegetical tradition; and that Husserl employs in order to elaborate the most significant discovery of the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, the "categorial intuition". By freeing himself of Brentanian psychologism, Husserl implicitly – and indirectly – frees himself of Brentano's Thomistic Aristotelianism too. The result is an unexpected use of the analogy, which applies to what may be phenomenologically apprehended as "being", in the sense of a multiplicity or it would be fair to say a manifold comparable to one of the most relevant thesis of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς, "being is said in several senses".
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Keywords: Husserl, Brentano, analogy, *analogia entis*, categories, categorial intuition

I

"The discovery of the categorial intuition" – Heidegger affirms in 1925 – "for the first time concretely paves the way for a genuine form of research capable of demonstrating the categories."[1] Thus is established the most significant advance of the *Sixth Logical Investigation*: from the categories to the categorial, Husserl would eventually succeed in developing the solution to a problem as old as philosophy itself. A problem that Aristotle already came to recognize, in an attempt to find the focal point between language and reality in response to the manifold senses by means of which being is said – τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς.[2] This, indeed, was the very formulation of one of the

1 Martin Heidegger, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. Marburger Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, ed. P. Jaeger Gesamtausgabe 20 (Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979), 97–98; English translation: *History of the Concept of Time. Prolegomena*, trans. T. Kiesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 71.

2 Among the various excerpts where the controversial phrase – τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς – can be found, see *Metaphysics* I–IX, trans. H. Tredennick (Cambridge, MA-London: Harvard University Press, 1989), henceforth cited as *Metaph*. Γ 2, Δ 7, Ε 2, Ζ 1. Considering the textual content of the excerpts in question,

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major philosophemes of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* that Brentano, in his time, chose as epigraph of his dissertation in 1862, *On the several senses of being in Aristotle*; the famous polysemy of being, which – according to a historically dominant tradition of the Aristotelian commentary – essentially holds in the forms of the predication, the κατηγορίαι.[3] The most significant contribution of Husserl's phenomenology, in the words of Heidegger, would therefore lie in the categorial intuition, in the capacity to directly grasp the forms that structure the modalities throughout which the objects appear to us. What comes to show would no more be a mere entity, the *res* or the οὐσία, but a formal structure in its generality. In short, the entity's being, and not the entity itself: the *Seinsstruktur des Seins* that Husserl, in Heidegger's view, would barely catch a glimpse of and then immediately retreat at the unprecedented possibility of a *Seinsfrage*.[4]

Speculative violence or hermeneutic intelligence? Beyond the more or less specious intent of such reading, between the respectful detractors of Husserl's phenomenology and the staunch defenders of its irreducible originality,[5] we would rather like to turn our attention to a preliminary question, seemingly minor. A historiographical question, concerning the forced alliance that is formed between Husserl and Aristotle in the light of the problem of the categories and the resulting access to being. With or without Heidegger, our query, pretty trivial at first glance, relates to the comparative gesture of this exegesis: does putting in the same perspective Husserlian phenomenology and Aristotle, implicitly oblige us to postulate that Husserl was an Aristotelian? Could we possibly trace an Aristotelian background pertaining to the Husserlian version of phenomenology, uncomfortably installed between Brentano and Heidegger – both Aristotelians by training and creed?

The immediate, as much as instinctive response, is obviously negative. And the reasons are immediately apparent. First, the lack of explicit references to Aristotle,

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not always thematically equivalent, see in particular *Metaph*., Z 1, 1028a 10–15 for an explicit presentation of the relationship between the problem of being and the problem of categories.

3 Franz Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* (Freiburg in Breisgau: Herder, 1862); English translation: *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, trans. R. George (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1975). Incidentally, the epigraph chosen for the 1862 dissertation concerns – and it is no coincidence – *Metaph*. Z 1, 1028a 10–15: "The term "being" has several senses [. . .] It denotes first the "*what*" of a thing, *i.e.* the individuality; and then the quality or quantity or any other such category." Starting at least from Porphyry's *Isagoge*, the *Categories* of Aristotle are indeed conceived as the access key to metaphysics. The general structure of the ontological problem is therefore focused in an increasingly explicit way on the categorical aspect. See *Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium* (CAG, IV/I), ed. A. Busse (Berlin: Reimer, 1887). For a broader comment, see Alain de Libera, "Sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de l'analogie de l'être", in *Les études philosophiques* 3–4 (1989), 238. The introductory role of the Aristotelian *Categories*, relegated to what might be considered the antechamber of metaphysics, tends to be confirmed at the time of the *Aristoteles-Renaissance* in nineteenth-century Germany, where we are seeing a real flourishing of the *Kategorienlehren*. Among the many contributions, it is enough here to mention F.A. Trendelenburg, *De Aristotelis Categoriis* (Berlin: August Petschi, 1833).

4 Martin Heidegger, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, 102/74–75. Concerning Heidegger's stance, we also find the interpretation of the *Sixth Logical Investigation* given, and not without fundamental amendment if compared to the 1925 seminar, in 1973 on the occasion of the *Zähringen* seminar: Martin Heidegger, *Seminare (1951–1973)*, ed. O. Ochwadt, Gesamtausgabe 15, 376–78.

5 By simplifying for methodological purposes the opposition between the two exegetical tendencies in question, we find by way of example Jean-Luc Marion, *Réduction et donation. Recherches sur Husserl, Heidegger et la phénoménologie* (Paris: PUF 1989), 11–63; concerning the second tendency, see in particular Rudolf Bernet, *La vie du sujet. Recherches sur l'interprétation de Husserl dans la phénoménologie* (Paris: PUF, 1994), 39–64.

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confined mostly to logical problems; the general rejection of a historical approach of philosophy, to which it is to be duly added the mathematical training that made Husserl definitely more prone to "Platonism" than to "Aristotelianism" – at least in an epistemological perspective.[6] And when the neutrality of the *Logical Investigations* was followed by an open metaphysical stance, it would rather be in the name of Descartes, Hume and Kant, as well as Plato, that Husserl transformed phenomenology into a transcendental idealism.[7] The assertion of a "Husserlian Aristotelianism" would thereby sound like a contradiction in terms, and could only be accomplished at the cost of a certain forcing, which makes it all the more senseless to want to find in Husserl the basics for a *Seinsfrage*, from which we may hear a resonance between the categories and the categorial – between Aristotle and phenomenology.

Our issue, we might summarily conclude, does not raise particular difficulties. We feel, however, quite uncomfortable in liquidating it in such an expeditious manner and beyond the more or less specious intent of the question, the firmness of the answer attenuates before the evidence of a historically verifiable derivation, a derivation where the echo of Aristotle is nevertheless still audible – from the *Aristoteles-Rennaissance* of the nineteenth century passing by Brentano up to Heidegger, who reshuffles cards. Is it possible to think of Husserl's position free from any Aristotelian contamination? Of course, this does not mean that the phenomenological Aristotelianism – as Heidegger will conceive it – disables the originality of Husserl's thought, who actually retains very little of Aristotle.[8] Prudence here is necessary, especially if we have to take into consideration the tangles of a tradition – Aristotelianism – that in our case is not thematically assumed. However, without craving to see at all costs in the Husserlian phenomenology the unexpected fulfilment of a secular trajectory, unbeknown to Husserl himself, a more risky approach is equally legitimate thanks to a further reason, historically essential in our view: if it is true that Husserl does not explicitly lay hands on Aristotle, the Aristotelianism filtered through Brentano's teaching – with particular reference to the "psychologist" Brentano – allows us to measure the originality of Husserl's advancements. Not only by way of contrast and in terms of breakage, but along the line of a derivation where the lexicon persists in spite of the concept. And it is in a lexical and conceptual transmission, in the passage that leads from descriptive psychology to phenomenology that are to be found the silent remains of a fundamental Aristotelian concept, ever yet at work in the Husserlian lexicon: "analogy".

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Here is our working assumption: among the crumbs of Aristotelianism that remain on the table of the nascent phenomenology, we will sift out the traces of the analogy,

6 See Edmund Husserl, "Entwurf einer Vorrede zu den Logischen Untersuchungen (1913)", in *Logische Untersuchungen. Ergänzungsband. Erste Teil. Entwürfe zur Umarbeitung der VI Untersuchung und zur Vorrede für die Neuauflage der Logischen Untersuchungen (Sommer 1913)*, Husserliana XX/1, ed. U. Melle (Dordrecht-Boston, MA-London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 273. For a broader survey of the intellectual and philosophical development of the young Husserl, see in particular Enzo Melandri, *Le Ricerche logiche di Husserl. Introduzione e commento alla prima ricerca* (Bologna: il Mulino, 1990), 15–153.

7 See in particular Edmund Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923–1924). Erste Teil: Kritische Ideengeschichte*, Husserliana VII, ed. R. Boehm (Den Haag: Martin Nijhoff, 1956).

8 Moreover, it is enough in this regard to see the report of Dorion Cairns, concerning a meeting with Husserl on the 7th of November 1931. Husserl himself did not hide his scepticism concerning Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle: "Husserl characterized Heidegger's Aristotle interpretation as a reading back into Aristotle of an attempt to answer a question which first arose in Husserl's philosophy." See Dorion Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink* (La Haye; Martin Nijhoff, 1976), 5.

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or rather of a certain form of analogy on which Aristotle bestowed strategic relevance. An analogy aimed at regulating – and not revoking – the polysemy of being, unlike the tradition of the ancient and medieval commentary,[9] in respect of which Brentano is no exception. A tradition which operates in a very specific way, transforming the analogy into an *analogia entis*: in a fairly complex relationship, neither analogical nor Aristotelian anymore, designed to resolve the problem of polysemy inherent in the manifold senses of being.[10] Tradition and treason: historically, the metamorphosis of the analogy marks the establishment process of "metaphysics", imposing an increasingly different theoretical view strongly oriented towards the sense of an ontological closure.[11] The legacy embodied in the famous phrase – τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς – then crystallizes into the univocity of a concept – the *conceptus entis* – at which the posterity of Thomas stood.[12] And not without surprise, Aristotle's analogy – as will be argued – turns out to be closer to Husserl's phenomenology, to the uses and the roles that Husserl continues to confer on it, than to Brentano's Aristotelianism, whose Thomistic background determines by contrast a metaphysically affected function of analogy.[13] Without Aristotle and before Heidegger, Husserl would then prove to be – here is our thesis – unexpectedly more Aristotelian than Brentano himself, thanks to an explicit distance with respect to his Brentanian genealogy. And it is only in the light of such a distance that a significant as much as indirect parallel with Aristotle can be justified.

II

Between Aristotle and Husserl, between the categories and the categorial, our question sets up as follows: *why the analogy?* Given a certain licence for methodological purposes towards the "long-term" history of the Aristotelian exegesis, between the Platonic

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9 As for the problem of being and the strategic role played by analogy in the establishment process of metaphysics, namely in the passage that goes from Aristotle to the first commentators – Greek and Latin – up to the Aristotelianism of the first and the second Scholastic, see the fundamental Pierre Aubenque, *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote* (Paris: PUF, 1960). For a more updated version including a broader historical survey, see also Jean-François Courtine, *Inventio analogiae. Métaphysique et ontothéologie* (Paris: Vrin, 2005).

10 Regarding the historically stratified establishment of the *analogia entis* and the process of its transmission, see firstly Bernard Montagnes, *La doctrine de l'analogie de l'être d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1963). For a historical survey of the intricate sequence of the medieval analogical doctrines that characterizes the posterity of Saint Thomas, see E. Jennifer Ashworth, *Les théories de l'analogie du XIIe au XVIe siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 2008). See also Etienne Gilson, *L'être et l'essence* (Paris: Vrin, 1948); and from the same author, *Le Thomisme. Etudes de philosophie médiévale* (Paris: Vrin, 1983^6).

11 In this regard, the most recent French historiography talks about a "marche de l'être vers l'univocité". See by way of example, Jean-Luc Marion, *Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes* (Paris: PUF, 1981). In addition to the already cited Jean-François Courtine, *Inventio analogiae*, from the same author see *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique* (Paris: PUF, 1990). For a summary of the historiographical problems concerning the study of metaphysics on the "long term", see also Pierre Aubenque, *Faut-il déconstruire la métaphysique* (Paris: PUF, 2009).

12 See in particular Olivier Boulnois, "Quand commence l'ontothéologie? Aristote, Thomas d'Aquin et Duns Scoto", in *Revue Thomiste* 1 (1995), 85–108. See also Enrico Berti, "L'analogia dell'essere nella tradizione aristotelico-tomista", in *Metafore dell'invisibile. Ricerche sull'analogia* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1984), 24; and from the same author, "L'analogia in Aristotele. Interpretazioni recenti e possibili sviluppi", in Giuseppe Casetta, ed., *Origini e sviluppi dell'analogia. Da Parmenide a San Tommaso* (Roma: Edizioni Vallombrosa, 1997), 94–114.

13 May we take here the liberty of mentioning our *Nient'altro che l'essere. Ricerche sull'analogia e la tradizione aristotelica della fenomenologia* (Pisa: ETS, 2012).

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inflection of the early commentators and the theological reception of Scholastic thought, we begin by reiterating the profound link that connects analogy with metaphysics, due to the critical polysemy of being: τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς. Being is manifold, as manifold as the real in all its forms and manifestations. What is the major meaning, if any, which might gather this ontological manifold into unity? The problem, according to Aristotle, is all the more acute if we consider that the possibility of "metaphysics" directly depends on this particular form of unity, supposed to guarantee to the ἐπιστήμη τις stated in *Metaph*. Γ 1, the status of a true science.[14] Without unity there is no science, and the whole difficulty is identifying a criterion in order to ensure cohesion to the manifold senses of being. Being, however –and here is the aporia of greater weight– rejects the unity of a concept, the definition of which we could clearly display; being refuses univocity. As clearly stated in *Metaph*. B 3, being is not a genus and the "sought science" that Aristotle, for his part, left problematically unnamed, is distinguished from all sort of positive sciences.[15]

The content of regional disciplines, limited to a particular domain of reality, is in direct opposition to the universality of a knowledge that aims to embrace all that is – the totality of entities – with a single look, transgressing the boundaries that separate one region from another, one science from another. The solution of the problem, we simply mention it, calls for a middle term between identity and difference, between the univocity of a concept and the manifold of reality, whose sense would be otherwise ungraspable. That is where the analogy comes in, "the most beautiful tie" as already stated by Plato.[16] The analogy to which Aristotle confers the exclusive privilege of breaking the ban that prevents the transition from a genus into another – the μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος.[17] The ἀναλογία – and the Greek word counts – strictly conceived as a relationship of proportionality, capable of bringing together things that do not share any common element – the white and the black, the light and the darkness, the health and the sickness.[18] The ἀναλογία, then, that indirectly administers the polysemy of

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14 Aristotle, *Metaph*. Γ 1, 1003a 20–23: "There is a science [Ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις] which studies Being *qua* Being, and the properties inherent in it in virtue of its nature. This science is not the same as any of the so-called particular sciences, for none of the others contemplates Being generally *qua* Being."

15 Aristotle *Metaph*. B 3, 998b 22: "But it is impossible for either Unity or Being to be one genus of existing things".

16 Plato, *Timaeus*, 31 c–32a: τοῦτο δὲ πέφυκεν ἀναλογία κάλλιστα ἀποτελεῖν.

17 Among the different forms of unity – numerically, formally, generically and analogically considered – the analogical unity represents indeed the broadest one. See in this regards *Metaph*., Δ 6, 1016b 30–35. The ban of μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος is explicitly stated in *Analytica Posteriora*, I 7, 75a 38, and in *De Caelo*, I, 1 268b 1.

18 See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA-London: Harvard University Press, 1990), V 3, 113a 31–32: "proportion being equality of ratio, and involving four terms at least". Another text, equally fundamental for the comprehension of the reception, or it would be fair to say the transformation of analogy is *Eth. Nic*., I 4, 1096b 25–28: "But in what sense then are different things called good? For they do not seem to be a case of things that bear the same name merely by chance [ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις]. Possible things are called good in virtue of being derived from one good [ἀφ'ἑνὸς]; or because they all contribute to one good. Or perhaps it is rather by way of a proportion [κατ'ἀναλογίαν]". See also the book Λ of *Metafisica* which could be considered quite rightly – we rely here on an indication given by Jean-François Courtine – as the "book of analogy" (*Inventio analogiae*, 165–69). See in particular *Metaph*. Λ 4, 1070a 31–35: "In one sense the causes and principles are different for different things; but in another, if one speaks generally and analogically [κατ'ἀναλογìαν], they are the same for all"; Λ 4, 1070b 16–20: "These things, then, have the same elements and principles, although specifically different things have specifically different elements; we cannot, however, say that all things have the same elements in this sense, but only by analogy [τῷ ἀνάλογον]: *i.e.*, one might say that there are three principles, form, privation and matter. But each of these is different in respect of each class of things, *e.g.*, in the

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being, but does not – here is the point – force it into the conceptually defined limits of a genus. A "synoptic" yet not systematic look would be consequently possible on the totality of what is[19] – a plastic unity that connects the whole of entities over every difference, reconfiguring each time in a different way according to the modes throughout which being contextually unfolds.[20]

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Throughout the centuries, from Aristotle to Aristotelianism, the dynamic sense of this solution will however get lost under the weight of a Platonic interpretation, giving rise to what Pierre Aubenque rightly called the "history of a contradiction".[21] Disregarding the original indeterminateness of Aristotle's metaphysical investigation, the ancient commentators – Greek and then Latin – imprinted a surreptitious systematic feature upon the so-called "science of being", making of the οὐσία – for Aristotle *prima inter pares* among all the categories – the principle on which anything else depends, no more the centre of gravity to which anything else relates, following the example we find in *Metaph*. Γ 2, between being and health.[22] It is rather a question of identifying the first among the many, the entity of all entities, understood as the origin where everything comes from, the foundation of the ontological universe. And it is a transfigured form of analogy that will be responsible for ordering the relationship between what is first and what is derived, based on a paradigm that should rather be sought in Plato's *Republic* book VI: the analogy between the Good and the sun, where the sun is defined as the *analogon* of the Good, for it is simultaneously its emanation and its image, by virtue of a participation that connects the εἰκών to the παράδειγμα, the sensible world to the intelligible world.[23] No more horizontal but vertical, the analogical identity of

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case of colour they are white, black, surface; or gain there is light, darkness and air, of which day and night are composed". See eventually *Metaph*. N 6, 1093b 17–18: "For there is analogy between all the categories of Being [τὸ ἀνάλογον] – as "straight" is in length, so is "level" in breadth, perhaps "odd" in number, and "white" in colour".

19 The image of a "synoptic look" relates to the expression τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν, which Aristotle employs in *Metaph*. Θ 6, 1048a 36–37: "[. . .] we need not seek a definition for every term, but must comprehend the analogy." See in this respect the comment of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, who correctly recognizes the analogy, assumed in a strictly proportional sense – and contrary to Brentano – as the problem solution of the unity between the many genus of being. Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, *Aristoteles Kategorienlehre*, in *Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie*, I (Berlin: Bethge 1846), 150.

20 Besides Pierre Aubenque's particularly vigilant effort with regard to the difficulties burdening the project of the science of being, it is to be duly mentioned that a much more conciliatory interpretation intended to stress the elements of a solution for the Aristotelian ontology. See in particular Enrico Berti, *L'unità del sapere in Aristotele* (Padova: Cedam, 1965); Giovanni Reale, *Il concetto di filosofia prima e l'unità della "Metafisica" di Aristotele. Con due saggi sui concetti di potenza-atto e di essere* (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1996).

21 See in particular Pierre Aubenque, "Ambiguïté ou analogie de l'être?"; "Les origines de la doctrine de l'analogie de l'être. Sur l'histoire d'un contresens"; "Sur la naissance de la doctrine pseudo-aristotélicienne de l'analogie de l'être"; "Néoplatonisme et analogie de l'être", in *Problèmes aristotéliciens*, 235–38; 239–50; 251–66; 267–80.

22 Aristotle, *Metaph*. Γ 2, 1003a 33–1003b 1: "The term 'being' is used in various senses, but with reference to one central idea and one definite characteristic, and not as merely a common epithet. Thus as the term 'health' always relates to health (either as preserving it or as producing it or as indicating it or as receptive of it)."

23 Plato, *Republic*, ed. and trans. by C. Emlyn-Jones & W. Preddy (Cambridge, MA-London: Harvard University Press, 2013), VI, 508 b–c: "Then this is what I mean when I use the expression the offspring of the Good which the Good produced in proportion to itself: just as the good relates to the mind in the intelligible realm and what is perceived by the mind, so this body (the sun) relates to sight and what can be seen."

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the causes and the principles – stated in *Metaph.* Λ 4 – is thus converted into an analogy of being, or should we say an analogy of entity: a surreptitious by-product of the medieval exegesis and a new paradigm of thought that combines the universality of entity's being with the supremacy of a principle identified with a single entity, the substance.

So, from the Aristotelian analogy, we should firmly distinguish the *analogia entis*, that complements the proportional horizontality of the analogical relationship by the verticality of dependence and derivation. Therein lies the fundamental fact to us: it is this complex form of relationship that the young Brentano will continue to rely on, in order to respond to Aristotle's efforts, repeating in his turn the Platonic inflection imposed by the ancient commentators on the Aristotelian text.[24] The dissertation of 1862 would appropriate the same strategy in an attempt to deduce the number of categories left problematically unspecified by Aristotle himself: bringing back the polysemy of being to the modes of predication, the Brentanian exegesis confers to the substance the focal point of the ontological system that gets thus transformed into what we may call an *ousiology*. All the remaining categories, reduced to the status of "accidents" in a broader sense, are consequently defined by the kind of relationship they have with the substance. By means of such a criterion, the metaphysical investigation, as Brentano conceives it, subsequently allows one to distinguish the authentic senses of being – what exists by its own – from the inauthentic ones, concerning anything that exists in reference to what actually is. It goes without saying that all the other modes of being's polysemy, explicitly formulated by Aristotle – the true and the false as well as the accident in a narrow sense and to a certain extent the actuality and the potentiality – are subsequently cut off and deprived of any ontological interest.[25] The most important legacy of the 1862 dissertation lies here, whose effects do not fail to spread across the whole Brentanian production: the key moment of the categorical table and by extension of being in the light of its problematic unity, is the couple "authentic/inauthentic". It falls thus to a transfigured form of analogy to regulate the relationship that goes from the authentic to the inauthentic; from what is first to

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24 The exegetical and speculative process which leads to the turn of the Greek ἀναλογία into the *analogia entis* is based on a "forced synthesis" – we rely on the felicitous phrase of Alain de Libera – concerning three different key texts: *Metaph.* Γ 2; *Cat.*, I 1; *Eth. Nic.*, I 4. Respectively, the manifold senses of being in the light of the primacy held by the substance (οὐσία), following the comparison between being and health; the predicative three-way split of the names in "synonyms", "homonyms" and "paronyms"; the different forms of unity, in addition to the unity univocally intended (συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται), on the one hand, and the unity merely equivocally intended (ἀπὸ τύχης), on the other hand. Then, it falls to the intermediary function of the paronyms to explicate the relationship between the οὐσία and the other categories of being, on the basis of a trans-categorical unity, that is, a unity by analogy (κατ᾽ἀναλογίαν), where the οὐσία operates as the principle from which anything depends (ἀφ᾽ἑνὸς) and to which anything relates (πρὸς ἕν). The polysemy of being finds therefore an order at the cost of a surreptitious transformation: the predicative sequence of the paronyms which goes from a main term to a term derived (for instance, *health . . . healthy*) is converted into an ontological hierarchy between the substance and the other categories. The unity of being consequently assumes the configuration of an analogical unity, based ultimately on the unity of a principle. Derivation, convergence, transgression: the intersection of these three coordinates leads to the *analogia entis*, a hybrid relationships, not an Aristotelian one, the establishment of which will be further influenced by the Arabic mediation and concluded in the Latin Middle Ages, where a noteworthy modification of the Aristotelian terminology is thus attested. Between the synonyms and the homonyms, the intermediary function of the paronyms is indeed replaced by the *analoga*.

25 See Franz Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* (Freiburg: Herder, 1862), 148. For a broader survey, see Jean-François Courtine, "Aux origines de la phénoménologie: l'aristotélisme de Franz Brentano", in *Études phénoménologiques*, 27–28 (1998), rpt. in *La cause de la phénoménologie* (Paris: PUF, 2007), 42–7.

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what is derived. And from metaphysics to psychology, the *Existenzweisen* that link the accidents to the substance would be translated in the *Vorstellungsweisen* which differentiate the representations into "authentic" and "inauthentic" ones. The importance of such a critical device is hard to underestimate. As already established by the most recent historiography, the couple "authentic/inauthentic" applied to the class of representations – even more than the doctrine of the intentional reference – is the common heritage around which the generation of Brentano's pupils will gather.[26] Just to remember, after all, that in the *Psychology from an empirical standpoint* the "representation" is defined as the backbone of every psychic activity: judging, feeling, loving, or hating involve a preliminary representation of the object to which they relate. That is why the *Vorstellung* shall be conceived, strictly speaking, as a real presentation – rather than a mere representation – capable of presenting something to consciousness in the form of an immanent content.[27]

"Authentic" is an intuitive representation, whose object manifests itself, as opposed to a symbolic, an imaginary or, if you would, an analogical representation, i.e. a representation that represents indirectly, with reference to what is not actually present nor can ever be.[28] The inauthenticity of the representation, in other words, denotes its defective character and can only be formed compositionally, starting from what exists in an authentic sense. On this principle will leverage the axiom of reducibility (*Rückführbarheit*), by means of which the complex breaks down in the simple, the abstract in the concrete, the unreal in the real.[29] And it is at this result that Brentano's teaching is thus attested the most remarkable: between the *uneigentlich* and the *eigentlich* exists a relationship of dependence and derivation – dependence and derivation that let us glimpse behind the primacy of the *eigentlich*, the shadow of the analogy of entity, still silently at work in the passage that leads from metaphysics to psychology.

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III

The legacy and at the same time the limit beyond which begins Husserl's phenomenology are probably to be sought in the very articulation of this device, whose reception is anything but passive. Since 1891, with his *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, Husserl is

26 See Claudio Majolino, "Appunti su Husserl, Brentano e la questione delle rappresentazioni simboliche", in *Filosofia e Linguaggio in Italia, nuove ricerche in corso* (Cosenza: Atti del VII congresso nazionale della Società italiana di filosofia del linguaggio, 2001). From the same author, see also "Les 'essences' des *Recherches logiques*", in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 1 (2006), 94. See eventually Jocelyn Benoist, "L'héritage autrichien dans la pensée du jeune Husserl: représentations propres et impropres", in *Austriaca*, 44 (1997), 22–52.

27 F. Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt I & II*, ed. Oscar Kraus (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1874), 110; English translation: *Psychology from an empirical standpoint*, ed. T. Crane & J. Wolff, trans. A. C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, L. McAlister (London-New-York: Routledge, 2009), 61.

28 F. Brentano, *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, ed. Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand (Bern: Francke, 1963), 64: "Auch Begriffe wie 'unendlich', 'grenzenlos', 'ewig' vermögen wir nicht in adäquater Weise zu bilden. Wir können nur durch Analogiebildung zu ihnen gelangen, indem wir uns einen überblickbaren Raum sehr erweitert oder ein periodisches Ereignis wie den Wechsel von Tag und Nacht vervielfacht denken. Ähnlich ist es aber auch, wenn wir Gegenstände nennen, deren einzelne Merkmale wir wohl fassen können, die aber wegen ihrer Komplikation für uns nicht mehr vorstellbar sind. Eine Million, eine Billion können wir nicht eigentlich mehr vorstellen und nennen sie, ohne den Namen genau zu verstehen."

29 By way of example, see F. Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt I & II,* Anhang XVII "Vom ens rationis", 248; English translation: *Psychology from an empirical standpoint*, 265. See also Franz Brentano, *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen. Briefe und Abhandlungen aus dem Nachlass*, ed. Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand (Bern: Francke, 1966), 173.

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indeed faced with a seemingly minor problem, the importance of which, before not too long, will be declared in its full extent. "Der Begriff der Zahl ist ein vielfacher" – there are various concepts of *number*.[30] Is it possible to identify a foundational order able to ensure homogeneity of the domain of arithmetic? Unity and multiplicity, univocity and equivocity. In the initial steps of the young Husserl, we find curiously the same oppositions that marked the problems of Brentano's Aristotelianism: where there is a manifold, a hierarchical order should be looked for and among the many ways of saying a thing, the authentic one is to be identified. In 1891, Husserl considers numbers as Brentano considers being, and the whole difficulty consists of choosing between two competing foundational criteria: the psychologist and the logicist. The unity founded by a relation of dependency, as Brentano taught, that would bring back all the numerical concepts to whole numbers, by virtue of a double priority, from the point of view of experience and of language;[31] and the unity of a structure or – as Husserl affirms significantly – the unity of a same algorithm that controls a series of conceptual domains, strictly separated.[32]

The initial hesitation that decrees the incompletion of the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, this first Husserlian attempt still imbued with psychologism, will result in a clear rejection of any solution that refers to a conceptual unity.[33] From here on out, it is rather a question of finding the structural invariants that go on repeating, modulating throughout different levels and involve indiscriminately, or should we say formally, all sorts of numbers – cardinal, ordinal, rational, irrational, and so forth. The primacy of the structure implies a priority of the relationship over the object, a primacy of form over content. The unity of a domain is thus defined on the basis of a set of laws and formal connections – as it is taught by the theory of manifolds (*Mannigfaltigkeitslehre*), "the fine flower of modern mathematics", to which Husserl will lend particular

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30 Edmund Husserl, *Philosophie der Arithmetik. Mit ergänzenden Texte (1890–1901)*, ed. Lothar Eley, Husserliana XII (Den Haag: Martin Nijhoff, 1970), 10; English translation: *Philosophy of Arithmetic. Psychological and Logical Investigations with Supplementary Texts from 1887–1901*, trans. D. Willard (Los Angeles, CA: Springer 2003), 11, henceforth cited as *Hua* XII with German and English page references respectively.

31 See Franz Brentano, *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, 27: "Wer kann Million anders denken als: eine große, mit dem Namen Million bezeichnete Menge? Hier haben wir also ein Beispiel, wo die Sprache dem Denken in der Art zu Hilfe kommt, daß sie ihm über Schwierigkeiten der größten Art, ja über Unmöglichkeiten hinaushilf. Ein Knabe kann mit Millionen manipulieren, indem er den Sinn 'die mit dem Namen Million bezeichnete Zahl' mit dem Wort verknüpft, der ausgebildetste Verstand wäre aber nicht imstande, die Begriffe dieser Millionen als in sich selbst spezifiziert Zahlen sich klar vorzuführen oder gar mit Leichtigkeit mit ihnen zu rechnen. Ähnliches geschieht fort und fort, auch wo es sich nicht um mathematische Begriffe, sondern um irgendwelche *termini technici* (Wärmemenge, Kalorie u.a.) handelt, wo immer in ähnlicher Weise eine allzu große Komplikation eintritt."

32 See *Hua* XII, VII. See also Edmund Husserl, *Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie (1886–1910)*, ed. Ingeborg Strohmeyer, Husserliana XXI (Dordrecht-Boston, MA-London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1983), 63–64: "In der Tat ist das, was man Arithmetik nennt, nur *aequivoce* eine Wissenschaft. In der Tat haben 2, + usw. alle die Grundzeichen der Arithmetik vielfache Bedeutung, entsprechend den verschiedenen Gebieten, in denen derselbe Algorithmus Anwendung finden kann."

33 See by way of example *Hua* XII, 12/13: "It may even be that the progress of our developments in Volume II will prove the opinion thus presupposed to be untenable." See also the letter from Husserl to Stumpf, on February 1890 in Edmund Husserl, *Briefwechsel. Band I: Die Brentanoschule*, ed. E. Schuhmann and K. Schuhmann, 158; English translation: *Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics*, trans. D. Willard (Dordrecht: Springer, 1994), 13: "The opinion by which I was still guided in the elaboration of my *Habilitationsschrift*, to the effect that the concept of cardinal numbers forms the foundation of general arithmetic, soon proved to be false. (The analysis of the ordinal number already made this clear to me). By no clever devices, by no 'inauthentic representing', can one derive negative, rational, irrational, and the various sorts of complex umbers from the concept of the cardinal number."

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attention at the time of the *Prolegomena*, in the effort to define the idea of a "pure logic" on the model of a *mathesis universalis*.[34] It is in the *Mannigfaltigkeitslehre* that the *Logical Investigations* will point out, with implicit reference to the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, "the key to the only possible solution of the problem that has not as yet been cleared: how, e.g., in the field of numbers impossible (essenceless) concepts can be methodically treated like real ones".[35] In this respect, the *Prolegomena* § 70 could not be more explicit: the "number is to be taken in a generalized formal sense".[36] That is the principle of the solution, which cannot be accomplished until the Brentanian psychologism is irrevocably dismissed.

It would be therefore neither illegitimate nor absurd to glimpse in the dedication of the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* the prodrome of a silent dissent. As Husserl himself states: "To him [Brentano] I owe the deeper understanding of the vast significance of inauthentic representations for our whole psychical life", stating a few lines before that "a symbolic or inauthentic representation [*symbolische oder uneigentliche Vorstellung*] is, as the name already indicates, a representation by means of signs [*durch Zeichen*]."[37] Ambiguous acknowledgement on behalf of the pupil, if we consider that the doctrine of the teacher lacks a genuine theory about "inauthentic representations". Strictly speaking, for Brentano an inauthentic representation is not a "representation" at all, since it does not present – it does not give – anything.[38] Husserl's debt would then contain the trademark of his own originality, privileging paradoxically what is left unsaid over what is spoken by Brentano. Outside the frame of that early psychologism still latently affecting descriptive psychology, the opposition is no more vertically conceived between the *eigentlich* and the *uneigentlich*, between who sees and who pretends to see, but horizontally, that is, between the different modes of a more complex relationship – a relationship throughout which fully operates the wide-range possibilities of the intentional acts.[39] A semantic interpretation of the symbolic dimension is derived from it as well as a signitive turn of representation. Language is no longer thought of as a mere substitute of perception, limited to replacing things with words. Rather, it is

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34 See Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Text der ersten und zweiten Auflage*, ed. Elmar Holenstein, Husserliana XVIII (Den Haag: Martin Nijhoff, 1975), p. 248; English translation: *Logical Investigation. Volume I: Prolegomena to pure logic*, trans. J. N. Findlay (London-New York: Routledge, 2001), 156, henceforth cited as *Hua* XVIII, with German and English page references respectively.

35 *Hua* XVIII, 250/157.

36 *Hua* XII, 252/158.

37 *Hua* XII, n. 1, 193/205.

38 See Franz Brentano. *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, 64: "Uneigentlich stellen wir solches vor, wovon wir keine genau entsprechende Vorstellung haben, oft gar nicht haben können. Hierher gehört z. B. die inadäquate Weise, wie wir Gott vorstellen durch Analogien, die wir kreatürlichen Dingen entnehmen. Wie bezeichnen mit dem Namen 'Gott' das, worauf unsere Analogien zielen. Was das aber ist, entzieht sich unserer Vorstellung. Wir wissen eigentlich nicht, was 'Gott' heißt, verstehen den letzten Sinn des Namens 'Gott' nicht. Gott ist ein notwendiger Begriff, d. h. seine Leugnung würde für den, der ihn hätte, unmittelbar absurd sein. Wir aber sprechen wohl 'Gott ist', aber ohne sofort und aus seinem Begriff die Wahrheit einzusehen. Ähnlich mag der Blinde von der Farbe sprechen. Wir sprechen so von den substantiellen Differenzen."

39 As evidence of a first dissociation from the semantic poverty of Brentano's psychology, see *Hua* XII, 354; English translation: *Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics*, 3: "The symbols here, quite to the contrary, refer to facts whose authentic representation is denied us –whether at the time, or permanently"; 356/35: "That inauthentic representation of this type must gain more and more in widespread use and importance with the development of language requires no special explanation. The formation of higher-level concepts went hand in hand with the development of language."

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the thing to be represented by means of signs and signitive representations prove to be representations for all intents and purposes. The many possible accesses to the thing are corresponded by a variety of modalities through which the thing manifests itself: in a symbolic representation, the object – even if indirectly – is nevertheless given.[40]

Of Brentano, Husserl will nevertheless preserve a fundamental assumption that in itself is enough to keep alive the sense of this problematic derivation: intuition continues to be the supreme authority of all knowledge. To fix the sense of an intention – its "tending towards something" – there is no other way than to see the object towards which it tends. Consciousness, in phenomenology, is defined as "consciousness of . . .", and it is in the object that the truth-claim of the intentional reference finds its confirmation, ensuring to phenomenology its own motto – *zu den Sachen selbst*. Here lies, in our opinion, the reason that motivates the persistence of the analogy from Brentano to Husserl: once the opposition is profoundly modified between the authentic and the inauthentic, the difficulty is rather in adjusting the grasping capacity of intuition with the semantic power of intentionality, where the synthesis of the two determines the way we perceive things. The signitive turn of the representation leads consequently to a semantic inflection of the intuition, thanks to which the objects show phenomenologically through an unprecedented form and sense. We see what we intend, as we intend it. Intentionality shapes by its nature our being in the world or, to put it more simply, the manifold modes throughout which the object manifests itself; and it is to an analogical ratio that Husserl – as we will see in a moment – turns in order to lay out the various senses of the object ("things", "states of affairs", "general objects", "ideas", and so on), to which correspond as many modes of perception (sensuous or supersensuous).

Emancipated from the inauthentic modality of representation wherein Brentano confined it, the analogy – according to Husserl – is no longer conceived as the mere reflection of a derivation nor of a dependence, but as the index of a structure. And this structure, let us say it straight out, is nothing but intentionality itself, supported at its very base by a fundamental correlation: as many modes of being as modes of givenness and evidence. That is, translating in Aristotelian terms a phenomenological principle: τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς.

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IV

Let us eventually notice the most meaningful occurrence, of particular concern to us: "If 'being' is taken to mean predicative being [*Sein als prädikatives Sein*], some *state of affairs* must be given to us, and this by way of an *act which gives it, an analogue* [*das Analogon*] *of common sensuous intuition*" (Hua XIX/2, 670/279–280).[41]

40 *Hua* XII, 193/205: "If a content is not directly given to us as that which it is, but rather only indirectly *through signs which univocally characterize it*, then we have a symbolic representation of it instead of an authentic one." See also *Hua* XII, 340; English translation: *Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics*, 20: "Concepts, or contents in general, can be given to us in a two-fold manner: First, in the *authentic* manner; namely, as that which they are. Second, in the *inauthentic* or *symbolic* manner; namely, through the mediation of *signs* – signs which are themselves authentically represented. Thus, for example, any intuitive representation in sensation or phantasy is an authentic representation, provided it does not serve us as a sign or something else. But if it does so serve, then in relation to this latter it is a symbolic representation."

41 E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. Zweiter Teil*, ed. Ursula Panzer, Husserliana XIX/2; English translation: *Logical Investigations. Volume II*, trans. J. N. Findlay (London-New York: Routledge, 2001), henceforth cited as *Hua* XIX/2, with German and English page references respectively.

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Being and analogy would seem to meet again in the phenomenological review of the categories and the encounter, if so, would smack of tradition, referring – beyond Brentano – to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, where it is stated that "there is analogy between all the categories of being."[42] But from Aristotle to Husserl stand out clearly the new features that make this approach quite slippery and impose by extension a critical restraint on any attempt seeking to establish a direct continuity between the two. Primarily, it should be recognized the predicative dimension to which the being is explicitly led back. This is the copula – "is" – expressed in a judgement such as "the gold is yellow", to which corresponds an intuition that Husserl names "categorial", capable to grasp the state of affairs thus enunciated, namely the fact that the gold is yellow. Predication and state of affairs: being, on the one hand, is reduced to a particle of language, a *syncategorema*, designed to articulate a proposition like "S is p" and, on the other hand, is regarded as an objective correlate, as a whole constituted of parts and structured by means of a specific relationship: predicative being and relational being.[43] The whole statement amounts to complex units of meaning, and demands at the same time an intuitive confirmation. We do not enunciate only names as well as we do not see only things. "We say likewise that the whole statement finds fulfilment through our underlying percept."[44] Herein is the reason that calls the analogy to a silent intervention, in response to the need to adapt what one says to what is said – following the double meaning of the verb λέγεσθαι that Aristotle has already taught us to recognize: "[. . .] we do not merely say 'I see this paper, an inkpot, several books', and so on, but also 'I see that the paper has been written on, that there is a bronze inkpot standing here, that several books are lying open'" (Hua XIX/2, 658/271).

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Husserl continues to conceive the truth like the Aristotelian tradition, confirming the ancient principle of the *adaequatio rei ac intellectus*. In this regard, the *Sixth Logical Investigation* could actually be read as an attempt – probably the most consistent from Aristotle to the twentieth century – to take this conception to the extreme. In the "ideal of adequacy", as indeed Husserl admits, is rooted "the ideal of knowledge" carried out by the full agreement between truth and being.[45] But from Aristotle to Husserl, being definitely changes in meaning, leading to an inevitable overturn of the ancient question concerning the categories. So let us start here. What are the "categories" from a phenomenological point of view? Neither things nor concepts. The response of the *Logical Investigations* emerges with all the more force if we consider the indication used by commentators from the *zurück zu Aristoteles* of the nineteenth century, whose interpretation of the Aristotelian categories varies between the consistency of the *res* and the emptiness of a mere *flatus vocis*. On the contrary, Husserl resolves and at once dissolves the gist of the problem: it is no longer a matter of deducing, much less is a matter of identifying a guideline capable of establishing an order for the categorical table. It is rather a matter of seeing and therefore of describing. In other words, the problem of the categories is converted into an adequacy problem: how

42 Aristotle, *Metaph*. N 6, 1093b 17–18.

43 See *Hua* XIX/2, § 44, p. 669/279: "The relational being [*das beziehende Sein*] expressed in predication, e.g. through "is", "are", etc., lacks independence: if we round it out to something fully concrete, we get the *state of affairs* in question, the objective correlate of the complete judgement."

44 *Hua* XIX/2, 658/271.

45 See *Hua* XIX/2, § 39, "Self-evidence and truth", 651/263.

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to conform the λόγος with the complexity of the ὄν and, vice versa, how to express the ὄν throughout the plasticity of the λόγος.

Given the details of the issue at stake, the difficulty is now understanding if an adequacy is still possible in so far as the propositional unity of the judgment is structured in a complex set of components. By saying "the gold is yellow", what does the copula correspond to? Is there anything in the object that could adapt to it? Being is obviously not a real predicate, as Kant would have argued and Husserl, on his part, basically agrees: we can see, for instance, colour, but not *being*-coloured; we can hear a sound, but not that something is sounding.[46] "Being is nothing in the object [. . .]", and to say that "a thing is" is not tantamount to bestowing on it real properties. Nonetheless, the apophantic character of the predication remains: the function of the copula operates by structuring the judgement, applying a connective form to the components of which the judgement is made. It is thus by means of such connective or relational or otherwise formative structure that the judgements relates to its object. By saying "the gold is yellow", we do not relate to the "gold", on the one hand, and to the "yellow", on the other, let alone relate to the sum of the "gold" plus the "yellow", but to a situation, to a state of affairs before which we state that "the gold is yellow". The perception adapts to the syntactic structure of the statement, allowing us to consequently perceive what the statement means. And vice versa, the meaning of the statement paves the way to the things the perception eventually grasps. To put it roughly, what we say confers a meaning to what we see, and if we can talk about things in general it is because the things we talk about can bear a sense. That is the reason why Husserl conceives the *adaequatio* under the terms of a synthesis, in which the meaning and the perceiving exchange their features. We have, thereby, to assume that the meaning can have a perceptual extent and that, conversely, the perception can suit a semantic form.

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What do we perceive, for example, before a state of affair like "a is major than b" or "b is minor than a"? The same thing, but not in the same way. We understand the diversity between the two forms of relationship, the arrangement of their components and the general configuration that in either case appear in a slightly different light. A gap separates the λόγος from the ὄν and the meaning is right there, as an essential vector of our relation towards being.[47] We understand the things we perceive by virtue of the meaning though which we mean them. The seeing, as Husserl tells us, is therefore to be considered in terms of a "seeing as", and the perceiving as equivalent of an act of recognition. But what about the *adaequatio rei ac intellectus*, if it is no longer the *res*, the thing, the οὐσία, that is intended, but a state of affairs, a connective form or a generality? Can we really grasp anything that goes beyond the concrete singularity of the substance? Perception, as Kant taught, is a sensuous faculty and we cannot but

46 See *Hua* XIX/2, § 43, "The objective correlates of categorial forms are not 'real' (*realen*) moments", 665/277: "The form-giving flexion *Being*, whether in its attributive or predicative function, is not fulfilled, as we said, in any percept. We here remember Kant's dictum: *Being is no real predicate.* This dictum refers to being *qua* existence, or to what Herbart called the being of 'absolute position', but it can be taken to be no less applicable to predicative and attributive being.

47 To avoid any misunderstanding, let us notice the synonymy established by Husserl himself between the concept of "sense" (*Sinn*) and "meaning" (*Bedeutung*). See in this regard *Hua* XIX/1, 52/201: "Meaning is further used by us as synonymous with 'sense'. It is agreeable to have parallel, interchangeable terms in the case of this concept, particularly since the sense of the term 'meaning' is itself to be investigated."

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perceive sensuous objects.[48] How dare we subscribe to a vision no longer sensuously determined? And what could we ever perceive by the way of a supersensuous perception? Husserl's solution obeys once again the principle of the *adaequatio*, even at the cost of breaking the bond by means of which Kant fastened together perception and sense. "With this goes an *unavoidable extension of the originally sense-turned concepts of intuition and perception*" – as we read in the opening words of the *Sixth Logical Investigation* – an extension "which permits us to speak of *categorial* intuition and, in particular, of *universal intuition*".[49] And in the § 44 of the *Sixth Investigation*, Husserl states:

> *As the sensible object stands to sens-perception* [*wie der sinnliche Gegenstand zur sinnlichen Wahrnehmung*] *so the state of affairs stands to the "becoming aware" in which it is* (more or less adequately) *given* [*so verhält sich der Sachverhalt zu dem ihn . . . gebenden Akt Gewahrwerdung*] –we should like to say simply: so the state of affairs stands to the *perception* of it.
>
> (Hua XIX/2, 669/279)

Let us notice the proportionality of the analogy clearly expressed in this argument, albeit the lexical occurrence is not explicitly detectable: the sensuous object stands to the sens-perception as the state of affairs stands to the supersensuous perception. A same proportion (λόγος) is repeated on (ἀνά) completely different levels, ensuring homogeneity to this heterogeneous combination of elements. Of course, to have a grasp of a singular object is not tantamount to having have a grasp of a general one; the existing thing is absolutely not to be confused with the subsisting state of affairs, and if we want to keep talking about "intuition" and "object", we should rather assume them in quite a broader sense. Nevertheless, whether it be sensuous or supersensuous "something appears as 'actual' [*wirklich*], as self-given."[50] The structure of intentionality is an invariant that unfolds throughout a variety of functions, and by extension the invariance of the functions permits to assign a formal structure to intentionality: the signitive intention, the filling intuition and the synthesis of identification – by means of which we recognize what we mean as we mean it – concern transversally any domain of consciousness and, ontologically speaking, the sensuous and the supersensuous, the real and the ideal, the singular and the general appear as objects or, better yet, as objectualities capable of supporting, and possibly confirming, the reference of any speech. It is, then, to the extent that the differences are more relevant between the various intentional modalities – to which systematically correspond as many ontological levels – that it is possible to establish with all the more force the analogical ratio, apparently affected by the heterogeneity in question. Even complex units of meaning, for instance, the logical predicate of identity (a = a), claim the right to adequacy, if not immediately with the percept, at least with the categorial form of it:

> It may also be the case that the epistemic essence of our seeing, in which the apparent object announces itself as self-given, serves to base certain connective or

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48 Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 39/B 56, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Akademische Ausgabe (Berlin, 1900 sgg).
49 *Hua* XIX/2, 541/186.
50 *Hua* XIX/2, 672/281.

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> relational or otherwise formative acts, and that it is to *these* that our expression in its changing forms is adjusted, and that it is in such acts, performed on the basis of actual perception, that our expression, in respect of such changing forms, finds fulfilment.
>
> (Hua XIX/2, 660–661/273)

Two arguments, seemingly incompatible, strike a fair balance: the intuitive confirmation of a judgement, considered in its propositional unity, is rendered possible without making of its categorial form a real component of the object itself. *The*, *and*, *or, is* . . . they are all logical functions, designed to articulate semantic units – the propositions – that shape our thoughts, structuring a statement that is not simply limited to saying something, but saying also about something (sets, relations, numbers, states of affairs, etc.). Facing the complex, if we want to understand what we see, we have to combine, connect, disconnect, establish relationships, that is to say, to give a categorial form to the data of our intuition. The perceiving needs intelligence in order to perceive and the intelligence, or rather, the *intellectus* in itself is not enough to grasp the reality of what intends, the *res*. The categorial operates at this very front, at the exact intersection between intention and intuition, where saying and perceiving, meaning and datum entwine in a single agreement. The plasticity of language, then, can encompass the whole of reality, highlighting its complexity, and reality can prove to be as plastic as it adapts to the categorial structure of a propositional form. Therein lies the essence of the analogy, to which Husserl continues to resort silently, refusing to consider its ratio in terms of an isomorphism. Perceiving is a differential concept that does not reject in itself an "essential homogeneity". Whether we see things or states of affairs, in either case we see "something". In the same way, whether we enunciate names or propositions, the presence of an objective correlate – sensuous or categorially structured – is required if the judgment is to be:

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> The essential homogeneity of the function of fulfilment, as of all the ideal relationships necessarily bound up with it, obliges us to give the name "perception" to each fulfilling act of confirmatory self-presentation, to each fulfilling act whatever the name of an "intuition", and to its intentional correlate the name of "*object*".
>
> (Hua XIX/2, 671/280)

It is this "essential homogeneity" that confirms the extension leading the intuition from the sensuous to the categorial:

> The explanatory value of this extended use [*Erweiterung*] of the concept Intuition can only lie in the fact that we are not here dealing with some inessential, merely disjunctive widening of a concept [. . .], but with an authentic generalization [*Verallgemeinerung*], which rests on a community of essential features [*auf der Gemeinschaft wesentlicher Merkmale beruhende*].
>
> (Hua XIX/2, 694/295)

The homogeneity (*Gleichartigkeit*) makes the extension (*Erweiterung*) a generalization (*Verallgemeinerung*), governed by a commonality (*Gemeinschaft*) in which what emerges is the invariance of certain properties and functions, namely the invariance of a structure:

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> We call the new acts "intuitions" in that, with a mere surrender of a "straightforward" relation to their object – the peculiar sort of immediacy defined by us as "straightforwardness" – they yet have all the essential peculiarities of intuitions: we find in their case the same essential divisions, and they show themselves capable of achieving the same fully performed *fulfilments* [*Erfüllungsleistungen*]. The last mentioned capacity is particularly important for our purposes, for it was with a view to such performances [*Leistungen*] that this whole investigation has been conducted.
>
> (Hua XIX/2, 694/296)

The analogy, thus, would seem to find a final justification in spite of the silence in which Husserl leaves it: the *wesentliche Gleichartigkeit* makes possible the establishment of a *Gleichheit von Verhältnissen*, that is, a strictly proportional analogy, which designates an "equality of relationships" and not a relationship of participation nor of derivation, let alone a mere similarity between things. Let us repeat the implementing levels of the analogical parallelism: between names and propositions, between things and states of affairs, between sense-perception and supersensuous perception. The differences are systematically gathered into unity, and it is in this way that the *analogon* is to be assumed: as the index of a structural homogeneity that operates within a specific class, the objectifying acts, ensuring its intrinsic cohesion. Both propositions and names can be said to be true or false; any mode of perception, whether it be sensuous or categorial, is to be assumed as a "perception". The same holds for the "objectuality", which is nothing but a general title suitable for any sort of object. The differences still remain. "Object", "perception" and "truth" are not said *univoce* nor *aequivoce*, but by analogy and it is up to the analogy to mark the perimeter of the objectifying acts, a class where our relationship towards being is essentially established – and where "being" means nothing more than "being-true". As Husserl himself states in § 38 of the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, "Sein im Sinn der Wahrheit oder auch Wahrheit", thereby confirming with an unprecedented gesture the sense of a multiplicity, or it would be fair to say a manifold that unfolds through ontologically heterogeneous stages, irreducible to the primacy of the *res* – the metaphysical alleged presence that would be still dangerously at work in Husserl's phenomenology. We should instead recognize that the "object", from this very Husserlian point of view, displays a variety of forms and functions quite difficult to interpret according to the metaphysical tradition in which, Heidegger would argue, Husserl was caught. The same remark applies, then, to the analogy at the service of an *adaequatio* pushed to the limits, before an ontological manifold that from Aristotle on, no one ever saw.

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By combining identity and difference in a single relationship, a same proportion is thereon repeated between heterogeneous terms and this shows a structural or, better yet, a formal unity which applies to what might be phenomenologically apprehended as "being". We can thus summarize the phenomenological performance of the analogy, that does not tolerate any drives towards univocity unlike the *analogia entis* that is anything but an invention of the medieval exegesis – an invention on which Brentano still relies. Along the way from Aristotle to Husserl, it seems therefore to be confirmed the irreducible polysemy of being that Aristotle himself was firstly able to recognize:

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the polysemy which can only be administered by the way of an analogical order that compares, puts in parallel and measures things that have no measure in common. Between one level and the other, between one genus and the other, exists a structural order that permits the establishment of a formal homogeneity throughout regional diversities that are, nonetheless, phenomenologically granted. If "it is said of every percept that it grasps its object *directly*, or grasps this object *itself*", then it has to be clearly claimed that

> [. . .] this direct grasping has a different sense and character according as we are concerned with a percept in the narrower or the wider sense, or according as the directly grasped object is *sensuous* or *categorial*. Or otherwise put, according as it is a *real* or an *ideal* object.[51]

The *verum* and the *ens*, the transcendental terms of phenomenology, do not show indifference with respect to regional identities. This is, so to speak, the moral of the story the analogy teaches us and that is, after all, how Aristotle understood it: analogy is an equality of relationships, and not a more or less perfect similarity between things. Hence is its proportional character, which Husserl rigorously abides by, proving to be at least from this point of view more Aristotelian than Platonic.[52]

"For proportion is an equality of ratios, and involves four terms at least", as Aristotle clearly stated in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, defying the analogy as the extreme form of unity capable for transgressing the boundaries between genus. In the same way, the *analogon* by means of which Husserl goes applying a proportional – not yet conceptual – equality to phenomenological and ontological heterogeneous relationships, is to be considered the index of a structural unity which shows the horizontal stratification wherein the analogical functioning is set. A functioning that does not violate the foundational order between sense and understanding – between the founding and the founded acts. If it is true that nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses – as, indeed, attested by the *Fundierung* exposed in the *Sixth Logical Investigation* – at the same time, there are objects or, rather, purely intellectual objectuality that for the senses are nothing. The empirical genesis of a concept does not entail the denial of its intellectual features. It is not a question of deriving the upper level from the lower one, modulating the proportionality into a genetic hierarchy, but of identifying the invariance capable for crossing transversely or, better yet, structurally the entire domain of consciousness and, consequently, the entire extent of being. The main focus of the investigation is no longer restrictively concerned with the thing toward which our consciousness is naturally directed, but with the how of its determinations, that is, with

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51 *Hua* XIX/2, 674/282.

52 After all, we shall here mention that Husserl himself personally complains about the wrong interpretations imposed on his alleged "Platonism". See in this regard Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen. Ergänzungsband. Erster Teil: Entwürfe zur Umarbeitung der VI Untersuchungen und zur Vorrede für die Neuauflage der Logischen Untersuchungen (Sommer 1913)*, ed. Ulrich Melle, Husserliana XX/1 (Dordrecht-Boston, MA-London: Springer, 2002), 282: "So viel Anstoß hat der in dem vorliegenden Werk vertretene 'Platonismus' erregt; den Vorwurf 'platonischer Hypostasierung', der Erneuerung des 'scholastischen Realismus' habe ich oft genug über mich ergehen lassen müssen. Dieser Vorwurf ist völlig unberechtigt, er steht mit dem Inhalt meiner Darstellung im schärfsten Widerspruch und beruht auf der Übermacht eben der historischen Vorurteile, von denen ich selbst mich einst mühsam losringen musste."

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its modes of givenness – may the thing itself be real or ideal. It is in such a way that Husserl's phenomenology, to say it louder, comes to decree the immediate destruction of any substantialist vision of the entity: from a monolithic ontology relegated to the effectiveness of the substance and subjected to the primacy of the οὐσία, we turn to a more composite ontology that unfolds in the light of the difference between the categorial and the sensuous, between the formal and the material. And it is in the name of his alleged Platonism that Husserl eventually succeeds to assure a strictly proportional feature to the analogical ratio, proving to be unexpectedly more Aristotelian than Brentano. The same Brentano who transformed the analogy into an *analogia entis* at the service of a vertical order from which the univocity – and no longer the Aristotelian polysemy – of being is argued.

We shall conclude, for the sake of paradox, that Aristotelianism and Platonism exchange tacitly their virtues, where the "Aristotelian Platonism" of Husserl is opposed to the "Platonic Aristotelianism" of Brentano. This is probably the most relevant outcome which results from the intervention of the analogy we have tried to reconstruct in the *Sixth Logical Investigation*. An intervention that reflects an irreversible displacement of the gravitational centre of the ontological universe: from a privileged entity, the substance, paradigm of absolute givenness to a manifold of being. The sensuous object stands to the sense-perception as the state of affairs stands to the supersensuous perception. An analogy, then, by virtue of a correspondence that adjusts to the different modes of givenness as many modes of evidence and being or, to say it in the words of Aristotle – but definitely beyond Aristotle himself – τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς.

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8 Having the right attitudes

John J. Drummond

Abstract: This paper reflects from a phenomenological perspective on Aristotle's notion of "right feelings." Adapting Husserl's account of intentional feelings and emotions, the paper describes the intentional structure of emotions and the conditions under which they can be said to be fittingly motivated and epistemically justified. This sense of appropriate emotions is a purely axiological sense of "right feeling," and the paper concludes with suggestions as to when we can speak of "right feelings" in Aristotle's moral sense.
Keywords: feeling, emotion, motivation, justification, fitting-attitude, buck-passing, Aristotle, Husserl

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1. Introduction

Aristotle—in a phrase—is "not much on Husserl's radar." When Husserl does mention him, the vast majority of these references concern Aristotle's logic. Most notable, of course, is Husserl's discussion of Aristotle's apophantic logic in *Formale und transzendentale Logik*.[1] Beyond those references, there is a rare mention of Aristotle's psychology as the first philosophical science of subjectivity[2] and, even rarer yet, mentions in Husserl's ethical writings. These typically concern Aristotle's critique of hedonism[3] or the Aristotelian notion of entelechy, although the latter often do not use the word "entelechy" itself.[4] Nevertheless, a number of scholars have reflected phenomenologically on Aristotelian themes or brought such themes to their exposition of Husserl's phenomenology. For the latter, I have in mind Richard Cobb-Stevens's use of Aristotle's idea of "species-looks" to shed light on Husserl's theories of mind and essence.[5] For

1 Edmund Husserl, *Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*, ed. P. Janssen, Husserliana XVII (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974); English translation: *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969). Hereafter *FTL* followed by page reference to the German edition, a slash, and the page reference to the English edition.
2 Edmund Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil: Kritische Ideengeschichte*, ed. R. Boehm, Husserliana VII (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 52.
3 Cf. e.g., Edmund Husserl, *Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920/1924*, ed. H. Peucker, Husserliana XXXVII (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 66, 79.
4 Cf. e.g., Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Texte aus dem Nachlass, dritter Teil: 1929–1935*, ed. I. Kern, Husserliana XV (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 380–81, 610; Edmund Husserl, *Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre 1908–1914*, ed. U. Melle, Husserliana XXVIII (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 180–82; and Husserl, *Einleitung in die Ethik*, 182.
5 Richard Cobb-Stevens, *Husserl and Analytic Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), especially chap. 6.

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the former, we can look to works by Robert Sokolowski on moral action[6] and the person[7] and by James Hart on the person and community[8] and the self[9] but there are many others as well. This chapter is written in this last spirit, and I shall consider Aristotle's notion of right feelings in the light of Husserl's axiology.

2. The issue

The virtues, Aristotle tells us, are states "in respect of which we are well or badly disposed in relation to feelings" (*NE* 1105^{b}26),[10] and virtuous agents express their virtue in both their feelings and their actions (*NE* 1109^{a}22–23). Aristotle's point is clear enough. Not only do we praise those who combat injustice and poverty, we commend those whose sense of indignation alerts them to injustice or whose sense of compassion reveals the pain of another's misfortune and motivates concernful action. On the other hand, we blame not only those who slaughter innocents or wield power tyrannically or appropriate wealth unjustly, but also those who fail to be indignant about such actions or who fail to feel compassion for the starving, the displaced, and the homeless. Aristotle further tells us that we are well disposed in relation to feelings when we hit the mean: "some vices fall short of what is right in feelings and actions, and others exceed it, while virtue both attains and chooses the mean" (*NE* 1107^{a}4–5). I am interested in that phrase "what is right in feelings." What is it to have a right feeling?

Aristotle treats feelings—a term that for him is understood broadly enough to encompass "appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, emulation,[11] pity, and in general things accompanied by pleasure and pain" (*NE* 1105^{b}22–24)—under the general heading of desire *(orexis)*. There are three kinds of desire, two of which are non-rational and desire their objects as pleasant (appetitive desire [*epithumia*] and spirited, sometimes competitive desire [*thumos*]) and one of which is rational and desires its object conceived as good (rational wish or deliberate desire [*boulēsis*]) (cf. *NE* 1111^{b}11–19, 1113^{a}15–24). Voluntary actions are for Aristotle those in which the motive principle, *orexis* or desire in general, is within us and we are aware of what we are doing. Chosen actions, by contrast, while voluntary, involve the particular form of desire that is *boulēsis*, which is, on Aristotle's view, inseparable from choice (*prohairesis*) (*De anima* 433^{a}21–25).[12] *Boulēsis* introduces practical reason into choice, and practical reason is at work in two dimensions (*NE* 1111^{b}7–8, 1112^{a}13–17). Practical reason (i) recognizes the choiceworthiness of those goods proper not merely to me here and now but to human life in general and (ii) deliberates about which actions to choose in the light of and as conducive to those goods (*NE* 1140^{a}24–1140^{b}8).

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6 Robert Sokolowski, *Moral Action: A Phenomenological Study* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).
7 Robert Sokolowski, *Philosophy of the Human Person* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
8 James Hart, *The Person and the Common Life: Studies in a Husserlian Social Ethics* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992).
9 James Hart, *Who One Is*, 2 vols. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009).
10 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. R. Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
11 Terrence Irwin (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 2nd ed. [Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1999]) translates this as "jealousy."
12 Aristotle, *De anima*, trans. J. A. Smith, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1:641–92.

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In *boulēsis,* then, reason functions so as to give an account of why it is *good* to have these desires in the light of the ends it recognizes as proper to human flourishing. Reason thus embodies in itself certain desires ordered toward ends known by practical reason to be good, and these desires might very well conflict with the non-rational desires, as when an agent's desire for health pulls her back from her desire for the pleasures of excessive food and drink. The agent *feels* this opposition as something like a contradiction, as being pulled in two different directions, and must decide between the two with the assistance of deliberative reason. The rational desires involve a persuasive force that enables us to control the non-rational desires.[13]

Aristotle's treatment of desire is advantageous insofar as it recognizes the unity of the active organism by making desire present in all the parts of the soul. There is a disadvantage, however, in that it closely ties the discussion of feelings and emotions to desire and action. It thereby blurs the useful distinctions between the affective and the moral and between valuation and volition. On the Aristotelian view, emotions, insofar as they are an instance of desire, include in their definitions a reference to pleasant or painful feelings, desire or aversion, and, implicitly or explicitly, action. Aristotle defines anger, for example, as "a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no call to slight oneself or one's friends" (*Rhet.*1378ᵃ31–32).[14] In other cases, the connection between the emotion and desire is stated more indirectly. The emotion is defined primarily by way of a feeling of pleasure or pain, but the account of the emotion includes the reference to desire. For example, Aristotle says envy is "pain at the sight of such good fortune as consists of the good things already mentioned" (*Rhet.* 1387ᵇ22–23). While there is no explicit mention of desire here, the reference to good things points toward those objects of desire that would produce a desirable and beneficial situation for me were I to possess them. We see this more clearly as Aristotle continues:

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> The deeds or possessions which arouse the love of reputation and honor and the desire for fame, and the various gifts of fortune, are almost all subject to envy; and particularly if we desire the thing ourselves, or think we are entitled to it, or if possession of it puts us a little above others, or a little below them.
>
> (*Rhet.* 1387ᵇ35–1388ᵃ4)

Similarly, fear is defined as "a pain or disturbance, due to imagining some destructive or painful evil in the future" (*Rhet.* 1382ᵃ22–23). The implicit reference here is to one's aversion to the destructive or painful evil. The definition is cast this way, perhaps, because fear can motivate different desires, for example, the desire to flee danger or the courageous desire to stand one's ground and to fight for what is important to oneself.

This incorporation of the emotions under the general notion of desire loses the sense of a purely evaluative experience apart from its connection to desire and the motivation

13 For this brief summary of Aristotle's view of rational desire and choice, I am indebted to Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Nancy Sherman, *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Sarah Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and John M. Cooper, *Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

14 Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, trans. W. R. Roberts, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. J. Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2:2152–2269.

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of action. There are instances, I believe, of valuations that do not motivate desire and action. For example, I might imaginatively envision some state of affairs as pleasurable and valuable without thereby having the desire to act so as to realize that state of affairs. Moreover, the incorporation of the emotions under the general notion of desire tends to collapse the distinctive affective sense of what is right in feelings into the moral sense of what is right in action. Indeed, this might explain why Aristotle, focusing his attention on right action, does not himself provide a clear account of having the right feelings.

Husserl's distinction between axiological reason and practical reason, by contrast, emphasizes just this separation between valuation and choice, and it allows us to consider more precisely what it is to have a right feeling. Husserl's account of reason is tied to the notion of evidence, by which he means an intuitive (in a broad sense), direct presence of the object as intended to mind, and he incorporates this notion of reason into his discussion of different aspects of human experience: the cognitive, the affective, and the practical. Whereas Aristotle unifies his account of the person by incorporating desire into all the parts of the soul, Husserl incorporates reason into the various kinds of experience, including the feelings and emotions. Husserl's question about evidential fulfillment in axiological experience is, in effect, another form of the question regarding right feeling in Aristotle.

I shall consider feelings in Aristotle's broad sense—although I shall within this sense distinguish intentional feelings, episodic emotions, and dispositional emotions—and the evaluations they accomplish. To put the matter another way, I shall consider axiological reason and ask in what consists the evaluative correctness or appropriateness of feelings and emotions. The response will develop certain themes found in Husserl's discussions of feeling-acts and emotions and their fulfillment, or what I shall call "correctness" or "truthfulness." Since Husserl does not work out the details of truthfulness in the axiological sphere, I do not claim to present Husserl's own view but only a Husserlian one.

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3. The intentional structure of feelings and emotions

Husserl provides a "clue" for understanding feelings and emotions by using the term *wertnehmen* to name what the feelings and emotions achieve, and by explicitly mentioning[15] the parallel between the terms *wahrnehmen* and *wertnehmen*.[16] By analogy with *wahrnehmen*, we can infer, first, that Husserl is naming a pre-predicative valuing, i.e., the "taking" of something as valuable, rather than a fully articulated judgment of value. Just as my perceptual taking of S as p is prior to and anticipates the judgment "S is p," my feeling-apprehension or emotional apprehension of Sp as v is prior to, but provides the basis for, my judgment "Sp is v." Second, just as my perceptual taking of S as p includes the naive belief in the existence of Sp, my feeling-apprehension of Sp as

15 Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie, zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, ed. M. Biemel, Husserliana IV (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), 10; English translation: Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 10–11. Hereafter *Ideen II* [*Ideas II*] followed by references to the German/English paginations.

16 Cf. John J. Drummond, "Feelings, Emotions, and Truly Perceiving the Valuable," *The Modern Schoolman* 86 (2009): 363–79.

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v includes the naive belief in the existence of *Sp* along with its value-attribute; the feelings and emotions are a kind of axiological perception revelatory of the value-attributes of things, events, situations, actions, and persons, all of which I shall collect with the single term "object." Third, the notion of taking something as valuable suggests that the value-attribute apprehended through the feeling or emotion is in the first instance just the object experienced as valuable rather than the value-attribute alone or an abstract value-object of some kind. Fourth, since these takings are pre-predicative, the term wertnehmen entails that feelings and emotions as evaluative experiences need not involve propositional content (although they can and, perhaps more often than not, do).

Husserl's translators use the English expression "value-reception" to translate Wertnehmung. Scheler's translators, by contrast, use "value-ception" for the same term.[17] Both translations suggest passivity—a reception—in the face of value, and certainly there is some degree of passivity in the feelings and emotions—the "passions," if you like. Husserl's translators, however, also note the more literal parallel: "truth-taking/value-taking,"[18] and I prefer to emphasize this notion of taking. Hence, wahrnehmen is taking something as true (veridical) in a perception, and wertnehmen is taking something as (truly) valuable in a feeling or emotion. The emphasis on taking reveals a greater role for background beliefs, interests, commitments, and the like that inform and contribute to the taker's picking out what is axiologically relevant or evaluatively salient in the object. The language of "taking" suggests, in other words, a degree of activity on the part of the subject in those experiences wherein we "perceive" things as valuable.

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Focusing on the aspect of "taking"—nehmen—common to perceiving and valuing also emphasizes their relation. Our taking is a single, unified experience having two distinguishable aspects. The truth-taking and the value-taking occur together even as they remain distinguishable within the experience. This is in accord with Husserl's repeated emphasis on the fact that our original experiences of objects—our takings—must be understood to include cognitive and affective (and practical) moments in their unity. In Ideen I, for example, Husserl says:

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> This world is not . . . there for me as a mere *world of things*; instead, *with the same immediacy* [my emphasis], it is there as a *world of values, a world of goods, a practical world*. Without further ado, I find the things before me equipped with valuable characteristics, just as they are equipped with the properties of a thing; I find them to be beautiful and ugly, pleasing and displeasing, agreeable and disagreeable, and the like . . . The same holds naturally just as much for human beings and animals in my surroundings as for "mere things." The former are my "friends" or "foes," my "servants" or "superiors," "strangers" or "relatives," etc.[19]

17 Max Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, trans. M. Frings and R. Funk (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 197.

18 "Translators' Introduction," *Ideas II*, 12n1.

19 Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*, ed. K. Schuhmann, Husserliana III/1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 58; English translation: Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. D. Dahlstrom (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2014), 49–50, translation modified. Hereafter *Ideen I* followed by reference to the German/English paginations.

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Husserl also insists that this immediacy in the experience of value is the normal way of experiencing things: "Everything that is touches our feelings; every existent is apperceived in a value-apperception . . . ."[20] Moreover, he emphasizes in an early, unpublished manuscript that this is the *original* mode of experience and that separating the aspects of the "mere" thing and the valuable thing results in an abstraction: "Mere sensation-data and, at a higher level, sensory objects, as things that are there for a subject, but there as value-free, are abstractions. There can be nothing that does not affect the emotions."[21]

In a view that raises tensions with this asserted immediacy of the emotions, Husserl also insists that the emotional experience is a founded one. "Emotional acts (Gemütsakte)," he says, "seem according to their essence to be founded acts, and, in fact, to be founded on intellective acts."[22] By "intellective acts," Husserl means presentations or, as he prefers to call them, "objectifying acts"—experiences "in which something becomes objective to us."[23] Objectifying acts include perceptions (and imaginings and rememberings) as well as judgments (both entertained and asserted). Considered abstractly, they present only the non-axiological features of the object.

Central to Husserl's account is its understanding of the place and role of feelings. The account is distinctive in its emphasis on the feelings as doing intentional work. The feelings are not merely an accompaniment to experiences wherein all the intentional work—the intentional disclosure of the object—is done by the objectifying act. This claim is best understood in light of Husserl's distinction between bodily feelings—feeling-sensations, as he calls them—and intentional feelings or, in Husserl's terms, feeling-acts.[24] Bodily feelings are pleasant or painful states of the organism; they are merely sensory experiences, for example, visceral feelings such as the tightening of the abdominal and neck muscles associated, say, with anger and fear. But insofar as our attention is directed toward the thing or situation that causes these bodily feelings, our attending to it is affectively charged and we take it as valuable or not. This is the intentional feeling that intends an object, disclosing it, broadly speaking, as likeable or not. This disclosure is an intentional achievement of the feeling,[25] and we might consider it a sort of proto-emotion.

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Intentional feelings and full-blown episodic emotions lie on a continuum, where the place on the continuum is a function of the degree of determination in our sense of the object's underlying non-axiological properties. The intentional feeling is contained within, but does not exhaust, the episodic emotion. An intentional feeling alone intends

20 Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, 404–5.

21 Ms. A VI 26, 42a. The text is difficult to date. Ullrich Melle, the director of the Husserl-Archief in Leuven guesses, based on the content of the manuscript and the context of the folio in which it is found, that it is from the early 1920s. However, a brief note written on the back of the page suggests that it could have been written as early as 1918. But no certainty as to the date is possible. I thank Professor Melle for permission to quote the manuscript and for his assistance in dating it.

22 Husserl, *Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre*, 252.

23 Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen, zweiter Band, erster Teil: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*, ed. Ursula Panzer, Husserliana XIX/1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 477, 500; English translation: Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N. Findlay, 2 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), 622, 639. Hereafter *LU II/1* followed by references to the German/English paginations.

24 Husserl, *LU II/1*, 402–10/569–76.

25 This view anticipates in some ways that of Peter Goldie (*The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000], 19) who speaks of "feelings-toward" an object and of a "thinking of with feeling."

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"thin" axiological attributes (unpleasant or distressing) whereas the episodic emotion intends "thick" axiological attributes (dangerous or unjust). I might, for example, dislike (and disvalue) the taste of a particular food on tasting it for the first time, but this experience remains at the level of an intentional feeling and does not rise to that of an episodic emotion. By contrast, seeing that meat is infested with maggots, I experience disgust and find the meat repulsive. This episode of disgust or, more precisely, the presentational content of the episode of disgust—the meat being maggot-infested[26]—is more determinate in cognitively characterizing the situation in which the episodic emotion arises and, thereby, in recognizing the grounds for disgust.

We should note that in the example of disgust the valence of the bodily feelings—for example, an unpleasant feeling in the stomach and the tightening of facial muscles—and the intentional feeling coincide. The risk here is that this coincidence will lead us to think of the episodic emotion simply as the bodily feelings or to conceive the emotion as directed to the bodily feelings themselves. We must, however, maintain the distinction, for feelings are considered in two different relations, once in relation to the body and once in relation to the thing or situation. These feelings, in other words, are at work simultaneously in pre-reflective bodily self-awareness and in object-awareness, and this is why we name them differently—pleasure or pain in the former relation and, in the latter relation, liking or disliking the object apprehended and thereby disclosing the object as likable or unlikable.

A second reason to maintain the distinction is that the valence of the bodily feelings and the intentional feeling can differ. For example, after orthopedic procedures, I experienced pain in response to manipulations performed by my physical therapist and to exercises I was assigned to do. Nevertheless, I positively valued these exercises insofar as they served the end of rehabilitation. My attention is focused on the non-axiological features of those movements and manipulations not as causative of pain but as conducive to a longer-term end I positively valued, and I therefore positively valued the movements and manipulations as having non-axiological features conducive to that end.

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The involvement of feelings in emotional episodes means that both the emotions and the valuations involved therein necessarily involve a first-person perspective. Fear of an angry, growling, charging Doberman Pinscher cannot be understood apart from the fact that the situation is dangerous to and for me who experiences these feelings and this emotion. This can be true even when the Doberman is not charging me. For example, the Doberman might charge my child while I watch from an apartment balcony. My fear is compounded. I feel fear for my child on account of the potential harm she might suffer, but the charging Doberman also presents a danger to me insofar as an essential aspect of my own well-being is harmed if my child is bitten or mauled by the dog.

I have argued elsewhere[27] that we should reject Husserl's view that emotional experiences are founded on objectifying experiences in favor of the view that the affective-axiological sense of the object as immediately and originally experienced is

26 The example is Peter Goldie's ("Emotion, Feeling, and Knowledge of the World," in *Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions*, ed. R. Solomon [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004], 97–98).

27 Most recently in John J. Drummond, "The Intentional Structure of Emotions," *Logical Analysis and the History of Philosophy/Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse* 16 (2013): 244–63.

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founded on the non-axiological sense of the object, even as these two layers of sense are immediately and originally co-experienced. In other words, emotional experiences encompass distinguishable aspects within the sense of the object such that a cognitive or "presentational" significance disclosing the non-axiological properties of the object—the sense of the dog as growling at me with its teeth bared—grounds an additional meaning-aspect disclosing the affective or valuable characteristics of that object—the sense of the dog as dangerous. [28] Or, to put the matter another way, although we immediately and originally experience the object as valuable and are pre-reflectively aware of the presenting and affective dimensions of the experiencing of the object as equiprimordial, the axiological or affective sense of the object presupposes, builds upon, and forms a unity with the non-axiological (cognitive) sense of the object.[29]

Recalling Anthony Kenny's retrieval of the scholastic distinction between material and formal objects allows us to clarify this position. Kenny writes:

> Anything which can be φd is a material object of φing. Beer, for example, can be seen, and so beer is a material object of seeing; when the executioners burnt Joan of Arc, Joan was the material object of their burning. The formal object is the object under that description which *must* apply to it if it is to be possible to φ it. If only what is P can be φd, then "thing which is P" gives the formal object of φing. Descriptions of formal objects can be formed trivially simply by modalising the relevant verbs: only what is edible can be eaten, only what is inflammable can be burnt, only what is tangible can be touched. But there are other descriptions of formal objects which are not trivial in this way. Only what is dirty can be cleaned, only what is wet can be dried, only what is colored can be seen, only what is criminal can be committed, only what is difficult to obtain can be striven for, only other people's property can be stolen. "Other people's property" is a description of the formal object of *stealing*, just as "one's own spouse" is a description of the formal object of *divorcing*.[30]

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28 John J. Drummond, "Aristotelianism and Phenomenology," in *Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy*, eds. J. Drummond and L. Embree (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 15–45; John J. Drummond, "Complicar las emociones," trans. M. Oyata, *Areté: Revista de Filosofía* 14 (2002): 175–89; John J. Drummond, "'Cognitive Impenetrability' and the Complex Intentionality of the Emotions," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 11 (2004), No. 10–11: 109–26; Sokolowski, *Philosophy of the Human Person*, 22–23.

29 For Husserl, a presentation can be a complete experience—a perception or a judgment—that presents the object in a determinate manner, that is, with a particular set of descriptive properties. Husserl calls such experiences "objectifying acts" (Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, pp. 500–501 [p. 639]). But the term "presentation" can also refer more narrowly to the content or "matter" of an experience that accounts for the object being presented in a determinate manner by that experience (Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, pp. 474–76, 514 [pp. 620–21, 648]). The significance of this narrower sense of "presentation" is that experiences that are not themselves objectifying acts must be founded not on another act, but on a matter—a presentational or descriptive content—of the sort that belongs to an objectifying act. Put another way, then, the foundational claim states that any act founded on a presentation comprises a matter identical to that of the objectifying intention that presents the merely descriptive features of the object in just that determinate manner present in the founded act as well. Since in Husserl's later, explicitly transcendental philosophy, the "matter" of a presentation becomes the "sense" belonging to the intentional correlate of the experience (Husserl, *Ideen I*, p.298 [p. 310]), we can state the claim as it appears in the main text.

30 Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion, and Will* (London: Routledge, 2003), 132.

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Kenny notes, furthermore, that each of the emotions is logically appropriate to certain restricted objects:

> One cannot be afraid of just anything, nor happy about anything whatsoever, If a man says that he is afraid of winning £10,000 in the pools, we want to ask him more: does he believe that money corrupts, or does he expect to lose his friends, or to be annoyed by begging letters, or what? If we can elicit from him only descriptions of the good aspects of the situation, then we cannot understand why he reports his emotion as fear and not as hope. Again, if a man says that he feels remorse for the actions of someone quite unconnected with him, or is envious of his own vices, we are at a loss to understand him.[31]

Kenny's discussion reveals that the connections between the emotions and their formal objects are conceptual rather than merely contingent.[32] To identify the formal object of an emotion is part of clarifying the concept of the emotion in question. Hence, as Kenny also notes, "the medieval schoolmen gave expression to restrictions such as those we have outlined by saying that the formal object of fear was a future evil, of envy another's good, of remorse one's own past sins."[33]

To adapt Kenny's convention to our present purposes, we can say that the material object of the emotion is the thing, situation, event, action, or person as presented apart from the φing that requires a formal object. To avoid the ambiguities of the term "material," we might better call this the "particular" object of the emotion. The formal object of the emotion, by contrast, is that object as (dis)valued in the emotional experience, or, more specifically, the value-attribute that discloses the object as (dis)valuable in a particular manner (the danger as disclosed by fear). Clarifying the concept of fear, then, requires an account of the kinds of things and circumstances that could cause future harm to one's well-being, i.e., future harm to oneself or to those persons and things whose presence or possession constitutes an aspect of that well-being. This, in turn, requires that we have a sense of the particular objects that we might recognize as dangerous insofar as they can cause such harm.

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In an experience at once cognitive and affective, then, we immediately "take" the thing, situation, or event—the particular object of the emotion—as (dis)valuable—as having a formal value-attribute—by virtue of being of a certain type or having such and such material or physical properties. By "material or physical properties," I mean those non-axiological properties that belong to the object as a particular object and as the correlate of a mere, abstract Wahrnehmung. In disclosing a particular object as (dis)valuable, the intentional feeling or emotion necessarily contains within itself (i) a moment that presents its object—the thing, event, situation, action, or person valued—with its conceptually relevant non-axiological properties, and (ii) a moment that is the affective response of the subject to the object's material or physical properties. The formal value-attributes or axiological features of the object belong to the object as the correlate of an evaluating feeling or emotion, a concrete Wertnehmung.

In brief, we take the particular object O as having the formal value-attribute v on the basis of its being (or having) the material features x, y, and z. Stated this starkly,

31 Kenny, *Action, Emotion, and Will*, 134.
32 Kenny, *Action, Emotion, and Will*, 134.
33 Kenny, *Action, Emotion, and Will*, 135.

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Husserl's view seems a version of a buck-passing account, which Thomas Scanlon has characterized as follows:

> . . . being good, or valuable, is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons. Since the claim that some property constitutes a reason is a normative claim, this account also takes goodness and value to be non-natural properties, namely the purely formal, higher-order properties of having some lower-order properties that provide reasons of the relevant kind . . . For this reason I call it a buck-passing account.[34]

Scanlon here stresses both the objectivity of the value attribute as an irreducible, non-natural property as well as the normativity proper to our evaluative responses. We have reasons for our responses, and because there are reasons to respond in a certain way, one *ought* to respond in that way.

Buck-passing accounts are often allied with response-dependent, fitting-attitude theories that claim that the higher-order value-attribute is dependent upon the response it engenders in a subject and the fittingness of that response. Values, in other words, are (at least) partly dependent upon human responses and attitudes. To be valuable is for the object to be the fitting object of some evaluative feeling or emotional attitude. Both neo-sentimentalist theories, such as those of Simon Blackburn[35] and Allan Gibbard,[36] and sensibility theories, such of those of David Wiggins[37] and John McDowell,[38] are versions of response-dependent, fitting-attitude theories. Since I believe that the neo-sentimentalists cannot account for the objectivity of value-attributes, my concern here will be with sensibility theory. Combining buck-passing and sensibility views is to claim that to be valuable is for the object to be the fitting object of an evaluative feeling or emotion by virtue of possessing certain lower-order, non-axiological properties. What makes the combination of buck-passing and sensibility accounts phenomenologically interesting are the grounding of the higher-order value-attribute in lower-order properties and the reference to a first-personal response as parts of our understanding of what a valued thing is.

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Regarding the latter point, consider, for example, the sensibility view advanced by Wiggins: "x is good iff x is the sort of thing that calls forth or makes appropriate [my emphasis] a certain sentiment of approbation given the range of propensities that we actually have to respond in this or that way."[39]

Wiggins here offers a response-dependent account of value-attribution, but, in contrast to Scanlon's account, it is unclear whether Wiggins's account makes a

34 Thomas Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 97.
35 Simon Blackburn, *Essays in Quasi-Realism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Simon Blackburn, *Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning* (New York. Oxford University Press, 1998).
36 Allan Gibbard, *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
37 David Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?", in *Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology*, eds. R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 145–56.
38 John McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," in *Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology*, eds. R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 137–44.
39 Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?", 154.

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normative claim ("makes appropriate"') or not ("calls forth"). He subsequently expands the account as follows:

> . . . for each value predicate φ (or for a very large range of such), there is an attitude or response of subjects belonging to a range of propensities that we actually have such that an object has the property φ iff the object is fitted by its characteristics to bring down that extant attitude or response upon it and bring it down precisely because it has those characteristics.[40]

This formulation, however, remains ambiguous. It is unclear whether the "because" in this formulation is causal, in which case Wiggins's theory *explains* value-attributes, or logical, in which case Wiggins's theory would have *normative* force since the underlying characteristics would serve as reasons for attributing the value.

McDowell clarifies the issue. Although his initial formulation of his view preserves Wiggins's ambiguity, his subsequent formulation removes it. McDowell first characterizes the response-dependent character of value-attributes:

> To press the analogy [between values and secondary qualities] is to stress that evaluative "attitudes," or states of will are like (say) colour experience in being unintelligible except as modifications of a sensibility like ours. The idea of value experience involves taking admiration, say, to represent its object as having a property that (although there in the object) is essentially subjective in much the same way as the property that an object is represented as having by an experience of redness—that is, understood adequately only in terms of the appropriate modification of human (or similar) sensibility.[41]

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Shortly thereafter, McDowell affirms both the response-dependency and the normative character of our value-attributions: "A virtue (say) is conceived to be not merely such as to elicit the appropriate 'attitude' (as a colour is merely such as to cause the appropriate experiences), but rather such as to *merit* it."[42]

I shall postpone a fuller discussion of the normativity of evaluative experiences and, for the moment, focus only on the objectivity of the response-dependent, formal value-attributes disclosed in feelings and emotions. The formal value-attribute of the evaluative taking is neither a monadic, mind-independent reality, as it is for Max Scheler,[43] nor merely the subjective response, as it is, say, for Hume[44] and the neo-sentimentalists, or for Sartre,[45] who views emotions as unreflective, but not unconscious, behaviors of the subject. It is rather a dyadic property that is disclosed only in relation to a subject with a particular physiological constitution, a particular experiential history, and particular interests, concerns, and commitments in the light of which a certain set of non-axiological properties intentionally motivate an affective response.

40 Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?", 154.
41 McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," 142.
42 McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," 142.
43 Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, 15.
44 David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
45 Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Emotions: Outline of a Theory*, trans. B. Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948).

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That the value-attribute is a dyadic property, however, does not entail that it lacks objective existence. There are three important considerations.

First, the value attribution of φ to the object does not arise simply on the basis of the subjects having her particular physiological constitution, her particular experiential history, and her particular interests, concerns, and commitments. The object to which the value is attributed must also possess a set of non-axiological properties if the object is to present itself as valuable to and for that subject. Hence, the value-attribute is rooted, even if not exclusively, in the object.

Second, the analogy between Wahrnehmung and Wertnehmung is again helpful. Husserl claims that our perceivings are characterized by the doxic modality of belief; we take it for granted that the world and the things we perceive in it exist as experienced unless some feature of the experience calls that belief into question. Part of our natural, everyday experience, in other words, is a realism. This is not the realism that is the conclusion of a philosophical argument; it is a realistic presumption built into the fabric of our experience. Just as we take for granted the real, physical existence of perceived objects and properties, we take for granted the real, but not merely material or physical, existence of "perceived" value-attributes that belong to a thing by virtue of its material or physical properties. We "take" these attributes as aspects of the objective world even though grounded in part in our response to the object's non-axiological properties. This is a phenomenological, not an ontological, claim, for our experience of them as objective also recognizes that the object is valuable to and for me and us.

Third, on Husserl's view, as on McDowell's, the beliefs, interests, concerns, and commitments that subjects bring to their experience of the world involve cultural inheritances passed down from preceding generations, and these are tested and reappropriated in the present. Hence, the dyadic value-attribute is, properly speaking, disclosed to this broad, cultural intersubjectivity. To experience fear, for example, is to take the charging Doberman Pinscher as having natural properties that make it fearsome to anyone and, in the very same experience, to take (affectively) the situation in which the dog is charging me as dangerous to and for me. The charging Doberman is the particular object of my fear, and the danger it presents is the formal object of my fear. But precisely to the extent that this experience invokes a shared understanding of what is fearsome and dangerous, the value-attribute "dangerous" is a dyadic attribute not merely in relation to my particular experience of fear but to the shared understanding of the reasons for something to be counted as dangerous.

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Considerations such as these recall Aristotle's emphasis on the importance of the education of the emotions for the development of moral character. Aristotle holds, for example, that virtue without wisdom can be blind (NE 1140b10). So, for example, "kindness directed to the wrong people can be harmful, just as uncontrolled fear can stand in the way of facing the challenges and risks necessary for pursuing desired ends."[46] The emotions are educated insofar as their constituent perceptions and beliefs are educated and insofar as appropriate affective responses are associated with these perceptions and beliefs.[47] In this way, we learn the affective and practical significance of different things and situations. Learning to experience correctly certain features of the world is tied to learning what one's culture considers appropriate emotional

46 Sherman, *The Fabric of Character*, 171.
47 Sherman, *The Fabric of Character*, 167.

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responses to those same features. In learning about the world, I learn which situations merit fear and which do not, which situations merit anger and which do not, which situations merit compassion and which do not, which situations merit shame and which do not, and so forth. I thereby become habituated to have certain emotions upon encountering certain things or situations. These dispositional emotions shape my new encounters with things and inform my experiences such that I immediately recognize what is evaluatively salient in a thing or situation. When I see the growling, charging Doberman, I immediately experience fear and recognize the danger. But not only do I fear the dog in its agitated state, I ought to recognize the danger and experience fear. If I do not, I am impervious to the "true" character of the situation.[48] As what we see or believe grounds what and how we feel and as the emotions continue to be educated over time, what we feel over time comes to shape how we see things and situations.[49]

This combination of buck-passing and fitting-attitude approaches to value is subject to challenge from two important perspectives. The first concerns the circularity of the position. Insofar, say, as danger is defined by the fittingness of fear as a response to a situation and fear is defined by its formal object, i.e., the dangerous, the position appears circular. But the nature of this circularity must be more carefully specified. For example, we commonly say that the danger in a situation arises from a certain constellation of non-axiological properties. The subject's fearing the situation just is to experience that constellation as dangerous. Both the fear and the danger arise on the same bases: the non-axiological features of the situation and the particular condition of the subject with its physical constitution, its experiential history, interests, concerns, and commitments. The intentional feeling or emotion and the value-attribute arise concurrently in the course of experience. The danger is neither logically nor temporally prior to the fear, and the fear is neither logically nor psychologically prior to the danger. This lack of priority underlies the apparent circularity of the definitions, but the circularity is not vicious since the theory provides an account of the nature of both the emotion as motivated and the value as justified.

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4. The justification of feelings and emotions

The second objection concerns the problem of the wrong kind of reasons, but a discussion of this objection requires that I say more about the justification of feelings and emotions and of the value-attributions they accomplish. What we have said about the objectivity of the value attributions accomplished by intentional feelings and episodic emotions is not sufficient to establish that a particular emotion is justified. Perhaps surprisingly, understanding the justification of feelings and emotions relies on a more precise sense of the nature and importance of the first-personal character of emotions.

Goldie claims (1) that feeling towards "is part of one's consciousness of the world with which one is emotionally engaged"[50] and (2) that this is an "unreflective emotional engagement with the world beyond the body; it is not a consciousness of oneself, either of one's bodily condition or of oneself as experiencing an emotion."[51] He distinguishes

48 Goldie, *The Emotions*, 30–31.
49 Sherman, *The Fabric of Character*, 171.
50 Goldie, *The Emotions*, 64.
51 Peter Goldie, "Emotions, Feelings, and Intentionality," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 1 (2002): 241.

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this unreflective object-directed consciousness from what he calls reflective consciousness, my "being aware that I feel afraid."[52] Goldie's concern, I take it, is to stress the fact that our emotional encounters are often focused exclusively on the intended things or situation without any thematizing of our own condition. This is true. Nevertheless, in grasping the situation as dangerous, I undergo physiological changes, I feel the tensing of my muscles, and I am pre-reflectively and non-thematically aware of my fearing the dog. I am aware, in other words, of my fearing the dog without my attention being turned explicitly either to my bodily feelings or to my fear. Goldie is correct that we can be unreflectively engaged with the world without reflective self-awareness, but we cannot be unreflectively engaged with the world without a pre-reflective awareness of that engagement.[53] I cannot fear the dog without being pre-reflectively aware of my fearing it. My claim is that this pre-reflective awareness of my experiencing an emotion (and the reflective awareness based upon it) is an important feature in the justification of emotions and their value-attributions.

So, the claim that I ought to fear the salivating, charging Doberman if I am to appreciate the "true" character of the situation I face returns us to the question of what justifies our affective responses. How is it that I recognize that the response I experience is appropriate or inappropriate? What are the grounds in the lived experience itself for distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate responses? Once again, what does it mean to speak of "right feelings"?

Husserl suggests that there is a special kind of evidence—an axiological intuition—that confirms the "truthfulness" or "rationality" or "appropriateness" of our emotional experiences.[54] In speaking of evidence, Husserl refers not to some kind of datum that counts for a belief and thus provides a reason for accepting that belief as true but to a more fundamental sense of evidence as the intentional experience that takes something as such a datum. This means that an evidential experience is always paired with a mere intending, say, judging (without intuitive evidence, i.e., in the absence of the object) that S is p. The evidencing experience then directly and intuitively grasps in a perceptually-based experience that S is actually p and thereby confirms the judgment, or it directly and intuitively grasps that S is q—a disconfirming experience that reveals that "S is p" is false.

In the case of emotional experiences, the case is similar. An axiological evidencing directly and intuitively grasps that S is actually, say, dangerous; such an evidence justifies our sense of the object as having that axiological sense, as having a particular affective attribute. While Husserl invokes his idea of axiological intuition with respect to judgments of value, this view holds also for the intentional feeling or episodic emotion in which pre-predicative valuing is accomplished. In looking for truthfulness in intentional feelings and emotions, I am looking, first, for the analog of veridicality in perception and, second, the analog of Husserl's notion of the truth of judgments in theoretical reason.

There are two complicating considerations that an account of the truthfulness of emotions must take into account: (1) the fact that there are distinct aspects of sense (cognitive and affective) within the emotion, and (2) the balance between the

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52 Goldie, *The Emotions*, 64.
53 Cf. John J. Drummond, "The Case(s) of (Self-)Awareness," in *Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness*, eds. U. Kriegel and K. Williford (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), 199–220.
54 Husserl, *Ideen II*, 9–11/10–12.

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subjectivity of the feelings at work in the felt emotions and the intersubjectivity at work in our understanding of emotion-concepts and evaluative concepts. These complicating factors suggest that there are multiple ways in which the feelings and emotions can go wrong.

Four of these have been suggested in the distinctions just mentioned: (1) we can be cognitively mistaken about the features of the thing or situation toward which the experience is directed, or (2) we can be affectively mistaken about the value-attributes of what is truthfully cognized. We can also be self-deceived, i.e., (3) mistaken about the true target of our emotion, or (4) mistaken in identifying the emotion we experience.[55] A fifth way feelings and emotions can go wrong is the case of "cognitively impenetrable" emotions, wherein the person experiencing the emotion knows, without reflection, that her emotion is inappropriate but what she knows cannot "penetrate" her feelings.[56]

On the basis of examples such as these, I have previously argued[57] that the structure of appropriate emotions can be articulated as follows:

Given that

(1) *F* is an intentional feeling or episodic emotion whose base *p* is either a perceptual (or memorial or imaginative) or judgmental presentation of an object or situation *O* and its non-axiological properties *x*, *y*, and *z*, and
(2) "justification" in this context means *prima facie*, non-inferential, and defeasible justification present in those intuitive experiences that fulfill empty intentions, then
(3) *F* is appropriate to *O* and its non-axiological properties *x*, *y*, and *z* if and only if
    (a) *p* is a veridical or true presentation of *O* and of its properties *x*, *y*, and *z*, and
    (b) *p* is justified, and
    (c) *p* is a (motivating and evidentiary) reason for *F*, and
    (d) *G*, a (pre-reflectively or reflectively) self-assessing feeling or emotion (such as approbation or pride) positively appraises and justifies *F*, and
    (e) no relation of justification mentioned is defeated.[58]

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The foundational claim is expressed most clearly in condition (c), but that condition is a compound one deserving further elucidation. While this account distinguishes motivating and evidentiary reasons, it does not give a sufficiently detailed account of the different founding relationships involved in the difference between motivating and justifying reasons. Moreover, this account focuses too much, especially in condition (d), on the individual's experience apart from its intersubjective dimensions. It fails, in

55 Robert C. Roberts, *Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 317.
56 Goldie, *The Emotions*, 76; cf. Drummond, "'Cognitive Impenetrability' and the Complex Intentionality of the Emotions," 109.
57 Most recently, Drummond, "Feelings, Emotions, and Truly Perceiving the Valuable," 373–76.
58 This modifies a position taken by Kevin Mulligan, "From Appropriate Emotions to Values," *The Monist* 81 (1998): 161–88.

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other words, to recognize fully the role of our shared understanding of value-concepts and emotion-concepts in our experience of emotions and their appropriateness.

We can distinguish (at least) four different founding relations as follows:

1. Reciprocal Supplementation: to say that sense *P* founds sense *Q* is to say that sense *Q* ("color") is supplemented by sense *P* ("shape") to form the complete compound sense *R* ("shaped color" or "colored shape"), and vice versa;
2. Presupposition: to say that sense *P* founds sense *Q* is to say that sense *Q* ("bachelor") presupposes sense *P* ("male");
3. Motivation: to say that sense *P* founds the experience *F* for a subject *S* is to say that sense *P* ("the man as armed") intentionally motivates, i.e., is a motivating reason for, *S* to experience *F* (fear) with its axiological correlate Φ (danger).
4. Justification: to say that sense *P* founds sense *Q* is to say that sense *P* ("the man as armed") provides epistemically justifying reasons for sense *Q* ("the armed man as dangerous and fearsome"), where the justification can be either inferential or non-inferential.

In every instance of a founding relation, one or more of these functions is found, but the presence of a founding relation does not require that all of them be found. In the present case of the appropriateness or rightness of intentional feelings and emotions, the last three founding relationships are at work.

The foundational structure of motivating reasons is expressed in 3. This is not a retreat to Husserl's view that the feeling-act or episodic emotion is founded on a presenting act, for the claim is that it is the non-axiological sense of the object that motivates the feeling or emotion. In grasping the object as being or having the non-axiological features x, y, and z, I concurrently and affectively respond in the feeling or emotion; in seeing a situation as involving potential injury or harm that would affect my well-being, I concurrently feel fear and recognize danger.

Presupposition (2) and justification (4) are present insofar as some set of relevant non-axiological features is a condition for the presence of the feeling or emotion's formal object. Insofar as this necessary condition must be satisfied, we can say that the axiological sense necessarily presupposes the relevant non-axiological sense(s). Moreover, it is just this non-axiological sense that non-inferentially justifies the axiological sense insofar as the recognition of the non-axiological features provides evidential reasons for the belief that the value-attribute that is the formal object of the emotion belongs to the object of the emotion. In the case of fear, for example, that something in the encountered situation can cause harm to myself or someone about whose welfare I care is presupposed by and epistemically justifies the sense of danger. If there is nothing in the situation that can harm me or someone about whose welfare I care, then my fear is unjustified and inappropriate.

It is in this context that we must further consider condition (d). Here is where the nature and import of the first-personal character of feeling and emotions enters the account of justification. Condition (d) arises out of the fact that our object-intending experiences invariably include a moment of self-awareness,[59] and just as our object-intending experiences are a complex of cognitive, affective, and practical moments, so

59 Cf. Drummond, "The Cases of (Self-)Awareness," 199–218.

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too our self-awareness, whether pre-reflective or reflective, encompasses cognitive and affective moments. Hence, in the moment of pre-reflective self-awareness, there is a second-order, self-assessing emotion involved in our first-order object-directed feelings and emotions. This second-order emotion recognizes both the motivational fit between the non-axiological reasons and the emotional response and the evidential fit between the non-axiological reasons and the axiological sense of the emotion's formal object. We can examine these complicated conditions for appropriateness by reconsidering our earlier examples of the ways in which emotions can go "wrong."

When A is angry at B for knowingly misleading her and A then discovers that B did not, in fact, mislead her, a moment of discord is introduced into the cognitive dimension of the emotion. Now recognizing the falsity of the underlying cognition, A is not only no longer angry at B but also feels, say, remorse for the anger directed at B. The remorse is the recognition that the presuppositional and evidentiary senses of foundation were, in fact, absent and that A's anger was neither motivated nor justified.

In another kind of case, the underlying cognition is true and justified—say, B misled A—but A's anger at B is nevertheless unjustified and inappropriate. This situation arises because A does not understand what non-axiological features are presupposed by and justify anger. This introduces a new element into our discussion of justification. A's failure here is in not fully understanding the emotion-concept, a concept that includes some sort of specification of the non-axiological features relevant to experiencing anger at having been wronged. A will live in this inappropriateness until she learns better in what circumstances and under what conditions anger is an appropriate response. Suppose, for example, that anger is inappropriate when B's misleading A is unknowing. Insofar as A comes to know that B's misleading her is unwitting, A's anger is modalized and corrected in a way that is analogous to the correction of cognitive mistakes, namely, by virtue of the introduction of discordance and a kind of "doubt" into the continuing flow of affective experience. A will, at the least, "suspend" her anger and perhaps even regret for having become angry. This change in the affective condition is the recognition that the non-axiological features of the situation do not appropriately motivate the anger and do not justify the attribution of the formal object of anger.

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Both of these cases involve an underlying cognition that was mistaken, as it were, in its "predicate." A's anger would be justified if B knowingly misled A. In the two previous cases, "knowingly misled" is false, either because no misleading was involved or because it was unknowing. The third example is a case where the mistake is in the "subject," not the experiencing subject but the object that is the subject of the non-axiological features. The mistake, in other words, is mistaking the target of the emotion. For example, A, after an especially difficult session, is angry with his therapist when, in fact, he is truly angry at his father.[60] The correction of this mistake requires that A's continued therapy be successful in identifying with whom A is angry and about what wrong A is angry. It is likely in such a case that only a continual therapeutic reflection can and will correct A's mistake. Although this case is different in the manner in which it is mistaken, it is like the two previous cases in that it requires a change in the underlying cognition. Once again, however, the self-assessing emotion—say, embarrassment or regret—regarding the original anger at the therapist is the recognition both of the mistake in targeting and the inappropriateness of the anger.

60 Roberts, *Emotions*, 317.

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The next case is significantly different in that the emotion felt is misidentified. Suppose for the sake of argument that envy can be described in the following way: A feels distress at B's having some good or goods that A lacks and that A desires. Envy is aimed at the person having the goods, and in this, it is opposed both to covetousness, which is directed to the goods themselves as the object of our desires, and to jealousy, which is directed at a person (a rival) insofar as he has (or appears to have) won the affection of a person whose affection the jealous person craves. Moreover, envy is one of those emotions wherein the self is involved not only by virtue of one's pre-reflective self-awareness as envying another, but also by virtue of the fact that the self is included in the intentional content of the emotion. In envy, I am intentionally aware of myself not merely as envious but also as lacking what another has.

I want to consider more closely the kind of envy where A not merely wants but thinks (wrongly) that she deserves what B has, which is already an evaluative judgment and which in this case serves as the ground of the episodic emotion.[61] In such a case, even though a third party might immediately recognize A's envy, A is unaware of her being envious and is instead indignant, another emotion that can involve the self in the intentional content of the emotion. Given her belief that she deserves this good that B has, it is an injustice that B has it while she does not. So, although A is truly envious of B, she originally takes this to be indignation; she truly thinks herself indignant, although she is truly envious. It is only upon reflection that A can realize that her lacking what B has is not an injustice at all, but only misfortune. And it is only then that A can recognize herself as being envious of B, and only then that a self-assessing emotion can play its role.[62]

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All these cases involve reflection of one sort or another, and the self-assessing emotion that registers the inappropriateness of the object-directed emotion itself has the character of reflection. The reflection in question brings evaluative and emotion concepts into play. These concepts capture our shared understanding of what non-axiological features are relevant to what emotions and what value-attributes. So, for example, in recognizing that B did not in fact mislead, A's reflection occurrently recognizes that the non-axiological features of the thing or situation that would underlie anger are absent. Similarly, when A reflectively recognizes that the desert she takes to be in play in her indignation is not truly a matter of desert and that she is envious rather than indignant, she occurrently appeals to shared understandings of desert, of indignation, and of envy. Only insofar as there is an appeal to shared emotion and value concepts can our reflective experience distinguish appropriately motivated emotional experiences and appropriately justified value attributions from those that are not.

Occurrent reflection is not always required in recognizing the inappropriateness of an intentional feeling or emotion. Consider M who, having an inordinate fear of heights, fearfully refuses to go out on an observation deck she knows to have a plexiglass shield

61 The conflict between this example and the thesis that our affective evaluations are rooted in non-axiological presentations is only apparent. More complicated cases wherein the feeling or emotion is rooted in another axiological property are clearly possible, but these in turn will point back to simpler apprehensions of an object's or situation's non-axiological properties. In the case of thinking I deserve the good that *B* has, I would ultimately account for my deserving it by appealing to some set of non-axiological features I possess, just as I would argue with a student that he deserves a failing grade on a paper because it did not show command of the material, was unable to marshal arguments for his position, and was poorly written with ungrammatical constructions and vague or unclear phrasings.

62 I owe this example and this point to Anne Ozar of Creighton University.

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surrounding it so that people will not fall or jump. She truly and justifiably grasps the non-axiological features of the situation and knows it is most unlikely that she would fall. No reflection is necessary; M knows from the beginning and without reflection that the situation is not dangerous and that her fear is inappropriate. What she knows, however, cannot "penetrate" her fear of going out on the deck. In this case, therefore, neither reflection on the truth of the cognitive dimension of M's experience nor reflection on the emotion and value concepts and the circumstances to which those concepts appropriately apply accounts for the recognition of the inappropriateness of her episodic emotion. It is instead the affective dimension within the original experience that discloses the inappropriateness of her fear. In the very moment of experiencing the fear, M is pre-reflectively aware of her inappropriately fearing to go out on the observation deck. She intuitively grasps this inappropriateness in a moment of pre-reflective self-awareness that, much like the experience of objects, has its own affective and evaluative moments. In fearing to go out on the observation deck, she is aware that she has no grounds for her fear and is, say, embarrassed by that fear.[63] Her embarrassment is a negative appraisal of the fear, and it highlights the fact that one aspect of her knowledge of the situation—that is, that the observation deck is safe—fails to justify her fear even as another aspect of her knowledge—that is, that the observation deck is high—along with her fearful disposition motivate it.

The fact that M can be pre-reflectively aware in her embarrassment of the inappropriateness of her fear means that her knowledge of what fear is and in what situations it is appropriate has already been learned and evidenced. Her reflective and critical work has already been done. But the facts that (i) the awareness of the inappropriate emotion is pre-reflectively located in the occurrent self-assessing emotion and that (ii) the reflection on the relevant emotion- and value-concepts is non-occurrent do not negate the idea that truthful emotions always contain as part of their justification a critically reflective dimension that invokes and assesses our understanding of emotion- and value-concepts. While M's knowledge of the facts of the situation cannot penetrate her fear, her learned and evidenced sense of fear and danger grounds her self-assessing emotion that is occurrent with her experience of fear.

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These considerations suggest that condition (d) must also be understood as complex. Its revision, then, would say:

(d) *G*, a (pre-reflectively or reflectively) self-assessing emotion recognizes in accordance with (but not necessarily occurrent reflection upon) the concepts of the emotion *F* and of its formal object *v* that

 (i) *p* fittingly motivates the experience of *F*, and
 (ii) *p* fittingly motivates the degree to which *F* is felt, and
 (iii) *p* rationally justifies the attribution of *v* as based on *x*, *y*, and *z*.

So, does the account of the motivating and justifying foundational structure of the emotions provide an answer to Aristotle's question about "right feelings"? Not quite. The difficulty is that when we say that one *ought* to fear the charging Doberman, the "ought" is not deontic. The point is not that we are morally to respond in that way, but merely that we have good reason to respond in that way. It is fitting or appropriate to

63 Cf. Drummond, "'Cognitive Impenetrability' and the Complex Intentionality of the Emotions," 122–24.

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do so on account of the way things are and the properties they have.[64] The "right" in Aristotle's "right feelings," however, is a moral "right." Aristotle is talking about having morally right feelings with the morally correct intensity. The present analysis, however, confirms our earlier sense that we should be careful not to collapse the axiological into the practical, the evaluative into the moral. Not all evaluations are moral evaluations, and it does not always—if ever—make sense to say that it is immoral to feel fear where fear is not motivated or not justified.

While agreeing that emotions involve evaluations and present an object as valuable or disvaluable, D'Arms and Jacobson argue that philosophical discussions of the appropriateness of the emotions fail to take into account "a crucial distinction between the question of whether some emotion is the right way to feel, and whether that feeling gets it right."[65] They argue in favor of two related theses: (1) "commonplace practices of property ascription presuppose that we can make sense of the fittingness of certain emotional responses" and (2) "moral considerations about the propriety of having an emotional response are irrelevant to whether the associated evaluative property obtains."[66] Confusing these two questions leads philosophers to commit what they call the "moralistic fallacy," i.e., "to infer, from the claim that it would be wrong or vicious to feel an emotion, that it is therefore unfitting." They claim, to the contrary, that "an emotion can be fitting despite being wrong (or inexpedient) to feel."[67]

On their view, whether it is prudent or good for S to feel F or whether, all things considered, S ought to feel F are different questions from "the question of whether [F] is fitting in the sense relevant to whether its [particular object] X is Φ."[68] Their target in these arguments is views comparable to McDowell's, that claim that the features of the object X and its relation to human sensibility are such that merit our feeling F and representing X as Φ. The term "merit" for McDowell is a morally normative term. Hence, for McDowell, to respond to some particular thing, event, or situation as having the value-attribute Φ is to think that feeling F, which represents an object as Φ, is morally appropriate. For example, to respond to a character trait one has as shameful is to think that shame is merited. To think that trait shameful is to think that I (morally) ought to feel shame.

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There are, however, instances where this view of appropriateness falls apart. Consider the case where someone tells a joke, but it would be rude or unbecoming to be amused because the joke is offensive to some group of people. McDowell's position points toward the claim that "considerations about the propriety of an emotion can properly be brought to bear on the ascriptions of these properties; the wrongness of being amused by a joke counts against the claim that the joke is funny."[69] In such cases, there might be moral or prudential reasons not to be amused and, say, not to laugh aloud, but, according to D'Arms and Jacobson, these reasons obtain whether or not the joke

64 Cf. A. C. Ewing, A.C., *The Definition of Good* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948); Daniel Jacobson, "Fitting Attitude Theories of Value," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. E. N. Zalta, URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/fitting-attitude-theories/

65 Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 61 (2000): 66.

66 D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy," 68.

67 D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy," 69.

68 D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy," 71.

69 D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy," 66.

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is funny.[70] D'Arms and Jacobson maintain against McDowell that the only relevant considerations are those reasons that speak to whether an emotion correctly represents its object (e.g., whether the joke is funny).[71] In the case where the joke is funny, to be amused is, if we put aside the moral and prudential reasons, appropriate or, as D'Arms and Jacobson, prefer to say, "fitting." The propriety of feeling the emotion is irrelevant to the fittingness of the feeling or emotion and to the correctness of the value-attribution; the virtuousness (or viciousness) of having a feeling or emotion is not what makes the feeling or emotion fitting (or unfitting).

These considerations reveal that, in at least some cases, our thinking about right feelings moves in two directions simultaneously. We are concerned with the fittingness of feeling F and the correctness of the attribution of the formal value-attribute Φ correlative to F. Both of these directions, however, move us away from the moral sense that is inherent in Aristotle's notion of "right feelings" and its connection to a moral notion of "right." The presence of these two directions is the reason, in condition (c) above, for saying that p is both a motivating reason for the feeling or emotion E and an epistemically justifying reason for the value-attribution Φ. An emotion will be appropriate if it is both motivated (or fitting) and its axiological sense (i.e., its value attribution) is justified. This is the purely axiological sense of "right feeling," but it falls short of Aristotle's moral sense.

Husserl often shades his formal axiology into his discussions of the formal theory of practice and of ethics, and when he does so he risks falling prey to the moralistic fallacy. At other times, however, he is careful to separate the axiological and the practical, and I think this is the proper view to maintain. Hence, the theory of appropriateness outlined herein is a purely axiological account of appropriateness as the confluence of fitting motivation, presupposition, and rational (epistemic) justification.

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At the same time, however, morality is inseparable from the valuation of ends, situations, actions, and persons. So, it remains an open question as to what emotions are morally "right" or "wrong," such that it would make sense for us to condemn someone, say, for failing to feel indignation at the atrocities committed in the Syrian or Sudanese civil wars. This example gives us a clue about how to proceed. As D'Arms and Jacobson concede, when the formal value-attribute ascribed to the particular object by an emotion is itself a moral property—for example, unjust—then, insofar as the experience of indignation is motivated by, presupposes, and is rationally justified by the actions of the agents in these civil wars, the emotion is not only appropriate (motivated and justified) but also "right" from a moral point of view.[72] Such emotions would constitute a class of explicitly moral emotions as opposed to those emotions that do not have moral attributes as their formal objects.

There is another perspective, however, from which we can consider all emotions from a moral point of view. Even those emotions that might be appropriate from a purely axiological point of view—amusement, for example—are relevant to a well-ordered emotional life and to the human well-being that presupposes such a life. Even emotions that do not have a moral attribute as their formal object can in certain circumstances destroy the balance in our emotional life and thereby do damage to living a flourishing

70 D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy," 71.
71 D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy," 66.
72 D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy," 87.

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life. To make the point from the opposite perspective: to the extent that a well-ordered emotional life characterized by an appropriate balance in our emotions, including the balance between first-order, object-directed emotions and second-order, self-assessing emotions, is an element of our well-being, an emotion—and, in particular, an emotional disposition—that disrupts this order would have moral or, perhaps more properly, ethical significance for us. This could be true even when the emotion is appropriate from a purely axiological point of view. There are emotions, in other words, that are appropriate (fittingly motivated and rationally justified) but not good for us. This is the perspective from which it makes sense to say that envy is always wrong to feel. In other words, from this perspective it makes sense to say, in a formulation Aristotle often uses, that one cannot be envious of the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, in the right way, and for the right reason. Envy, as it were, eats away at the soul and issues forth in resentment, disrupting not only our own well-being but our relations with others and their well-being.

Nevertheless, D'Arms and Jacobson are correct to insist on a separation between the axiological and moral. I would add only that I do not think that the appropriateness of an emotion is found only in its fittingness. If we are to take appropriateness as the norm for the emotions—the norm for having the "right feeling"—we must recognize that appropriateness is a compound notion encompassing both fittingness and rational justification, as we have seen in the discussion of the different senses of "foundation" and the clarification of conditions (c) and (d) in discussing the notion of appropriateness. From a phenomenological point of view, then, there is a notion of "right feeling" that differs from the Aristotelian one, a notion for which I think it is better to use the term "appropriate feeling" with its compound sense of fitting and justified. If we take "right" to refer to moral normativity, however, we can preserve the Aristotelian sense of "right feeling," but this requires that we bring into the account not only the relevant emotion-concepts and value-concepts involved in the epistemic justification of an axiological sense but also the moral notions of the goods to be pursued in action, of responsibility, and of both individual and common well-being.

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9 The infinite Academy

Husserl on how to be a Platonist with some (Aristotelian?) help

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Abstract: This study tries to make sense of Husserl's explicit view of the relation between Plato and Aristotle within the general framework of his overall phenomenological project. After a methodological introduction (§1), it indicates how Husserl pictures the role of Plato and Aristotle inside a narrative of the history of Philosophy culminating with his own transcendental phenomenology (§2). Subsequently, the article turns to show how Husserl's distinctive narrative significantly overlaps, even in some of its most specific details, a parallel view widely held in ancient philosophy, especially in Middle-Platonism (§3). This "heuristic filter" will eventually bring us back to Husserl's texts as to shed new light on the articulation between the eidetic (§4) and the transcendental sides of his phenomenology (§5).
Keywords: Husserl, Plato, Aristotle, Middle-Platonism, eidetics, transcendental

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"All people know the same truth. Our lives consist of how we chose to distort it."
Woody Allen

1. A cliché

1.1. "*Do you own a dog or a cat?* If your answer was a dog, you're an Aristotelian. (. . .) If your answer was a cat, you score one as a Platonist." It is in such playful terms that American popular historian Arthur Herman recently introduced a "test" to frame what he calls the Plato vs. Aristotle "Personality Divide" (Herman 2013b). Let aside its humorous style, the test was also meant to reveal the existence of a deeper and less playful "Struggle for the Soul of Western Civilization" (Herman 2013a). A struggle opposing Platonists and Aristotelians of all sorts, on the most fundamental issues of human life.

Of course, one might—and should—frown upon such oversimplification.[1] But laughing at the cat/dog test and dismissing Herman's sweeping statements on the Western soul

1 In case you are curious, these are the reasons for Herman's intriguing assessment: "Aristotle believed human beings were naturally social animals; so are dogs. He also described friendship in his Ethics this way: 'Those who desire the good of their friends for the friends' sake are most truly friends.' Certainly no animal meets that standard more than the dog, Man's Best Friend. The relationship between cats and their owners, as we all know, is spiritual and intuitive. And while dog owners will argue that their relationship with Rex and Rover is spiritual, too, every cat owner knows that the Egyptians worshiped the cat five thousand years ago because its aloof personality embodies the enigma of the Divine—something every Platonist is automatically drawn to" (Herman 2013b). Things gets even more embarrassing in Herman (2013a) where the divide often takes the form of a cheap contest between good guys (Aristotelians) and bad guys (Platonists).

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would be barking at the wrong tree. For the very idea of an overall conflict opposing Plato and Aristotle on almost everything is quite an old cliché, deeply entrenched in the history of modern culture. Not that Antiquity was not aware of the various disagreements between the two authors. Yet from Raphael's arch-famous *School of Athens*—where Plato's finger upwards is contrasted to Aristotle's steady hand, keeping "ideas" at human range—to Samuel T. Coleridge's alleged claim that "every person is either a Platonist or an Aristotelian", modernity has often pictured the Plato-Aristotle relation in terms of *broad conflicting alternatives*. Name it: the ideal vs. the real, the a priori vs. the empirical, the divine vs. the human, the religious/poetic vs. the scientific approach, etc. And, strange as it might seem, this confrontational view holds not only for Italian painters, English poets and American pop historians, but also for trained philosophers from all over the world. Even today, both in and outside the continent—although mostly in analytic philosophy—a good number of scholars still indulge with more or less sophisticated versions of Raphael-like pictures.

1.2. This also happens in Husserl studies. There are mostly two opposed ways of questioning the relation between Husserl, on the one hand, and Plato and Aristotle, on the other. There is the *local* approach, comparing and contrasting Husserl with his illustrious predecessors on specific concepts or selected topics (say, categories, abstraction, perception, phantasy, time, intentionality, etc.); and there is the *global* one—far more ambitious—qualifying Husserl's overall phenomenology, ontology, or methodology, alternatively, as "Aristotelian" or "Platonic".

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Both approaches might certainly be rewarding. And yet each of them has its flaws. For stressing Husserl's local or global "Aristotelianism" or "Platonism" is often an indirect way for *praising* or *blaming* his views, local or global.

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So, to begin with, I would like to make clear what the present study is *not* about. And it is definitively *not* the attempt to show if and to what extent "Husserl's phenomenology" or "Husserl's theory of *xyz*" are—for better or worse, openly or secretly, "in a weak" or "in a strong sense", etc.— "kind-of-Aristotelian" rather than "kind-of-Platonic", or vice-versa. As long as the two labels are used as empty shells to rephrase some general paradigmatic oppositions and smuggle surreptitious assessments, Husserl's alleged "Aristotelianism" (local or global) will appear just as bogus—or convincing—as his supposed "Platonism". As it turns out, Husserl didn't have either dogs or cats.

There are at least two reasons for rejecting this controversial approach. The first is related to Husserl's *explicit view* of the relation between Plato and Aristotle; the second has to do with the *actual position* of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology within the long-term and quite complex history of Platonism and its relation with Aristotelianism.

In what follows, I will explore these two paths according to a very specific strategy.[2] I will first indicate how Husserl actually pictures the role of Plato and Aristotle within a narrative of the history of philosophy culminating with his own project of transcendental phenomenology. In order to do so, I will mostly rely on Husserl's texts from the

2 This strategy, called "heuristic filter", has been already applied to study the relation between the cluster *Meinen/Bedeuten* in descriptive phenomenology (Brentano, Husserl, Marty, Bühler) and its Medieval counterpart *intentio/significatio* (see Majolino-Cesalli 2014). It has also been used, in a slightly different form, to establish the relation to Aristotle of contemporary theories of intentionality, both analytic and continental (Majolino 2016a).

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early 1920s on (see *infra* §2). After that, I will try to show how Husserl's distinctive narrative significantly overlaps, even in some of its most specific details, a parallel view widely held in late ancient philosophy, especially in Middle-Platonism. A view according to which Plato and Aristotle are of a piece, and share the same philosophical agenda (see *infra* §3). This will finally bring us back to Husserl's texts. At this point, we will try to establish, if and to what extent other distinctive Middle-Platonic views *that do not enter into Husserl's explicit narrative* could nevertheless be used to shed some new light on his eidetic (see *infra* §4) and transcendental (see *infra* §5) phenomenology. I will finally wrap things up and draw some general conclusions.

2. A mosaic

2.1. A cursory look at the texts is already enough to state the obvious: Husserl's take on Plato and Aristotle hardly squares with the arch-famous cliché of the *School of Athens*.

Husserl never stages the "proud metaphysical systems (*stolze metaphysische Systeme*) of Plato and Aristotle" as opposing each other, not even in his early lectures (see Hua-Ma III, 230). On the contrary, the two authors are constantly and consistently associated as parts of the same conception of philosophy.[3]

As a result, if one had to change the iconic background of the discussion and forget the *School of Athens*, Husserl's view would appear to be more in line with another, quite remarkable picture, i.e. the picture of *Plato's Academy*, which is shown in a famous mosaic, discovered in Torre Annunziata in 1897, currently displayed at the National Archeological Museum of Naples.

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Extensively commented on by Konrad Gaiser (1980) and more recently by Marwan Rashed (2012), the mosaic shows Aristotle (on the far right) together with (counterclockwise) Xenocrates, Eudoxus of Cnidus, Eratosthenes of Cyrene, Plato, Speusippus and Heraclides Ponticus. All together, they form a community of philosophers, astronomers and scientists discussing, pursuing and developing, both jointly and in different directions, Plato's seminal insights.

The cautious reader of Husserl's lectures of the 1920s on first philosophy (Hua VII, 36–50) and intersubjectivity (Hua XIV, 183), and even the occasional reader of the *Krisis* (Hua VI, 9–12) or the Vienna lecture (Hua VI, 322–6) would easily recognize in this picture a rather familiar Husserlian leitmotiv. Philosophy, Husserl repeatedly says, is the rigorous rational activity of an ongoing trans-national and trans-generational "form of community" (*Gemeinschaftsform*) following Plato's footsteps (Id., 326). Nota

3 This fact is far from being surprising. In his *Lectures on the History of Greek Philosophy*, Brentano (1988) too put Plato together with Aristotle—both deeply influenced by Socrates (Id., 163–4)—at the top of the first "mounting period" (*aufsteigende Periode*) of Greek philosophy (Id., 31–2). According to Brentano's "theory of the four phases", the mounting period is characterized by the presence of two distinctive features: (1) "a lively and pure theoretical interest" (*ein lebendiges und reines theoretisches Interesse*) and (2) "a method (. . .) essentially consistent with the nature of things" (*eine wesentliche naturgemässe (. . .) Methode*) (Id., 20–21). This first period is followed by three phases of "decadence" (*Verfall*): the first, marked by the priority of practical concerns over theoretical interests and marked by the Stoics and the Epicureans (Id., 312–26); the second is "the epoch of the prevailing skepsis" (Id., 21), dominated by the New Academy and Pyrrhonean skepticism (Id., 327–31); and the third, characterized by the raise of mysticism and the search for "immediate intuitive forces", culminating with Neoplatonism (Id., 338–54). Husserl's narrative, as we will see, although having some points in common with Brentano's, is extremely different especially when it comes to the role of skepticism (see *infra* §2.3).

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Figure 9.1 Plato's Academy, mosaic, National Archaeological Musem of Naples

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bene: *not* Plato's theory of the intelligible forms, the anamnesis, or any of Plato's positive doctrines—but the "Platonic idea of philosophy" (*die Platonische Idee der Philosophie*), the "Platonic drives" (*die Platonischen Impulse*) will eventually shape the very notion of "European science" (Hua VII, 15–17).

So let us start here: according to a pretty explicit Husserlian view, that will become increasingly relevant by the beginning of the 1920s, *in some sense*, philosophy as such is Platonic. But in what sense?

2.2. In Husserl's late lectures and talks, philosophy in general is trivially pictured as having a factual birthplace (Greece) and a factual birthdate (between the seventh and the sixth century BC) (Hua VI, 321). What is less trivial, however, is Husserl's account of what might be called its intentional genesis.

Philosophy is in fact, so Husserl, born out of "a *new sort of attitude* of individuals toward the surrounding world" (*eine* neuartige Einstellung *einzelner zur Umwelt*) (ibid.). This new attitude, Husserl continues, fosters "the breakthrough of a totally new form of cultural formation rapidly growing into a systematically self-enclosed cultural formation" (*der Durchbruch einer völlig neuen Art geistiger Gebilde, rasch anwachsend zu einer systematisch geschlossenen Kulturgestalt*) (ibid.):

> The Greeks called it *philosophy* (*Philosophie*). Correctly translated, in the original sense, that means nothing other than universal science, science of the whole of the world (*Weltall*), of the all-encompassing unity of all that is. Soon the interest in the whole, and thus the question of the all-encompassing becoming and being in becoming, begins to particularize itself according to the general forms and regions

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of being, and thus philosophy, the one science, branches out into many particular sciences (ibid.).

Three key tenets then, set the stage for the advent of philosophy *as such*:

(*Phil.1*) a preliminary *individual change of attitude*, raising a theoretical interest toward the all-encompassing unity of all that is; in order to be called "philosophical" such an interest toward the whole has to be "theoretical", not "practical";
(*Phil.*2) the *collective transformation* of such an individual change into a stable ongoing cultural formation, pursued by an instituted community and not by a single person;[4]
(*Phil.*3) the movement of *particularization* of such cultural formation into distinct "sciences", i.e. theoretical disciplines corresponding to the different regions in which "all that is" is articulated. Each of these sciences is pursued by its own "community of researchers" and yet all such communities proceed under the common heading of "*the* unique science" (die *Eine Wissenschaft*).

Thus philosophy qua "cultural formation" (*geitsige Gebilde*) as the *Weltall* becomes the theme of a theoretical (not practical), collective (not merely individual) and internally differentiated (not merely holistic) attitude—an attitude already nested within another, more general one, i.e. the *natural* attitude. In order to become the focus of an explicit overall theoretical interest, the "world"—the "true" (*warhaft*), "actual" (*wirklich*) and "real" (*real*) unity of everything that is, the whole of everything "that can be possibly experienced and known on the basis of what is actually (*aktuell*) experienced and known" (Hua III/1, 8)—*this world* has already to be assumed as existing, posited in its being (see Hua III/1, 6–8). There *is* an overall world, made in *such and such a way*. This amazing fact turns into a theme, triggers the philosophical θαυμάζειν and promotes the constitution of a form of community entirely devoted to its investigation (Hua VI, 331–2).

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2.3. Now, this extremely general account of philosophy should not be conflated with another, narrower, one. This is what Husserl calls "*genuine* philosophy" (*echte Philosophie*). Its initiator is Plato.

Thales, for instance, is one of those "men who create philosophy as a new sort of cultural formation upon the theoretical life" (Id., 332–3). The same holds for Democritus, or Parmenides, whose famous saying "το γάρ αυτό νοείν έστίν τε και είναι" turned into the leading principle of an entire School asserting the "identity" (*Identität*) of "being" (*Sein*) and "thinking" (*Denken*) (Hua XXV, 135). But these were just philosophers in the broad sense of (*Phil.1–3*). At a certain point, Husserl continues, a rupture occurs, a phase of *problematization*. The Sophists's radically skeptical approach

4 According to Husserl, while the collective transformation of a theoretical "line of vision" (*Blickrichtung*) directed toward the "all-encompassing unity of all that is" brings to the birth of philosophy, the corresponding institutionalization of a universal "practical" attitude leads to the constitution of myths and religions. Unlike the philosophical attitude, "the mythical-religious attitude exists when the world as a totality becomes thematic, but in a practical way" (*Mytisch-religiöse Einstellung besteht nun darin, dass die Welt als Totalität thematisch, und zwar praktisch thematische wird*) (Hua VI, 330). The diversion from practical interests as a defining feature of philosophy is famously put forward by Aristotle in *Met*. A 2 (982b, 11–28 and 983a 11–23), to which Husserl implicitly refers in Hua VI, 331–2 (see also Hua VIII, 96).

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ends up shaking the naïve confidence of early philosophers with respect to the all of being, truth and knowledge (ibid.). And it provokes the rise of a new form of philosophy (Hua VII, 8, 311ff.).

Protagoras' account of sensibility defies the idea of an epistemic access to truth; his account of dialectics ruins the trust in rational truth since "everything can be proved or disproved, i.e. for every proposition one can find theoretical reasons to prove it and, at the same time, other equally powerful reasons to disprove it" (Hua XXXV, 269; see also Hua XXV, 135). As for Gorgias—an author extremely important in Husserl's narrative—his "genial paradoxes" (*geniale Paradoxe*) bring the sophistic challenge as far as to attack at once the possibility of true knowledge (Hua XXV, 135–7) and the very existence of an external "*Weltall*" (Hua XXXV, 268, 640, 644). The world of the natural attitude is no longer self-granted. In Husserl's account, Gorgias is often presented as the anti-Parmenides. If Parmenides maintains that "being" and "thinking" are one and the same, then, Gorgias replies, since "thinking" is subjective, "being" has to be subjective as well (Hua XXV, 135–6).[5]

The skeptical attack of the Sophists is thus twofold: on the one hand, they challenge the possibility of an objectively valid truth (Protagoras); on the other, and more radically, they question the actual existence of a transcendent being, of "external objectivities" (*fremde Gegenständlichkeiten*), in principle, accessible to knowledge (Gorgias) (Hua XXV, 137).

This point deserves already to be stressed. Unlike Brentano's (1988, 140) historical picture, where skeptics and sophists represent the "decadent" tendency (*Tendenz*) of philosophy, Husserl's view is far from being dismissive (see Hua VI, 78; Hua VII, 58–9).[6] On the contrary, his assessment of the "radical significance" (*radikale Bedeutung*) of Sophistry for the history of philosophy, as we will see shortly (see *infra* §2.7), can be hardly underestimated. As Husserl emphatically puts it, referring again to Gorgias's discovery of the "enigmatic essence" (*rätselhafte Wesen*) of consciousness and knowledge with respect to the transcendence of being (Hua XXV, 137): "if this is the actual meaning of the Sophist, then he is the discoverer of the critical-rational problem of the possibility of transcendent knowledge" (Id., 136).

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At any rate, by destroying the idea of a "philosophy naively directed toward the external world" (*naiv aussenweltlich gerichtete Philosopie*), the advent of Sophistry has a double outcome (Hua VII, 8):

(*Soph.1*) *positively*—by stating the "problem of the transcendence of consciousness" (*Das Problem der Bewußtseinstranszendenz*) (Hua XXV, 137), it opens the way to the transcendental problem of knowledge (Ibid.; Hua VII, 58–9);

(*Soph.2*) *negatively*—by weakening the "self-consciousness" (*Selbstvertrauen*) in the objectivity of truth, it produces a twofold distress:

5 Gorgias' paradoxes, to which Husserl often refers in his lectures, are the one reported by Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.*, VII, 65–87) and famously introduced by the following three claims: "the first that nothing exists, the second that even if it exists, it cannot be known to man, the third that even if it is knowable, it surely cannot be expressed or communicated to another" (ἓν μὲν καὶ πρῶτον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν στιν, δεύτερον ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἀνθρώπωι, τρίτον ὅτι εἰ καὶ κατάληπτον, ἀλλὰ τοί γε ἀνέξοιστον καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον τῶι πέλας) (fr. B 3).

6 It has to be said, though, that Husserl's reading of the relation between Gorgias and Parmenides has some striking similarities with Brentano's (1988, 150–52).

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(*Soph.2.1*) *theoretical*: "philosophy loses the sense it was aiming at" (*Zielsinn*) (Hua VII, 8);
(*Soph.2.2*) *practical:* "the whole of practical life is deprived of its normative goals" (Hua VII, 8–9).

2.4. It is precisely at this point that the "double star" (*Doppelstern*) Socrates-Plato enter the scene (Hua VII, 8–9; Hua XXXV, 52).

Taking seriously (Hua VII, 16) the Sophistic challenge, Socrates and Plato now consider the transcendence of being, the objectivity of truth and the possibility of knowledge as problems—not only as themes of a general theoretical attitude (Hua VI, 16; Hua XXV, 6). They have to be granted, not merely assumed.

Socrates, the "practical reformer" (Hua VII, 9; Hua XXV, 6; Hua XXXV, 52), takes the inward path, and confronts the Sophists' *practical* challenge, spelled out in (*Soph.2.2*). He thus submits the whole of ethical life to a "radical critique" (Hua VII, 12). Socrates' insights are the following:

(*Soc.1*) he inaugurates a philosophy based on critical "self-reflection" (*Selbstbesinnung*) and the Delphic principle "know thyself!" (Hua VII, 9; Hua XXXV, 52);
(*Soc.2*) he addresses the fundamental contradiction between "unclear opinion and evidence" (*unklare Meinung und Evidenz*), on which practical life ultimately rests (Hua VII, 11, 32);[7]
(*Soc.3*) he understands that "the fundamental meaning" (*Grundsinn*) of method is to be a "clarifying self-reflection accomplished in the apodictic evidence" (*Methode klärende* soc. *Selbstbesinnung sich vollendend in der apodiktischen Evidenz*) (Hua VII, 11);[8]
(*Soc.4*) he implicitly discovers the "intuition of essences" (*Wesensintuition*) (for what results from self-reflection is not limited to the contingently reflecting subject, but has a general and exemplary value) (Hua VII, 10).

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This finally brings us to Plato.

While Socrates applies his insights (self-reflection, evidence, method, intuition of essences) to reform the *practical-axiological* life of individual agents (vs. *Soph.2.2*), Plato uses the same weapons to fight the *theoretical* distress and restore the sense of philosophy as a whole (vs. *Soph.2.1*) (Hua XXV, 52–3). According to Husserl, what we owe to Plato is "the creation of the idea of a true and genuine science" (*die Schöpfung der Idee wahrer und echter Wissenschaft*), the "beginning of a genuine and radical philosophy" (*Anfang zu einer echten und radikaler Philosophie*)" (Hua VIII, 8; Hua XXV, 137; Hua XXXV, 53–4).

2.5. If Presocratics *took for granted* and Sophists variously *criticized* the triad being-truth-knowledge (Hua XXV, 135), Plato's approach is somehow *metacritical* (Hua VII, 16). Accordingly, his way to "genuine philosophy"—applying to (*Phil.1–3)* the

7 All these traits can variously be found in Brentano (1988, 158–64). According to Brentano, Socrates' "hegemony of the insight (*Herrschaft der Einsicht*) has become the fundament of the Platonic doctrine" (Id., 163–4).

8 See: "*Die sokratische Erkenntnismethode ist eine Methode vollkommener Klärung*" (Hua VII, 9).

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Socratic insights (*Soc.1–4*)—is described by Husserl as revolving around five additional and tightly interrelated tenets:

(*Plat*.1) the *refutation of the sophist's arguments* against the objectivity of knowledge by the identification of ideal laws (Hua XXXV, 53);
(*Plat*.2) the invention of the *question of the method*, as a way to make sure that philosophy has actually the cognitive means to realize its ambitions (Hua VII, 13);
(*Plat*.3) the critical focus on the *unity of the* ὄντως ὂν, intended as the totality of what is and can be truly known (Hua VII, 13; Hua VI, 11, 27; Hua XXV, 125–6);
(*Plat*.4) the idea of articulating a first and a "second" philosophy, i.e. the recognition of "a scientific discipline of the beginnings" (*wissenschaftliche Disziplin der Anfänge*) a "*doctrine of the principles*" (*Prinzipienlehre*) whose fundamental task is to investigate *not* the whole of factual being, but the "principles" of all that is and can be known; principles out of which all single sciences of empirical but rationally unified facts ("second philosophies") are ultimately grounded (Hua VII, 13–14);
(*Plat*.5) the task of a *rational reform of individual and collective "active life"* (*handelnde Leben*) in all its aspects: theoretical, practical and axiological (Id., 16).

As it is readily apparent, Plato's "novel idea of philosophy" (Hua VII, 13) is more than a culturally institutionalized and internally articulated theoretical attitude turned toward the world as a whole (see *supra Phil.1–3*) (Hua XVII, 5–8). It is also, and more importantly, the first "formal preliminary drawing" (*formale Vorzeichnung*) (Id., 3), the "living germ" (*lebendige Keime*) (Id., 13) of a form of wisdom that: is opposed to but takes very seriously the skeptical tendencies of Sophistry and, accordingly, reflects about and justifies its own methods and conditions of possibility, looking for certainty and evidence; is critically based on the correlation of the whole of truth and the whole of being—a correlation that is not simply assumed to be so but rationally established; fosters a rational reform of the whole of human life (personal and collective), and does so by identifying the non-factual first principles whose unitary foundational power vouchsafes the existence of the world and its true knowledge. Accordingly, "One can say that it is for the first time with Plato that the pure ideas of genuine knowledge, genuine theory and science, as well as of genuine philosophy—encompassing them all—entered into the consciousness of humanity" (ibid).

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It is specifically in this sense that Plato counts as "the father of all genuine and rigorous science (*aller echten und strengen Wissenschaft*)" (Hua XXV, 53). Husserl's Plato provides philosophy with a second birth. As a result, *all* philosophies taking up the five tenets spelled out above as (*Plat.1–5*) deserve to be ultimately regarded as "Platonic". Somehow in the same way in which—*mutatis mutandis*—all sciences after Galileo ought to be called "Galilean". But more on this later.

As for the moment, let us simply stress what follows. If one agrees to consider "philosophy" as the "cultural formation" (*geistige Gebilde*) (see *supra* §2.2) revolving around a particular change of attitude, then "Platonism" turns out to be the name of a *habitualized new change of attitude occurring within the originally philosophical attitude itself*—a new variety of "universal attitude" triggered by the confrontation with the devastating force of the sophistical *skepsis* (see Figure 9.2).

If this is correct, one should thus distinguish between two, often overlapping although quite different, understandings of the term "Platonic" (*Platonisch*) in Husserl's writings.

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

Figure 9.2 The system of attitude

On the one hand, we find the reference to Plato's doctrines (*Lehre*, *Lehrgehalt*); on the other, the indication of Plato's way (*Weg*, *Idee*). All passages of Husserl's works explicitly mentioning or simply alluding to the dialectical method (Hua XXV, 126), the doctrine of intuitive ideal forms (Hua XXV, 123), the participation (Hua VI, 20), the anamnesis (Hua VI, 370), or the idea of the Good (Hua XXV, 278), variously belong to the former. They refer to the specific way in which Plato himself has fulfilled the Platonic ideal.[9]

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As for the rest, the term "Platonic" can also be used as the emphatic name for a "drive" (*Impulse*). An "intention" (*Meinung*) to be fulfilled; a "teleological idea" (*Zweckidee*) to be followed—not a set of doctrines to be claimed or preserved. And it is precisely in this sense that, though sometimes eager to call himself a "Platonist" (see *infra* §5.8), Husserl nevertheless explicitly rejects the emphatic slogan "*zurück zu Platon!*" (Hua XXV, 206; Hua VII, 335).

2.6. It is precisely within the framework of this Platonic "second birth of philosophy" that Husserl's take on the relation between Plato and Aristotle has to be rightly located.

As already pointed out (see *supra* §2.1), Husserl never feels the need to oppose Aristotle to Plato in any meaningful way. Moreover, even when he employs the straight-forward "platonic" talk of ideal objects "such as numbers, propositions, pure genera and species etc.", he does so by "utterly disregarding the conflict opposing Platonism and Aristotelianism" (Hua 1913, 131). Thus, just as in the mosaic of Pompeii, Husserl's narrative consistently pictures Aristotle as *one remarkable character of Plato's Academy*. A character taking the path of "genuine philosophy" and pursuing his master's agenda with other means.

9 This certainly includes the critical discussion of "ideas qua objects" (*Ideen als Gegenstände*) and the endorsement of Lotze's or Bolzano's perspective on ideal being, most clearly discussed under the head "Platonism" in the *Entwurf einer Vorrede* (Hua 1913, 119–20 and 125–33; 323–8). But, more importantly, the distinction between Platonic doctrine and Platonic drive can also shed new light on Husserl's account of Galilean physics in the *Krisis*. When Husserl talks of the "migration of the Platonic forms into nature" he explicitly refers to the particular doctrine of the μέθεξις: "For Platonism reality had a more or less accomplished *Metexis* with ideality" (Hua VI, 20). Galileo is thus an offspring of Plato both in the broad and in the narrow sense.

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Husserl's view of Aristotle thus follows a very precise path. On a quite general level, both Plato and Aristotle are equally credited for having recognized the fundamental role of the philosophical θαυμάςειν, intended as a form of interest toward the whole of being turned into a theoretical "attitude" (*eingestellt*) and stabilized into a collective "habit" (*habituell geworden*) (Hua VI, 331–2). Following Socrates, they both take "human being" (*der Mensch*) and its place in the world as the "grand theme" (*zum grossen Thema*) of their research (Id., 341). But, as we know, these are extremely general points of agreement (see *supra* §2.2).[10] What is more significant, instead, is the list of Aristotle's achievements literally presented by Husserl as "realizations" (*Verwirklichungen*) or "implementations" (*Weiterentwicklungen*) or "developments" (*Fortführungen*) of Plato's idea (*Idee*) of philosophy:

> The new philosophy born out of Plato's dialectics, logic, general metaphysics (Aristotle's first philosophy), mathematics, the sciences of spirit and of nature with their different disciplines (as physics, biology, psychology, ethics and politics) were just incomplete realizations of the Platonic idea of philosophy.
>
> (Hua VII, 17)

> After the general idea of a rational science conceived by Plato and fruitfully developed by Aristotle went through, minds were captivated by the task of realizing such idea in always new rational sciences—a task that would set the agenda for all further developments.
>
> (Id., 52).

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More specifically, in Aristotle's case:

(*Ari.1*) he takes up the Sophist's challenge to the objectivity of knowledge by pursuing the project of a "platonic foundation of logic" (*platonische Begründung der Logik*) and systematically developing Plato's dialectics into a regimented logic of consequence (Hua VII, 17; Hua XVII, 12, 53, 76, 418);
(*Ari.2*) he extends Plato's idea of science to the field of subjectivity, and creates "the first outline of a universal science of subjectivity" (*ein erster Entwurf einer universalen Wissenschaft von der Subjektivität*) (Hua VII, 52–3);
(*Ari.3*) he does so in connection with the problem of practical and ethical agency (Id., 51);[11]
(*Ari.4*) he develops a "universal doctrine of being" (*allgemeine Seinslehre*) articulated in different although intimately unified fields (Id., 183);
(*Ari.5*) his original conception of metaphysics as "πρώτη φιλοσοφία" echoes the originally Platonic "theoretical intent" (*theoretische Absicht*) of a doctrine of the first principles (Id., 5).

10 Unless one wants to see already in Plato's and Aristotle's awareness of the founding role of the θαυμάςειν the application of a "self-reflective" approach. Husserl's texts, however, are not so explicit on this point.

11 Sophistical skepsis in the field of knowledge and truth has its ethical parallel in hedonism. Husserl defines in fact "hedonism" (*Hedonismus*) as "the the form of skepticism grounded in the essence of the ethical domain" (*die am Wesen des ethischen Gebiets selbst begründete Gestalt des Skepticismus*" (Hua XXXVII, 78). He subsequently refers to Aristotle's critique of Eudoxus' arguments in *Eth. Nic.* X, 1172b (Id., 78–9 and 66; also Hua VI, 51). On the topic see Majolino-Trizio 2014.

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Aristotle is thus presented as fighting Plato's philosophical fight on all its fronts: logic (with his analytics), ethics (with his critique of hedonism and theory of values), ontology (with the establishment of a science of subjectivity related with all other particular sciences of being) and first philosophy (with his general metaphysics). And this holds true even if, just as in the mosaic of Pompeii, Aristotle ends up turning his back to Plato and disagreeing on some relevant points of the latter's doctrine.

A further point to be stressed is that Husserl's narrative repeatedly associates Aristotle's name to Euclid's, to show how the Platonic ideal has been differently realized in the Greek world.

Husserl calls Euclid as "a known Platonist" (*ein bekannter Platoniker*) and "the first classical author having systematized pure mathematics" (Hua VII, 34). On the one hand, he is the first one having developed a "material ontology" on the basis of "Plato's doctrine of the ideas" (*der Platonischen Ideenlehre*) (Hua XXV, 132). And, in this sense, Euclid's geometry, dealing with space and spatial figures in general—i.e. with the "ideal form of all physical objects in general"—is clearly a "Platonist" in the most *doctrinal sense* of the term (ibid.). But Husserl adds an additional element to the story. "Inspired by Eudoxus", Euclid has also delivered the "first accomplished project of a purely rational science according to the ideal of the Platonic school" (Hua VII, 34). Euclid's *Elements* are therefore "Platonic" in a twofold sense. As for their geometrical content, they belong to material-ontology and deal with "idealities" as discovered by Plato's theory of forms; as for their systematic deductive form, they are a model of rigorously connected truths and propositions, gesturing toward the disciplines of the *mathesis*.

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Now, "the *Analytics* founded by Aristotle, a direct student of Plato, (. . .) formed the basis of a rational discipline in the same sense" as Euclid's *Elements* (Id., 35). Hence the two works, providing the first formal outlines of the twin *formal* disciplines of formal apophantics and formal mathematics, are often presented by Husserl side by side, illustrating the very first, still incomplete and yet quite "powerful" (*gewaltige*), attempts to realize Plato's ideal of science (Id., 52; see also Hua XVII, 1–2 and *passim*). At the same time, Aristotle and Euclid have also pursued Plato's agenda in the *material* field: the former with his geometry (following Plato's doctrine of the ideas), and the latter with his psychology (rejecting Plato's doctrine of the ideas).

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Whether Euclid was actually a Platonist, as traditionally claimed by Proclus, is certainly a matter of dispute.[12] What are hardly disputable, however, are the general points relating Aristotle with the Platonic "ideal": Aristotle develops Plato's dialectics in new ways (*An. Pr.* I, IV, 46a and V, 57a; *Met.* B, 1, 995b); he stresses the importance of method and aims of philosophical inquiry as being part of this inquiry itself (*Eth. Nic.* 1095 a30–b; cf. *Resp.* 511 a3–c2 and *Phd.* 101 c9–102 a1); he criticizes sophistry (*Ref. Soph.* I, 164a 20–30); he considers these two aspects as having a high moral and educational goal (*An. Pr.* 639a 4–15); he inaugurates a science of the soul (*De An.* I, 1, 402a 1–15); and he is concerned with the problem of the unity of science (*Met.* B 2–3, 996a 18–998a 19; *Met.* Γ 1 1003a 21–6) within which he articulates a first and a second philosophy (*Met.* E 1, 1025b 1–32). Insofar as these facts meet the general criteria (*Plat.1–5*) to define a broadly construed concept of Platonism, for Husserl it is fair to say that Aristotle is definitively following a "Platonic" drive. As a result, all critiques he

12 On the topic see the extensive introduction in Acerbi (2007, especially 16 ff.).

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might have eventually addressed to this or that otherwise crucial point of the Platonic doctrine (*Lehre*) (be it the rebuttal of separate intelligible forms or the criticism of Plato's epistemology) are, at least from Husserl's standpoint, hardly enough to sever the Aristotelian plant from Plato's philosophical roots.[13]

2.7. Now, just as in the mosaic of Pompeii, Husserl's Aristotle argues *with* Plato, *against* Plato, but always *as* a member of Plato's Academy. Belonging to the circle of "genuine philosophers" sharing the same idea of science. But, as already anticipated (see *supra* §2.1), there is more.

One might have noticed, in fact, that the mosaic represents Plato just as one member of his own Academy. Pictured as the third man from the left, Plato is neither put right in the middle, nor is he in a higher position with respect to his fellow discussants. Likewise, having learned to distinguish between "doctrine" (*Lehre*) and "ideal" (*Idee*, *Impuls*),[14] we are now in a good position to see to what extent even Husserl's Plato is somehow a Platonist, just as Aristotle. *Primo inter pares*, Husserl's Plato is the first of a long list of what might be called *asymptotic Platonists*, i.e. actual approximations to the idea of a genuine philosophy whose first factual instantiation is to be found in Plato's own dialogues.

Consequently, even Plato's specific way of fulfilling the Platonic project has its flaws and calls for completion. For instance, according to Husserl, Plato did not properly recognize the first—positive—contribution of Sophistry (*Soph.1*):

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> The great philosophical sense, that brought Plato to a completely radical doctrine of the method, went lost already with his successors. And this happened all the more easily that (as we will explain later below) he did not grasp the core-points of a *transcendental philosophy* lying in Gorgias's skepticism" (*Und das um so leichter, als er die in der Gorgiasschen Skepsis* (. . .) *liegenden Keimpunkte einer* transzendentale Philosophie *nicht ergriff*).
>
> (Hua XXV, 127)

And not unlike Aristotle, Plato remains on the verge of the genuine philosophical science he wanted to achieve:

> Despite all his efforts to ground a logic in such a radical spirit, Plato couldn't make it to the necessary beginnings and methods (*zu den notwendingen Anfängen und Methoden drang er nicht durch*), and already Aristotle fell into the very natural tendency to take the pre-given world for granted (*selbstverständlichkeit einer vorgegebenen Welt*), thus giving up to such a radical foundation of knowledge. So the ancient science, despite all its ambition to be philosophy, to be a science

13 We have already suggested that, in some sense—*mutatis mutandis*—one might be tempted to say that Husserl's "Plato" stands to the idea of "genuine philosophy" as the "Galileo" of the *Krisis* stands to the idea of "modern science". These latter remarks show that, although somehow correct, the parallel would not go very far. Many reasons could be suggested, but one seems to be quite compelling: Husserl never suggests that Plato was a "concealing Genius" (*verdeckendes Genius*) (Hua VI, 53). Accordingly, there is nothing to "uncover" or "unconceal". Plato's project has to be "realized" or "radicalized".

14 In the *Krisis*, Husserl makes a similar distinction for the second leading character of his narrative, Descartes. He distinguishes between Cartesian "motives" from Cartesian "themes". On the topic, see Majolino 2008a, 174–84.

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> indeed ultimately justified, despite its remarkable achievements, could only reach the level of what we call the dogmatic science (*dogmatische Wissenschaft*), and what we take to be only as a preliminary level of a genuine philosophical science, not this science itself.
>
> (Hua VII, 56)

Husserl repeatedly insists on this point: Plato's dialectics could eventually restore the trust into the objectivity of knowledge (a truth valid in itself), but was literally "powerless" (*machtlos*) when confronted to the "problem of transcendence" (Hua XXV, 137). Hence, since the Sophist's *transcendental* problem (see *Soph.1*) is unresolved, *the silent weight of the natural attitude on the overall philosophical attitude still remains unnoticed*. This is the main reason why Plato's first realization of the Platonic ideal remains wanting. And, quite paradoxically, this is also why the actual Plato turns out to be the first "failed Platonist".

At any rate, since philosophy is a structurally collective and institutionalized endeavor (see *Phil.2*), this cannot be the end of the story. For other "asymptotic Platonists" will eventually step in, starting with Aristotle, with his quite remarkable accomplishments in logic, metaphysics and ontology, cutting across the different regions of being and even exploring "the mental life as a scientific theme" (Id., 52).

And yet, in Husserl's view, even Aristotle's second asymptotic Platonism is defective, and needs to be strengthened and further radicalized. The reason is the same: Aristotle is still unable to really face what Husserl now emphatically calls "the immortality of skepticism" (*Unsterblichkeit der Skeptizusmus*), the "fundamental significance" (*grundsätzliche Bedeutung*) of the *Skepsis* (Id., 58–5). One should show the "truth" (*Wahrheitsgehalt*, *Wahrheitssin*) of Gorgias's skepticism, not stigmatize it; one should face the transcendental challenge not avoid it—it is only in this way that Plato's ideal could finally have a chance to prevail (Id., 58).

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It is Descartes who, according to Husserl, will eventually pick up the philosophical torch and reactivate the original Platonic, then Aristotelian drive (Id., 7–8; see also Hua XXV, 138–9). Descartes not only thinks *with* Plato and *against* Plato, but also—and for the first time—*with* Gorgias and *against* Gorgias.

This point, often neglected, deserves to be strongly emphasized. Why does Husserl actually praises Descartes? Neither for the doctrine of method, nor for having stressed the difference between evident and non-evident knowledge. All these insights are extremely general and, as pointed out above (see *supra* §2.6), belong to the Platonic heritage as such. No, Descartes is rather credited for having identified that "absolutely necessary beginning of philosophy" that Plato and Aristotle were looking for (respectively in the doctrine of the intelligible forms and in that of the substance) with the "knowledge of oneself" (*Selbsterkenntnis*, *Selbstbesinnung*) (Hua VII, 8). The evident principles of a first philosophy, needed to ground truth, knowledge and being, only appear to self-reflection.

It does not come as a surprise then, if the last words of the *Cartesian Meditations* (Hua I, 183) report not only a slightly modified version of Augustine's maxim "noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas" (see *De vera religione*, I, 39, 72) but also—and more importantly—its Greek matrix, i.e. the Socratic principle "γνῶθι σαυτόν": "know thyself"! (see above *Soc.1*). A principle that Plato's *Charmides* (164d–165b) presented as an injunction (σωφρόνει) inscribed on the temple of Delphi and Husserl takes as an indication of the right path to be taken by a *transcendental* genuine

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philosophy. With transcendental phenomenology, Husserl says, "The Delphic saying γνῶθι σαυτόν has acquired a new meaning (*eine neue Bedeutung*)" (Hua I, 39, 183).

Let me insist on this issue: *the whole point of transcendental phenomenology as a "new cartesianism"* (Hua I, 3), *is to provide the* γνῶθι σαυτόν *with a new meaning*. At this point, Husserl's *prima facie* somehow trivial idea of a Socrates qua ethical reformer as opposed to Plato's more theoretically oriented intents, becomes extremely original. For, as we have seen, Socrates' insights revolving around the principle "know thyself!" were meant to face only the *practical* distress provoked by the second Sophist challenge (*Soph.2.2*) (see *supra* §2.4). After that, they are generalized by Plato (*Plat.1–5*) and applied to the *theoretical* distress (*Soph.2.1)* (see *supra* §2.5). What Husserl suggests now is that the full force of the eidetic (*Soc.4*) evidence (*Soc.3*) generated by the γνῶθι σαυτόν (*Soc.1*) should be methodically (*Soc.2*) mobilized to take up the *first* sophistic challenge (*Soph.1*), i.e. the one *denying the very existence of the world and following the transcendental lead*. For it is true that Aristotle inaugurates the science of subjectivity. But the subjectivity Aristotle's psychology deals with, is still a piece of natural philosophy, a factual psycho-physical animated being (see Hua VII, 53–5). And if Descartes' Platonism is also a failed one, it is because he takes the *ego* as a "fragment of the world" (*Endchen der Welt*), just as in the Aristotelian-Scholastic psychology of the *mens sive animus sive intellectus* (Hua I, 63; Hua XXV, 167).

By contrast, the subject of the Socratic "γνῶθι σαυτόν" is *not* a piece of anthropology, psychology, or natural science. And *this* is what Descartes' *Meditations* ultimately understood, although in a rather confused (Hua VII, 61–3) and distorted way (Id., 65–6; Hua I, 63–4).

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So, strange as it might seem, the modern turn to subjectivity operated by Descartes and prepared by Augustine (Hua VI, 61; Hua I, 39, 183) is *not* seen by Husserl as a departure from, but as a "radicalization" (*radikalizierung*) of, an originally Socratic-Platonic gesture. And its "radicalism" consists precisely in the fact of opposing to the "enigmatic" subjectivity of the Sophists the subjectivity of the Socratic γνῶθι σαυτόν—out-of-the world and yet capable of insuring the transcendence of knowledge, truth and being. This is the reason why Descartes is not a "founder" (*Begründer*) but a "pioneer" (*Bahnbrecher*) (Hua XXV, 166): the eidetic science of what evidently appears after having followed the injunction "γνῶθι σαυτόν" in its relation with the project of a first philosophy still needs to be established.

2.8. If the above is correct, the seven characters in the middle of the mosaic of Pompeii, seen through Husserl's lenses, hardly appears as a closed set.

Plato's *actual* Academy was only the factual-historical core-community of "scientific researchers of a science" (*Gemeinschaft der wissenschaftlichen Forscher einer Wissenschaft*) (Hua XIV, 213), factually-historically gathered around "the father of all genuine science" (Hua VII, 12). But, as we have seen, such a community is meant to be extended. Or, at least, it will be necessarily extended as long as *the truth of Sophistry will not be recognized by and become part of genuine philosophy itself*. As we know (see *supra* §2.7), Husserl is adamant in declaring that the Platonic idea of philosophy has not been fulfilled by "any historically transmitted philosophical system" (*keineswegs (. . .) in irgendeinem der historischen überlieferten philosphischen Systeme erfüllt*) (Id., 5). Not even by Plato's own system.

It is an "infinite task" (*unendliche Aufgabe*) (Hua VI, 324) that continuously calls for completion. Socrates, Plato, Euclid, Aristotle, Augustine, Descartes, but also the

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Stoics (Hua VII, 17–30) and Leibniz (Id., 182–99) will all eventually step into the family picture of the *philosophia perennis* (Id., 6). In Husserl's view, taken all together, they draw the ongoing and always incomplete mosaic of an *infinite Academy*.

Not unexpectedly, at the far bottom of the picture, a place is left for Husserl's own transcendental phenomenology itself. The last, "still incomplete approximation" (*noch unvolkommene Approximation*) (Hua VII, 6) to the Platonic asymptote.[15] The last frontline of what Husserl emphatically pictures as the confrontation between the "*unendlichkeit*" of Plato's Academy and the "*unsterblichkeit*" of Gorgias's Sophistry.

3. A bunch of distortions

3.1. Let us pause for a moment and put Husserl's narrative at some distance.

Husserl is obviously not alone in defending a philosophical view bringing Plato and Aristotle under a common heading, within a grand narrative of the Western philosophical tradition. Let us remind ourselves for instance, of the quite disparaging words of Bertrand Russell, stigmatizing the secret complicity between Aristotle and his master:

> Aristotle's Metaphysics, roughly speaking, may be described as Plato diluted by common sense. He is difficult because Plato and common sense do not mix easily. When one tries to understand him, one thinks part of the time that he is expressing the ordinary views of a person innocent of philosophy, and the rest of the time that he is setting forth Platonism with a new vocabulary.
>
> (Russell 1946, 150)

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Or Derrida's (1967, 11–12) broad construal of the "phono-logocentric metaphysics of presence", lumping together not only Plato and Aristotle but the whole of the so-called Western philosophical tradition (including Heidegger and even the early Lévinas). Now, in all these cases, what unites Aristotle and Plato is either a set of explicitly professed theories (Russell), or an unspoken tacit presupposition (Derrida). It is *not*, like in Husserl, the idea of a shared "attitude" turned into a deliberately assumed "task" and whose *repetition* is justified by the persistence of a certain theoretical and practical distress.

The fact is, that Russell and Derrida are content in their time, and look at the pair Plato-Aristotle somehow from the outside. They believe to see what the latter could not see; they assume they are aware of something of which neither Plato nor Aristotle were aware. They have reached a peak (historical and theoretical) from which the common ground on which both the Lyceum and the Academy are supposedly built, appears at clear distance. In short, they are above and beyond the authors they are talking about.

Husserl, by contrast, openly locates himself *within* the very tradition he is willing to describe. Being himself part of the "infinite Academy" (see *supra* §2.8), part of a past that has not passed yet, he sees his own activity not as understanding what Plato and Aristotle didn't or couldn't understand—be it accidentally or essentially—but as trying

15 In this chapter, I do not distinguish—as I should—"Academic", "Platonic" and "Platonist" (see, for instance, Bonazzi 2003). For, as we will see shortly, Husserl's framework consists precisely in blurring the boundaries between the three terms.

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to do what they also tried to do, although with different means. *Husserl sees himself as one of the characters of the mosaic*. Accordingly, his overall narrative/reconstruction is not supposed to criticize the Greek ancestors of Western philosophy from a Modern point of view. Nor is it meant to endorse the more or less nostalgic view according to which the Greeks "got" something that we, Moderns, have sadly lost.

In Husserl's view, contemporary philosophy is still struggling with the same issues that have prompted the historical beginning of philosophy itself. It is still fighting against the skeptical tendencies of Sophistry. And is still tormented by the same distress that other asymptotic Platonists like Descartes had to face some centuries later (see Hua I, 46–7). If there is a *philosophia perennis*, there is also an *angustia perennis*.

Sure, if one looks at Husserl's narrative with a certain detachment, it is not hard to recognize something of the famous saying "*nanos gigantum humeris insidentes*" acting behind his account of the history of philosophy. Something quite common-sensical indeed. But the idea that the unresolved conflict with skeptical Sophistry still haunts the philosopher of the twentieth century just as it haunted Descartes in the sixteenth and all "philosophical beginners" from the fifth century BC on, gives an entirely different flavor to this Medieval phrase.

Since the truth of Sophistry has not been fully recognized so far, Sophistry has still the same power to undermine truth and restate the problem of transcendence. Since the philosopher has failed to master the sophist *from within*, the sophist has finally mastered the philosopher. As a result, philosophy has variously turned into a practical-axiological attitude toward the *Weltall* disguised in theoretical clothes. A sort of "secular religion" or "logical mythology", where there are "so many philosophers and almost equally many philosophies" (*so viele Philosophen und fast eben so viele Philosophien*) (Hua I, 46). Where sciences, whose defining concepts remain unclarified, dismiss their "philosophical" status and turn into mere "theoretical technologies".[16] And where the choice of a philosophical theory over another sometimes seems to be a mere matter of taste.

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Hence, Husserl's saddened and scornful remark in the "Introduction" to the *Cartesian Meditations*:

> Instead of a unitary living philosophy, we have a philosophical literature growing beyond all bounds and almost without coherence. Instead of a serious discussion among conflicting theories that, in their very conflict, demonstrate the intimacy with which they belong together, the commonness of their underlying convictions, and an unswerving belief in a true philosophy, we have a pseudo-reporting and a pseudo-criticizing, a mere semblance of genuine philosophizing with and for one another (. . .) To be sure, we still have philosophical congresses. The philosophers meet but, unfortunately, not the philosophies. The philosophies lack the unity of a mental space in which they might exist for and act on one another. It may be that, within each of the many different "schools" or "lines of thought", the situation is somewhat better. Still, with the existence of these in isolation, the total philosophical present is essentially as we have described it. In this unhappy present, is not our situation similar to the one encountered by Descartes in his youth?"
>
> (Hua I, 46–7)

16 This point is extremely well taken and understood within the general framework of Husserl's *Krisis* in Trizio 2016.

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If Husserl appears to be critical with respect to the "philosophy" of his own time, it is precisely because he thinks that what Plato and Aristotle could not achieve, what they have transmitted to the infinite Academy as a *valuable* project, is now wrongly deemed as unachievable; what motivated the genuinely critical stance of philosophy—i.e. the confrontation with the Sophist *and* the interest into the *Weltall*—is no longer felt as a driving and compelling force for thinking and acting. The existence of the world is *taken for granted*, and the existence of truth has become *indifferent*. The Sophist has won over the genuine Philosopher because no one feels the need to take the challenge seriously anymore. The *philosophia perennis* has become outdated, because the *angustia perennis* has been numbed.

This diagnosis widely explains why Husserl's relation to asymptotic Platonists like Plato, Aristotle, or Descartes is not that of a commentator, an advocate, or an opponent, with respect to their specific doctrines.[17]

He does not extract from the Aristotelian-Platonic corpus any particular "argument" to discuss or test. He does not uncover any hidden "presupposition" to expose or de-construct. He does not want to go "back" (*zurück*) to the Ancient Greeks or to the Cartesian origin of modernity either (Hua XXV, 206). What we have instead is the explicit endorsement of an overall project, a way of conceiving philosophy—*and* the employment of all possible conceptual tools developed in the philosophical tradition, freely mixed up, readjusted and allegedly improved, in order to fulfill the project's proper task. So it is not a matter of *interpreting* an author or a text, but of *contributing to a cause*. Husserl confronts the history of philosophy not as a hermeneutist, but as an activist.

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In this sense, his anti-hermeneutical approach is akin to what historians of Ancient Philosophy have studied under the name of "βοήθεια", "true help".

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The term is probably introduced by Aristotle to refer—maybe mockingly—to those Academics (Speusippus, Xenocrates) having tried to "rescue" Plato's cosmological picture of the *Timæus* from its contradictions (*De Cælo* I, 10 297b 32–280a 2). More generally, it is used to describe different authors having approached Plato's doctrines with the idea of "lending a helping hand", as it were, and bolstering the gist of his philosophy by any means.

This would happen in two different ways:

(*Boet.1*) one could help Plato by explicitly "correcting" his doctrine on some controversial points—as did Speusippus with his rejection of the intelligible forms (see *Met.* Z. 2, Λ 6, M 8–9);

(*Boet.2*) or one could also tacitly introduce new elements, often taken from the conceptual toolkits of rival schools (mostly the Stoics), if not from Aristotle's "system" itself, considered as already consistent with Plato's—as it will happen in later forms of Imperial Platonism (see *infra* §3.3).

Obviously, the procedure ends up generating various forms of more or less overtly assumed philosophical contaminations. But this was deemed to be acceptable. For the βοήθεια was not supposed to provide a mere apology or preserve a binding form of

17 Husserl barely quotes any text, and all his allusions to Plato's, Aristotle's or Descartes' actual doctrines are always vague and generally elusive.

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orthodoxy. It was rather a way to introduce—be it explicitly or implicitly—a pragmatically acceptable degree of heterodoxy useful to restate and reinforce the overall validity of the original claims defended.

Mutatis mutandis, this is exactly what Husserl does: he both *corrects* and *contaminates* Plato for Plato's sake. *Except* that—as we have seen—his βοήθεια is not intended to lend a hand to Plato's doctrines themselves, but to that Platonism of which Plato's doctrines were the first factual example. So Husserl, quite literally, tries to "help out". He sees himself as giving his specific, hopefully decisive, contribution to the *still valuable cause* of the infinite Academy.

Just as Aristotle, Descartes and many others did before him.

3.2. But still. Despite this charming idea of a "helpful" Husserl, one might suspect, however, that the overall narrative sketched above is flawed by fairly modern prejudices.

In fact, even if we leave aside for the moment the transcendental issue and the question of the unsurpassable weight of the natural attitude (both related to the more technical core of Husserl's thought), there are certainly quite compelling reasons to contest Husserl's idea of the infinite Academy.

To begin with, one might be tempted to ask whether the very idea of a somehow "systematic Plato", fundamentally compatible with Aristotle, the Stoics, Descartes, Leibniz, etc., etc. is something more than a plain and simple myth. A myth made of a quite recent and patently Modern fabric. Besides, was the "true" Plato really a systematic thinker? As is well known, Plato delivered his thoughts in the fragmentary form of dialogues. Such dialogues are sometimes aporetic and sometimes lead to quite conflicting views. Moreover, even the picture of a systematic Aristotle is far from being uncontroversial. If one follows Aubenque's (1962) famous reading of the *Metaphysics*, for instance, Aristotle appears not as "the master of those who know", but as the hesitant and open-ended "travel companion of those who search". He looks for a science that does not and cannot exist, but can only be sought: the science of being qua being.

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Finally, one could also remind that major and incompatible disagreements oppose many of the authors happily lumped together by Husserl. One might in fact have serious reservations about the actual possibility to make Aristotle's terms *logic* and *ontology of the substance* compatible with a Stoic *propositional logic* and *materialistic ontology*. Even more generally, one could also cast some serious doubts on the actual extent to which, notwithstanding their manifest differences, both Aristotle and the Stoics should actually be seen as pursuing the same "Platonic" agenda. And if one adds Descartes or Leibniz to the picture, things become even more byzantine.

In sum, for all these reasons, it may sound fairly reasonable—at least *prima facie*—to brand Husserl's picture of the history of philosophy, with its improbable eclectic syncretism, as the vagary of "the last of modern rationalists" (Granel 1976)—unaware of the complexity of the history of philosophy, and therefore victim of its unspoken commitments and unshakable prejudices.

And yet, it is precisely the complexity of the history of philosophy that, at least in part, may come to the rescue of Husserl's picture.

3.3. Allow me a short digression.

In one of his most luminous studies, Richard Sorabji (1991) has examined the historical development of the concept of intentionality from Aristotle to Brentano. As is well known, Brentano had repeatedly claimed that his account of intentional

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in-existence was somehow "Aristotelian" and maintained that Aristotle's doctrine of the αἴσθησις as presented in *De An.* II.12 supports a very similar if not the same view (Brentano 1874: 115–16; 1975: 119–20). Brentano's idea is that a concept (here "intentional in-existence") deserves to be called "Aristotelian" if it is *faithful* to some of Aristotle's original insights, i.e. if one of its versions can be explicitly found, with some degree of approximation, in Aristotle's texts. Following this lead, some prominent scholars have confirmed Brentano's account and found a Brentano-like theory of intentionality in Aristotle.[18]

But Sorabji's study put this whole picture literally upside-down.

In the course of a very detailed historical survey, he pointed out—somehow paradoxically—that if Brentano's "intentional inexistence" *does indeed* deserve to be called "Aristotelian"; it is precisely because *nothing* even remotely similar can be found in Aristotle's own account of the αἴσθησις. As a matter of fact, it was only after a centuries-long series of "revisions" and "transformations" and "distortions" of Aristotle's originally physiological theory of perceptual visual process that his account of the αἴσθησις could finally turn into something sufficiently differentiated and dematerialized to foster Brentano's interpretation in terms of intentional in-existence.

This series of revisions made by various waves of commentators (some of them having Neoplatonic or Stoic inclinations), deeply modified the original Aristotelian account of sense-perception, finally changing into something completely different from Aristotle's original own view. Thus Brentano's concept of intentionality should not be labeled as "Aristotelian" because of its putative elaboration from or agreement with Aristotle's theory of mind. Rather, to put it in Sorabji's terms, because it was the "*culmination of a series of distortions*" whose starting point and basic materials are actually to be found in Aristotle:

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> (. . .) we have seen that the reinterpretation of Aristotle was (. . .) the work of commentators, whether, Christian, pagan, or Muslim. It was the commentators who made possible Brentano's interpretation and who lent authority to his important new proposal for the philosophy of mind. Brentano's interpretation should not be taken at face value, but seen for what it is, the culmination of a series of distortions. The moral is that in the history of philosophy the distortions of commentators can be more fruitful than fidelity.
>
> (Sorabji 1991, 248)

One could push this claim even further and add that—*at least sometimes*—"distortions" as such, not only those made by commentators, can be "more fruitful than fidelity".

This brings us immediately back to Husserl, who is certainly quite unfaithful to his authors. And it is surely a fact that his picture introduces a set of distortions, which in turn are layered on previous distortions that could finally be traced back to Plato's or Aristotle's texts. Thus, instead of blaming Husserl for not being *faithful* to his sources, a more interestingly exercise would be to reconstruct the chain of distortions leading to his historical narrative. More precisely, what should definitively catch our attention is the "fruitfulness" of Husserl's *specific* distortion. Or, to put it in a slightly different

18 I have discussed the complexity of the issue in Majolino (2016a).

Proof

Proof

way, ones should try to identify the eventual conceptual productivity of Husserl's account.

3.4. But what is the word "fruitful" supposed to mean? How do we decide whether a distortion is fruitful or not?

Sorabji's answer is not explicit on this point—nor should it have been. But drawing from Max Black's distinction between "emphasis and resonance" in his classification of metaphors, one could tentatively state that in order to be "fruitful" (as opposed to "sterile" or "trivial") a philosophical distortion has to be both highly "*emphatic*" and extremely "*resonant*" (Black 1979, 25–7). A metaphor, Black says, is "emphatic" if it allows "no variation upon or substitute for the words used" (Id., 26); and it is "resonant" insofar as it "supports a high degree of implicative elaboration" (Id., 27). On the contrary, trivial metaphors are, on the one hand, "expendable, optional, decorative or ornamental" (as for their emphasis) and, on the other, "poorly implicative" (as for their resonance). *Mutatis mutandis* I would like to maintain that something similar holds for philosophically relevant conceptual distortions.

Some of them—as Herman's (2013a and 2013b) Plato vs. Aristotle personality divide leading to the cat vs. dog dilemma (see *supra* §1.1)—are certainly trivial (i.e. emphatically dispensable, for many other quite interchangeable concepts could have done the very same job); and quite unproductive (i.e. poorly resonant, for they do not ask to be carried out and developed in any significant way, but simply accepted and re-stated in similar forms). Other distortions—as in Sorabji's (1991) reconstruction of the Aristotelian genesis of the concept of "intentional in-existence"—are not expendable, are implicatively rich and, in that very precise sense, they can now be safely labeled as "fruitful" in a very specific sense.

The new question now is the following: is Husserl's distortion a "fruitful" one?

3.5. If I have chosen the mosaic of Pompeii as a heuristic guide to Husserl's infinite Academy, it is not merely for ornamental reasons. The picture could also be of a certain help precisely to assess the great "emphasis" and extreme "resonance" of Husserl's *specific* distortion. A distortion whose complexity would have likely remained unnoticed.

Realized at the beginning of the first century AD from a Greek original of the Hellenistic period (Gaiser 1980, 8–12), the mosaic of Pompeii appears in a time when discussions about Plato's true legacy and its "symphony" (συμφωνία) or "harmony" (ἁρμονία) with Aristotle's doctrines were at their height.

That Aristotle may count as "Plato's most authentic disciple" (γνησιώτατος τῶν Πλάτονος μαθητῶν) (see Diogenes Lærtius, *V* 1, 6) was a quite widespread view in Antiquity.[19] By contrast, the view that some of Aristotle's concepts, blended with various Stoic insights, could be tacitly attributed to Plato himself as to recover the genuine spirit of Platonism from its skeptical deformations, is far more distinctive. This view will eventually spread out at about the same time of the mosaic, in that oftentimes neglected strand of the philosophical tradition known as "Middle-Platonism".

19 As reported by Simplicius (*In Phys*. 242, 28–9) the early peripatetic Eudemus of Rhodes already considered Aristotle's philosophy as an expansion of Plato's teachings. The view of a "Platonic" Aristotle has been recently and convincingly defended by Lloyd Gerson (2005).

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Since its introduction by K. Prächter, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the label "Middle-Platonism" has been extensively discussed and variously criticized (see Brittain 2008, 527–38). The vagueness of the term suggests already that it is neither the name of a school, nor that of a full-fledged and homogeneous philosophical movement, harboring a set of relatively consistent doctrines. "Middle-Platonism" is rather a historiographical stratagem to put under a common heading various authors having claimed to be "Platonists" between the end of the Hellenistic Academy and the beginning of Neoplatonism.[20]

Chronologically squeezed between the *anti-systematic* skeptical outcomes of the New Academy and the highly sophisticated *system* of Plotinus, so-called "Middle-Platonists" wrote in a time when—as Bonazzi (2015, 73) beautifully puts it—Platonism was moving "toward the system" (*verso il sistema*) without actually having one. Fascinated by the strong systematic consistency of the rival Stoic school and, at the same time, adamant about "helping" Plato's doctrines by all means, a whole host of authors writing roughly between 80 BC and AD 220, have pushed the βοήθεια (see *supra* §3.1) to a remarkable degree of complexity.

It will be my contention that, at least in some of its most peculiar moments, "Middle-Platonism" understands Plato's heritage and his "symphony" with Aristotle through a certain "pattern of distortions" that could soundly and compellingly be paralleled with the general tenets (*Pla.1–5*) used by Husserl in his lectures to define the Platonic ideal. Identifying a "Middle-Platonist" *patent theme of distortions* of which Husserl's narrative of the infinite Academy could be a *distinctive variation*, strikes me as a quite promising move. A move that—without turning Husserl into a "Middle-Platonist" or vice-versa—could help detect some unsuspected aspects of Husserl's transcendental phenomenological contribution to genuine philosophy—aspects that are not sufficiently emphasized in Husserl's explicit account of the history of philosophy.

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This, at least, will be our bargain.

3.6. So let us start with the obvious. As succinctly reminded by Karamanolis (2006, 3):

> The majority of Platonists in this era shared the view that Aristotle's philosophy, when understood in the right spirit, is essentially compatible with Plato's doctrine, as they interpreted it. Platonists actually maintained that the core of Aristotle's philosophy both supports and complements Plato's philosophy, and this, they argued, was not accidental.[21]

20 It is, very broadly, "the Platonism between Antiochus and Plotinus" (Opsomer 1998, 13). Quite overlooked and mostly studied only as a step toward "Neoplatonism", the Middle-Platonic "tradition" has been somehow rediscovered in the last forty years. On the topic see Dillon (1977), Opsomer (1998), Tarrant (2000), Boys-Stones (2001) Karamanolis (2006). For a recent overview see Bonazzi (2015, 73–109). Needless to say, the acknowledgment of Middle-Platonism (let alone of the actual and quite complex long-term history of Platonism) for the history of phenomenology is next to zero. While—mainly thanks to Derrida (1972, 77) and Ricœur (2004, 203)—Neoplatonism in general and Plotinus in particular, have been variously and vaguely associated with the post-Heideggerian deconstructive project (see also Aubenque 2009, 33–66), the host of names forming the scattered universe of Middle-Platonism has been plainly and simply ignored in phenomenology. I fear that Majolino (2008b, 23) is, to the best of my knowledge, the only article dealing with phenomenological matters cursorily mentioning such "tradition". I will briefly come back to the issue of Neoplatonism in the last part of this essay.

21 See also Id., 331–6. To this brief reminder, one could immediately add Sorabji's (1990, 5) following remark: "Not for the only time in the history of philosophy (. . .) a perfectly crazy position (harmony)

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Antiochus of Ascalon (about 130–68 BC),[22] for instance, is reported to have claimed a strong continuity between Aristotle and Plato (Cicero, *Acad.* 1. 17–18; *De fin.* 5. 7). Their philosophically consistent "systems", so he argues, have in fact set the agenda for Peripatetic and Academic scholars alike (*Acad.* 2. 15). According to Varro's report, who in Cicero's *Academics* speaks on Antiochus' behalf, the latter believed that "there was no difference between the Peripatetic and the Old Academy" (*nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academiam differebat*) (*Acad.* 1. 17). He would have also maintained that, although called in different ways, the two schools "agree about the things" (*rebus congruentes*) and have "a common source" (*idem fons*) (ibid.). The fundamental assumption of Antiochus was, of course, that Plato *did* have a system (*Acad.* 2. 27–9). A belief nourished by the fact that the rival Stoic school, very prominent at the time, was indeed a system of doctrines (*dogmata*). A system built on a tight intertwinement of logic, physics/metaphysics and, most importantly, ethics.[23]

Antiochus also maintained that, as a rational enterprise—fundamentally theoretical, but ultimately aiming at the establishment of a virtuous "art of living" (*De fin.* 3.4, 5. 16)—philosophy had to promote a steady knowledge of "what is there" and, on such basis, the attainment of a "good life":

> The knowledge of virtue provides the highest evidence for the fact that we can grasp and understand many things. On this sole basis rests, we claim, science—that we do not take to be the mere comprehension of things, but a comprehension that is stable and immutable—and wisdom, the art of living that finds steadiness in itself' (*Maxime vero virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi multa posse. In quibus solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus, quam nos non comprehensionem modo rerum sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse censemus, itemque sapientiam artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat constantiam.*)
>
> (Cicero, *Acad.* 2. 23)

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Following this path, he therefore criticizes the skeptical tendencies of the New Academy. And he does so from what he takes to be the "genuine" (*verum*) standpoint of Plato's creeds. Philosophy is a science (*scientia*) whose task is not just the pursuit of truth, but the pursuit of a truth that is certain (*rata*); a science dealing not just with things, but with things that are immutable (*immutabiles*):

> It cannot be doubted, none of the principles of the wise man can be false, and not being false is not enough, they have to be stable, fixed, certain, unshakable by any reasoning. (*Non potest igitur dubitari quin decretum nullum falsum possit esse sapeientis neque satis sit non esse falsum sed etiam stabile fixum ratum esse debeat, quod movere nulla ratio queat*)
>
> (*Acad.* 2. 27)

proved philosophically fruitful. To establish the harmony of Plato and Aristotle, philosophers had to think up new ideas, and the result was an amalgam different from either of the two original philosophies."

22 On Antiochus, see Dillon (1977, 52–105); Barnes (1989, 51–96) and Karamanolis (2006, 44–84).

23 And these are precisely the stoic terms in which Antiochus describes Plato's alleged heritage: "There was a tripartite distinction of philosophy inherited from Plato: the first part was about life and morals, the second about nature and the things that are hidden, the third about arguing and what is true or false" (*Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex, una de vita et moribus, altea de natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserend et quid verum quid falsum*) (*Acad.* 1. 19).

Proof

Proof

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

This is a standpoint that, again, Antiochus assumes to be shared by Platonists, Peripatetics and Stoics (*Acad.* 2. 11–18). And because of such a putative "Grand Alliance", he feels entitled to introduce strong Stoic elements in what should be a Platonic theory of knowledge (see Dillon 1977, 63–9). At any rate, one the principles (*decreta*) of a genuine philosophy established, any skeptical contravention counts as a "crime" (*scelum*) against the "law of truth" (*lex veri*) (*Acad.* 2. 27). And if we add that Antiochus's cosmology also identifies a pair of first principles (*principia*), ποιοτής and ὑλη, described by a mixture of Platonic allusions to the *Timæus* couched in a stoic jargon (*Acad.* 2. 27 ff.), we find already—*mutatis mutandis*—a first variety of all five key tenets of genuine "Platonic" philosophy (*Plat.1–5*) described by Husserl (see *supra* §2.3).[24]

3.7. A slightly different case is that of the more aggressive "Middle-Platonist" called Atticus (c. 175 AD).[25]

Unlike Antiochus, Atticus rejects the idea of a strong continuity between Plato and Aristotle. On the contrary, in the short treatise *Against those who please themselves of interpreting the doctrine of Plato through that of Aristotle*, he massively denies all possible "harmony" between the two authors. Atticus confirms, however, Antiochus's ground-idea that Plato was the first to bring philosophy to the level of a "complete unity" (ὁλόκληρος) (fr. 1. 19–23, 34). Plato—he claims—is the one who, more than anybody else, has "brought to unity all the parts of philosophy (συναγείρας εἰς ἓν πάντα τὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρη) that, before him, were scattered" (fr. 1. 20–23).

Atticus' explicit reference is to the theoretical enterprise of the Pre-socratics. Not having brought philosophy to the unity of a "system", Pre-socratic thinkers are philosophers in a very different sense: they work on this or that subject matter, but have no vision of the whole (fr. 1. 24–32). By contrast, "the Platonic is at home everywhere, whether he deals with nature, ethics or dialectics" (πάντων ἔφαμεν μετεῖναι τῶι Πλατωνικῶι καὶ φυσιολογοῦντι καὶ περὶ ἠθῶν λέγοντι καὶ διαλεγομένωι) (fr. 1, 37–9).

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Then again, if Aristotle should not be used to read Plato, it is precisely because Aristotle is *not* a philosopher in a genuine sense. He is more like a Pre-Socratic scientist: he merely observes and records what is experienced (fr. 5. 13–15; 6. 34–44). Finally, just as Antiochus, Atticus attributes to Plato a stoic tripartite distinction of philosophy (fr. 1. 8–11; 2, 1–5). He openly refers to a doctrine of the first transcendent principles (fr. 1. 14–16) and ends up identifying, in a quite confusing way, three interrelated ἀρχαι (Matter, the Demiurge and the Ideas). An account later scornfully criticized by Porphyry (see Procl., *In Tim.*, 1, 391 6ff.).

In sum, although rejecting the "harmonizing" view, Atticus' polemic treatise shares the same Platonic tenets of Antiochus: there is a coherent and methodologically structured Platonic system, dealing with the whole of what is there; within such system, ontology, logic and theory of knowledge appear to be mutually consistent and intimately articulated; such a system ultimately serves the purpose of a better ethical life; and it finally rests on a doctrine of the first principles.[26]

24 Although some information can be gathered about Antiochus's cosmology, Cicero does not say anything about the latter's metaphysics. There is no evidence either of any distinction between a first and a second philosophy. Dillon (1977, 81), however, suspects that this absence might have to do more with Cicero's selective interests than with Antiochus' lack of concern about broadly metaphysical issues.

25 On Atticus, see Dillon (1977, 247–58); Tarrant (2000, 65–7) and Karamanolis (2006, 150–90).

26 To be fair, Atticus' treatise makes no explicit reference to the critique of skepticism or sophistry. But this latter point can be safely taken for granted, because of the general Middle-Platonic rebuttal of the skepticism of the Hellenistic Academy. As for Plutarch's relative exception, see *infra* §3.9.

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3.8. If we cross the line and move to the Peripatetic side, a similar and even more explicit account can be found in Aristocles of Messene (c. first century AD).[27]

Aristocles believed that Aristotle and Plato shared the very same principles of a "genuine way of doing philosophy" (ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφεῖν) (fr. 7, 9, 3). And, not unlike his Middle-Platonic counterparts (Antiochus and Atticus), he credits Plato for having pursued, more than anyone else, an authentic and complete system of philosophy (Ἐφιλοσόφησε δὲ Πλάτων εἰ καί τις ἄλλος τῶν πώποτε γνησίως καὶ περὶ τελείος) (fr. 1, 1, 1–2).[28] A system rooted in the priority of the whole (παντός) over its parts (fr. 1, 7, 1–7) and in which both "senses and reason (αἰσθήσις καὶ τὸν λόγον) are employed to obtain the knowledge of things" (fr. 7, 9, 3–5).

If this is the way of "genuine philosophy" (ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφεῖν), whoever loses it should not be called a philosopher at all, "for it takes away the very principle of philosophy (ἀναίροῦσάν γε δὴ τὰς τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀρχάς)" (fr. 4, 30, 3–4). Not unexpectedly, those who have lost their way and are responsible for the destruction (ἀναίρεσις) of philosophy's true principles are the Sceptics (fr. 4), the Cyrenaics (fr. 5), the Sophists (fr. 6) and the Epicureans (fr. 8). As for the Stoics, once their materialistic commitment put aside, their doctrine of the principles—one active and one passive—perfectly squares with Plato's principles of beings (τῶν ὄντων), i.e. "matter and god" (ὕλην καὶ θεόν) (fr. 3, 1).

Again, all the themes of which Husserl's (*Plat.1–5*) are late variations, can also be heard in Aristocles's fragments.

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3.9. But, as far as we are concerned, the most interesting case is certainly that of Plutarch of Chareoroneia (c. 50–120 AD).[29]

Plutarch surely shares, although in different forms, most if not all of the key tenets discussed so far. He not only tacitly absorbs Stoic logical concepts into a Platonic system but also openly maintains that Aristotelian and Stoic logic originate—if are not already entirely in place—in Plato (*An. Proc.* 1023e; *Adv. Col.* 1115d ff.). This fact, however, does not prevent him from criticizing the Stoic epistemology (*De Com. Not.* 1082e), metaphysics (*De Com. Not.* 1073d–1074d) and ethics (*De Virt. Morali*, 441c and *passim*), whenever they openly "contradict" (ἀντιλέγοντες) Plato's views. The same holds for his approach to Aristotle's views (*Adv. Col.* 115c). These views can also be found, in more or less refined ways, in other Middle-Platonists. But Plutarch is important also for two additional reasons.

Firstly, he is one of the rare "Middle-Platonists" who refrains from stigmatizing the skeptical tendencies of the New Academy. Interestingly enough, he recognizes the value of what we have called "the truth of skepticism", and he does so by defending the thesis of the unity of Plato's Academy. He therefore maintains that Academic skepticism should not be regarded as a falsification of Plato's genuine philosophy but as something that, rightfully understood, has its full place within the latter (*Adv. Col.* 1121f–1122e)[30].

27 On Aristocles of Messene, see Chiesara (2001, xiv–xlii).
28 Chiesara 2001 repeatedly insists on this point (see 61–2 and *passim*).
29 On Plutarch's extremely rich contribution see Dillon (1977, 184–230), Opsomer (1998, 127–212) and Karamanolis (2006, 85–126).
30 On the topic see Opsomer (1998, 127–62). Challenging the widespread opposition between a skeptical Hellenistic Academy and a dogmatic Middle-Platonism, the author also shows how Plutarch belongs to an "important current in Middle Platonism" in which the systematic and metaphysical interpretation of the whole of Platonic philosophy is not necessarily at odds with the spirit of the New Academy (Id., 14).

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Secondly, and even more importantly, Plutarch openly recurs to the Pythagorean language to describe the first principles in terms of one and Many.

> Of the supreme principles—I mean the one and the indefinite dyad—the second, being the element underlying all formlessness and disarrangement, has been called limitlessness (ὅτι τῶν ἀνωτάτων ἀρχῶν, λέγω δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος, ἡ μὲν ἀμορφίας πάσης στοιχεῖον οὖσα καὶ ἀταξίας ἀπειρία κέκληται); but the nature of the one limits and arrests (ὁρίζουσα καὶ καταλαμβάνουσα) what is empty and irrational and indeterminate (τὸ κενὸν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀόριστον) in limitlessness, gives it shape, and renders it in some way tolerant and receptive of definition.
>
> (*Def. Or.*, 428f, 1–5)

Plutarch's latter move is, again, far from being isolated. On the contrary, identifying varieties of the one/many first principles (with or without a higher Principle raising above both) was in fact a quite common and very distinctive fact in Middle-Platonism.

This was especially the case for the so-called "Platonizing Pythagoreans". These authors—from Eudorus of Alexandria (late first century BC) to Numenius of Apamea (150–200 AD)[31]—used to handle first principles by drawing from Plato's alleged Unwritten Teachings, regarded as substantially identical with Pythagoras's numerological doctrines. This tendency is especially clear in Eudorus, who expounds the following "Pythagorean/Platonic" view:

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> According to the highest account, one has to affirm that the Pythagoreans maintain that the principle of all things is the one; yet, according to a second account, two are the principles of the generated things, the one and the nature opposed to it. (Κατὰ τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον φατέον τοὺς Πυθαγορικοὺς τὸ ἓν ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων λέγειν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον δύο ἀρχὰς τῶν ἀποτελουμένων εἶναι, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν τούτῳ φύσιν)
>
> (fr. 3, 3–5)

Eudorus' text is extremely explicit: whether the "one" alone is the highest principle or needs to share its privilege with its opposite, "the Many", it is clearly a matter of dispute. What is undisputed, however, is the fact that these Pythagorean notions can be someway legitimately conveyed within a genuinely Platonic conceptual framework. Of the two rival options, Eudorus will finally chose the first. He will thus introduce a highest "One" above the lower-order twin principles of the monad ad the dyad (see Simplicius, *In Phys.* 5, 181, 7–30). Plutarch will rather take the second path and stick to the idea of two equal-level and evenly original opposing principles. By doing this, his doctrine of the principles meets that of Speusippus and Xenocrates, i.e. the head of the Old Academy after Plato's death and "the second founder of Platonism" (Dillon 1977, 22).

31 On Eudorus, see Dillon (1977, 115–35); Tarrant (2000, 72–4 and 2008); and Bonazzi (2005). On Numenius, see the classical Guthrie (1917); Dillon (1977, 361–78); Karamanolis (2006, 127–49), who interestingly addresses the issue of the "compatibility" between Pythagoreansism and Aristotle (Id., 132–6). Numenius' incredibly complex doctrine of the first principles, distinguishing between three (or two!) Gods, ranked in terms of fatherhood and layered on the one/dyad distinction is discussed by Proclus (*In Tim.* 1 303, 27ff.).

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As reported by Aristotle, Speusippus admitted, next to the ἓν, a second irreducible principle, the πλῆθος (*Met.* N 4, 1091b 30–32 = fr. 35a Lang). As for Iamblichus, he describes Speusippus' account in the following terms:

> (. . .) one must postulate two first and highest principles, the one (that should not even be called being, because of its simplicity and its position as principle of everything that is; and it is granted that a principle is in no way that which those are of which it is the principle); and another principle, that of the many, which is able of itself to initiate division, and which, if we are able to describe its nature most suitably, we would like to compare it to a completely fluid and flexible matter. (δυό τὰς πρωτίστας καὶ ἀνωτάτω ὑποθδτέον ἀρχάς, τὸ ἕν (ὅπερ δή οὐδὲ ὄν πω δεῖ καλεῖν, διὰ τὸ ἁπλοῦν εἶναι καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀρχήν μὲν ὑπάρχειν τῶν ὄντων, τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν μηδήπω εἶναι τοιαύτην οἷα ἐκεῖνα ὧν ἐστιν ἀρχή), καὶ ἄλλην πάλιν ἀρχὴν τὴν τοῦ πλήθους, ἣν καὶ διαίρεσιν οἷόν τ'εἶναι καθ'αὑτὸ παρέχεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὑργᾷ τινι παντάπασι καὶ εὐπλαδεῖ ὕλῃ)
>
> (*Comm. Math.* IV, 15, 5–18)

The one and the many are thus "potencies" (δυνάμει)[32] or "seeds" (σπέρματα) of everything that is (see Aristotle, *Met.* Λ 7, 1072b 30ff.; Ps. Alex. Aphr. *In. Met.* 699, 28 ff.). They are not "being" but that from which everything is generated and comes to being. And, interestingly enough, the second principle, often identified with matter, is called by Xenocrates the "everflowing" (ἀέναον), literally: what is perpetually non-one (ἀ-ἕν) (DK fr. 28H).

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3.10. Whether Plato actually had a set of Pythagoras-like "unwritten doctrines", as indicated by Aristotle (*Met.* A 6, 987a 29 ff.), restated by Simplicius (*In Phys.* 151 6ff.) and strenuously defended by the Tübingen school (see Gaiser 1963), should not bother us here.[33] Nor we actually need to spell out in details Plato's alleged doctrine of the Monad and the Indefinite Dyad, out of which everything is derived, from mathematical entities to ideas down to sensible things (cf. *Met.* Z 2, 1028b 18–24; M 8, 1083 a 20–35).[34] And it won't even be necessary to dwell into the otherwise important differences between Speusippus' and Xenocrates' account of the principles and their relation to the ideas.

As far as we are concerned here, what really matters is the following: (*a*) drawing from Aristotle's testimony and the work of Plato's successors (Speusippus, but mostly

32 See Ioannes Philop. *In Arist. Metaph.* "principia enim semper imperfect, potentia cum sint". (*fr.* 59).

33 To be fair, my sympathies would rather go to the opposite camp. And even if one were to accept the existence of such doctrines, this would not necessarily lead to the massively speculative picture of Plato fostered by Gaiser & Co. On the topic, see Fronterotta (1993), Besnier (1996) and especially Brisson (2000, 15–110)

34 An interesting attempt have been recently made to connect, through a very particular reading of Jacob Klein (1934–36 and 1985), Husserl's phenomenology directly with Plato's alleged Unwritten doctrines (see Hopkins 2010 and 2011). I have already discussed this approach (see Majolino 2012b). As it will be readily apparent from the present study, however, I have some doubts about the legitimacy—let alone the necessity—of using, at face value, arithmological considerations to frame Husserl's overall view. Moreover, as already pointed out, I have also reasons to believe that no straightforward opposition Plato vs. Aristotle could do the job of clarifying Husserl's overall position within the complex history of the Platonic tradition. Hopkins's work has nevertheless the undisputable merit of having recognized the importance of situating Husserl within the broader framework of Plato's heritage.

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Xenocrates); and (*b*) within the strongly systematic framework of an overall defense of Plato's doctrine, (*c*) "Middle-Platonists"—like Eudorus, Plutarch and many others—although in different ways and various forms, *did explicitly consider the one and the many as the "first principles" of everything that is*. Principles that, in turn, *should not be understood in terms of being* but rather as "potencies", "seeds" or even "roots".

We will have to come back to this point later on (see *infra* §5).

4. A matter of principles I: εἶδος

4.1. It does not seem necessary to provide further examples of what we have called the patent "theme" or "pattern of distortions" of which Husserl's narrative appears to be a variation.[35]

The previous section should have sufficiently shown that, without being strictly identical in their content; or occurring each time altogether; taking very different and sometimes contrasting forms—varieties of all the general tenets singled out by Husserl to define the Platonic way to "genuine philosophy" (see *supra* §2.5) are massively present in the debates of Middle-Platonism. But the previous section should also have revealed some distinctive themes that we did *not* find explicitly stated in Husserl's narrative.

Reading Husserl through a Middle-Platonic heuristic filter[36] has now a twofold effect: it *gives historical depth* to some of Husserl's claims we were already familiar with, and *calls attention to* some additional claims we totally ignored. More specifically, we have:

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(i) the idea of one "genuine philosophy" (ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφεῖν);
(ii) inaugurated by Plato;
(iii) dealing with the whole of everything that is in its innermost union;
(iv) looking for the first principles of everything that is (matter/quality; matter/god; matter/demiurge/ideas; god/ideas(numbers)/matter; one/many; one/monad-dyad etc.);
(v) having a strong systematic unity, both methodological and ontological;
(vi) striving to attain firm, fixed and stable (*rata, fixa, stabile*) true knowledge;
(vii) pursued by "Plato's most authentic disciple" (γνησιώτατος τῶν Πλάτονος μαθητῶν), i.e. Aristotle;
(viii) and yet fundamentally compatible if not identical with the Stoic view of philosophy;
(ix) somehow compatible also with some Pythagorean insights as for the doctrine of the first principles;
(x) rejecting all forms of skeptical "destruction" (ἀναίρεσις) of philosophy;
(xi) and yet sometimes leaving open the possibility to vindicate the truth of skepticism;
(xii) finally culminating in a reform of the whole of ethical life.

35 Again, we will leave aside here the complex question of the actual extent of such distortion(s), i.e. how much "philosophical justice" is done to Plato and Aristotle by taking them seriously. As far as we are concerned here, we should simply assume that these are distortions (and they may be not), without further dwelling upon their degree of "faithfulness" (see *supra* §§3.3 and 3.4; and *infra* §§5.6 and 5.7).

36 That is, taking Middle-Platonism neither as a mere "parallel", nor as an "ancestor", an "influence" or an "anticipation" but as a "metaphor" for transcendental phenomenology—in the specific sense spelled out above (see *supra* §3.4).

Proof

Proof

Having already parsed Husserl's lectures (see *supra* §2), we are already familiar with points (i)–(iii), (v)–(vii) and (x)–(xii). But two points appear now to be partly or entirely new.

Firstly, what is *in part* new, is point (viii), i.e. the massive and pervasive presence of a Stoic framework in the overall Middle-Platonic discussion about Plato's heritage. We have seen that the Stoic contribution to the Platonic project takes mainly two forms. Superficially, it seems to be limited to the introduction of logical sophistications and syllogistic technicalities that could already be found—more or less explicitly—in Plato's dialogues. But on a deeper level, Stoics' conceptualities deeply and covertly shape the very way in which Middle-Platonists conceive philosophy itself as a system, according to Plato's ideal of unity.[37] *Does Husserl have a similar account? Are there reasons to believe that Husserl's Stoics are more than skillful logicians?*

Secondly, we knew already that, according to Husserl, genuine philosophy fulfills Plato's mission by turning into a "first philosophy"; we also knew that such "first philosophy" should not be understood in Aristotle's limited sense as the science of being qua being, but more literally (see Hua VII, 3), as an "archeology" (*Archäologie*) (Hua VIII, 40), "a science of the first sources" (*Urquellenwissenschaft*) (Id., 4), a "doctrine of the principles" (*Prinzipienlehre*), a "science of true beginnings" (*Wissenschaft von der währen Anfängen*), etc. (see *supra* §2.4). Now, what is that supposed to mean?

While reconstructing Husserl's view, we have been deliberately silent about the nature of such "first principles" (*erste Prinzipien*) or "beginnings" (*Anfänge*). We know, of course, that such principles will bring Husserl to transcendental subjectivity, something that is not a "fragment" (*Endchen*) of the world but its "source of validity". But now we have learned that Middle-Platonist doctrines of the principles, sharing a great deal of defining tenets with Husserl's idea of genuine philosophy, mostly operate with two variously articulated opposing ἀρχαι: the one and the many. Hence the following question: *is this fact relevant to understand Husserl's views? Are there reasons to believe that something like a distinctively "phenomenological-transcendental" variety of one/many principle is at work in Husserl's "archeology"?*

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One might already think to the fact that, as we have seen, the "many" principle is also described by Xpeusippus as the "everflowing" (ἀέναον); just as Husserl's temporally enfolding self-constituting transcendental life (*immer strömende, dahinströmende, fließende* etc.) (see Hua I, 99). But is this extrinsic similarity all?

By dwelling on these two points—the role of the Stoics and that of the one/many—we should be able to go beyond the idea of a pattern of shared distortions discussed so far. And move to the next step as to identify Husserl's *peculiar and unshared* distortion, as it were. That one singular distortion constituting the most distinctive contribution of his transcendental phenomenology to the infinite Academy.

4.2. Let us start with the Stoics.

The presence of Stoic themes in Husserl's phenomenology is another extremely important issue—barely noticed if not entirely neglected in the literature.

If we look back to the twelve points listed above (see *supra* §4.1), there is certainly no room for Husserl's idea of a teleological or asymptotical Platonism. Nothing could be farther from the sensibility of a Middle-Platonist than the difference between Plato's

37 On the topic, see Bonazzi and Helmig 2007.

Proof

Proof

specific *doctrine* and Plato's philosophical *ideal* (with the former being a first imperfect realization of the latter). And yet, if we compare the two accounts, many of its defining elements are clearly in place—starting from the idea of an explicitly endorsed or tacitly assumed first "Grand Alliance" between Aristotle and the Stoics.

As already pointed out (see *supra* §2.8), Husserl repeatedly credits the Stoics for having pushed forward Aristotle's logical project. And not unlike Plutarch, he apparently considers the logic of both Aristotle and the Stoics as a somehow more systematic version of Plato's dialectics (Hua VII, 17–30 and *verbatim* 42). So at first glance, this is the most distinctive "helping hand" that, according to Husserl's lectures, Chrysippus and his offspring have "lent" to the infinite Academy.

But first glances are often deceiving. And especially so in this case.

To begin with, one could be surprised to find Husserl describe, in some of his texts, the "ideal of the philosopher" (*das Ideal des Philosophen*) according to the Stoic tripartite distinction of a "systematically achieved logic, ethics and metaphysics" (*systematisch abgeschlossene Logik, Ethik, Metaphysik*) (Hua V, 159–60)—not unlike Antiochus, Plutarch or any regular Middle-Platonist (see *supra* §3.2). But looking closer at Husserl's manuscripts on formal sciences, it also appears that the disciplines of the *mathesis universalis*—i.e. formal apophantics and formal ontology—can *all* be seen as Stoic contributions to Plato's cause.

4.3. Husserl is quite clear on this point.

On the side of *formal apophantics*, the Stoics have not only pushed forward Aristotle's syllogistic, turning it into a rational system (*Systematik*) (Hua VII, 24). They have also, and far more importantly, identified the *right theory of meaning* (*Bedeutungslehre*) needed to prevent logic from being a mere psychological theory of the correct judgment and bring it closer to ontology. In other words, Husserl's overall theory of "ideal meanings" often dubbed as "Platonic" results instead from an explicit appropriation of the Stoic doctrine of the "λέκτον". The clearest passage in this sense is the following:

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> (. . .) the word ἀποφανσις could be entirely be interpreted as proposition. I should incidentally remind that the subtlety of the Stoics has acknowledged the necessity of the distinction between the psychological consciousness of meaning, the logical meaning and the objectivity to which both refer. One should not be satisfied with the distinction that—although not terminologically—goes back to Aristotle, between νόημα and πρᾶγμα and rather distinguish between both and the λέκτον. The latter means literally 'the said' and corresponds precisely to our expression, what is expressed, and fully meets our concept of meaning. (*Das Wort* ἀποφανσις *dürfte sich gar wohl als Satz interpretieren lassen. Erwähnen muß ich übrigens, daß der Scharfsinn der Stoiker die Notwendigkeit der Unterscheidung zwischen psychologischem Bedeutungsbewußtsein, logischer Bedeutung und der Gegenständlichkeit, auf die sich beide beziehen, erkannt hat. Man dürfte sich nicht mit der—wenn auch nicht terminologisch—auf Aristoteles zurückgehenden Unterscheidung zwischen* νόημα *und* πρᾶγμα *begnügen und <müße> noch zwischen beiden und den* λέκτον *unterschieden. Letzteres heißt wörtlich das Gesagte, es entspricht genau also unserem Ausdruck, das ausgesagte Was, und trifft vollkommen unseren Begriff der Bedeutung.*)
>
> (ms. F I 1, 39b)

Proof

Proof

Husserl's semantic Platonism is indeed a Stoic one.

Something more complex, but equally revealing, can be found in §26 of *Formal and Transcendental logic*. Husserl begins by blaming Aristotle's "first philosophy" for being only a "general ontology of the real" (*allgemeine Realontologie*) having missed the very concept of a "formal ontology": "Aristotle had a universal ontology of the real only; and *this* was what he accepted as 'first philosophy'. He lacked formal ontology, and therefore lacked also the cognition that formal ontology is intrinsically prior to the ontology of realities" (Hua XVII, 70).

This claim is extremely important and should not be conflated with another important one, certainly related but not identical, i.e. Husserl's critique of Aristotle's "metaphysics" (*Metaphysik*) as first philosophy. For "Realontology" and "metaphysics" are not synonyms.

4.4. Husserl has always variously defined "metaphysics" as the science of the "ultimate facts" (*Fakta*) (Hua III/1, 7), of "being" (*Seinswissenschaft, Wissenschaft von Seienden*) or of "factual being" (*tatsächliche Sein*) (Hua VII, 186).[38] The metaphysician, as Husserl sometimes puts it, is a "*Dies-da-setzer*", positing the existence of actual individuals and the whole "within which" such individuals happen to exist (Hua III/2, 565). As a result, metaphysics is tightly related with all particular "sciences of facts" (*Tatsachenwissenschaften*). Empirical psychology is the science of the factual laws of factually existing mental facts; physics formulates the factual laws of factually existing physical facts; history of historical facts etc. (see Hua III, 11–14). Accordingly, metaphysics addresses the most general and fundamental questions common to all these sciences and concerning the whole of whatever factually exists (Hua XVIII, 25–6).

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Now, according to Brentano's teaching, Aristotle identifies "metaphysics" as science of being qua being and "first philosophy", intended as the most general of all sciences:

> In *Met.* Γ 1, 1003a 21 he [*scil.* Aristotle] says: 'there is one science which considers being as being and the attributes which it has as such. This science differs from all particular sciences'. It is general science, the so-called first philosophy, which has being as being as its proper subject (Met. E 1, 1026a29; K 4, 1061b 19 and 30–37.1064b 6). The first philosopher (*De an.* I 1, 403b 16), or the philosopher as such, considers being as being, and not any of its parts (*Met.* K 3, 1060b 31; 1061b 4–10). Thus, as he himself says (*Met.* Z 1, 1028b 2), Aristotle researches and investigates in the books of the *Metaphysics* always only *one* question, namely, what is being? (*was ist das Seiende?*).
>
> (Brentano 1862, 2)

Husserl follows Brentano also on this point. However, if "metaphysics" deals with being qua being and more precisely with being qua *factual* being, then Aristotle's

38 Metaphysics is also defined as the "universal doctrine of being" (*Universale Seinslehre*) (Hua VII, 186); as the "Science of being in an absolute and ultimate sense" (*im absoluten und letzten Sinn*) or "in its absolute reality" (*in seiner absoluten Wirklichkeit*) (Hua II, 23, 32; see also Hua VII, 190); of "being in general" (*Seiende in allgemeinen*) (Hua VII, 184); of the "highest fundaments of being" (*der obersten Seinsgrunden*) (Id., 72) etc. The philosopher's task, intended as "metaphysician in the proper sense", is therefore to "deal with being" (*über Seiende*) and elaborate a "theory for being" (*Theorie für Seiendes*) (Hua XVII, 238).

Proof

Proof

metaphysics—not unlike any metaphysics—*cannot be* "first philosophy". And this for at least two parallel reasons.

The first is that, as already pointed out, being "dogmatic" in character and positing existence as a starting point, Aristotle's metaphysics ignores the transcendental problem of knowledge and neglects the first challenge of the Sophist (Hua VII, 56). The second, is precisely that it equates "being" with "factual being" (*tatsachliche Sein*) or "actual reality" (*reale Wirklichkeit*). This second fact, prevents metaphysics from actually being the most universal of all sciences, providing a satisfactory foundation for all sciences qua sciences.

In §5 of the *Prolegomena*, at the very beginning of his phenomenological journey, Husserl illustrates the "domain of metaphysics" (*Reich der Metaphysik*) (Hua XVIII, 26), presupposed by all sciences of "actual reality", with questions such as: is there an *actually existing* external world, infinitely extended in space and time? Has *this* space the mathematical character of a tridimensional Euclidian manifold? Does *actual* time have the mathematical character of an orthoid unidimensional manifold? Is everything existing submitted to the law of causality? (ibid.). All these issues, Husserl continues, "entirely belong to the field of Aristotle's first philosophy" (*in den Rahmen der Ersten Philosophie des Aristoteles*) (ibid.).

Now, at best, Aristotle's metaphysics/first philosophy could only provide a foundation (*Grundlegung*) for sciences dealing with "factual events" (*faktische Ereignisse*) (Hua XIX/1, 27), i.e. with the "explicative sciences of reality" (*erklärende Realwissenschaften*). The trouble is, Husserl continues, that there are also a priori sciences dealing with objects that are "independent from real being and non-being and are thought as mere bearer of ideal determinations" (*die unabhängig von realem Sein oder Nichtsein als bloße Träger rein idealer Bestimmungen gedacht sind*) (Hua XVIII, 27). Aristotle's metaphysics is thus unable to secure the "theoretical unity" (*theoretische Einheit*) of sciences *qua sciences*. Some of them are empirical, others a priori; some deal with factually existing objects, others with mere bearers of ideal determinations (Id., 25). Only a general "theory of science" (*Wissenschaftslehre*) could do the job of providing such a theoretical unity (Id., 26).

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One could find varieties of this very same argument, formulated in the *Prolegomena*, scattered all over Husserl's texts. The idea remains the same: Aristotle's account of metaphysics qua first philosophy has to be rejected.

4.5. But Husserl's later claim, the one formulated in *Formal and transcendental logic* (see *supra* §4.3) and according to which Aristotle's first philosophy was only a "real ontology", not a "formal ontology", has a completely different meaning.

Unlike "metaphysics", "ontology" does not deal with "facts" (*Tatsachen*), but with "essences" (*Wesen*) (see Hua III/1, 21–3); its theoretical target is not "*das Seiende*" qua existing but qua "εἶδος" (Id., 6, 8–9); it is not meant to discover the factual laws of what is there, contingently and posited as existing (in part or as a whole), but the eidetic laws of whatever is necessarily possible, no matter if factually posited or not (Id., 15ff.); finally, it does not provide what Husserl alternatively calls the "principles" (*Prinzipien*), the "foundations" (*Grundlage*) or the "presuppositions" (*Voraussetzungen*) of factual sciences insofar as they are *factual* (this would be the job of "metaphysics") (Hua XVIII, 25–7), but insofar as they are *sciences*, and more specifically, insofar as they are sciences whose objects belong to certain material regions mutually unified and having borders that can be traced a priori.

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The material a priori laws determining the specific (*besondere*) content of the object domain investigated by particular sciences; the laws under which every possibly existing individual of a certain kind necessarily fall (including the factually existing individuals of the actual world, investigated by factual empirical sciences) in order to be such-and-such (*Sosein*)—all these laws are *eidetic* without being formal (Hua III/1, 14). And one of the names Husserl also uses to lump together all the "ontological" disciplines that are *eidetic but not formal* is precisely—although not unequivocally—"real ontology" (*reale Ontologie*):

> [There is] 1) *The connection of propositions* (*der Zusammenhang der Sätze*), incorporated into the explicative theories in a very particular way. Pure grammar and formal *mathesis* refer to propositions in general. 2) *The connection of objects* (*der Zusammenhang der Gegenständlichkeit*) about which the propositions assert something being true. More precisely, this connection is different for each science, it is the scientific domain scientifically explored. Formal ontology (corresponding as equivalent to the formal *mathesis*) and real ontology refer to the objectivities considered in their generality of principle. (*Auf die Gegenständlichkeit in prinzipieller Allgemeinheit beziehen sich die formale Ontologie (die mit der formalen Mathesis äquivalent zusammenfällt) und die reale Ontologie*)
>
> (Hua XXIV, 167; see also 158)

"Ontology of what is real" is thus an alternative way to talk about "material" or "regional" ontology.

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Husserl's argument should now become clearer. In the *Prolegomena*, Aristotle's first philosophy was put into question because of its metaphysical bond to "being" and more precisely to "factual being" (*tatsächlich*); by contrast, in *Formal and transcendental logic* Aristotle's first philosophy is found wanting because it limits the scope of ontology to "being" intended as "material being" (*sachhaltig*). In other words, Husserl is not saying (as in the *Prolegomena*) that Aristotle's "metaphysics" *cannot be* first philosophy because of

(1) its limited foundational scope, uncovering the presuppositions

  (1.1) of factual sciences only;
  (1.2) of factual sciences qua factual (not qua sciences);

(2) its need to be preceded by a theory of knowledge/theory of science, securing the correlation between knowledge and being (see also Hua-Ma III, 223–5).

Husserl in now rather affirming that Aristotle's "ontology" *does not cover* the entire field of what he here calls "first philosophy", for it is only limited to the material/regional/real part of it. In fact, Aristotle's "*Realontologie*" only covers that part of being that is not concerned with the disciplines of the formal *mathesis* (pure grammar, logic of consistency and logic of truth on the one hand, and formal ontology on the other).

The first objection, the objection raised in the *Prolegomena* still holds. And Aristotle's *metaphysical* questions have still to be delayed, as they cannot be addressed "firstly". Even the late Husserl will insist that Aristotle's metaphysics—and metaphysics in general—is not "first" but "last" philosophy (see also Hua I, 181–2). For its problems cannot be rigorously tackled, until the transcendental gauntlet of Gorgias is finally

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taken up. It is only after having provided a transcendental critique of reason (theoretical, practical and axiological), non-reason and unreason (Hua XXV, 193, 197 see also *infra* §5.4) that philosophy will finally be able to consider empirical sciences in their innermost metaphysical sense.[39]

As for the second objection, referring this time not to Aristotle's "metaphysics" but to his "eidetic ontology" (*eidetische Ontologie*) (see Hua XXV, 132), the idea is not that it should be delayed, but rather that it should be—or should have been—expanded. For "real ontology" (*Realontologie*, *reale Ontologie*), i.e. the ambiguous name designating whatever belongs to a "'region' of material individual being" (*'Region' des sachhaltigen individuellen Seins*), i.e. Nature, Spirit, things, living bodies, persons, etc., does not tell us the whole story of the a priori "connections of objects" needed to genuinely unify the field of philosophy in all its interconnected parts (see *supra* §2.2, *Phil*.3).

Thus Aristotle could perfectly deal with regional ontologies, providing the "eidetic" foundations of factual sciences. For example, the empirical sciences of nature dealing with nature as it factually is, are preceded by a science of nature as such, i.e. by an "eidetic ontology of nature" (Hua XXV, 132–3). And the latter belongs to the broader domain of "real ontology" (Hua XXIV, 158, 167). It is also in an Aristotelian way, with reference to a core-form of individual (*Individuum*) that regional ontologies as such can be built.[40] By contrast, what Aristotle could not do, was to follow the path of "formal ontology", and reach the principles proper to the disciplines of the *mathesis*.

The question is: why?

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4.6. This brings us back to the Stoics.

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While listing some of the reasons having prevented Aristotle for making such a step (Hua XVII, 71), Husserl restates the claim according to which Aristotelian logic lacks an appropriate semantic theory of meanings as "idealities" (*Idealitäten*) (Id., 71–2). And it is precisely at this point that, following Prantl's *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, Husserl praises again the great novelty of the Stoic doctrine of the λέκτον. A doctrine that was far ahead of its times, because it *promoted, from the outset, the complicity between formal apophantics and formal ontology*:

> (. . .) the very advanced insight already expressed in the Stoic doctrine of the λέκτον did not win out in antiquity and that, in the modern age, even after the development of a formal mathematics and its enlargement to include the calculus of logic, most logicians were unable to see an internal connection between the themes of mathematics and the themes of logic.
>
> (Id., 72)

The same claim can be found in other earlier texts. According to Husserl, the "great merit of the Stoics" (*das große Verdienst der Stoa*) has always been the following: they developed, way before Bolzano, a "pure noematic logic", i.e. a "formal logic qua doctrine of the validity of (*Geltungslehre*) of the λεκτά" (Hua XXV, 127–8):

39 "What is also called philosophy in the genuine sense (*im echten Sinne*) next to the critique of reason, is definitively what follows: metaphysics of nature, metaphysics of the whole of spiritual life and therefore metaphysics in general understood in the broadest way" (Hua II, 58–9).

40 On the topic, see Majolino (2015).

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> Such noematic logic was intertwined (*verflechten*) with the first steps of a *formal theory of the object*, the first theories of what is truly being in general (*erste Theorien über das wahrhaft Seiende überhaupt*), as the correlate of the objective truths that determine it, i.e. of the knowledge that rightfully judges upon it) (. . .) [The Stoics] recognized the essentially noematic character of the Aristotelian analytics.
>
> (Id., 127)

We can finally answer to our first question (see *supra* §4.1): are Husserl's Stoics just skillful logicians?

The answer is, of course, negative. The Stoics not only developed but also corrected Aristotle's logic, turning it from noetic to noematic (ibid.). But Husserl also highlights a second, immensely important, Stoic contribution to the disciplines of the *mathesis*. A contribution that will remain silent and unacknowledged until Vieta (Hua XVII, 53, 84) and Leibniz (Id., 29): the Stoic semantics of the λέκτον, Husserl says, is of a piece with a formal ontological account of the "empty form of the *Etwas überhaupt*" (Id., 75). A form that, through Leibniz and Bolzano (Id., 74–5), will later become the center of formal mathematics and theory of manifolds (see Id., 78 ff.).

And, at least on this very specific point, Husserl's suggestion appears to be hardly disputable. Although not formal in the specific sense of a correlation between a formal system of axioms and its object-domain, Stoic "ontology" is nevertheless based on a formal-empty "supreme genus" i.e. "*the something*" (τὸ τι).[41]

The Stoic "τι" is in fact as general as to include the existence of corporeal beings (τὰ οντα) and the non-existence of incorporeals, like the λέκτον. For, literally, *everything whatsoever,* existing or non-existing, real or ideal, corporeal or incorporeal *is* something.[42] And, as Husserl puts it, the unity of the "τι" or "*Etwas überhaupt*" is neither that of a material genus (like Nature, Spirit, Thing, Animal, Person etc.); nor is it a focal unity (as the non-generic unity of Aristotle's "being qua being"). It is the unity of an "*empty form*" (Hua III/1, 21–2).

Accordingly, both disciplines of the *pure mathesis*, i.e. the one dealing noematically with the "connection of propositions" as ideal meanings (*der Zusammenhang der Sätze*) and the other dealing with the "connection of objects" (*der Zusammenhang der Gegenständlichkeit*) in their most formal features (Hua XXIV, 167), ultimately appear as developments of Stoic intuitions: the λέκτον and the τι.

4.7. Of course, such developments are not without certain Aristotelian contaminations—as in the most genuine spirit of the βοήθεια.

In fact, in Husserl's view, all εἶδη, all pure essences, whether formal or material, whether belonging to logic or ontology, are always and necessarily ranked into "genera and species":

41 And again, interestingly enough, it has been claimed that the origin of the Stoic notion of the "something in general" can be found in Plato's *Sophist*. See Aubenque 1991, 370–75. Jacques Brunschwig says that the "τι" is the "highest genus" of Stoic "ontology" (2003, 220 and 1994, 92–157). In Husserl's terms, this description would not be adequate, for the *Etwas überhaupt* is the highest "empty categorical form" and does not count as a genus but as a quasi-genus.

42 Unlike Husserl's formal ontology, the Stoic ontology of the τι excludes universals and fictions (for an overall view, see Brunschwig 2003).

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> Each essence, whether materially filled or empty (i.e. purely logical), is ordered within a hierarchy of essences, within a hierarchy of generality and specificity. (*Jedes Wesen, ob ein sachhaltiges oder leeres (also reinlogisches) Wesen, ordnet sich in eine Stufenreihe von Wesen, in eine Stufenreihe der Generalitat und Spezialitat ein.*)
>
> (Hua III/1, 30)

Thus material ontological essences like "thing" (*Ding*), "lived experience" (*Erlebnis*) and the like; formal ontological "categories of objects" (*Gegenstandkategorien*) like "number" (*Zahl*), "set" (*Menge*), "relation" (*Relation*), "state-of-affairs" (*Sachverhalt*), "property" (*Eigenschaft*), "order" (*Ordnung*) etc. (Hua III/1, 25, 27); and formal logical "meaning categories" (*Bedeutungskategorien*) such as "Proposition" (*Satz*) or "Inference" (*Schluss*) (Id., 30)—*all essences* are necessarily ordered into Porphyrian trees, according to what Husserl also calls "Aristotelian genera and species" (*aristotelische Gattungen und Arten*) (see Hua-Ma I, 130–32; Hua X, 245–7).[43]

"Lived experience" (*Erlebnis*) is a materially filled highest genus; "objectifying act" is a genus; "perception" is one of the latter's species; "perception of thing" is an eidetic singularity (*infima species*) (see Hua III/1, 157–8). So far, so good. But the same "Aristotelian" structure can also be found within the domain of pure logic: its highest genus, Husserl says, is "meaning" (*Bedeutung*); "proposition in general" (*Satz*) in an intermediate genus; and the *modus ponens* an eidetic singularity (Id., 30). And Husserl's favorite example taken from the formal ontological domain is the category "number", of which particular numbers like "2, 3, 4 . . . *n*" are the lowest differences (ibid.; see also Hua-Ma I, 131).

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In sum, even essences belonging to the "Stoic" domains of the λέκτον and the τι, the highest genera "meaning in general" (*Bedeutung überhaupt*) and "object in general" (*Gegenstand überhaupt*), are organized into "Aristotelian genera and species" (Hua III/1, 30–31; see also Majolino 2015, 41). Aristotle didn't have the concept of "formal ontology". He nevertheless provides the latter with the formal-logical concepts of genus and species, needed to articulate its eidetic contents according to their degree of generality.

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A full study of Husserl's appropriation—be it implicit or explicit—of Stoic conceptualities would certainly deserve a study on its own. And the same holds for the Aristotelian concepts "contaminating", as it were, their employment. But since our present study is focused on the cluster Plato/Aristotle, let us simply stress that in:

(*Sto.1*) developing Aristotle's analytics as formal apophantics (Hua VII, 17–30);
(*Sto.2*) correcting Aristotle' noetic semantics with a noematic theory of ideal meanings (ms. F I 1 and Hua XVII, 72) (doctrine of the λέκτον);
(*Sto.3*) paving the way to the idea of formal ontology grounded on the formal quasi-region of the "something in general" (doctrine of the τι) (Hua XVII, 72ff.)

the conceptual resources of the Stoics have been both *explicitly* recognized and *actively* employed by Husserl to "help" Plato's cause.[44]

43 Husserl will later reject this talk (see Ms. A III 1/43a, quoted in Hua XLI, xxv).

44 Other Stoic themes in Husserl's work, upon which we cannot pause here, are: (1) the holistic view of propositions (*Satz*); (2) the ontology of states-of-affairs (*Sachverhalte*); (3) the originally stoic (!) doctrine of the ἐποχή, as defended by Zeno of Citium (see Couissin 1929); (4) the doctrine of the evaluative

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

Figure 9.3 The ideal of philosophy

This can be illustrated with the following diagram (Figure 9.3), showing the "theoretical unity" (*theoretische Einheit*) obtained by completing Aristotle's exclusively *material ontological* inclinations through the developments of the more *formal* leanings of Stoic *semantics* and *ontology*.

4.8. This finally brings us to our second and last question, related to the one/many issue (see *supra* §4.1).

Figure 9.2 illustrates Husserl's systematic achievements in the field of ontology. More, precisely, it shows what might be called Husserl's *universal eidetics*, bringing together the a priori disciplines of the *mathesis* (formal logic and formal ontology) and those of real ontology in a system of εἶδη (organized in genera and species, empty/filled, mutually founded and articulated in various ways etc.).[45]

Such a vast ontological picture is meant to provide the fundamental concepts to ground a priori both the unity and the differences of empirical sciences, dealing "metaphysically" with factual individuations of this or that region of being. In this sense, the diagram also shows how Husserl deals with the third Platonic tenet of a genuine philosophy, ensuring the correlation between being and truth (*Plat.3*), first formally, then materially.

What the diagram is *not* supposed to show, however, is Husserl's view about the actual accomplishments of Plato, Aristotle or the Stoics. In other words, Figure 9.2 is *not* a historical tableau.

Husserl certainly sees his own "universal eidetics" as a more successful realization of that very same Platonic philosophical project that also Aristotle, the Stoics and many others have tried to realize (see *supra* §§2.6 and 2.7). And considering such a

indifference (*Gemütsbewegung der Gleichgültigkeit*) explicitly phrased as ἀδιαφορία in many of Husserl's texts (for instance in Hua XXV, 107, 196); and (5)—last but not least—the epistemology of the φαντασία καταληπρική, that "cognitive impression that firmly grasps its object and grants for its being and being so" (Diog. Laert, *V*. 40d), i.e. what Husserl calls "*apodiktische Evidenz*". As already suggested (see *supra* §§3.6–3.9) the presence of the latter is extremely important in the Middle-Platonic accounts of knowledge.

45 On this point, see the often overlooked *Beilage I* to §§10 and 13 of *Ideas I* titled "*Wesen des Wesens*" (Hua III/1, 383).

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commonality of views, he does not see the fact of mixing up Aristotelian and Stoic conceptualities as a form of bare eclecticism. It is rather a way to *transform such concepts in order to make them actually do what they were meant to*. Yet, despite this fact, Husserl does not see himself as being "inspired" by his predecessors, or as following their lead. For, as repeatedly stated, ancient, medieval and even modern philosophies, having neglected the "transcendental impulse of Sophistry (*transzendentale Impuls der Sophistik*) (Hua VII, 60) and avoided the challenge of a transcendental theory of knowledge, remained "dogmatic" (*dogmatische*) (Id., 183) (see *supra* §2.3):

> Their fundamental concepts and propositions, their methods and theories were not drawn from the ultimate sources of transcendental subjectivity and do not receive from them their ultimate sense and truth. (*Aus den letzten Ursprüngen in der transzendentalen Subjektivität geschöpft und empfingen also nicht von daher ihren letzten Sinn und ihre letzte Wahrheit.*)
>
> (Id., 183)

"Dogmatic" approaches could certainly succeed in erecting rigorous systems, coherent methods or ambitious conceptual constructions. But scattered facts remain scattered, even if treated systematically. And contingent events, occurring within "the naïve pregivenness of the world" (Id., 61), will always bear the marks of their factual contingency. Unlike facts, εἶδη are neither unrelated nor mutually related in a merely accidental or contingent way. They are mereologically founded, coordinated, subordinated as genera and species etc. (Hua III/1, 25–7). While there might be scattered facts, there are no scattered essences, no unrelated a priori laws: εἶδη are always *necessarily interconnected in some way.* And as Husserl repeatedly maintains, the different regions of being (and quasi-regions of formal meanings and objects) essentially connect into the unity of the ὄντως ὄν, just as the different particular sciences are part of philosophy in general (*Phil.*3) (Hua VII, 13–4).

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This brings us to the idea that the "systematic unity of the highest a priori principles", i.e. the object of first philosophy, is prior to and grants for the "unity of factual reality", i.e. the object of second philosophy (ibid.). Only the former, Husserl sometimes says, deserves the name of "radical ontology, science of the ὄντως ὂν and not simply of being in the empirical sense" (*radikale Ontologie, die Wissenschaft vom* ὄντως ὄν*, anstatt von dem Sein im empirischen Sinn"*) (Hua XXIV, 99). The science of the "true being", namely ontology in the a priori sense or "universal eidetics", looks for the "fundaments and the principles of empirical ontologies" (*Fundamenten und Prinzipien der empirischen Ontologien*) (ibid.). And since such principles are mutually and necessarily interrelated (Hua VII, 4–5), things finally come full circle again: the unity of being and truth, grounded in the a priori connection of eidetic principles (*Plat.3*), vouchsafes for the contingent unity of facts investigated by particular sciences (second philosophies), protects human knowledge and action from skeptical and relativistic tendencies (*Plat.1*), and finally promotes the idea of a better humanity (*Plat.5*) (Id., 15).

4.9. But if Husserl believes to have reached the true "theoretical unity" needed to clarify the fundamental concepts (*Grundbegriffe*), propositions (*Grundsätze*) and methods (*Methoden*) of science in a "non-dogmatic way", it is precisely because the εἶδη pictured in Figure 9.2 *are established by being traced back to their transcendental source*

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Proof

(Hua VIII, 27–8). They are not naively found "out there", they are transcendentally constituted (Hua VIII, 29).

So Plato's doctrine of the first principles (*Plat.4*) finally meets Gorgias' transcendental impulse (*Soph.1*); it frees Socrates' γνῶθι σαυτόν (*Soc.1*) from its ethical limitations, and turns subjectivity, evidently showing itself in self-reflection (*Soc.2* and *4*), not into the object of a particular science (*Phil.3*)—i.e. the empirical and/or eidetic doctrine of the Soul (*Ari.2*)—but as the object of a universal science called "archeology" (*Archäologie*):

> (. . .) a science that is necessary and one should truly call "archeology", systematically investigating that which is ultimately original and resolves in itself all origins of being and truth (*jenes Letzursprüngliche und alle Ursprünge des Seins und der Wahrheit in sich Beschliessende systematisch erforschen*)
>
> (Hua VIII, 29–30)

The concept of "principle" (*Prinzip*) should now be understood in a subtler, twofold sense.

On the one hand, each particular science has its own "fundamental principles", determining both its object-domain and its methods. Such principles are nothing but the εἴδη of their corresponding material regions as well as the categorial essences proper to science qua science. The *a priori* principles of factual physics or metaphysics of nature are the one established by the "ontology of nature"; those of history belong to the "Ontology of the Spirit", etc. (Hua XXV, 132–3). But "first philosophy", although often associated, and "universal eidetics" are not synonyms:

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> What is needed is a science of the original sources (*Urquellenwissenschaft*), a *first philosophy*, a science of transcendental subjectivity. It is from the latter that all genuine sciences (*echte Wissenschaften*) have to derive the origin of all their fundamental concepts and propositions as well as all of the other principles of their methods. (*den Ursprung aller ihrer Grundbegriffe und Grundsätze und aller sonstigen Prinzipien ihrer Methode ableiten*)
>
> (Hua VIII, 4)

If "universal eidetics" is the science of the εἴδη qua principles of whatever is and can be truly known, then "transcendental phenomenology", intended as *first philosophy*, deals with principles in a quite different sense. The principles of transcendental phenomenology are also called as the "origin" (*Ursprung*) or the "original source" (*Urquelle*) from which the principles of universal eidetics draw their validity.

This nuance is of the outmost importance. One could therefore distinguish between

(*Pr.1*) *principles in the ontological sense* (εἴδη), i.e. the *a priori* principles from which factual sciences draw their fundamental concepts.

(*Pr.2*) *principles in the transcendental sense* (or ἀρχαι *tout court*, with no further determination), i.e. the *"origin"* from which (*Pr.1*) draw their validity.

Now, this twofold move, from "facts" (empirical sciences, metaphysics) to "essences" (universal eidetics, ontology), and from "essences" to "principles" *tout court* (archeology, transcendental phenomenology) is too massive to be neglected. And, considering

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the shared pattern of distortions identified above (see *supra* §4.1), it is also too reminiscent of another path, followed by many of Plato's historical heirs—from Speusippus and Xenocrates to Antiochus and Plutarch—to be dismissed as a mere coincidence.

A pattern trying precisely to articulate Plato's doctrine of the ideas as intelligible forms (εἶδη) and a doctrine of the principles (ἀρχαι). More specifically, Husserl's distinction

Tatsache—Wesen—transzendentale Subjektivität

strikingly parallels the "Platonic" triplet

ὄντα—εἶδη—ἀρχαι

But since we have learned that the most typical way to deal with the ἀρχαι—both in the Old Academy and in Middle-Platonism—was in terms of one/many (see *supra* §3.3), we have now strong reasons to ask the following question: is Husserl's "transcendental subjectivity" intended as ἀρχη, also conceived in a similar way? Could one soundly affirm that *somehow* the one and the many are the "field of origination" (*Ursprungsfeld*) from which the eidetic principles are generated?

5. A matter of principles II: ἀρχη

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5.1. This hypothesis can be confirmed in at least two different ways.

The first one can be found in a passage of *Philosophy as a rigorous science* (Hua XXV, 61) as well as in a typescript written at the time of the *Kaizo* article (Hua XXVII, 123; see Id., 260–61) and some other texts (Hua XXV, 202). The "science of true beginnings" that in the lectures on first philosophy goes by the Aristotelian name "πρώτη φιλοσοφία", is already named science of the "origins" (*Ursprünge*) or the "true beginnings" (*Wissenschaft von der währen Anfängen*). But this time, Husserl also uses an alternative expression. He calls it the science of the "ῥιζόματα πάντων", i.e. the "roots of everything":

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> According to its essence philosophy is rather science of the true beginnings, of the origins, of the ῥιζόματα πάντων. The science of what is radical (*Wissenschaft vom Radikalen*) has to be radical also in its procedure and in all its aspects.
>
> (Hua XXV, 61)

The formula is clearly borrowed from one of Empedocles' fragments: "The four roots of all things hear first (. . .)" (τέσσαρα μὲν πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε) (DK, B 6. 1).

Now, Empedocles' "roots", as reported among others by Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math*., 9. 362, 10. 315), are nothing but the four physical elements: fire, earth, wind and water[46]—what Aristotle will paradigmatically call the "elements" (στοιχέια). And, as we have seen, such a Pre-Socratic, physicist's view, hardly squares with the status of a Plato-inspired "genuine" philosophy. Moreover, no reader of Plato (*Tim*. 48b)—or Aristotle for that matter—would have conflated "elements" and "principles". So either

46 See also Aristotle, *Met.* A 3, 984 a 8–11.

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Husserl's philosophical talk of "roots" is clumsy and misplaced or it has a different source.

Needless to say, this second source brings us again to that very same cluster of Platonic distortions discussed above (see *supra* §3.3).

The form "ῥίζα" appears in fact already in Plato's *Timæus* (81c 6), with reference to geometrical figures.[47] Even more importantly, it appears in the famous "Pythagorean oath" where the talk of "ῥιζώματα" is referred to the famous "Tetractys", the triangular figure made of ten dots obtained by piling up as many dots as the first four integers: "No, by the one who grants our head the tetractys is the root and fount of everlasting nature" (οὐ μὰ τὸν ἁμετέρᾳ κεφαλᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτύν, παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως ῥιζώματ᾽ἔχουσαν) (DK, 58 B 15).

The two sources—the Pythagorean and the Platonic—will eventually converge in the Old Academy's doctrine of the "first principles", where the talks of "roots" (ῥιζώματα), "principles" (ἀρχαί) and "seeds" (σπέρματα) (*Met.* Λ 7, 1072b 35) finally merge. As already pointed out (see *supra* §§3.1, 3.9 and 3.10), for Plato's successors, the theory of ideas as separate intelligible forms was not necessarily as central as we tend to think. Accordingly, notions such as ἀρχή and εἶδος were carefully distinguished and set apart (see *Met.* M 8, 1083a 21–4). By contrast, there was no doubt that what went under the name of "principles" or "roots" or "seeds" of everything were precisely varieties of the one (ἓν) and the many (πλῆθος). A centripetal principle of unity, limitation, regularity, etc. and a centrifugal principle of multiplicity: fluid, shapeless, material, limitless, etc. (see *supra* §3.9).

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Now, the fact that such principles are named by means of botanical images like "root" or the "seed" is far from being insignificant. What the talk of "ῥιζώματα" or "σπέρματα" adds to the picture is the idea that, unlike the εἶδη, the principles look different from what they are the principles of. Just as the plant does not look like its seeds or roots, the two principles of the one and the many do not look like the entities they generate.

In other words, unlike the εἶδη, the ῥιζώματα/ἀρχαί no longer work as models or paradigms, as something with respect to which, to use Husserl's own terms, a particular individually existing entity is an "example" (*Exempel*) or an "instance" (*Beispiel*) of (see Hua III/1). The one and the many are neither individual contingent facts submitted to "coming to being and passing away"; nor are they essences, stable in their a priori being. They are rather "potencies" (δυνάμει) or "sources" (*fontes*) as in Speusippus (see *supra* §3.10). They are not "being", neither real nor ideal. The pair one/many can be safely described with the very terms employed by Husserl to portray transcendental subjectivity: it is "what resolves in itself all origins of being and truth" (*jenes Letzursprüngliche und alle Ursprünge des Seins und der Wahrheit in sich Beschliessende*) (Hua VIII, 29).

There is no way to tell for sure whether Husserl knew the historical connection between the talk of "roots" and that of the Pythagorean-Platonic principles. But even if we assume this was only a lucky coincidence, one thing strikes nevertheless as certain: the most distinctive defining features of the two doctrines show, again, a rather remarkable proximity.

47 Plato talks of the "ῥίζα τῶν τριγώνων" (roots of the triangles) (see also *Tim.* 53d and ff.).

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5.2. If the occasional reference to the "ῥιζόματα πάντων" is hardly enough to detect a transcendental-phenomenological variety of the Old Academy's doctrine of principles (revolving around the pair ἓν/πλῆθος), more convincing evidence can be found in *Ideas*, the *Bernau Manuscripts*, the *Cartesian Meditations* and all those manuscripts where the process through which everything that is constituted—in its "being" (*Sein*), "being-so" (*Sosein*) and even in its factual existence (*Faktum*)—is explicitly described by means of the twofold principle "Unity and Multiplicity" (*Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit*) (Hua I, 232).

Husserl repeatedly insists on this point: each singular *fact*, falling under a material εἶδος; every εἶδος, formal or material; all categorical forms, be it ontological or semantic, etc.—everything whatsoever, once understood as "phenomenon" (*Phänomen*) and taken as a "transcendental guiding thread" (Id., 87), appears to be ultimately constituted as the transcendent unity of an infinite but not chaotic multiplicity of actual and possible lived experiences:

> In short, everything that in the natural attitude is *simply there* (*einfach Da ist*) or, thanks to our cognitive activity, enters within the scope of our scientific sight as a theoretical Unity (*theoretische Einheit*), as soon as we reflect on the experiencing consciousness is given in a bewildering Multiplicity of modes of consciousness (*gibt sich in der Reflexion auf das erlebende Bewußtsein in einer verwirrenden Mannigfaltigkeit von Bewußtseinsweisen*): of affections and actions of the self, of sensible data and sense bestowing acts of apprehension, of changing aspects, of appearances changing either in their properly intuitive components or as for their components having a vague or an empty—and yet delimited in its sense—indeterminacy; a multiplicity of modes of givenness, in the form of perceptual, memorial or empathic presentifications; or in the sphere of thought, where theoretical themes are sometimes conscious in symbolic thinking sometimes in a more or less intuitively saturated thinking (. . .) etc. We thus bump into a remarkable parallelism according to which whatever in the natural attitude of experience and theory is experienced as one or is consciously known as one proposition, one truth, one proof or one theory, once we turn to and reflect on knowledge is traced back to the Multiplicity—and *idealiter* to the infinite Multiplicity (*unendliche Mannigfaltigkeit*)—of conscious life and, enacted within the latter, of particular lived experiences (*Erebtheiten*); i.e. each of these units is traced back to *its* proper intrinsic infinite multiplicities.
>
> (Hua XXV, 146)

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The claim is quite straightforward.

The natural attitude deals with worldly beings (*Seiende*) of all sorts. More precisely, it constantly—although not exclusively—deals with particular beings of a certain ontological kind: actually existing things, living bodies, persons, etc. Once the natural attitude suspended, what were "beings" turn into "'phenomena' in the sense of phenomenology" (Id., 173). As a result, things, living bodies or persons now reveal themselves as distinctive transcendent unities of a "bewildering" and virtually infinite multiplicity of modes of consciousness (Id., 146–7). Such modes of consciousness are, in turn, unities of virtually infinite multiplicities of singular lived experiences, each having its own constitutive multiplicities, etc. If we leave aside this latter point for the

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moment,[48] Husserl's main claim seems to be the following: what for the natural attitude was an actual or a possible *being* in-the-world (*Sein in der Welt*) (Hua III/1, 10), now *appears* under reduction as a constituted, actually or possibly posited, *Unity-of-a-Multiplicity*.

This formula appears in too many texts to be neglected: "each object is the unity of a pure multiplicity of consciousness" (*Jeder Gegenstand ist Einheit von reiner Bewußtseinsmannigfaltigkeit*) (Hua XXV, 193).

To say that something is a "phenomenon in the sense of phenomenology" ('*Phänomen*' *im Sinn der Phänomenologie*) or that it is variously constituted as the unity of a multiplicity of lived experiences is one and the same thing (Id., 173).

Such phenomenon, Husserl insists, is not itself in-the-world. Part of that "*Weltall*" in which things, living bodies or persons actually or possibly co-exist (Id., 152). And it is not even a pure possibility, a denizen of possible worlds, as the objects belonging to the eidetic realms of a priori real ontologies. Phenomena are, in fact, quite literally and in a non-mysterious sense, "out of the world": causally inert; not located in space or time; not motivationally connected with any-thing; unlike images, their appearance is not grounded in any-thing; unlike reflections or phantasms they are not the effect of some-thing on some-thing else; unlike fantasized objects they are not the mere outcomes of a subjective activity; unlike essences they are not obtained through generalization or formalization from particular cases etc.

Every entity can turn into a phenomenon, when it comes to its origin. As a result, "to be a phenomenon" is not the essential or the accidental property of a being. It is rather the way in which what Husserl calls the "roots" (*radices*) of being become manifest, i.e. that with reference to which certain lived experiences, literally, "make sense" (*Sinn*), are brought together as the experiences of some transcendent and even sometimes mind-independent being.

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5.2. The term "thing", for instance, has a threefold sense:

(*Thing.1*) *metaphysically*: it names any *factual denizen of the actual world* whose general distinctive features are studied by that particular branch of second philosophy called physics;

(*Thing.2*) *ontologically*: it is the name of a *material essence*, an εἶδος, determining the a priori features that an entity has to have in order to be one of its infinite factual or fictional "examples". Its eidetic properties are fleshed out by that branch of first philosophy called "ontology of material nature" and deliver the a priori principles of (*Thing.1*);

(*Thing.3*) *transcendentally*: it is the name of a *typical phenomenon*, i.e. of the specific transcendent correlate of a specific way-to-be-one proper to a specific multitude of multi-layered lived experiences. A "rule" (*Regel*), as Husserl also puts it, to make sense of an infinite and yet non-chaotic variety of *Erlebtheiten.* It is studied by transcendental phenomenology qua "archeology" and counts as the "origin" of (*Thing.2*) and its factual individuations (*Thing.1*).

48 Further elements in support of this reading can be found in Majolino (2012a, 168–9 and 175–82).

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From a strictly phenomenological standpoint, a "thing" is therefore "the synthetic unity of a multiplicity of related modes of appearance" (*synthetische Einheit einer Mannigfaltigkeit zugehörige Erscheinungsweise*) (Hua I, 77); the

> (. . .) unity of a multiplicity of ever-changing modes of appearance, of the latter particular perspectives and particular differences in the subjective here and there" (*Einheit einer Mannigfaltigkeit immer wieder abzuwechselnder Erscheinungsweisen, ihrer besonderen Perspektiven, besonderen Unterschiede subjektiven Hier und Dort*)
> (Id., 16 see also 18, 134)

It is what appears and is ultimately posited when experience unfolds itself in a certain way: not just the unity of a multiplicity of adumbrations (*Abschattungen*), but also as the unity of a multiplicity of "causal dependencies" (Hua V, 30). A thing is in fact constituted as a system of appearances, going beyond the ineffectiveness of the "phantom" (Hua IV, 21ff., 36ff.), and including the different layers of the *res materialis*, the *res extensa* and the res *temporalis* (Hua III/1, 415). At each of these levels, there are unities of multiplicities which, in turn, are constituted of lower-order unities of multiplicities.

The same also holds for each abstract part of a thing, like its singular color or its particular shape, equally constituted qua phenomenon as the "unity of streaming multiplicities" (*Einheit dahinströmender Mannigfaltigkeiten*) (Hua I, 78; see already Hua X, 237–45; Hua IV, 43; Hua III/1, 130–31). More specifically, a "thing" with its constitutive moments, is whatever would appear to any possible consciousness bringing together any virtually infinite multiplicity of actual and possible lived experiences, in that distinctive form of unity called "perception" (*Wahrnehmung*). A form of unity of which the actual "perceptual" synthesis factually realized by human beings and other conscious animals, are nothing but examples.

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Again, considered under reduction, the thing-qua-phenomenon (*Thing.3*) is neither a factual entity (*Thing.1*) nor an εἶδος (*Thing.2*). It is rather a "rule for a possible course of appearances" (*Regel möglicher Abläufe von Erscheinungen*) (Hua XXV, 149) a "rule for possible synthesis" (Hua I, 24, 66, 90; Hua IV, 40).[49] In short, it is a *certain way-to-be-one* that, once suitably varied in free fantasy and ideated as a pure possibility (Hua XXV, 169ff.), turns out to be an a priori condition for every conceivable experience of "things": actual, actually possible or possibly possible.

Correlatively, "perception" is no longer a psychological faculty or the name of an otherwise important class of mental states. It is a *particular way to make sense of conscious life*, a way to limit the infinite variety of connections between lived experiences, and turn a "turmoil" (*Gewühl*) or a "chaos" (*Chaos*) of *Erlebtheiten*—both intentional and hyletic—into a meaningful (*Sinnvoll*) "system of appearances" (*Erscheinugssystem*) (Hua I, 136).

In short, phenomenologically speaking, "perception" is the name of an open-ended multiplicity of lived experiences unified in a certain way according to the constitutive imperatives of the eidetic type "thing" (see Hua IV, see Hua IV, 40, 44, 55ff., 61).

49 "The thing is a rule of possible appearances, i.e. it is a reality as unity of a multiplicity of appearances belonging together according to a rule" (*Das Ding ist eine Regel möglicher Erscheinungen. Das sagt: das Ding ist eine Realität als Einheit einer Mannigfaltigkeit geregelt zusammengehöriger Erscheinungen*) (Hua IV, 86).

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5.3. This fact has clearly a broader significance:

> Transcendental subjectivity is not a chaos (*Chaos*) of intentional experiences, it is a unity of synthesis, a multi-layered synthesis (*eine Einheit der Synthese, und einer vielstufigen Synthese*), in which always new types of objects and singular objects are constituted. Each object however designates *a structure of rules for transcendental subjectivity*.
>
> (Hua I, 22)

> Transcendental subjectivity is not a chaos (*Chaos*) of intentional processes. Moreover, it is not a chaos of types of constitution, each organized in itself by its relation to a kind or a form of intentional objects. In other words: The allness (*Allheit*) of objects and types of objects conceivable for me transcendentally speaking: for me as transcendental ego is no chaos; and correlatively the allness of the types of the infinite multiplicities, the types corresponding to types of objects, is not a chaos either: noetically and noematically those multiplicities always belong together, in respect of their possible synthesis. (*und korrelativ ist das auch nicht die Allheit der den Gegenstandstypen entsprechenden Typen der unendlichen Mannigfaltigkeiten, die jeweils ihrer moglichen Synthesis nach noetisch und noematisch zusammengehoren*)
>
> (Id., 90)

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Not only "perception" but "transcendental subjectivity" *as such*, is not a "chaos" but a "multi-layered unity of synthesis". More precisely—as already pointed out (see *supra* §5.2)—"transcendental subjectivity" is the name of a *very distinctive* unity of a multiplicity of unities of multiplicities . . . etc. of lived experiences. Thus, just as "perception", but on a different level of complexity and synthesis, "transcendental subjectivity" names a way-to-be-one (see Hua VIII, 90ff.). An overall system of rules to make sense not only of the appearance of "things" but of a whole world (*Weltall, Allheit*). A world in which not only things but also an infinite amount of many other beings, actually or possibly, co-exist.

In fact, "things" are not the only transcendent unities of variously intertwined and multi-layered lived multiplicities. And Husserl has always been clear on this point: "*each* object as a unity of consciousness has *its* multiplicities (*So hat* jeder *Gegenstand als Bewußtseinseinheit* seine *Mannigfaltigkeiten*)" and "according to its objective genus (region)" it has the "distinctive modes of givenness of that genus" (Hua XXV, 134). So parallel patterns of constitution can also be found for "phenomena" belonging to any other ontological region or sub-regions.

"Other subjects" (*andere Subjekte*), for instance, or, more specifically, "alien living bodies" (*fremde Leibe*) can also be described as phenomena (Hua IV, 202, 81). Their distinctive transcendence can also work as the transcendental guiding-thread establishing the "systems of rules" under which some specific varieties of conscious unities-of-multiplicities can possibly and do actually operate. Accordingly, worldly encountered psycho-physical organisms, once put under reduction, ultimately appear as constituted qua "actual beings in a multiplicity of mutable and variable experiences" (*als wirklich seiende, in wandelbaren, einstimmigen Erfahrungsmannigfaltigkeiten*) (Hua I, 123).

Of course, the "multiplicities of appearances of the living body" (*Erscheinungsmannigfaltigkeiten des Leibes*) have to be understood in their "singularity" (*eigentümlichkeit*),

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not conflated with the constitutive multiplicities of appearances proper to the constitution of a "thing" (Hua IV, 159). More precisely, if the constitutive unity-of-a-multiplicity corresponding to the appearance of a "thing" goes by the name of "perception", the complex intentional operation (*intentionale Leistung*) by means of which alien psycho-physical living bodies are constituted as transcendent unities of multiplicities of analogically *transferred* first-personal embodied lived experiences (*überschobene Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit*) is now called "empathy" (*Einfühlung*) (Id., 204; Hua I, 134). Husserl variously describes it, although in different contexts, both in §41 of *Ideas II* (Hua IV, 159ff.) and in §54 of the *Cartesian Meditations* (Hua I, 147ff.).

The unity-of-multiplicity constituting the alien body, however, clearly rests on other unities-of-multiplicities. As Husserl puts it:

> (. . .) the unity of living body and spirit constitutes itself as a higher unity of two real unities. It necessitates its own constitutive multiplicities. (*Die Einheit von Leib und Geist konstituiert sich aber als höhere Einheit zweier realer Einheiten. Sie erfordert eigene konstitutive Mannigfaltigkeiten.*)
>
> (Hua IV, 245)

Accordingly, in order to constitute analogically the alien body, the psychological "real ego" (*reale Ich*) has to already "constitute itself in multiplicities of lived experiences" (*das reale Ich, das sich in Mannigfaltigkeiten von Erlebnissen konstituiert*) (Id., 213). This is the case for the constitution of my own empirical embodied ego by means of a "multiplicity of kinesthetic appearances" (Hua XVI, 255; Hua IV, 22ff., 159ff.). A unity-of-multiplicity from which the constitution of the alien body, to which analogous unities-of-multiplicities are empathically "appresented", clearly depends (Hua IV, 162–6).

In all these cases, and not unlike "thing", the terms "living body" (mine or alien) or "psycho-physical ego" (mine or alien) turn out to be the names not of facts or essences, but of "rules of synthesis", of typical patterns of constitution, of the many ways-to-be-one of a Nature-experiencing conscious life.

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5.4. The very same pattern also holds for all these objects intersubjectively constituted as belonging to the region "Spirit" (*Geist*), i.e. persons, cultural objects, communities etc. (Hua IV, 201ff.).

These are new and irreducible beings; seen as new and irreducible "systems of rules"; calling for new and irreducible synthesis; and appearing as new and irreducible unities of multiplicities. This time, spiritual objects are described as transcendent unities whose constitutive infinite multiplicities of actual and possible intersubjective lived experiences are variously brought together by different forms of what Husserl now calls synthesis of "evaluation" (*Wertnehmung*) (Hua IV, 10, 186). Accordingly, even social and cultural phenomena—just as "*any* multiplicity of constitutive phenomena" (jeder *Mannigfaltigkeit konstituierender Phänomene*), as Husserl explicitly maintains—are constituted by means of "multiplicities of appearances" (*Erscheinungsmannigfaltigkeiten*) (Hua IV, 201). Appearances that, this time, are brought to unity qua intersubjective objects of a "community-world" (*Gemeinschaftswelt*) thanks to affective appearances unified by what Husserl sometimes calls the synthesis of "mutual understanding" or "comprehension" (*Einverständnisse, Wechselversändnisse, Komprehension*) (Id., 201, 206, 308, 324).

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Obviously, the "Aristotelian" concepts variously belonging to the real-ontological material regions "Nature" and "Spirit" (such as thing, living body or psycho-physical entity, person, community, etc.) (see *supra* §4.2) are not the only one to be constituted as unities of multiplicities.

The same clearly holds for the "Stoic" concepts of formal ontology and logic, i.e. genera, species, meanings, categories and the like. Such "idealities" (*Idealitäten*) once put under reduction, taken as systems of rules and seen qua "phenomena", turn out to be nothing but new and irreducible "unities of constitutive multiplicities" (*Einheiten konstitutiver Mannigfaltigkeiten*), layered on lower-order constituted unities of multiplicities thanks to certain specific synthesis of consciousness (Hua XXXI, 15). In order to account for the remarkable form of constitution whose transcendent system of rules goes by the name of "ideal objects", now Husserl has to take advantage of the genetic distinction between the temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) proper to the unity of consciousness called "passive synthesis" and the omni-temporality (*Allzeitlichkeit*) constituted by means of "active synthesis" (Id., 31). Yet in both cases "synthesis" remains the key word for constitution, and what actually constitutes ideal objects is, again, a specific way of being-one of a virtually infinite multiplicity of actual and possible lived experiences.

Each ideality—be it an essence or a meaning—is in fact constituted by a complex system of active synthesis as the "over-temporal unity passing through a temporal multiplicity" (*Es geht also durch die zeitliche Mannigfaltigkeit eine darin liegende überzeitliche Einheit hindurch*) (ibid.). And, in order to account for the multi-layered process bringing higher-order and omni-temporal idealities to appearance, Husserl also introduces the distinction between different levels of constitution of universal essences: the "original constitution" or the "pre-constitution" (*ursprüngliche Konstitution*, *Vorkonstitution*) of a lower-order "synthesis of similarities" (Id. 78); and the higher-order one, grounded on the operation of free variation.

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Interestingly enough, the first lower-order "unity of generality" (*Einheit eines Allgemeinen*), the individual singularization of a concrete essence, goes by the formula used by Aristotle in *Met.* A 9 (990b 7–8, 13) and in the lost treatise *De Ideis* (Fine 1993) to describe the Plato's ideas: "ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν" (Hua XLI, 147ff.; Hua XXXI, 79; EU, 391, 414).[50]

As for the second, higher-order unity, the multiplicity out of which the "pure unity of the universal" is ultimately constituted becomes manifest by

> (. . .) continuing the given multiplicity in the realm of *free possibilities* and passing through the consciousness of an open multiplicity of arbitrary possibilities qua examples in the form of the "etc." (*Fortgang von der gegebenen Mannigfaltigkeit in das Reich der freien Möglichkeiten und in einem Durchlaufen einer bewusstseinsmäßig offenen Mannigfaltigkeit beliebiger Möglichkeiten als beliebiger Exempel in der Form des* "*usw*")
>
> (XXXI, 80)

50 This might suggest that Husserl considers Plato's ideas—or, more precisely, the ideas of Plato's doctrine of the intelligible forms (*Lehre*) (see above §2.5)—not as pure essences but only as "concrete essences" (*konkrete Wesen*), i.e. as what is identical in a multiplicity of individuals that cannot contain any further singularity (see Hua XLI, 147 and more generally Txt. 11). One could in fact remind that Aristotle's formula is employed in the context of a critique of Plato's doctrine of the ideas.

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So when it comes to the constitution of pure idealities, it is the "freedom of fictional phantasy" (*fingierende Phantasie*) that provides the "multiplicity" out of which the transcendent unity of the object is constituted (Hua XXV, 169).

In sum, both the eidetic objects of "Aristotelian" real and "Stoic" formal ontology are all unequivocally constituted in their transcendence as unities-of-multiplicities (Id., 204).

But Husserl does not stop here. Since everything whatsoever is constituted and, as a matter of fact, the world—*any* world—is far from being necessarily rational in its entirety, phenomenology should also extend its transcendental account to the domain of the non-rational and the irrational. Say, not only of "things", but also of "what seemed to be a thing but it is actually not". Images, make-believes, illusions, fictional and fantasized objects, but also random conducts, contradictory values, *despite their patent unsoundness* they all make sense as unfolding series of constitutive *Einheiten* and *Mannifgaltigkeiten*.

Whoever is originally interested to the theme of the unity and the multiplicity (*Wer sich ursprünglich für das Thema Einheit—Mannigfaltigkeit*), of the object and its rational consciousness or its possible knowledge, should certainly investigate together with reason also unreason (negative reason) and the irrationality, i.e. the entirety of pure consciousness (*muß doch mit der Vernunft die Unvernunft (negative Vernunft) und Nichtvernunft, das gesamte reine Bewußtsein studieren*) (Hua XXV, 197, see also 193).

5.5. We can now turn back to the most general idea of all (see *supra* §5.3): transcendental subjectivity as such is a multi-layered unity-of-multiplicity.

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At this point, one should not be surprised to find Husserl accounting for the self-constitution of the transcendentally reduced *ego cogito*, as an "open infinite multiplicity of concrete and individual experiences" (*offen unendliche Mannigfaltigheit von einzelnen konkreten Erlebnissen*) brought to unity (*zur Einheit*) thanks to certain modes of connection (*Weisen der Verbindung*) (Hua I, 76). And, more precisely, to describe the constitutive unity without which no transcendental consciousness could be established as granted by the "universal synthesis of transcendental time" (Id., 43).

Transcendental time is in fact the synthesis of synthesis, the primitive and most fundamental way in which transcendental life is unified (see Hua XI, 125). The "original temporal field" (Hua X, 31) is precisely what constitutes consciousness as constitutive, and allows it to follow all further "rules of appearance" which we are aware of thanks to the existence of transcendent objects of all sorts. And, accordingly, it is because of its constitutive/constituted temporal nature that consciousness can be-one in all the manifold different ways described so far.

As Husserl tellingly puts it in one of its first manuscripts on time-consciousness (and despite all the flaws of his early account of time): if one considers lived experiences themselves; if one takes them as "individuals" but not as "natural objects" (*ein Individuelles aber kein Naturobjekt*); if one takes into account the multitude of *Erlebtheiten*, actually and immanently given within the stream of inner time, then "one realizes that *the opposition of Unity and Multiplicity receives a new sense* (der Gegensatz von Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit einen neuen Sinn bekommt), that will guide us back to a deeper layer of constitutive conscious events" (Hua X, 271, Husserl's emphasis).

In its real immanence, Husserl continues, every lived experience, be it intentional like a *cogitatio* or hyletic like a sensation devoid of any presentative function (*Empfindungston, Empfindungsfarbe*), comes to "absolute self-givenness" (*zur absoluten Selbsgegebenheit*

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kommt) (ibid.) only and necessarily as "*a unity in the stream of its temporal phases*" (Einheit im Fluß seiner Zeitphasen) (Id. 272, Husserl's emphasis). And exactly the same one-many structure will be reverberated at the deepest levels of the self-constituting time and transcendental consciousness as a whole.[51] Accordingly, as explicitly phrased in the *Cartesian Meditations*, if "synthesis is the original form (*Urform*) of consciousness" (Hua I, 77), then "transcendental time is the universal synthesis (*Universale Synthesis*)" (Id., 79ff.):

> Unity and Multiplicity (. . .) The synthesis as fundamental fact (*Grundtatsache*) of the sphere of consciousness, as connection (*Verbindung*) of consciousness and consciousness in a new consciousness of founded intentionality. The universal unity of conscious life in the ego is a unity of synthesis in which the ego becomes conscious of itself as unity.
>
> (Id., 190)

5.6. There is no need to go into the details of Husserl's complex conundrum of time-consciousness (on the topic, see De Warren 2009). As for now, what is rather important is to (1) finally come back to our second question (see *supra* §4.1) about the Old Academy's and Middle-Platonic doctrine of principles; and (2) add some concluding remarks about Husserl's ultimate Platonic distortion and last contribution to the infinite Academy.

As for the first point: the previous section should have sufficiently shown that if transcendental consciousness is the origin "of being and truth" (Hua VIII, 29), such origin has undoubtedly a one/many structure. "Each single total consciousness—said Husserl already in one of its early texts—is a unity in which everything is connected with everything else (*Das jeweilige Gesamtbewußtsein ist eine Einheit, in der alles mit allem in Verbindung steht*)" (Hua XXII, 92). And yet there are many ways to be one (*Ein*), countless manners in which a lived experience may be connected (*in Verbndung*) with various other lived experiences and form a unity.

We have learned from *Thing and Space* (Hua XVI, 285–93 and *Ideas I* (Hua III/1, 92) that some of these connections are utterly unstable and do not support any positing.[52] Accordingly, their transcendent outcomes simply destroy themselves because of a "host or irreconcilable conflicts" (ibid.). A conscious life made of such disjunctive synthesis of irresoluble non-harmonious lived experiences would have as a correlate what Husserl calls a "non-world" (*Unwelt*) (Id., 88), incapable of confirming itself in its being (see Hua XVI, 287–91). Not a world tolerating a local or a contingent amount of irrationality, but the global and inexhaustible theatre of appearances that no experience has the "force" (*Kraft*) to confirm in their being (Id., 290).

But there are also other ways in which a multiple array of conscious events may turn into one whole lived experience of self-confirming posited transcendent unities of multiplicities. To each of these ways-to-be-one corresponds a typical form, a configuration (*Fügung, Gefüge*) as it were, whose unfolding is coherent enough to support the position of independent transcendent unities. A conscious life united in such a globally coherent way is definitively able to posit a world (*Welt*) (Hua III/1, 88). An objective

51 This point is extremely well identified in De Warren (2009, 250ff.).
52 On the topic, see Majolino (2010) and (2016b).

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world, upon which something true can be said and judged, the validity of which can be in principle shared by any other conscious lives unifying their experiences according to the same typical form; a world in which errors can be made, corrected or ignored; a world in which even a huge amount of non-rational or irrational events can take place—precisely because such world is definitively *there!*

And yet, it is precisely because such a conscious life unifies its virtually infinite manifold of lived experiences according to a certain form, that it can be said "to constitute" such world. But if this is correct, then *not every consciousness is world-constitutive as such; and transcendental subjectivity is not transcendental simply qua subjectivity.* It is the specific way in which its many lived experiences are one that decides of *transcendental character* of a conscious life. Only *some* of the many ways to be one of many conscious lives, *some* of the many manners in which lived experiences can be brought together, are ultimately able to constitute the phenomenal origin of being and truth and guarantee for their possible and actual knowledge.

5.7. Again, if this is correct, "the original form of consciousness" (*Urform des Bewusstseins*), the "fundamental fact" (*Grundtatsache*) thanks to which subjectivity *becomes* transcendental and is finally able to posit a world, is precisely what Husserl unambiguously calls "synthesis" or "unity of a multiplicity" (Hua I, 41).[53]

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53 An interesting contribution to identify the relation between "synthesis and givenness" can be found in De Santis (2015). One should also mention the important exception of Sokolowski (1974, 86–110; 2000, 27–33), who has the merit of being the only interpreter of Husserl I know of, who has recognized the significance of what he calls the "formal structure" named "identity in manifolds". According to Sokolowski: (*i*) the "formal opposition" between "identity" and "manifolds" is a structural feature of Husserl's phenomenology (1974, 86); (*ii*) it occurs together with two other "contrarieties" [*sic*!] (ibid.), i.e. "parts/wholes" (Id., 8–17) and "presence/absence" (Id., 18–56); (*iii*) the three distinctions are "interrelated" but irreducible to one another (2000, 22); (*iv*) while Aristotle had already worked out the mereological distinction between wholes and parts, and Plato that between identity and manifold, Husserl's original discovery is bound to the opposition between presence and absence (ibid.). As for point (*i*), Sokolowski is definitively right and correctly identifies the fact that different layers of "identity of manifolds" are always involved in the constitution of material things (1974, 86–97), categorical and cultural objects (Id., 98–100), the ego and other minds (Id., 101 and 109–10), etc. Points (*ii*) and (*iii*), however, appear already to be more problematic, for they lump together *formal ontological structures of objects in general* on the one hand, and *transcendental a priori conditions of sense-constitution* on the other. In fact, "identity" and "difference", "genera" and "species", "parts" and "wholes", and even "unity" and "plurality" are all formal ontological categories, applicable to *everything whatsoever* (Hua III/1, 27, 132). By contrast, "unity of synthesis", "empty/filled intentions", "horizon", "multiplicity-of-appearances" (*Erscheinungsmannigfaltigkeit*), etc. do not name formal structures of objects in general but laws of sense constitution, ways-to-be-one of transcendental life. Thus, as already pointed out, *if* one-many are to be called "principles", it is precisely insofar as they are the constitutive principles *of phenomena*; or, in a slightly different sense, because they are the transcendental *origin* of the ontological "principles" (εἶδη) on which the correlation between truth and being is grounded. Accordingly, one/many should not be conflated or put on a par with part/wholes or even identity, difference, manifold, etc. intended as formal categories. Moreover, once considered as principles, they finally include and are not opposed or contrasted to, the pair empty/filled (which, in turn, is not adequately described by the somehow Heideggerian jargon of absence and presence). What, in my view, could have put Sokolowski on the wrong track, appears to be expressed in point (*iv*). Having overdetermined the originality of presence/absence, the author considers the one/many only from the point of view of Plato's "unity of forms" (2000, 22): "Plato and the Neoplatonic thinkers—he says—as well as the scholastics, explore the idea of the identity within differences, the one in many" (ibid.). Since the one/may issue boils down to the problem of "the one *in* the many", i.e. the mode of being of universal forms, Sokolowski does not see that "the one *and* the many" can also be understood *not* as categories, but as "principles", "origins", "roots" etc. (see *supra* §§4.8–9).

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Such an "original form" is variously diffracted into the different modes of unity corresponding to the different types of globally rational and locally non-rational and irrational objects of actual or possible experience. This clearly explains why "transcendental consciousness" is not and cannot be the name of a being or of a somehow supreme original Entity. Taken in its strictest phenomenological sense, the word simply indicates the fundamental fact (*Grundtatsache*) that many connected (*verbundene*) lived experiences come to be one in a way that, quite literally, "makes sense".

Accordingly, the word "constitution" (*Konstitution*), used by Husserl to describe what makes transcendental subjectivity the true ἀεχη/ῥιζόμα of the "Allness" (*Allheit*) of actual, actually possible or possibly possible objects and types of objects, is only an abridged form, whose full expression reads "constitutive universal synthesis" (*universal konstitutive Synthesis*) (Hua I, 90, 134). Both constituted and constituting, transcendental consciousness can be certainly said to be "out of the world", but it is definitively not *beyond unity and multiplicity*. On the contrary, it is constitutive *and* transcendental, precisely because of the distinctive manifold ways in which it can be one.

In order to be the "original field" (*Urpsrungsfeld*) or the "original domain of the radical problem of the transcendence" (*Das Ursprungsgebiet des radikalen Transzendenzproblem*), Husserl's transcendental life of consciousness has to be already delimited by certain unities of multiplicity. The first one, as already mentioned, is the "universal synthesis of time" (see *supra* §5.5). The unlimited, "everflowing" stream (*Ström*) or absolute flux (*absolute Fluß*) of lived experiences (Hua X, 114), brought to unity thanks to the intentional "form" (Form) of time-consciousness, couched in the primordial one-many form of the living present and its varieties (Id., 366). A "Heraclitean stream" (Hua I, 18, 191) constantly flowing within the limits of a temporal stream bed that, as such, does not flow. This is already a first one/many figure, lying at the very heart of subjectivity itself.

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On the other hand, one cannot but notice that the terms ὕλη/μορφή, used by Husserl in Ideas I (Hua III/1, 191ff.) to distinguish between two different kinds of living experiences, intentional and non-intentional (sensuous), are clearly two of the possible names used in Middle-Platonism to rephrase the one/many principles (see *supra* §3.3). Finally, the reference to the open-ended horizon of potentialities of the cogitations, is also described with the language of "potentialities", already intentionally pre-traced in some way, both determined and undetermined (see Hua I, 81–3). We find again the very vocabulary used both in the Old Academy and Middle-Platonism to describe the many as a principle of indeterminacy: matter, everflowing, multiplicity, potentiality (ὕλη, ἀέναον, πλῆθος, δύναμις). A principle constantly intertwined with its opposite, providing forms, rules, limitations, unity, actuality, etc.

However, contrary to Speusippus or Plutarch,[54] the one and the many have now migrated. They are no longer cosmological principles—or, if they could still be named

54 As far as I can see, unlike Xenocrates or Eudorus, and more like Speusippus and Plutarch, Husserl's variety of the one/many principle(s) does not include any reference to One ultra-transcendent principle above the one and the many. This is also the reason why the scattered universe of Middle-Platonism, with its different undecided configurations, seems to me more suitable as a "heuristic filter" than Plotinus' amazingly sophisticated and extremely consistent Neoplatonism. As far as I can tell, all the points justifying a heuristic proximity between Husserl and Plotinus are common to the broader Middle-Platonic tradition. By contrast, the most specific aspects of Plotinus' philosophy do not seem to have any strong parallel in transcendental phenomenology: there is no ultra-transcendent, perfect, and ungraspable or ineffable One; nor a doctrine of emanation or conversion; no idea that matter is evil, etc. Husserl talks about Plotinus in

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this way, it is in a "completely new sense". For Husserl's distinctive distortion has now transformed the many ways in which the many can be one, into the *principles of phenomena*. And it is only insofar as conscious life is variously submitted to their authority that *some of its constitutive synthesis* can soundly be described as the "origin of truth and being"—beyond being and non-being.

5.8. This finally brings us back to Husserl's position within his broad narrative of the infinite Academy. And at this point, whether one agrees or not, Husserl's mosaic appears as extremely original and quite fascinating.

It is probably needless to remind that Husserl's narrative of the history of philosophy is more a *philosophical statement* than an actual report of facts and figures. Husserl himself was so aware of this fact to openly describe his own historical reflections in the *Krisis* as a kind of "philosophical fable" (*Dichtung der Philosophiegeschichte*) (Hua VI, 512–13, 556):

> The reader, the philosopher thinking by itself, is not motivated by the care for historical scientific accuracy (and for centuries this was totally excluded); he uncritically takes whatever the tradition delivers him as a fact, and lets himself be motivated by that which he theoretically understands of "the" Platonic, Aristotelian etc. philosophy. The one takes from this, the other takes from that, according to his own time (. . .) and when, for instance, he gets a decisive impulse from Plato, so that he will later count himself among the Platonists, maybe he has never had the time, the possibility or the desire—captured by the urge of the work of his life—to study all the texts of or attributed to Plato, let alone the reports or the critiques of other thinkers referring and clarifying indirectly the Platonic philosophy (. . .) He reads and understands what he reads on the basis of his own thoughts, in a way, he apperceives Plato on the basis of the "perception" of his already formed concepts, methods, convictions. Thanks to this apperception he obtains something now, he unfolds himself as a philosopher, and, similarly, by reading and interpreting other philosophical texts he turns into someone else. Reading Plato after a certain time again, the latter takes a new face, and this new Plato, just as the other authors of which he has a new understanding, motivate him again and again etc. (. . .) *What is* and should be *the meaning of this* for the philosopher thinking by itself? Is his work lost, if he has accomplished it, neglecting historical scientific accuracy, under the guidance and taking advantage of his "non-historical", false Plato etc.? (*Ist seine Arbeit verloren, die er, um wissenschaftliche Geschichtlichkeit umbekümmert, unter Leitung, unter Verwertung seines 'unhistorischen', unwahren Plato etc. getan hat?*) (. . .) Answering to this question has never been as urgent as in our time.
>
> (Id., 511–12)

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While the *excusatio non petita* is certainly manifest, there is definitively more in this Husserlian sketch of the relationship between history and philosophy than meets the

a short summary of *Enn*. V, 4, 1 and VI, 8 (Hua VII, 328–9). In this very brief synopsis, redacted in 1913, Husserl simply reports some of Plotinus' most distinctive views without expressing any judgment. The issue should nevertheless be studied more in detail.

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eye. And to begin with, one should start noting the significance of the technical terms "apperception" and "perception" (*Apperzeption/Perzeption*), used by Husserl to frame the general principles of his, say, "hermeneutics for philosophical activists". Unfortunately, this would lead us too far.

What can already be stressed, however, is that Husserl invites the reader to judge Plato and Aristotle—as we have tried to do ourselves (see *supra* §§3.3 and 3.4)—more from the standpoint of the "fruitfulness" of their historical distortions, than as targets of scientific-historical reconstruction. The two approaches, historical accuracy and philosophical activism, are equally legitimate—but they are not identical at all and correspond to two different theoretical operations.[55]

Hence the question is not whether Husserl's Plato or Aristotle are the *true* Plato or the *true* Aristotle. Husserl knows quite well that they are not. The question is rather, if and to what extent Husserl's distinctive variety of eclectic Platonism, i.e. "one of many 'possible Platonisms'",[56] is "emphatic" and "resonant" in the sense defined above (see *supra* §3.4). Is it worth accepting Husserl's amount of distortions or are we finally left with the another variety of fake cat/dog dilemma (see *supra* §§1.1 and 3.4)?

So here is the amazing picture we get once Edmund Husserl, aka "the philosopher thinking by himself" (*philosophische Selbstdenker*), decides—because of the urgency of his time—to continue his philosophical combat by turning his non-historical (*unhistorische*) Plato, Aristotle, Socrates etc. into the characters of a historical narrative.

Just like Descartes, Husserl's "archeological project" replies to Gorgias by turning back to the Socratic γνῶθι σεαυτόν. Now, the Socratic "self"—just as the one of Augustine—is not an unextended thinking substance: it is a living, acting, willing subject. Now Descartes posits such subject as another being. Openly dismissing this Cartesian view, Husserl now calls for additional help. The subject at stake is not a first principle in the sense of an axiom; nor in the sense of a fundamental Being from which the transcendent *Weltall* and its existence have to be logically and consistently deduced (see Hua I, 63–4). Such a principle is a "field": the field of transcendental life, whose universal laws of the synthesis determine the many-ways-to-be-one necessary to make sense of a whole world. As a result, Husserl's mosaic of the infinite Academy, heuristically enriched by our Middle-platonic detour, would finally look like this:

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1) Socrates' *way to a non-substantial subjectivity* meets, say, Speusippus' *doctrine of the two non-ontological first principles* of the one and the many;
2) thanks to this Socratic contamination, the one and the many are, so to speak, "de-pythagorized". For the point is no longer to maintain—in any meaningful sense—any naive metaphysical claim like "things are numbers" or "things are generated from numbers";
3) one should rather to respond to the Sophist's *transcendental challenge*;
4) as to provide the correlation between being, truth and knowledge needed to insure the principles of Aristotelian "real" and Stoic "formal" *ontologies* (first philosophy);
5) and finally help realizing Plato's project of *a genuine philosophy*;

55 One of the most interesting cases of silent conflict between "historical accuracy" and "philosophical activism" is the contemporary discussion of the putative "Aristotelian" origin of the concept of intentionality. On the topic, see Majolino (2016a).

56 I borrow this beautiful formula from Chiaradonna (2009, 20).

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6) all this, leaving to us the daunting task of finally turning to the most fundamental questions of metaphysics (last philosophy), and face contradictions and hardship of factual, individual and collective, life.

5.9. Once properly identified, Husserl's ultimate distortion is now finally open to discussion, and its "fruitfulness" (emphasis, resonance) ready to be carefully assessed.

The picture appears already, even at first sight, extremely "emphatic". For its originality is beyond any doubt. None of its elements is in fact dispensable or ornamental; nor does the overall drawing seem to look like any other known portrayal of the philosophical tradition.

As for its "resonance", it definitely needs to be measured yet. For the post-Husserlian phenomenological tradition, both analytic and continental, has massively followed entirely different paths.

Questioning the reasons of phenomenology's enduring turn away from Husserl would be the topic for another study. Is it the fascination of a wholesale critique of the Western philosophical tradition qua onto-theological metaphysics of presence? Is it the comfortable stance of doing some piecemeal philosophy, without being bothered by any "grand question"? Is it the obsolescence of the concept of reason? Is it one of the (inappropriate) side-effects of the (more than appropriate) political sense of guilt of post-colonial Europe? Is it the (sometimes appropriate) academic sense of guilt of philosophers, with respect to their colleagues in science departments? Or is it simply the fact that, after the post-modernist hangover, the magic word "realism" seems to have finally made everybody happy again?

Again, this is not the right place to discuss the tribulations of contemporary phenomenology and its unresolved relation with Husserl. It suffices to have provided some elements of discussion.

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There is one last thing worth considering though. Especially after having learned about the βοήθεια, and the Middle-Platonic fondness for contaminations. As far as we know, Husserl didn't have any dogs, or cats. Had he had a pet, however, it would have likely been a kind of platypus—a somehow "improved" beaver, part duck, part otter and part something else entirely different. An infinite platypus, indeed. Scuffling around. And making a mess of that cliché called "the phenomenological *School of Athens*". A cliché picturing Husserl with his finger upwards, and Heidegger extending the right arm into the air with a straightened hand.

(*a Emiliano, che crede ancora nella filosofia*)

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10 Phenomenology and ancient Greek philosophy

Methodological protocols and two specimens of interpretation—Part I

Burt C. Hopkins

Abstract: Sedimented in the "empty intention" moment of intentionality's normative reference to intuitive fulfillment is the schema of pure concepts separated from intuition, a schema that is constitutive of symbolic cognition in Cartesian science (the mathesis universalis). Fully developed, this schema originates the notion of a formal ontology, whose formal object—the "something in general"—is materially indeterminate in a way that no being in ancient Greek ontology ever was. Three methodological protocols related to overcoming the historical bias inseparable from Husserl's concept of intentionality are presented for the phenomenological interpretation of ancient Greek thought. One, the privilege of the relational structure of meaning, in both the normatively structured empty intention and the Heideggerian hermeneutical "as," should not tout court be assumed as the universal structure of the intelligibility of unity across all historical epochs, particularly when it comes to the whole-part intelligibility of unity in ancient Greek mathematical thought and Plato's ontology. Two, Husserlian intentionality should not be used as the guiding clue for interpreting ancient Greek ontology. And, three, characterizing the formality of ancient Greek ontology in terms of a formal ontology and its object, the "something in general," is illegitimate. Two specimens of phenomenological interpretation, guided by these protocols, are presented of Plato's eidetic account of the intelligibility proper to unity. Part I interprets the account in Plato's *Sophist* 253d–e of the three kinds of eidetic unity and their opposite. Part II interprets the different lengths of λόγος presented in *Sophist* 262c–264d in relation to λόγος ψευδής. The significance of these two specimens of interpretation for Husserl's mature account of eidetic unity is then discussed.
Keywords: collective unity, number, eidetic number, form, mereology, Gadamer, Jacob Klein, Heidegger, Husserl, Plato, Aristotle

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Introduction: Phenomenology and ancient Greek philosophy—Three interpretative strands

Hans-Georg Gadamer tells the story that Heidegger in the 1920s once asked his students in a seminar on Husserl's *Logical Investigations* who was "the first to recognize the Aristotelian insight that Being is not a genus?"[1] Gadamer relates that there were all sorts of answers, and that he "cheekily proposed the answer that it was Leibniz, in view

1 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Erinnerungen an Heideggers Anfänge," in *Gesammelte Werke*, Band 10 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1995), 3–13, here 6.

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of his concept of monads," to which Heidegger responded that "that would have been a happy event, if he would have understood that. No, it was Husserl." And Dorian Cairns reports that in a conversation in 1931, "Husserl characterized Heidegger's Aristotle interpretation as a reading back into Aristotle of an attempt to answer a question which first arose in Husserl's philosophy."[2] These two anecdotes are emblematic of one of the two well-known strands in the history of the phenomenological interpretation of ancient Greek philosophy, namely Heidegger's use of Husserl's phenomenology, or more precisely, of a key concept in that phenomenology, the intentionality operative in categorial intuition, as the guiding clue for his interpretation of Aristotle. The other well-known strand concerns Heidegger's use of his interpretation of Aristotle as the guiding clue for his interpretation of Plato, according to "the old principle of hermeneutics, namely that interpretation should proceed from the clear into the obscure."[3] Aristotle's clarity relative to Plato was evident for Heidegger in the fact that "What Aristotle said is what Plato placed at his disposal, only it is said more radically and developed more scientifically" (ibid.).

In addition to these two familiar strands of the phenomenological interpretation of ancient Greek philosophy I want to present a third, much less familiar strand, one that I will argue is best understood as a fundamental critique of both these familiar strands. The basis of this strand is a two-part study, completed in 1934 and published in 1936, titled "Die grischische Logistik und die Entstehung der Algebra."[4] Its author, Jacob Klein, a Russian Jew from Courland (present-day Latvia), then and now is almost as obscure as the journal that published his study, *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik, Astronomie und Physik*, attended many of Heidegger's lectures at Marburg in the 1920s, along with his close friends at the time, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Leo Strauss. Klein was also an intimate of the Husserl family. Klein's study, in effect, challenges both of the presuppositions behind Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of Plato and Aristotle; namely, (1) that Husserl's notion of categorial intentionality is capable of providing the hermeneutical key for interpreting truth (ἀλήθεια) in Aristotle and (2) that Aristotle's account of the mode of being of the kinds (γένη) and forms (εἴδη) is clearer and therefore philosophically superior to Plato's.

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Point of departure of Jacob Klein's critique of Heidegger's interpretation of Plato

Klein's argument, unpacked phenomenologically, takes issue with Husserl's concept of intentionality as an appropriate guiding clue for interpreting Greek thought generally and Plato's thought in particular. The problem with Husserl's concept in this regard is twofold.

On the one hand, the normative dimension of the notion of "empty intention," which is inseparable from Husserl's account of intentionality's essential structure,

2 Dorian Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 5.

3 Martin Heidegger, *Plato's* Sophist, trans. R. Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 8. Hereafter cited as "Heidegger's *Sophist*."

4 Jacob Klein, "Die griechische Logistik und die Entstehung der Algebra," *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik, Astronomie und Physik,* Abteilung B: *Studien*, vol. 3, no. I (1934), 18–105 (Part I), and no. II (1936), 122–235 (Part II); English translation: *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra*, trans. Eva Brann (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969; reprint: New York: Dover, 1992). Hereafter cited as "GMT."

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brings with it a semantic presupposition rooted in the symbolic mathematics that is the sine qua non for the modern project of a mathesis universalis. This presupposition, in turn, is inseparable from Husserl's characterization of the object of formal ontology, the Etwas überhaupt (something in general). Because both this presupposition and its ontological basis are characteristic of a conceptuality whose historical inception cannot have occurred before the sixteenth century, the extent to which they are inseparable from Husserl's concept of intentionality is precisely the extent to which this concept is an unsuitable guiding clue for interpreting Greek philosophy in general.

On the other hand, Husserl's concept of intentionality, as it functions in his account of categorial intuition, presupposes the Aristotelian logic of predication, and with that a whole-part structure grounded in individual objects conceived of as ontologically independent. Because the whole-part structure of Plato's logic is grounded in an ontology whose basis is a multitude of objects, that is, a plurality of objects foundationally inseparable from one another, each one of which is accordingly not independent of the others, categorial intentionality is conceptually blind to both Plato's logic and the ontology underlying it.

The first problem with Heidegger's hermeneutical employment of Husserl's concept of intentionality thus concerns the modern philosophical presuppositions that are inseparable from and therefore "sedimented" in it. These presuppositions are a problem for Klein because the notion of the intuitively empty, rule-governed conceptual reference determinative of the "consciousness of" constitutive of intentional directedness, as well as the notion of an intentional object that is formal in the sense of being materially indeterminate, are foreign to the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. The second problem concerns the logical structure of the Aristotelian predication behind Husserl's concept of categorial intentionality, which cannot but privilege Aristotle's logic over Plato's dialectic. These historical and systematic presuppositions behind Heidegger's interpretation of Plato and Aristotle are addressed in Klein's interpretation of their philosophies. Klein does so in a manner that endeavors to neutralize them, by striving to interpret the "formality" proper to Plato and Aristotle's accounts of the kinds and forms (γένη and εἴδη) from its own conceptual level in each of their philosophies, rather than from the conceptual level of the formality constitutive of modern philosophy and mathematics.

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To accomplish this, Klein adopts a twofold strategy. First, he rejects the argument behind Heidegger's privileging of Aristotle's philosophy over Plato's, that it is clearer and more scientific, and maintains instead that Aristotle's thought is most appropriately presented as emerging from out of its Platonic context. Second, rather than employ categorial intentionality as the guiding clue to interpret both Aristotle and Plato, and therewith—like Heidegger—to privilege in his interpretation of their thought the whole-part structure of predicative λόγος, Klein employs as his guiding thread the whole-part structure of what Husserl called in his first work the "authentic" or "proper" (eigentlich) structure of number,[5] in order to interpret both the concept and being of number in Plato and Aristotle.

5 Edmund Husserl, *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, ed. Lothar Eley, Husserliana XII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970); English translation: *The Philosophy of Arithmetic*, trans. Dallas Willard (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), Chapter I.

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The non-predicative whole-part structure of Husserl's authentic (*eigentlich*) number as guiding clue for Klein's interpretation of ancient Greek Ἀριθμὸς

Number (Anzahl) in its proper sense for Husserl is not characterized by the association of a concept with a sign or by a sense-perceptible numeral, but by the immediate and "collective" unification of a concrete multitude—that composes its parts—by the number in question, which composes its whole. This mode of unification is such that the numerical unity that encompasses those parts as their whole is something that nevertheless cannot be predicated of each of the parts individually. For instance, the whole of the unity of the number two, which encompasses and therefore collectively unifies each one of the items belonging to the (smallest) multitude that compose its parts, cannot be predicated of either of these parts taken singly. Only when both are taken together can these parts be said to belong to the whole of the number that unifies them. Precisely this state of affairs, then, is behind this whole-part structure exceeding the limits of the intelligibility that is made possible by the whole-part structure of predicative λόγος. For in accordance with whole-part structure of predication, the part is a part of the whole in the sense that the whole can be predicated of it, e.g., the horse *is* an animal, the dog *is* an animal. This state of affairs is unlike the relation of the parts of a number to its structural whole, about which it cannot be said, for instance, that "one *is* a two," or that "one *is* a three." Moreover, from the perspective of predicative λόγος, when the "being one" of the structural unity of the numerical whole that collectively encompasses the multitude of its parts is stressed, it cannot but seem to predicate mistakenly unity to something that by definition is more than one, namely the multitude that belongs most properly to number.[6]

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The non-predicative whole-part structure characteristic of Husserl's account of the proper structure of number, which is to say with both Husserl and Klein, the structure of non-symbolic numbers, is exhibited according to Klein by the concept and being of

6 Aristotle's answer to the question that he maintains is unanswered in Plato's generic account of number, namely, *what* it is that is responsible for the unity proper to number, begins by posing it only for *actually* counted multitudes. Such multitudes, as multitudes of homogeneous ones, comprise a unity insofar as each multitude is measured by its own one. Therefore there is no collective unity, no being one of a multitude beyond the many ones that compose it. Thus Aristotle writes: "We speak of one and many in just the way one might say one and ones, or a white thing and white things, or speak of the things measured off in relation to their measure; in this way, too, manifold things are spoken of, for each number is many because its consists of ones and because each number is measured by the one, and is many as opposed to the one and not to the few. In this sense, then, even two are many, but this not as a multitude having an excess either in relation to anything or simply, but as the first multitude" (*Metaphysics* I 6, 1056b 23–24).

Counting presupposes the homogeneity of that which is counted, which means that in counting one and the same thing is fixed upon, such that its definite amount is arrived at only after one and the same thing has been counted over. The "one," then, does not have priority in counting as the superiority of a genus over a species, but rather in its character as the "measure (μέτρον)" by which the definite amount of a multitude is determined. The one is not a "something common (κοινόν)" (Metaphysics I 1, 1053 a 14) over or alongside of the many things that are counted, for "It is clear that the one signifies a measure" (Metaphysics N 1, 1087b 33). Any specific number is therefore "a multitude measured by the one" (Metaphysics I 6, 1057 a 3 f.). As such, its "thinghood (οὐσία)" is the multitude of units as such, in the precise sense of the "how many" it indicates. Thus, οὐσία is understood here by Aristotle to be derived, insofar as that what each number is, is not something that is separate or detached from the definite amount of homogeneous units it delimits. Thus, for example, "six" units are not "two times three" or "three time two" units, but rather precisely "once six" (Metaphysics Δ 14, 1020b 7f.). For Aristotle, then, there is no such thing as the six, with an intelligible being that would be distinct from the many hexads that delimit this or that multitude of "once six" units.

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number (ἀριθμὸς) in ancient Greek arithmetic and logistic. Klein's interpretation of ancient Greek philosophy hinges on precisely this structure, which he argues presents the key to interpreting Plato's philosophy, Aristotle's critical response to that philosophy, as well as the fundamental difference in concept formation in ancient Greek and early modern philosophy. Methodologically, the latter point is the crucial one, because so long as the modern, symbolic concept of number (Zahl) guides any interpretation of ancient Greek philosophy, let alone any interpretation with phenomenological aspirations, not just the problematic behind the meaning of mathematical unity and multiplicity in ancient Greek mathematics will remain inaccessible, but likewise also the problematic behind the meaning of the unity and multiplicity of being in ancient Greek philosophy. Once these problematics come into view, the entire axis not only of Plato's philosophy but of Aristotle's critical departure from it shifts from the standard view. Regarding the former, the real locus of the participation (μέθεξις) problem turns out to be accounting for the one and the many structure exhibited by the community of forms (κοινωνία τῶν εἰδῶν), the structure of which the participation of many sensible beings in the unity of a single form is but a derivative reflection. With respect to the latter, the real target of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic separation (χωρισμός) thesis emerges to be not the one form's putative separation from the many sensible beings but the irreducibility of the common (κοινόν) unity of the kinds (γένη) and forms (εἴδη) to the kinds and forms that they encompass and therefore with which they are in community.

Crucial to Klein's interpretation are the portions of Aristotle's Metaphysics (Books A, M, and N) that zero in on the whole-part structure of number behind Plato's account of the common unity responsible for the unity of a multitude that is constitutive of the participation problem. On Klein's view, the zeal with which Aristotle criticizes what he reports is the Platonic thesis that the forms are in some sense numbers signals both the importance of the whole-part structure of number in Plato's philosophy and Aristotle's rejection of it as a suitable account of the mode of being of the forms. Before discussing Klein's phenomenological interpretation of ancient Greek philosophy in more detail, however, a brief consideration of Gadamer's misappropriation of it in his hermeneutical interpretation of Plato will help make salient Klein's interpretation.

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Gadamer's misappropriation of Klein's account of the whole-part structure of the Greek Ἀριθμὸς

Gadamer reports in 1968 that "J. Klein in his investigations concerning 'Greek Logistic and the Origin of Algebra'[7] . . . had pointed my own research in new directions at the time I was with him in Marburg." Gadamer identifies the source of these directions with "the thesis which I have been advocating for more than 30 years now . . . that from very early on in the dialogues there are references to what in a word might be called the *arithmos* structure of the logos," and he maintains "this idea was first elaborated by J. Klein." By the "*arithmos* structure of the logos," Gadamer understands the whole-part structure of number in the proper sense, whereby the unity of λόγος as a whole

7 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Platos ungeschriebene Diaklektik," in *Gesammelte Werke*, Band 6 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1985), 129–153, here 133. English, "Plato's Unwritten Dialectic," in *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1980), 124–155, here 129. Here after cited as "PUD."

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makes manifest an intelligibility that exceeds the multitude of words that compose its parts. While Klein's general insight into this structure guides both Gadamer's account of the λόγος in Plato and that of the community of forms, of which Gadamer maintains the Platonic λόγος functions as a "reflected repetition (*reflektierte Wiederholung*),"[8] Gadamer departs from Klein by presenting the whole-part structure of numerical unity as paradigmatic of Being in Plato. Klein, however, taking his cue from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* B 6, 1002 b 15f, where three kinds of number in Plato are reported—eidetic, sensible, and mathematical (ἀριθμὸς εἰδητικός, ἀριθμὸς αἰσθητός, and ἀριθμὸς μαθηματικός)—maintains that it is the whole-part structure of eidetic number that functions as the paradigm of unity in Plato's philosophy, although, significantly, not of the unity of the λόγος but exclusively that of eidetic and mathematical being.

Gadamer's departure from Klein is not only significant because his appropriation of Klein's phenomenological interpretation of the structure of the Greek ἀριθμὸς elides Klein's account of the important structural difference between the unity intrinsic to the parts of a mathematical number and those of an eidetic number. It is also significant because this difference plays a crucial role in Klein's phenomenological interpretation of the λόγος in Plato's philosophy, or, better, his interpretation of the philosophical significance of the appearance of the λόγος in Plato's dialogues. And this interpretation, in turn, has profound implications for the phenomenological interpretation of the relationship between the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle in general as well as for the assessment of the phenomenological significance of Aristotle's critical departure from Plato. Klein's phenomenological interpretation of the difference between the unity of the parts of eidetic and mathematical numbers, that is, of the difference between an eidetic and a mathematical monad (μονάς), focuses on Aristotle's report that the unity of eidetic monads is incomparable (ἀσύμβλητοι),[9] in the sense that the intrinsic intelligibility of each form as a singular unit is unique to that form, and thus cannot be compared with other forms. The unity of each singular mathematical monad, in contrast, is reported by Aristotle to be identical with that of any other, such that any mathematical monad is homogeneous—which is to say, comparable—with any other.

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When Gadamer talks of the arithmos-structure of the logos, and of number being paradigmatic of Being in Plato, that is, of "Plato's doctrine of ideas" (PUD, 152), he has in mind "the mysterious nature of the arithmos" (141), insofar as it "consists of units each of which by itself is one, and nevertheless the number itself, according to the number of units it includes, is not many but a definite 'so-many', the unity of a multiplicity bound together" (147). That is, Gadamer focuses on the peculiar phenomenological character of the collective unity characteristic of the whole of the Greek ἀριθμὸς that Klein uncovered, which indeed is the structure that both the λόγος and the community of forms have in common. This focus is what is behind his argument for number's paradigmatic function in Plato. For Klein, however, despite the commonality of this aspect of the arithmos-structure to the λόγος and the community of kinds, that is, despite the irreducibility of the unity of the whole in relation to its parts, the difference between the parts of eidetic and mathematical numbers is also significant for

8 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Amicus Plato Magis Amica Veritas," in *Gesammelte Werke*, 71–89; English, "Amicus Plato Magis Amica Veritas," in *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*, 194–218, here 80. Hereafter cited as "APM."

9 Aristotoel, *Met.* M, 1080a 20.

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interpreting Plato's philosophy. Gadamer, however, does not mention this difference, which is what allows him, in the end, to follow Aristotle's criticism that "sees in Plato's thinking a mathematization of nature," (APM, 209–210), and therewith of Being and the λόγος.

Implications of Gadamer's bypassing Klein's stress on the difference between the unity of the units of eidetic and mathematical numbers

Klein's interpretation maintains that the difference between the units in eidetic and mathematical numbers accounts for both the eidetic number's foundational relation to mathematical numbers and the λόγος's limited ability to give an account of eidetic unity, that is, of the unity proper to the community of forms (κοινωνία τῶν εἰδῶν). Regarding the mathematically foundational role of eidetic numbers, or more precisely, of the ten eidetic numbers Plato reportedly limited them to according to Aristotle, Klein (again following Aristotle's reports about Plato) maintains that for Plato:

> Only because there are *eide* which belong together, whose community in each case forms a "kinship" which must, due to the "arithmetical" tie [i.e., the whole-part structure proper to the ἀριθμός] among its "members" as eidetic numbers, be designated as *the* six or *the* ten, can there be arbitrarily many numbers, such as hexads or decads, in the realm of "pure" units as well as in the realm of sensibles. (GMT, 92)

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Regarding the λόγος's limited ability to account for the eidetic unity of the forms in community, Klein maintains that for Plato there is a tight connection between the units of mathematical numbers and the limits of what the λόγος can make intelligible in the following sense: inseparable from the signifying power of the λόγος is the being one, two, or many of that which it discloses (*Sph.*, 237 D). That is, behind the capacity of the λόγος to disclose what it discloses and to give an account of that disclosure is the supposition inseparable from its disclosing power, namely that the unity of the referent to which it refers is homogeneous, such that more than one referent can be distinguished and therefore counted. Because it is the non-homogeneous unity proper to the incomparably singular forms that are united in their eidetic kinship that is responsible for both mathematical numbers and for the kinds (γένη) and forms (εἴδη) that render intelligible the unlimited multitude of things in the sensible world, the beinghood (οὐσία) of the λόγος is intrinsically limited in its capacity to render an *account*, "with complete clarity" (*Sph.*, 217 A–B, cf. 254 B), of their intelligibility. This is the case because of the fundamental presupposition that lies behind the capacity of the λόγος to give an account of anything, namely, that it signify the unity of what it discloses as a something that is comparable (homogeneous) with the unity of the other things it discloses. This presupposition, however, precludes precisely what is the case in the intelligibility of unities that belong to the kinds (γένη) and forms (εἴδη), to wit, their incomparability. To cite Klein's primary example, in the *Sophist* the kinds of Being, Motion, and Rest, when counted by the λόγος, appear to signify—each one—a separate kind, while all together they appear to signify three kinds. Yet, because the unity of each is not comparable with the others, it turns out that the Being as a kind does not count as a third kind, apart from Motion and Rest, but rather it (Being) can only appear to thought precisely as Motion and Rest, both together.

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Thus, whereas, as we have seen, Gadamer has the Platonic λόγος's disclosing power reflectively repeating the intelligibility of the community of forms, Klein maintains that Plato's dialogues mimetically display precisely the "weakness" of the λόγος when it comes to giving an account, which is to say, literally, to being able to count the forms. Gadamer, in fact, understands the intelligibility of the forms relationally, in terms of Heidegger's "hermeneutical as." Thus for Gadamer, "[o]nly when the idea is 'alluded' to in respect to another does it display itself as something" (PUD, 152). The structure of proportion, then, for Gadamer is more fundamental than that of ἀριθμός. Or, better, he understands the arithmos-structure of the interwovenness of the forms in the λόγος as a mathematical λόγος, that is, in terms of a proportion. The characteristic of a proportion, "that its mathematical value is independent of the given factors in it" (PUD, 150), provided the same proportion is maintained, is thus interpreted by Gadamer as an "allusion" to the whole-part structure of ἀριθμός. For Klein, however, the whole-part relation proper to the collective structure of ἀριθμός is more fundamental than the relations that compose a proportion, since a numerical proportion is a relation between numbers. Gadamer himself, paradoxically, recognizes this, when he writes that "[t]he same relation can exist even when the numbers in it are changed" (ibid.).

The intelligibility of relational and non-relational unity in Greek mathematics

Behind the discrepancy between Gadamer and Klein over the structural priority of number or proportion is the question of the relation between theoretical arithmetic and theoretical logistic in ancient Greek mathematics, that is, the question of which knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is the more fundamental. According to Klein, theoretical arithmetic is the more fundamental, because it investigated that which is presupposed by theoretical logistic, namely number, given logistic's status as the mathematical knowledge of how numbers are related to one another. More specifically, ancient Greek arithmetic investigated the forms (εἴδη) of numbers in themselves (e.g., the odd and the even), while ancient Greek logistic investigated the relations between the different forms of number. These logistical relations expressed themselves in terms of ratios and proportions. Ratio—for our purposes only arithmetic ratios need be considered—was understood to be a whole based on a kind of comparison of its parts—numbers—with respect to size. And proportion was understood to be a whole whose parts are composed of the same ratios. On Klein's view, however, the reasons behind the priority of theoretical arithmetic over theoretical logistic in Greek thought are difficult to discern, so long as the guiding paradigm for the basic concepts of mathematical science presupposes modern symbolic mathematics. Above all, this is the case because the advent of modern algebra in the sixteenth century paved the way for conceptualizing the basic structure of number as a ratio. With this, the ancient understanding of an arithmetical proportion, as the relationship between ratios of numbers that—as ratios—are distinct from the numbers themselves that compose the ratios, is lost. What is lost, then, is the concept of proportion understood as the whole-part structure of an encompassing unity of the multitudes of units that are its comparative parts. Thus, for ancient mathematics, number and ratio are different mathematical objects, whereas for modern mathematics, the conceptual structure of number is formulated in terms of the conceptual structure of ratio, such that the very being of number is understood as a ratio.

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When the fundamentality of the relational structure of mathematical being that is operative in modern mathematics is elevated to a universal concept, its intelligibility effectively transcends the historicity of its conceptual origin. This is to say, rather than articulate the structure of one possibility of mathematical being, the relational formulation of mathematical unity assumes the status of the a priori structure underlying mathematical being per se in any historical epoch. One consequence of this is the interpretative bias visible in Gadamer's relational (proportional) understanding of both the arithmos-structure of the logos and the intelligibility of the community of ideas commented upon above. The identification of this bias provides the occasion to formulate the first methodological protocol for the phenomenological interpretation of ancient Greek philosophy, namely, avoiding tout court the supposition that in such thought the intelligibility of all unity is relational. As we've seen, the unity of both eidetic and mathematical numbers is inseparable from a whole-part structure whose intelligibility does not presuppose that that structure is relational. In the case of both forms of numbers, neither the unity of the parts with the whole nor the whole with the parts refers to anything other than their community with each other. The intelligibility of the unity at issue here is thus radically different from the intelligible structure of relational unity. Relational unity, as we've also seen, is intelligible in terms of an independent whole-part unity that refers to another independent whole-part unity, whether those whole-part unities are numbers, as in a ratio, or whether they are ratios, as in a proportion.

Or, better, relational unity, in its ancient Greek mathematical and Platonic philosophical context, is intelligible as the reference of independent whole-part unities to other such unities. With the advent of modern symbolic mathematics, Klein argues that the shift in concept formation responsible for the transformation of the ancient Greek concept and being of number into its modern concept and being makes possible an understanding of relational unity that completely bypasses the ancient Greek mathematical paradigm of independent whole-part unities referring to one another.

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The origin of the schema separating pure concepts and intuition in Descartes' identification of algebra with symbolic geometry

Klein identified two key moments of this shift, both of which were initiated by Descartes' identification of "'algebra' understood as a symbolic logistic with geometry *interpreted by him for the first time as a symbolic science*" (GMT, 206). The first is the separation (abstraction) of both the concept of multitude from a multitude itself and the concept of figure from geometrical figures. The second is the identification of these concepts with sense-perceptible signs. On Klein's view, one consequence of the first abstraction is Descartes' understanding that the numbers in his analytic geometry do not deal with multitudes of things or their representation in the imagination but with their multitudinousness as such, their indeterminate manyness to which nothing truly in being corresponds. Descartes thus draws a sharp distinction between the indeterminate concept of a multitude that the mind abstracts from its cognition of a multitude that has being, e.g., five units or five counted points or any other arbitrary objects, and the determinate being of that multitude itself. Likewise, the figures in Descartes' analytic geometry, in Descartes' words, "abstract no less from numbers themselves than . . . from geometric figures or from anything else you like" (*Regulae*, Rule XVI, 455 f.).

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The identification of letters and figures with these abstracted concepts generates mathematical symbols, which, being perceptible by the senses, assume the guise of mathematical objects independent of the mathematical beings—determinate multitudes and geometric figures—of traditional mathematics. As such, the semantic content of the symbols of Descartes' mathematics is "general," in the precise sense that they neither refer to determinate amounts of units (numbers in ancient Greek sense of ἀριθμοί) nor determinate geometrical figures. Rather, for Descartes they represent the meaning fundaments of universal mathematics—the mathesis universalis—whose object is the pure concept of "magnitude in general," to which no determinate beings correspond. On Klein's view, these abstractions "alone give rise to the possibility of contrasting 'intuition' [Anschauung] and 'concept' [Begriff], and of positing 'intuition' as a separate source of cognition alongside the mind [Verstandes]" (GMT, 202). They do so because the identification of these concepts with perceptible signs grants them an epistemological autonomy from the "true being"—determinate amounts of units or determinate figures—of the numbers and geometrical figures from which they've been abstracted.

Husserl's doctrine of intentionality as the fullest expression of the Cartesian separation of pure concepts and intuition

According to Klein, the expression of this contrast reaches its fullest epistemological expression in Husserl's phenomenological doctrine of intentionality. Husserl's notion of an intuitively "empty" conscious intention that nevertheless somehow predelineates the conditions of its intuitive "fulfillment" in an intentional object transcendent to that empty intention presupposes precisely the epistemological separation between the mind's pure concepts and intuition that is constitutive of Cartesian science. Significantly, Husserl initially encountered this separation in his first work, the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, in the course of his search for the intuitive referent proper to the symbolic concept of number in universal arithmetic. On Klein's view, this was neither an accident nor an indication of Husserl's direct influence by Descartes. Rather, it was the direct consequence of the mathematical presupposition (which Husserl took over from his teacher Karl Weierstrass) that the symbolic numbers of universal analysis originate from and therefore ultimately refer to numbers in the proper sense. The fact that Husserl abandoned this mathematical presupposition even before finishing that first work, because he soon discovered that neither descriptive psychology nor logic could discover in the indeterminacy of the unity of symbolic numbers a reference to the whole-part unity of determinate numbers, does not detract from the lasting influence of the schema behind it on Husserl's concept of intentionality, the central notion of his thought. In particular, its two crucial notions are at play in Husserl's doctrine of intentionality. On the one hand, there is the idea that the meaning of indeterminate concepts that are divorced from intuition is nevertheless something that originates in some intuition. On the other hand, there is the idea that somehow inseparable from the consciousness of those concepts there is a reference that predelineates or otherwise articulates the rules that govern the conditions for recognizing in intuition their non-conceptual referent.

Now even though Husserl eventually extended the notion of 'empty intention' beyond the realm of signitive meaning and therefore beyond the realm of his original encounter with it in mathematically symbolic meaning, he nevertheless retained the idea that all empty intentions somehow predelineate, as it were, the rules for their fulfillment in the

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intuition of their intentional objects. On Klein's view, this is problematic for two basic reasons. One, because the source of the original predelineation is the syntactical "rules of the game" governing the meaningful combination of mathematical symbols. These rules, or better, their normative structure, have their basis in the symbolic techniques of calculation constitutive of modern mathematics. The intentional object realized by the correct application of the calculative norms is therefore a mathematical construction, indeed, a formalized mathematical construction. In Husserl's mature phenomenological terminology, the mathematically formalized intentional object is characterized as "formal ontological," in the precise sense of it being empty of any material ontological content. Husserl captures its objective indeterminacy succinctly with the term he uses to designate it: "Etwas überhaupt" (something in general).

Husserl's problematical extension of the normative character of empty intentions beyond the signitively symbolic

According to Klein, Husserl in effect extends normative referentiality beyond syntactically determined symbolic empty intentions, with his characterization of the phenomenologically peculiar "consciousness of" proper to an empty intention in terms of its predelineation of the intuitive givenness of its intentional object in acts of fulfillment. For Klein, this extension of the normative beyond the syntactical is problematical, both in-itself phenomenologically and in the case of Heidegger's use of Husserl's formulation of intentionality as the guiding clue for interpreting Aristotle. What is in-itself phenomenologically problematical is that it overdetermines the "consciousness of" moment of intentional directness in modes of intentionality that are not rule governed, e.g., perceptual, memorial, imaginative, and temporal. While what is hermeneutically problematical is that the conceptuality behind this overdetermination belongs to a distinctively modern mode of cognition, namely, the rule-governed symbolic cognition operative in modern mathematics. This fact, therefore, makes it unsuitable as a guiding clue for interpreting pre-modern modes of cognition, like the ancient Greek, which know nothing of symbolic cognition. Thus a second methodological protocol emerges in the phenomenological interpretation of ancient Greek philosophy, that of the hermeneutical unsuitability of Husserl's concept intentionality as a guiding clue.

Closely related to this second methodological protocol is a third and final one that Klein's research makes necessary. It concerns the unsuitability of attributing or otherwise characterizing ancient Greek ontology in terms of formal ontology and the object of that ontology in terms of the "something in general" (Etwas überhaupt). As we've seen, the ontological concept of an indeterminate object as well as the ontological cognition in which it is given presuppose pure, indeterminate concepts that have been abstracted from the whole-part structure of determinate objects. Which is to say, because ancient Greek mathematics and philosophy presuppose the being of precisely such determinate objects, it is an anachronism to interpret the formality of the beings investigated by their ontology in terms of the "something in general" and as well to characterize the character of ancient Greek ontology as "formal ontology." To do so, as Heidegger does with respect to both Plato's and Aristotle's ontology,[10] thus gives rise

10 See for instance, Heidegger's *Sophist*, where Aristotle's research into Being is characterized as "the origin of what we today call formal ontology" (206/142) and λόγος is characterized as the guiding clue for

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to our third methodological protocol, that of the interpretative illegitimacy of characterizing ancient Greek ontology as an ontology whose object is the "something in general," that is, as a formal ontology.

Summary and transition

By way of a summary, so far I've argued that Jacob Klein's phenomenological interpretation of ancient Greek thought challenges the fundamental presuppositions behind Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of Plato and Aristotle. Klein does so on the grounds that Heidegger's acknowledged guiding clue, Husserl's concept of categorial intentionality, is problematical. The problem is two-fold.

On the one hand, categorial intentionality privileges the whole-part structure that is constitutive of the unity of the predicative λόγος that renders intelligible Aristotle's ontology of independent beings. This is a problem when it comes to interpreting Plato's ontology, which is based in the ontology of a plurality of beings that are foundationally inseparable from one another. Heidegger's guiding clue is therefore blind to the intelligibility of the non-predicative whole-part structure of the collective unity of the beings that are paradigmatic in Plato's ontology, eidetic numbers.

On the other hand, sedimented in Husserl's characterization of the "empty intention" moment of intentionality, as including a normative reference to the conditions for the intuitive fulfillment of its intentional object, is the schema of pure concepts separated from intuition that is constitutive of the symbolic cognition determinative of Cartesian science (the mathesis universalis). This presents a problem for interpreting ancient Greek ontology in general, since when fully developed, this schema gives rise to the notion of a formal ontology, whose formal object—the "something in general"—is materially indeterminate in a way that no being in ancient Greek ontology ever was.

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These considerations gave rise to three methodological protocols for the phenomenological interpretation of ancient Greek thought, all related to overcoming the historical bias of the modern conceptuality inseparable from Husserl's concept of intentionality. One, the privilege of the relational structure of meaning in both the Heideggerian hermeneutical "as" and Husserlian normatively structured empty intention, should not tout court be assumed as the universal structure of the intelligibility of unity across all historical epochs, particularly when it comes to the whole-part intelligibility of unity for ancient Greek mathematical thought and Plato's ontology. Two, Husserlian intentionality should not be used as the guiding clue for interpreting ancient Greek ontology. And, three, characterizing the formality of ancient Greek ontology in terms of a formal ontology and its object, the "something in general," is illegitimate.

With these protocols in place, I turn now to two specimens of phenomenological interpretation, both chosen for their relevance to phenomenology's original aspiration to be an eidetic science. The first will focus on the philosophical Stranger and

explication of what is uncovered, "even if only the sheer something in general [*Etwas überhaupt*]" (225/155). Also in Heidegger's *Sophist*, Plato's resolution of the possibility of the Being of λόγος ψευδής is said to be resolved "by means of a formal-ontological consideration" (433/299), his reflection on the structure of the connection between word and meaning "is satisfied with the simple formal-ontological fact that to the word as word belongs that which is meant" (453/313), and Plato's account of the "λόγος as such, by its very structure, already co-says determinate moments of beings, determinate formal-ontological configurations" (515/356).

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mathematician Theaetetus' discussion in Plato's *Sophist* (253d–e) of the three kinds of eidetic unity and of their opposite, while the second will engage their discussion (*Sph.*, 262c–264d) about the different lengths of λόγος in connection with λόγος ψευδής. By way of a conclusion, the significance of the results of these two specimens of interpretation for Husserl's mature account of the constitution of eidetic unity will be considered.

253d–e, Immediate Context and Heidegger's Incomprehension

The discussion of the three kinds of eidetic unity and their opposite in the *Sophist* is arguably the most important passage in that dialogue if not the entire Platonic corpus, as what is at issue there is "the free man's [viz., the philosopher's] knowledge" (*Sph.*, 253c7), characterized as "dialectical knowledge" (*Sph.*, 253d1). Belonging to such knowledge is the ability "to distinguish according to kinds (γένη) and to deem neither the same form (εἶδος) to be another nor another to be the same" (*Sph.*, 253d2–3). Such knowledge is necessary to show which kinds mix with one another and which don't. Moreover, such knowledge is "especially" (*Sph.*, 253c) necessary for finding out if those that mix are held together by other kinds "present throughout" [διὰ πάντων] (*Sph.*, 253c), and if for those that don't, where there are "separations," there are kinds that are "the causes of division throughout the whole." The Stranger then articulates the three kinds of eidetic unity, along with their opposite, that the one who has dialectical knowledge "discerns distinctly enough" (*Sph.*, 253d5), in order "to make his way with accounts" (*Sph.*, 253b) to show the right way some of the forms "fit" each other and others don't accept each other:

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1) "a single form [μα single] that is extended every way through many, each one of which is situated apart" (*Sph.*, 253d6);
2) "and many [forms], different from one another, that are embraced from without by a single [form]" (*Sph.*, 253d7);
   "and, again,"
3) "a single [form] running through many wholes [δι single [form] that is assembled into a unity [or gathered into a one]" (*Sph.*, 253d8);
4) "and many [forms] that that are separated off apart in every way" (*Sph.*, 253d9).

To know 1–4, which "belongs to dialectical knowledge" (*Sph.*, 253d1), "is to know how to discern, according to kind (γένος), where each is able to combine and where not" (*Sph.*, 253e1).

Regarding what Plato has the Stranger say here, Heidegger remarks, "I confess that I do not genuinely understand anything of this passage and that the individual propositions have in no way become clear to me, even after long study" (Heidegger's *Sophist*, 365). According to Heidegger,

> . . . it remains completely obscure what is meant by μίαν αὖ δι' ὅλων πολλῶν ἐν ἑνὶ συνημμένην [a single form running through many wholes that is assembled into a unity], and furthermore by the ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας [that are embraced from without by a single form] and above all by the κειμένου χωρίς [situated apart]" (366).

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The one thing that he finds “partially understandable” is “καὶ πολλὰς ἑτέρας ἀλλήλων,” which he glosses as “the dialectician sees many ideas, which are intelligibly [*sachhaltig*] different from one another” (365).

Heidegger situates his incomprehension within the context of the observation that “[o]ther people are of the opinion, to be sure, that it is all very clear, but I cannot convince myself of that and do not want to waste time on their surmises.”[11] And he explicitly rejects as unjustifiable the traditional interpretation, which introduces “a distinction between γένος and εἶδος, genus and species” (366), because “Plato does precisely not make this distinction.” Klein attended Heidegger’s lecture course (winter semester 1924–25) on the *Sophist* and most likely was present when Heidegger made this confession. Ten years later, he published his GMT, a large part of which reconstructs the arithmetical mathematical context of ancient Greek philosophy generally and the concept and being of its most fundamental principle, number, such that the whole-part structure of mathematical and eidetic numbers is both made manifest and distinguished. Because, as we will see, it is precisely the distinction between the unity belonging to the whole-part structures of these related yet two different kinds of numbers that is the key to interpreting 253d–e, it is not too much of an exaggeration to say that since Klein’s GMT establishes (for the first time in the literature) this difference, that work amounts to a refutation of Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato.

Critical review of standard and most recent interpretations of 253d–e

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Klein himself, however, did not explicitly interpret 253d–e. Thus, we will begin our phenomenological interpretation of this passage by considering briefly the arguments behind the traditional view alluded to by Heidegger, the definitive critique of that view recognized by the literature, and a recent attempt at a fresh interpretation. In the traditional interpretation, the passage is understood as an articulation of the method of definition by division demonstrated in the dialogue, based on the hierarchal division of classes from higher to lower, down to the infima species as the definiendum. In Julius Stenzel’s classical articulation of this interpretation, statements 1–4 compose as it were a pyramid of classes (104), from higher to lower. One of the five greatest kinds, the Other (105), provides the form of unity articulated in statement 1, while statement 2 refers to collected forms (103) and 3 and 4 to divided forms. Alphonso Gómez-Lobo’s

11 Heidegger most likely had Paul Natorp and Julius Stenzel in mind here. Natorp interprets Statement 1) as articulating “[t]he summary grasp of any one multiplicity of individual and separate sensible objects” (*Plato’s Theory of Ideas*, trans. Vasilis Politis and John Connolly [Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2004], 273—hereafter “Natorp”), Statement 2) as “[t]he summary grasp of a multiplicity of such different unities (ideas) [viz., the unity at issue in 1)] under a single comprehensive unity,” Statement 3) as “[t]he apprehension in every case of a single ultimate idea, which, since it is present in the many ideas . . . collects them into a unity (namely the unity of a category, e.g. quality), and Statement 4) as, in contrast, “other ideas (since they belong to a different category),” which “must be kept wholly separate and must be distinguished from a previous aspect.” Stenzel (Julius Stenzel, *Plato’s Method of Dialectic*, trans. and ed. D.J. Allen [Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1940]) takes issue with what he claims is Natorp’s consideration of 4) “as relatively unimportant afterthought” (97), as well as finding in 1) “only the simplest application of the unity of a concept,” and raises the question whether the allusion to sensible objects is appropriate, given “the constant concern of the whole Dialogue with the κοινωία τῶν γενῶν or εἰδῶν” (98–99). See below for an account of Stenzel’s interpretation of the statements.

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widely accepted critique[12] of Stenzel's interpretation challenges the basic premise behind it, that the passage is an account of definition by division.[13] Gómez-Lobo argues instead that the proper interpretative context of the passage is its anticipation of the discussion of the five greatest kinds together with the account of Not-Being that follows it. The first pair of statements (1–2), then, are taken to articulate the eidetic unity provided by Being, understood as one of the greatest kinds, while the second pair are taken to articulate the separation effected by Not-Being. Mitchell Miller's recent reading[14] of the passage departs from these interpretations by rejecting the view that any of its statements refer to collection and arguing against the division of the pairs of statements as referring to Being and Not-Being respectively. Based on his argument that the passage's proper interpretative context is the trilogy (*Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Statesman*) in which, dramatically speaking, the *Sophist* is central, Miller argues the following. On the one hand, the passage presents eidetic fields that address and advance beyond the two most significant epistemological aporias presented in the *Theaetetus*, and, on the other hand, it presages the introduction of non-bifurcatory division in the *Statesman*. Thus, each pair of statements lays out an eidetic field traced by the division of a kind in the service of its definition. The first pair presents non-bifurcatory division's resolution of a kind into its elemental subkinds and the second pair presents bifurcatory division's partitioning of many wholes until "the one that contains the *definiendum*" (346) is found.

From a phenomenological point of view, several things stand out in light of these interpretations. First off, as Gómez-Lobo observed, there's no mention of definition by division in either the passage or the text leading up to it. The immediate context of the passage is the mixing and non-mixing of kinds, and the agreement between the philosopher and mathematician that the ability to show correctly which mix and which don't requires some kind of knowledge. Indeed, that it requires knowledge is singled out as especially being the case if there is the intent to show whether there are some kinds that hold those that mix together and other kinds that are responsible for the "separations" (διαιρέσεις) (*Sph.*, 253c14) of those that don't. Of course, definition by division presupposes the ability to show correctly what kinds mix and what kinds don't, and because of this the knowledge in question here is indeed directly relevant to definition by division. However, that the relevance here is not exclusively tied to definition can be seen with the realization that definition by division—as it is presented in both the *Sophist* and *Statesman*—in no way requires finding out if there are kinds that are responsible for the mixing and non-mixing of kinds. The sought-after kinds in question here are clearly the greatest kinds investigated by the philosopher and mathematician shortly after 253d–e. The ability, then, that belongs to dialectical knowledge, to divide kinds in a manner that doesn't confuse the same form with another or another with the same, would appear to embrace both definition by division and the account of the kinds responsible for the combination and non-combination

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12 Alphonso Gómez-Lobo, "Plato's Description of Dialectic in the 'Sophist' 253 d 1–e2," *Phronesis*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1977): 29–47.

13 Gómez-Lobo finds nothing in the passage to support the claim that the method of division, involving two operations (ascent and decent) and defined forms, is at issue in it, since in it the "Dialectician simply 'discerns clearly' (Cornford) four items" (35).

14 Mitchell Miller, "What the Dialectician Discerns: A New Reading of *Sophist* 253d–e," *Ancient Philosophy* 36 (2016): 321–352.

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of forms. Significantly, the knowledge in question here would, "perhaps" (*Sph.*, 253c), as the mathematician puts it, be "nearly equal in size to the greatest."

This, then, I submit is the proper immediate context for what is articulated in our passage, namely, the knowledge necessary for definition by the division of forms and for an account of the kinds that are responsible for the combination and separation of the forms at issue in definition by division. Its proximity to the greatest knowledge, presumably that of the idea of the Good, signals the nearly supreme significance of our passage, and of course raises the question why its author would present it in a way that is so obscure, indeed, why, perhaps it "is made deliberately"[15] so. But is it really so obscure? If we take Miller's path-breaking suggestion that there is a broader context that must be taken into account to make manifest what our passage articulates, namely the connection between the aporetic ending of the *Theaetetus* and the content of the *Sophist*, and grant our argument that the knowledge of kinds at issue in the passage concerns both a) their combination and separation discerned in definition by division and b) the finding out whether there are other kinds responsible for the combination and separation of kinds articulated by definition by division, the obscurity of the passage lifts like a veil. Or so I want to argue. That is, I want to argue that there's a paradigmatic aporia in the *Theaetetus* that the *Sophist* engages, and that our passage is crucial for that engagement. The paradigmatic aporia in the *Theaetetus* is manifest in the whole-part relationship between "whole" (ὅλον), "all" (πᾶν), and "all of something" (π, an), as exemplified by the whole-part unity of number, which is engaged in by the *Sophist*'s aporia about Being and its investigation of the eidetic whole-part unities brought about by the five greatest kinds. And our passage is crucial to that engagement, as it lays out the three structures of whole-part unity, together with the absence of any kind of whole-part unity, that the one who has dialectical knowledge can discern. Or better, can discern "distinctly enough" to be able to make arguments about the definitions of kinds, as well as arguments about the other kinds that are responsible for the combination and separation of the kinds articulated by those definitions.

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The aporia of the relation of 'whole' (ὅλον) and 'all' (πᾶν), and 'all' and 'all of something' (π 'a)

The aporia in the *Theaetetus* concerns Socrates' return dream for Theaetetus' dream that knowledge is "intelligible" (ἐπιστητά) *Tht.*, 201c–d) only as correct opinion with an articulation, and that correct opinion without an articulation is "unintelligible" (οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ). The core of the aporia concerns the stipulation that only a compound (συλλαβὴ) can be articulated, because beyond being named and perceived what is non-compounded is intrinsically without parts and therefore cannot admit attributes like "to be" (*Tht.*, 205c) or "this." Only that which is made up of more than one part and therefore compounded presumably admits a λόγος that can bring together or hold distinct those parts, that is, articulate them. This stipulation, however, invites the question of the being of the compound, specifically, of the precise nature of its relation to the parts that compose it. Is the compound, as "a single form that comes out of each

15 Noburu Notomi, *The Unity of Plato's* Sophist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 235. Hereafter, "Notomi."

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and every [of its parts] when they are fitted together" (*Tht.*, 204a), something without parts, because for "a thing of which there are parts, it's necessary for the whole [ὅλον] of it to be all the parts [τὰ πάντα μέρη]" (204a); or is "the whole that has come into being out of the parts . . . also some one form, different from all the parts?" And, if the latter, does this mean that the whole in its being is "a single indivisible form" (*Tht.*, 205c)? Formulated in this way, the question about the being of the compound comes down to the question whether the all (πᾶν) of the compound, in the sense of the totality of all its parts [τὰ πάντα μέρη], is the same as the whole of the compound, or whether the whole is something different from the parts.

Either way the question of the being of the compound is answered, the stipulation that only it can be articulated proves unfounded. On the one hand, if the being of the whole of the compound is different from the being of the all, then the compound doesn't have parts that can be articulated. On the other hand, if the being of the compound is the same as the parts, it would be "knowable" in the same way, which is to say, unintelligible, because beyond being named and perceived, there couldn't be any other articulation of it. Moreover, if the compound were a single indivisible form, that would mean it has "fallen into the same form as the element [part]"[16] (*Tht.*, 205d), and being without parts it would be incapable of being articulated and thus unintelligible.

Whole-part structure of number as a way out of the aporia of whole, all, and all of something

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From a phenomenological standpoint, it's significant that the aporia here is caused by a philosopher trying to convince a mathematician that his opinion that the whole and all are different is false (*Tht.*, 204b). The significance is twofold. One, the mathematician is in possession of the knowledge capable of articulating the truth of his opinion. Two, he doesn't do so because he accepts the philosopher's formulation of the mutually exclusive possibilities of the unitary relation between a whole and its parts: either the whole and the parts are the same, such that no difference between them is manifest, or they're different, such that there is manifest nothing in common between them. But there's a third alternative, namely that the whole unifies its parts without thereby becoming partitioned in any one of them and without being the same as all of them (πάντα), such that the parts belong to the whole without the whole being the same as it, either singly or all together.

Socrates, in fact, exhibits just such a whole-part unity with his example of the number six (*Tht.*, 204c). The number six for ancient Greek mathematics is the first "perfect" or, better, "complete" (τέλειος) number, and this is not only something Theaetetus would have known, but it is also likely that he was the discoverer of the form (εἶδος) of such numbers.[17] This form, referred to in the definition of a complete number, encompasses all numbers that are the same as the sum of their proper parts, where proper part is understood as a measure of the number. In the case of the number six, the parts that measure it are one, two, and three, which added together are six. Thus, when six is expressed mathematically as the first complete number, it is manifestly false that all of

16 "Elements" [στοιχεῖα] are explicitly identified as "parts" [μέρη] in Socrates' and Theaetetus' discussion (*Tht.*, 205b).

17 For all these points, see F. Acerbi, "A Reference to Perfect Numbers in Plato's *Theaetetus*," *Archive for History of Exact Sciences*, 59 (2005): 319–348.

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it (πᾶν) is the same as all its parts (τὰ πάντα μέρη). This is the case because, as Socrates' example makes clear, albeit without using the term, the parts of six also include four and five, in accordance with the ancient Greek mathematical definition of any number as including as its parts all the numbers before it, which, in the context of complete numbers, is to say its incomplete parts.

In the case of any number, moreover, it is also false that "all of it" is the same as "all its parts," because each of these parts is manifestly different from the unity of each number as a "whole." This can be seen beginning with the first number recognized by ancient Greek mathematics, two, the unity of which is not the same as its parts, because each of these parts, as a unit (μονάς) in a multitude, is exactly not two but one. Only both together, as encompassed by the whole of the dyad, are they what neither is separately, namely the number (ἀριθμός) two. Or rather, this is the form of number according to what Plato said, if we disentangle Plato's view of the unity of number from Aristotle's critique of it.

Aporia of the dream stipulation that the intelligibility of knowledge is correct opinion together with an articulation

The discussion in the *Theaetetus* (or any other dialogue) does not explicitly pursue this line of thought,[18] although we'll see shortly that a crucial aspect of the whole-part structure of number reconstructed here is made manifest in the *Sophist*'s discussion of the community (κοινωνία) kinds Being, Motion, and Rest. Rather, the aporia of the unintelligibility of whole and parts that emerges when their relation is formulated either in terms of being the same or different, leads to the rejection of the dream's claim that "a compound is knowable and speakable and an element [part] is the opposite" (*Tht*., 205d). The pursuit of the articulation of a correct opinion stipulated in the dream as what makes knowledge intelligible then shifts to the power to speak about the elements (parts) of the compound, following the agreement that "all those who have a correct opinion obviously have it with an articulation" (*Tht*., 206e). The capacity to articulate all the elements of a syllable or all the parts of a whole, however, is rejected as satisfying the dream's stipulation of knowledge's intelligibility as the articulation of a correct opinion. This is because the unity of the whole-part structures, as illustrated by the unity of syllables and their elements, is such that it's possible to have an articulation with a correct opinion that is not knowledge. Case in point is the written articulation of the correct opinion that the first syllable of Theaetetus' name is composed of the letters [elements] theta and epsilon together with the written articulation of the incorrect opinion that the first syllable of Theodorus' name is composed of the letters tau and epsilon. Illustrated here is that when the knowledge in question is of the first syllable of both Theaetetus' and Theodorus' name, the articulation of a correct opinion is not tantamount to knowledge.

The response to this possibility is the final formulation of the articulation of correct opinion at issue in knowledge, in terms of an articulation of "in what respect the thing in question differs from all things" (*Tht*., 208c). However, this stipulation, too, ends in aporia, as it presupposes the bifurcation of articulation into two kinds: one that articulates what each thing has in common with other things and the other that

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18 Although the *Hippias Major* 300a–302b comes close.

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articulates "the difference of each thing by which it differs from everything else" (*Tht.*, 208d). Therefore, because correct opinion is shown to "be about the differentness of each thing, too" (*Tht.*, 209d), the requirement that the intelligibility of knowledge involves a correct opinion along with an articulation of the difference of something from everything else turns out to be "completely ridiculous" (ibid.). Correct opinion, then, already involves an articulation of something, or, more precisely, of the whole and parts of something, in terms of its commonness and differentness. And this involvement brings us back to and points a way out of the first aporia, which was made manifest by the philosopher trying to convince the mathematician that the unity of whole-part structures requires either that the whole and parts are completely the same or completely different. This last aporia makes manifest in a perceptual compound the unity of a whole wherein its parts are both the same and different. Theaetetus' body parts are something that he shares in common with other humans, while his snub nose and bug eyes (*Tht.*, 209c) are different from everybody else (including Socrates' snub nose and bug eyes). As was mentioned, the third possibility regarding the relation of the whole and parts in their unity allows for precisely this coexistence of what is common and different in the unity of a whole and its parts. Specifically, in the case of number, we saw that the whole unifies the parts without being partitioned in them and therefore saw that the whole in this case is something that its parts have in common while yet remaining different both singly and all-together from it.

The coexistence in the unity belonging to a whole of what is common or the same and what is different, of course, is a major issue in the *Sophist*, as is the relationship between number and Being. The concluding aporias in the *Theaetetus* thus clearly provide a general context for *Sophist* 253d–e. However, beyond that, our passage snaps into focus if not clarity when read in terms of the paradigmatic aporia in the *Theaetetus* concerning the unity of a whole and parts, or better, mindful that this aporia is unfolded there in terms of the problem of such unity in number, λόγος, and perception, in terms of the aporia of the different kinds of unity at issue in them (i.e., number, λόγος, and sensible being). Of course, missing from this mix is the problem of unity belonging to the whole-part composition of Being that is central to the *Sophist*, but even here we will see that the paradigmatic aporia in the *Theaetetus* provides the crucial context. Before turning briefly to this last problem, however, I want to highlight the first aspect of our passage that snaps into focus when the specifics of its context in the *Theaetetus* are brought to bear on it. As we've seen, there the problem of knowledge is framed in terms of its pre-condition, namely correct opinion. And, with the exception of sensible being, the basic unit of the whole-part unity articulated by correct opinion is non-relational, in the precise sense that the unity of whole and parts in both number and the syllable does not refer to anything other than their respective wholes—number and syllable—in its composition. Looking to our passage, we see the exact same thing: each of the three kinds of unity articulated in 1–3 is composed on the basis of its single form's manner of composing its many parts.

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The aporia of being in the *Sophist*: Being is not a third kind

Turning now to the aporia of Being presented in the *Sophist*, from a phenomenological perspective it's important to track its appearance in what both the philosopher and mathematician say, in what *appears* when their words are taken together. The philosopher asserts the mathematician says that, "Rest and Motion" (*Sph.*, 250a) are

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"most contrary to one another," which elicits the mathematician's agreement. The philosopher then asserts that the mathematician claims "at least: that both and each of them alike are (εἶναι)," to which the mathematician agrees; and he agrees as well with the philosopher that in claiming this he does not mean either "that both and each of them are in motion" *Sph*., 250b) or "that both of them are at rest" when he says "they both are." To the philosopher's suggestion that the mathematician posits "Being (τὸ ὄν) as some third thing in the soul beyond these, as if Rest and Motion were embraced by it," such that "through taking them together and focusing on the community of their beinghood (οὐσίας κοινωνίαν)" he says "that both of them are," the mathematician replies "We truly do seem to divine that Being is some third thing, whenever we say that Rest and Motion are." The philosopher then draws the following implications from what the mathematician has agreed that he says and claims, implications that the philosopher then calls into question: that "Being is not Motion and Rest both together but something other than these" *Sph*., 250c), such that "according to its own nature, Being is neither at rest nor in motion." The philosopher next signals that he is about to call this into question, that is, call into question that Being is a third thing in the soul beyond Motion and Rest, by questioning where "can the man who wants to establish something clear about it [Being] for himself still turn his thought [διάνοιαν]" (ibid.). And he goes on to say "there's nowhere he can still turn easily" (*Sph*., 250d), because "if something isn't in motion, how is not at rest? Or again, how is that which is in no way at rest not in motion?" Noting that if, as they've agreed, "Being has now come to light for us outside both of these," the philosopher addresses the mathematician to ask "Is that possible?"—to which the mathematician replies "It's the most impossible thing of all."[19]

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The aporia that emerges from this exchange is that when Motion, Rest, and Being are counted, Being is posited as a third thing, other than both Motion and Rest, which is supremely impossible, because what is either is in motion or is at rest. I follow Klein's phenomenological analysis of this aporia, which as mentioned is based on a

19 Miller's recent discussion endorses Theaetetus' agreement with the Stranger's initial suggestion that he posits Being as a "third" beyond both Motion and Rest (Miller, 348). He does so on the ground that because Motion and Rest are complete contraries, "the *being* of the one must be thought as independent of the *being* of the other, with neither in any way constitutive of the other." Each, then, in their independence from the other, is "a case of Being" (348) according to Miller, while "Being itself, on the other hand, is one and the same." In order to account for "its internal unity and the way it is common to both Motion and Rest," Miller holds, then, that "it [Being] must be thought as 'a third (τρίτον τι)) that is 'beyond' (παρὰ, 250b7) Motion and Rest while they must be thought as 'embraced by it' from 'outside them both'" (ibid.). Miller's acceptance of Theatetetus' initial assent to the Stranger's suggestion that Being is a third (kind) beyond Motion and Rest, hinges on his notion that each of these is "a case Being," insofar as each of them "are." However, in light of the agreement later in the passage between Theaetetus and the Stranger that it is "the most impossible thing of all" for something to *be* without in any way without *being* in motion or at rest, being a "case" of Being, assuming what is meant by this is something that shares in what something else is, would entail that the case of Being is something that is characterized by *both* Motion and Rest. This is to recognize that while what Being has in common with Motion and Rest cannot be constituted by any quality or qualities that Motion qua Motion and Rest qua Rest share with each other, given their opposition, Being nevertheless can exhibit something common with Motion and Rest insofar as both together in their opposition must be thought to compose it. Thus, neither Motion nor Rest independently of the other can possiblity be thought of as being a "case" of Being, because Being is precisely *both* of them. Because of this, neither one, Motion or Rest, "are situated apart," as both *are* only when they are *together*. This is why they must be thought to be embraced by Being "from outside them both," since if Being were internal to Motion and Rest they would not be two but one, which is impossible. See the discussion of Statement 2 for further elaboration of this last point.

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reconstruction of the concept and being of the ancient Greek ἀριθμός, together with an interpretation of Aristotle's account in the Metaphysics of the Platonists and Plato himself seeing the forms as numbers.[20] As touched upon above, the upshot of this analysis is that the concept of number, which in the Greek context means its form (εἶδος), is that of the whole-part unity (or being one) of a multitude of homogenous indivisible units (μονάδες). The mathematical being of this form, which was investigated by theoretical arithmetic, concerned what is responsible for the number's whole-part unity. For our purposes, the two most fundamental forms of number need only concern us, the Odd and the Even. These forms divide the whole-part unities of numbered multitudes into those that are divisible by two and those that when divided by two have a unit left over. In contrast to the mathematical being of number, the philosophical being of the form of number, or better, Plato's account of its philosophical being, as discussed above, articulates the irreducibility of the unity of the number as a whole to any of its parts, taken singly or as a totality. And it is precisely this mode of being that Klein argues, compellingly on my view, the aporia of Being, Motion, and Rest makes manifest, save one important difference. That difference concerns both the parts of the respective numbers and the relation of the whole to its parts. We've already mentioned that the units of mathematical numbers are comparable, as they are identical and therefore homogeneous, while those of eidetic numbers are incomparable, meaning

20 Oskar Becker's investigation ("Die diaretische Erzeugung der platonischen Idealzahlen," *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik, Astronomie, und Physik*, Abteilung B; Studien, Vol. 1, 1931: 464–501, English trans., Jerome Veith, "The Diaretic Generation of Platonic Ideal Numbers, *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, VII, 2007: 261–295) of Plato's "'*ideal number*'" (289), the first in the phenomenological tradition, arrived at the conclusion that that "*rather nebulous term*" should be replaced with "'***idea-number***'," because his interpretive efforts establish "that an εἰδητικός ἀριθμός is nothing other than a *number of ideas* (εἰδῶν ἀριθμός)." Becker establishes that "[t]he expression ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ τῶν εἰδῶν" (282) "is none other than the common expression for a *named number* ('a number of ideas', just as a 'number of sheep' or "dogs'). More explicitly, "ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ τῶν εἰδῶν means nothing other than 'a definite amount [(*An-*) *Zahl*] of ideas', i.e., a concrete [*benannte*] number with the designation idea, an ordered multitude [*Menge*] or multiplicity of ideas—thus a number whose units (μονάδε) are ideas. (Thus, of all things, *not*: *one* number = one determinate idea!) (283).

Regarding the unity of the Greek number in its non-ideal (Platonic) and presumably mathematical sense, Becker holds that even in Aristotle "ἀριθμός still bears a sense that is strange, figurative, and 'archaic' to us" (285). Specifically, Becker characterizes the "unitariness" (286) of the "whole" of ἀριθμός "apart from the elements (the units)" as a number formation "with a certain intuitive 'dimension' [*gewissen anschaulichen 'Umfang'*], which nonetheless is not nearly as universal as that of our concept of quantity . . . —the modern concept of number that is neutrally applicable to everything." Becker continues, "Thus, ὁ ἀριθμὸς τοῦ πλήθους πᾶς, the entire (whole) number of the multitude [*Menge*] or multiplicity [*Vielheit*]—*not* 'all numbers of the set' [*Menge*], i.e., all that somehow occur in the whole structure!—does not represent a 'cardinal number' [*Anzhal*] in our contemporary sense, but rather a much more figural sense, in which the articulation (structure) of all parts is strictly determined throughout the whole."

Becker appeals to the "intuitive dimension" of the figural quality of the whole of ἀριθμός rather than to the phenomenological structure of collective unity, because his interpretation of this point follows Stenzel's interpretation, which stresses the Greek number's "intuitiveness" [*Anschaulichkeit*] and "figure-like nature" [*das Gestalthafte*]. Klein raises a fundamental objection "against stressing the 'intuitive' character of the ἀριθμός-concept, namely that it arises from a point of view whose criteria are taken not from Greek, but from modern, symbolic, mathematics" (GMT, 63). This is the case, as we've seen above, because for Klein intuition as an independent cognitive function first emerges as an epiphenomenon in relation to the pure, world-less conceptuality of the symbolic number concept. Thus, Klein maintains that Becker, "in general" (ibid., 62) and "especially in the interpretation of the ἀριθμοὶ εἰδητικοί, is guided after all by *our* [symbolic] number concept [*Zahlbegriff*], which has a totally different structure" (ibid.) That said, Klein credits Becker with having pointed out "the central significance of the 'monads' for an understanding of the Platonic doctrine of the so-called 'ideal numbers'" (ibid.).

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that despite their unity as parts they are not identical and therefore exhibit different kinds (γένη). In the case of the "seeming" triad of Being, Motion, and Rest, when seen as a number, that is, an eidetic number, the parts of the whole in question, which is to say, the parts of Being as a whole, are unlike the parts of the whole in question in a mathematical number. Whereas the whole of the number two cannot be predicated of its parts, that is, the single units that this whole composes as a unity, without being partitioned in them, the whole of Being necessarily has to be partitioned in its parts, Motion and Rest, albeit not exclusively. That is, both Motion and Rest are, without either exclusively coinciding with Being; if either was exclusively Being, then either all things would be at rest, if Rest exclusively is, or in motion, if Motion exclusively is. On the contrary, Being only is when both together are, despite their difference and indeed opposition. This is why the kinds Being, Motion, and Rest cannot, strictly speaking, be counted. Counting them brings with it the presupposition that what is counted are homogeneous units, such that Motion would be one, Rest another one (two), and Being a third one. Thought, however, has to concede that Being, rather, is not a third thing but precisely just is Motion and Rest, both together.

The three kinds of whole-part unity and the absence of whole-part unity manifest in 253d–e

Turning now to our passage, we can illuminate it as follows. Statement 1, "a single form that is extended every way through many, each of which is situated apart," clearly articulates the basic whole-part unity of any sensible or intelligible multitude composed of homogeneous parts. Thus, from a phenomenological perspective, the argument that because our passage articulates the knowledge needed by the dialectician to distinguish forms, the "many" in all of its statements must refer exclusively to forms, is not convincing.[21] The argument fails to convince because, from the phenomenological perspective, the *sine qua non* for the initial access to the forms is the capacity to distinguish their appearance from the appearance of the many sensible things for which their intelligible unity is responsible. The parts of a homogeneous multitude must be arithmetically more than one. The minimal condition for this is that the parts—whether sensible or intelligible—are not just different or other than one another, as in the case of Motion and Rest, but that they are discrete, that is, situated apart. To be unified by the single form as a homogeneous part of its whole, however, that form must extend through each part in every way, without, of course being the same as it.

Statement 2, "many [forms], different from one another, that are embraced from without by a single [form]," clearly articulates the unity of a multitude composed of

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21 Natorp and more recently Sayre assume that the "many" here are "sensible objects" (Natorp, 273) or "different things" (Kenneth Sayre, *Metaphysics and Method in Plato's* Statesman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 43). As we've seen, Stenzel questions this (n. 11), as he initially leaves the question "open" (Stenzel, 99), but then subsequently takes "this meaning for granted" (103). Gómez-Lobo rejects "the view which sees material objects" (Gómez-Lobo, 31) here, but oddly attributes precedence for this to Stenzel. Natomi (Natomi, 236) and Miller also concur with—as Miller puts it—the view that "the Visitor takes forms or kinds as his proper objects, not sensibles" (Miller, 339). From a phenomenological point of view, extending the scope of the many referred to in Statement 1 to a sensible multitude is not necessarily inconsistent with the view that it belongs to dialectical knowledge to have forms or kinds as its proper objects, because, clearly, the capacity to distinguish sensible beings from eidetic ones must be a part of such knowledge. Moreover, the sensible extension in the scope of the many likewise is not necessarily inconsistent with the view that the many referred to in Statement 1 may also refer to intelligible beings.

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heterogeneous parts. The least such multitude would be exhibited in the aporia of Being, Motion, and Rest. Being embraces, from the outside, Rest and Motion, which while different from one another, are not "situated apart," as are the parts articulated in Statement 1. If either were so situated, it would be capable of being what it is—Being—independently of the other, from which (as the aporia of Being makes clear) something impossible would follow: for Being would then be either exclusively Motion or exclusively Rest, and, hence, not composed of a multitude. If Being embraced them from the inside, they'd cease to be a multitude, as they'd be one and not two.[22] Statement 3, "a single [form] running through many wholes that is assembled into a unity [or gathered into a one]," departs from the whole-part unities articulated by 1 and 2, insofar as its parts are themselves whole-part unities, unlike the parts in 1 and 2.[23] The kind of unity articulated there would be, for example, the unity of something like the being exhibited by either of the two most basic forms of number, each of which run through the many wholes of number, assembling or gathering their whole-part unities into the unity of a single form, the Odd or the Even.[24]

22 Cf. 243d, where the Stranger asks, in connection with the question whether those who say Being is hot and cold, whether they are saying Being is "a third besides these two . . . [f]or surely when you call the one or the other of the pair Being, you're not saying both similarly are," since in that case "the pair would be pretty much one but not two."

23 Natorp equates "δι᾽ ὅλων πολλῶν" at 253d8 with "διὰ πάντων" at 253a (Natorp, 273), which therefore treats ὅλων and πάντων as interchangeable. In this case, the reference to ὅλων in Statement 3 wouldn't necessarily signal a difference between the πολλός that composes the πάντων and those in the first two statements. Stenzel points out that "[t]he use of ὅλων for πάντων is unlikely as early as Plato" (Stenzel, 100). But the stronger argument against this usage is the context provided by the *Theaetetus*, which, as we've shown above, displays the aporia, in the paradigmatic case of the whole-part being of ἀριθμός, that occurs when ὅλων and πάντων are not distinguished. From a phenomenological standpoint, it's important to keep in mind that ὅλων and πάντων show up in both the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* in terms of the whole-part structure of multitudes. Likewise, it is important to keep in mind the necessity of distinguishing structurally ὅλων and πάντων, to which the aporias in the *Theaetetus* point. Recall that for the whole-part structure of an ἀριθμός to be intelligible, its whole must unify its parts without either partitioning itself in any one of them or being the same as all (πάντα) of them. In line with this, the many wholes referred to in Statement 3 therefore would refer to the unity of whole-part multitudes, not to the determinate unities of those parts considered together, that is, to "all of them" (πάντων).

Stenzel distinguishes δι᾽ ὅλων and διὰ πάντων methodologically, in terms of the division of an εἶδος into its lesser εἴδη and the collection of lesser εἴδη under higher ones. Δι᾽ ὅλων refers to division, διὰ πάντων to collection according to Stenzel, because in the division "the important thing is . . . that it pass through wholes or unities" (Stenzel, 101), while in collection "the essential thing is to include *all* the kinds (γένη) under certain higher ones" (ibid.). Apart from the problem of the text not supporting the interpretation that finds collection in 253d–e (which is pointed out by both Gómez-Lobo and Miller), Stenzel's interpretation raises the substantive issue of the relation between method and structure. Specifically, whether for Plato the being of ὅλων and πάντων present structures that are independent of methodical intervention or whether their very structures are dependent on their methodical articulation. The intelligibility of the unity of ἀριθμός pointed to in the *Theaetetus* appears as such independently of the methodological intervention characteristic of division or collection. Whether it would also be manifest independently of the methodological intervention of Socrates' questions and Theaetetus' answers, that is, independently of the dialectical "method" inseparable from Platonic philosophy, is not the issue here. Rather, the issue is whether the unity of the whole-part structure that the method of division partitions is somehow there *prior* to its methodical intervention or whether such intervention is requisite for that unity to come into being.

24 Because in Statement 3 a single form is characterized as "running through" *many* such wholes, or better, many such whole-part unities, and, moreover, because that form's unity, its being one, is said to be assembled or gathered together on the basis of this running through, the unity or being one of the form in question appears to be inseparable from and therefore dependent on its basis in these many wholes. The interpretive question, then, is whether the assembling or gathering of the form's unity on this basis presupposes some kind of directed methodical intervention, viz., collection or division. Natorp, Stenzel, and Miller answer this question affirmatively, albeit without a consensus on the method involved, as

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Finally, Statement 4, “many forms that are separated off apart in every way,” clearly articulates the opposite of any whole-part unity, including that of a mathematical (homogeneous) or eidetic (heterogeneous) multitude. What we have here is a heap, albeit a heap of forms, with no overriding whole manifest to provide unity. For example, the forms of justice, angler, and juggler.

The traditional interpretations of our passage take the “and, again” (*Sph.*, 253d8) as a structural key, as it divides the statements into two pairs, with the point of departure for each pair—“one [form]” and “many [forms]”— mirroring the other. However, as we’ve seen, there’s little interpretative consensus about the meaning of the statements. Our phenomenological interpretation of that meaning departs from all others by maintaining that the passage articulates the preconditions for dialectical knowledge. These preconditions manifest the kinds of whole-part unity together with the opposite of any kind of whole-part unity that allow the dialectician to arrive at both definitions by division and to articulate the kinds that are responsible for the community and separation of the kinds articulated in those definitions. That is, rather than claim that the statements in 253d–e refer either to definition by division or to the kinds of unity and separation the greatest kinds are responsible for, or to a combination of division and greatest kinds, my argument is that the statements articulate the whole-part unities (and their absence) that are responsible for the soul’s capacity to articulate definitions and greatest kinds in the first place. This interpretation is consistent with Notomi’s observation that the passage “unites the two parts of the *Sophist*” (Notomi, 237), namely the definitions by division of the sophist prior to the passage and the inquiry into the greatest kinds following it. Moreover, in connecting the structural wholes articulated in Statements 1–3 to the numerical way of overcoming the paradigmatic aporia at the end of *Theaetetus*, we have shown that each of these statements not only articulates the unity of a whole-part structure in which sameness and difference coexist, but also that they articulate three distinct kinds of whole-part unity. Statement 1 articulates the unity of the whole of a homogeneous multitude, inclusive of multitudes

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Natorp sees collection at work while Stenzel and Miller see definition by division. Gómez-Lobo’s answer to the question is negative, as he sees not method but the form of Not-Being at work here.

Considering the context provided by the *Theaetetus* once again, Theaetetus’ and young Socrates’ division of “all number in two” (*Tht.*, 147e), accordingly as they have or don’t have the “potency to come into being as an equal times an equal” or not, is significant on three counts. One, it exhibits the one form (unity) of whole-part structures in a manner that is consistent with the articulation of unity in Statement 3 but *inconsistent* with the process of definition by division in the *Sophist*. This is because, one, *both* kinds of number, termed, respectively, “square” and “oblong,” are the relevant result of the division. Thus, the distinction between the “left” and “right” hand of what is divided is irrelevant to process and results of this division in the *Theaetetus*. Two, on the assumption that the kinds of number are the definienda, the one form that runs through the many numbers in each case doesn’t function to “tie together” (συναγωγή) the putative many right-handed parts of previous divisions. *Both* halves of the division are therefore relevant to the (arithmetical) knowledge in question. And, three, the relevance of this form proper to arithmetical knowledge, that is, proper to one form running through many whole-part unities, to the one form of knowledge per se (ἐπιστήμη), is stressed by Socrates. Specifically, it is stressed when he urges Theaetetus to “try to imitate your answer about potential squares [viz., “square numbers”], and just as you encompassed them all, many as they are in one form, so too try to address the many forms of knowledge in one account (λόγος)” (*Tht.*, 148d). Moreover, it is noteworthy that what Socrates singles out as relevant here makes no mention of the division of all number that yielded the one form of potential square numbers, just as Statement 3 makes no mention of division. The phenomenological point here being *not* that Statement 3 rules out the kind of unity aimed for in definitions by division, but rather that the kind of unity it articulates is not limited to the unity or being one aimed at by definition’s συναγωγή.

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proper to both sensible and intelligible parts. For instance, the unity of multitudes of sensible beds or intelligible units. Statement 2 articulates the unity of the whole of a heterogeneous (incomparable) multitude. For instance, the unity of the smallest multitude of kinds, Being, Motion, and Rest, whose eidetic number is two, not three. As such, Statement 2 also articulates the paradigm for the division of the overarching unity of a kind into two different forms, which is to say, the paradigm for bifurcatory division. Statement 3 articulates the unity of the whole of a homogeneous multitude of parts that are themselves whole-part unities. For instance, the unity of the multitude of whole-part unities composed of oblong numbers (*Tht.*, 148a; 148d). Because the last statement doesn't deal with the unity of a whole at all but with its absence, the phenomenological interpretation doesn't find a structural parallelism in the ostensible pairs of statements, since Statement 4, despite mirroring Statement 2's beginning and its concerns with a multitude of kinds, does not articulate any kind of unity.

Given the "foundational" role for dialectical knowledge played by these three unities and their absence that is articulated by these statements, the order of their appearance stands out as significant from a phenomenological perspective. Because the first whole-part unity articulates the form of a homogeneous multitude and the second whole-part unity articulates that of a multitude that is heterogeneous, the question of the relation, if any, between these two kinds of multitudes naturally arises. Since we know from the phenomenologically established interpretative context of our passage that the whole-part unity that composes a heterogeneous multitude is the kind of unity responsible for the whole-part unity that composes a homogeneous multitude, the ordinal priority of Statement 1 can be ruled out as signaling its foundational priority over 2. Rather, given this responsibility, it's the other way around, as the whole-part unity articulated by Statement 2 manifests the foundation for the unity articulated in Statement 1. A better candidate for Statement 1's priority, therefore, is that what it articulates comes first in the order of knowing. Certainly, this kind of eidetic unity appears first in the dialogues, and insofar as its apprehension presupposes the capacity to differentiate intelligible unity from sensible unity, its priority would appear to be methodological as well. The heap articulated in Statement 4, of course, can in no way stand in a foundational relationship to the kind of eidetic unity in Statement 3's articulation of the form of parts that are themselves whole-part unities. Statements 3 and 4, therefore, do not mirror the foundational relationship between the statements in the first pair. Moreover, because the parts of 4 are explicitly identified as forms, 2 is the only statement in the first pair that it could possibly parallel. And it does, insofar as it articulates the exact opposite of many different forms united from the outside by a single form, viz., many discrete forms, which is to say, a heap of forms.

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11 The phenomenologizing subject as an active power

An Aristotelian model for Husserl's theory of subjectivity

Danilo Manca[1]

Abstract: The main goal of this chapter is to adopt an Aristotelian model in order to account for Husserl's conception of philosophical subjectivity. By comparing *noûs poietikós* with light, Aristotle introduces the model of the double actualization according to which active intellect makes things thinkable and at the same time actually thinks. I will examine Husserl's distinction of the stages of phenomenological research in light of Aristotle's model of double actualization. My thesis is that the phenomenologizing subject can be described as an active power (*héxis*, in Aristotle's terms) to be fully actualized by adopting a self-critical attitude toward phenomenological research. This will also allow me to argue that at the level of the natural attitude, the mundane ego trains itself to make a transcendental attitude habitual in an unconscious and involuntary manner (*en parergoi*, in Aristotle's terms).
Keywords: Husserl, Aristotle, *héxis*, phenomenologizing subject, double actualization, second potentiality.

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Introduction

In this chapter I would like to adopt an Aristotelian model in order to account for Husserl's conception of philosophical subjectivity. My idea is that we can describe the phenomenologizing subject as an active power to be fully actualized. My purpose is to interpret the latent work leading the ego to undertake a transcendental attitude by means of Aristotle's distinction between potentiality and actuality. By this I do not mean to argue that Husserl's philosophy surreptitiously presupposes categories stemming from Aristotle's vocabulary. Instead, my approach will be comparative. I aim to show how Aristotelian categories such as *prótē entelécheia* (first actuality) or *héxis* (occasionally translated as habit, permanent disposition/state, second/developed/active potentiality, or active power[2]) can profitably be used to interpret Husserl's account of subjectivity.

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2 On the possible translations of the Greek term *héxis,* see Ferrarin 2001, *Hegel and Aristotle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 270–277, 318–319; Kosman, Louis Aryeh 1992, "What does the Maker Mind Make?" in Nussbaum, M.C. and Rorty, A.O. (eds.), *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 330–345; Pakaluk, Michael 2005, *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. An*

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In so doing, I take a particular position with respect to studies aimed at seeing Husserl as an Aristotelian thinker. Let me say few words about that.

Paraphrasing what Robert Sokolowski says in his *Introduction to Phenomenology* about the relationship between Husserl and the ancients,[3] Richard Cobb-Stevens holds that "phenomenology not only restores an essentially Aristotelian understanding of human intelligence and its access to truth but also interprets specifically modern contributions to philosophy in ways that get beyond a sterile confrontation between ancients and moderns."[4]

I agree only with the second part of Cobb-Stevens' argument. I do not think that Husserl restores an Aristotelian point of view. However, I also think that we cannot reduce Husserl's perspectives to those of modern thinkers. Accordingly, I share with Cobb-Stevens and Sokolowski the idea that Husserl sheds new light on the relation between the moderns and the ancients by proposing a conceptual framework aimed at grasping what is theoretically essential to both perspectives. Therefore, in my view, we cannot speak of Husserl as an Aristotelian thinker. We may nevertheless employ an Aristotelian model in order to illuminate some aspects of Husserl's theory of subjectivity.

Husserl's theory of subjectivity is undoubtedly rooted in the modern philosophical tradition. This implies that there is a radical difference between Aristotle and Husserl regarding the way in which the character of subjectivity should be interpreted. For Husserl, subjectivity is essentially transcendental—namely, it is graspable as such even when the world-horizon is annihilated (*Weltvernichtung*). On the contrary, for Aristotle, the intellectual soul is the world itself in its potentiality. *Noûs pathetikós* is the capacity to become each different intelligible form in turn. It has no form of its own. Recently, Alfredo Ferrarin has clearly explained this point by arguing that in contrast to Husserl, for Aristotle

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> [. . .] the soul is not removed from, but lives originally by the things of the world. It cannot be understood thanks to an original and reflective relation to itself. There is no I as opposed to the world—or the body—that functions as the pole from which all its several activities irradiate or the center which brings back to itself its various representations and actions. It is no wonder then that when Aristotle describes memory, perception, imagination, thinking, he describes them as objective processes, not as activities stemming from an original I.[5]

Despite this radical difference between Aristotle and Husserl, the systematic attention Husserl pays to the justification of his conceptual framework allows him to attribute

introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 106–107; Polansky, Ronald 2007, *Aristotle's De Anima*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 458–465. Following these scholars, I will translate *héxis* with "habit" when referring to the ethical sphere (or in Husserl's terms, to the ego's personal sphere), with "permanent disposition" or "state" when I focus on a particular sense of the notion that I will explain in detail in the following section, and with "second potentiality" when the argument I take into account is ontological. "Active power" is conversely the generic translation.

3 Sokolowski, Robert 2000, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 203.

4 Cobb-Stevens, Richard 2004, "The Presence of Aristotelian Nous in Aristotle's Philosophy" in Pozzo, R. (ed.), *The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University Press of America), 231.

5 Ferrarin, Alfredo 2015a, *From the World to Philosophy, and Back*, in Bloechl, Jeffrey and de Warren, Nicolas (eds.), *Phenomenology in a New Key: Between Analysis and History. Essays in Honor of Richard Cobb-Stevens* (Cham-Heidelberg-New York-Dordrecht-London: Springer), 66

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some features to subjectivity in a way that shares unexpected similarities with an Aristotelian mode of thinking. However, by focusing on these similarities, I do not intend to discuss whether Husserl is an accurate reader of Aristotle. My aim is rather to show that a specific philosophy is well founded when it deals with its inherited knowledge without any kind of presupposition.

In light of all this, the issues I will address in this chapter are substantially two: Husserl's distinction of two stages of phenomenological research, and the problem of the phenomenologist's self-awareness. To pursue my goals, I will proceed as follows.

In the first section, I will provide some evidence for the idea that Husserl's theory of habit maintains both general senses of Aristotle's conception of *héxis*: that of a permanent disposition and that of preliminary activity making a power active.

In the second section, I will focus on the model that Aristotle's notion of *héxis* as second potentiality implies. In *De Anima* III, 5 430 a15, Aristotle likens *noûs poietikós* to light qua *héxis*. In the article entitled "What does maker mind make?", Aryeh Kosman shows that such a claim should be interpreted by saying that *noûs poietikós*, like light, makes a double actualization possible: one makes the process of seeing visible, or that of thinking thinkable; the other effectively makes those same processes actual. I will adopt such a model of double actualization in order to describe the activity of the phenomenologizing subject. My thesis is that the phenomenologizing subject not only makes the constitutive process visible, but at the same time leads the constitutive process to a higher level by prompting the phenomenologist to deal with the constitution of phenomenology's own research method.

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After having demonstrated that the phenomenological attitude is fully actualized only when the ego has adopted a self-critical orientation toward its own transcendental self-experience, I will argue in the third section that in the stage of phenomenological research focused on the clarification of phenomenological method, processes like affection and neutralization, as well as activities like perceiving, image-consciousness, and phantasy, play a role that is completely different from the role they play in the initial and still naïve stage of the research. In addition, I will show that the philosophizing subject is already at work in the mundane sphere, even though it is only unconsciously and involuntarily that this subject acquires its capacity of carrying out the epochē.

1. Husserl's habit and Aristotle's *héxis*

Many manuscripts bear witness to Husserl's interest in a theory of habit. Nonetheless, Husserl did not elaborate it systematically, nor do his reflections on habit frequently appear in his published works. The most famous exception is *Cartesian Meditations* § 32, where Husserl speaks of the self as a substrate of habitualities.

As Moran argues, habit is one of Husserl's operative concepts. In other words, Husserl routinely employs the term without making it explicitly thematic. Furthermore, there is an extremely wide range of terms for expressing the concept of habit in Husserl's works—namely, *Gewohnheit*, *Habitus*, *Habitualität*, and occasionally, *das Habituelle* ('the habitual' as a noun), *Besitz* ('possession'), *Habe* ('having').[6] In a few cases Husserl even employs the Greek term *héxis*.

6 See Moran, Dermot 2011, "Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology of Habituality and Habitus", in *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 42, No. 1, January, 59. For a deep interpretation of the

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If the word "habit" calls to mind Hume's philosophy, the Greek term *héxis* is one of the most important concepts of Aristotle's philosophy. I think that comparing Husserl's conception of habit with Aristotle's could be helpful in highlighting some important aspects of Husserl's theory of the self as a substrate of habitualities.

First of all, let us notice that *héxis* is an operative concept in Aristotle's philosophy too. It basically appears in different contexts as a synonym for first actuality (*prótē entelécheia*), but it assumes at least two different meanings: 1) *héxis* could be said to be the activity making one able to activate a potentiality; or 2) this term could designate an abiding state, a permanent disposition. In *Metap*. V 20 Aristotle explains this distinction as follows:

> "Having" means (1) a kind of activity of the haver and of what he has—something like an action or movement. For when one thing makes and one is made, between them there is a making; so too between him who has a garment and the garment which he has there is a having. This sort of having, then, evidently we cannot have; for the process will go on to infinity, if it is to be possible to have the having of what we have. – (2) "Having" or "habit" means a disposition according to which that which is disposed is either well or ill disposed, and either in itself or with reference to something else; e.g. health is a "habit"; for it is such a disposition.[7]

In *Categories VIII*, Aristotle clarifies that "'habit' (*héxis*) differs from disposition (*diáthesis*) in being more lasting and more firmly established." Or said more explicitly: "habit differs from disposition in this, that while the latter is ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter."[8] In other words, whereas by "disposition" we generally mean a condition that is easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite, by "habit" we mean what is difficult to displace once acquired. Thus habit could be exclusively meant as a particular kind of disposition, that is, as a permanent, abiding state.

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Regarding the other meaning, consider *De Anima* II, 5 417 a21–b2. Here Aristotle focuses on two ways of thinking of the transition from potentiality (*dýnamis*) to its actualization (*entelécheia*). To explain his point, Aristotle takes the use of the term "knower" as his example: on the one hand, one might say that a man is a knower, "meaning that the man falls within the class of beings that know or have knowledge"; on the other hand, one may call a man "a knower" because he has learnt, say, grammar. Now of these two men, each possesses the capacity of knowing, but in a different way: one is potentially a knower because the capacity of knowing essentially belongs to his genus; the other is a knower because he is capable of applying his acquired knowledge at will, assuming that there is nothing external to hinder this exercise. The second conception of potentiality requires a preliminary activity, and consequently a preliminary actualization. We should therefore acknowledge that *héxis* is the halfway moment being between mere potentiality and full actuality. In this ontological context, the term is

ontological implications that a phenomenological theory of *habitus* entails, see Funke, Gerhard 1957 "A transcendental-phenomenological investigation concerning universal idealism, intentional analysis and the genesis of *habitus*. *Archē, phansis, hexis, logos*", trans. by Harlan, R.M. in *Apriori and World. European Contributions to Husserlian Phenomenology* (The Hague: Nijhoff 1981), 71–113.

7 *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, translated by Ross, W.D., in Ross, W.D. and Smith, J.A. (eds.), *The Works of Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1928, reprinted 1953).

8 Aristotle's *Categories*, translated by Edghill, E.M., in *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. 1.

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usually translated with second potentiality and assimilated to the concept of first actuality (prótē entelécheia).

In the example taken from *De Anima*, grammar is an actualization of the mere potentiality of knowing, a potentiality that essentially belongs to human beings. This actualization depends on learning, which makes us knowers. Before having learnt grammar, we are not effectively able to exercise our potentiality to know grammar: we do not yet know what grammar is or what the syntactic rules are that we unconsciously adopt when speaking. Instruction entails a change within the human soul. Aristotle describes it as a transition from a reverse condition (*ex enantías metabalòn héxis*). Here *héxis* is meant as a permanent disposition to be changed. Yet Aristotle even distinguishes between he who is changing his condition by learning and he who moves from 'having' grammar into exercising this knowledge. He says that the man who is a knower in the sense of being capable of applying his knowledge passes "from the inactive possession of sense or grammar to the active exercise of this knowledge [*ek toû échein tèn arithmēthikèn è tèn grammatikén, mè energheîn dé, eis to energheîn, állon trópon*]" (translation slightly modified). In this second case Aristotle employs the verb from which "*héxis*" stems, that is, "*échein*", instead of the noun *héxis*. Consider that transitively employed, *échein* means "to have", "to own"; intransitively employed, it conversely stands for "to be", or "to be endowed with". Here what Aristotle means by *héxis* is an activity that allows whoever actualizes it to be endowed with a capacity that can be exercised at will. In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle takes a virtue of character to be a *héxis* in both meanings: it is a stable trait, built up and established through some kind of training.[9]

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Husserl certainly retrieves Aristotle's idea of habit as a permanent disposition. For instance, in Cartesian Meditations § 32 Husserl identifies habitus with an enduring state whereby I can be said to abide by my decision. Through these acquired decisions, I constitute myself as a "'fixed and abiding' personal Ego". Convictions I hold contribute to building up my personal character as "an abiding style" with a unity of identity throughout all of my positions, alterations, and properties.[10]

This conception of habit could be connected with Hume's, according to which the "far greatest part of our reasonings with all our actions and passions, can be derived from nothing but custom and habit".[11] But in my view, there are at least two aspects showing that Husserl's conception is akin to Aristotle's instead. One is the idea that the formation of habit is one with the process of making a potentiality active; the other is that Husserl demonstrates that he is aware of the difference between disposition and habit.

The first aspect emerges from *Ideas* II §§ 58–59. Here Husserl says that

> [. . .] the spiritual ego can be apprehended as an [. . .] *organism of faculties*", where "*a faculty is not an empty ability but is a positive potentiality*, which may now happen to be actualized but which is always in readiness to pass into activity,

9 See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by Crisp, R. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000), 1105b19–1106a12 and Pakaluk 2005, 108.

10 See Hua I, § 32, tr. 66–67.

11 Hume, David (1738–40) 2014, Selby-Bigge, L.A. (ed.), *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), X, 77.

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> into an activity that, as it is lived, refers back to the corresponding subjective ability, the faculty.[12]

Here Husserl does not take faculties to be a sort of equipment with which the ego is innately endowed. Nor does he take faculties to be empirically acquired by means of the passive repetition of specific behaviours, as Hume did.[13] Of course, Husserl claims that "habits are necessarily formed, just as much with regard to originally instinctive behavior (in such a way that the power of the force of habit is connected with the instinctive drives) as with regard to free behavior."[14] However, he also emphasizes that "the Ego does not originally arise out of experience—in the sense of an associative apperception in which are constituted unities of manifolds of a nexus—but out of life (it is what it is not *for* the Ego, but it is itself the Ego)."[15]

By so arguing, Husserl seems to share with Aristotle the idea that faculties of the personal ego are manifestations of life in its immanent development: "I am the subject of my life, and the subject develops by living."[16] Here Husserl's concern is not for the origin of a specific and already formed faculty, but for the process through which the organism as a whole develops. The typical modern issue of whether the faculty is innate or empirically acquired is solved from the outset. It is the product of a transcendentally explicable synthesis. Hence the problem is instead how "latent capacities (dispositions) which have not yet appeared, have not yet been apperceptively objectified"[17] can be acknowledged as powers to be activated. In other words, the problem is how a potentiality belonging to my "I can" contributes to the development of the abiding style of my personal ego.[18] Put in Aristotle's terms, the problem concerns the transition from the first to the second sense of potentiality: the question is how a potentiality becomes an active power to be exercised at will.

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Still further evidence for how Husserl comes close to Aristotle's theory of habit is to be found in a manuscript dated between 1918 and 1921 where Husserl directly employs the Greek term *héxis*. At issue here is the primacy "in the individual subject (*im vereinzelten Subjekt*)" of "unity formations (*Einheitsbildungen*)" over an isolated act of conviction. Husserl says that each "new act [. . .] is understood as a new instance in which my conviction is actualized, and each possible act is acknowledged [. . .], in the same style, as a possible or hypothetical actualization."[19] Thus after having pointed out that what is at stake here is the model of a potentiality to be actualized, Husserl adds that the "expression 'disposition' is not helpful for this", namely, to express the tendency of an act to be actualized, "nor it is 'permanent habitus', since these words

12 Hua IV, § 59, 254–255, tr. 266–267.
13 See Moran 2011, 53–54.
14 Hua IV, § 59, 255, tr. 267.
15 Hua IV, § 58, 252, tr. 264.
16 Hua IV, § 58, 252, tr. 264. On the problem of continuity between nature and ego as substrate of habitualities in Husserl, see Ferrarin, Alfredo 1994, "Husserl on Ego and its Eidos (Cartesian Meditations, IV)", in: *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 32:4 (October), 650.
17 Hua IV, § 58, 252, tr. 264.
18 On the similarities between Aristotle's notion of *héxis* and Husserl's notion of personal ego, see Hart, James 1992, *The Person and the Common Life. Studies in a Husserlian Social Ethics* (Dordrecht-London-Boston, MA: Kluwer), 52–54.
19 Hua XIV, 195: "Jeder neue Akt [. . .] wird erfasst als neuer Fall, in dem meine Überzeugung sich aktualisiert, und jeder mögliche Akt wird dann, [. . .], in gleichem Stil erkannt, als mögliche oder hypothetische Aktualisierung" (translation mine).

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express differently oriented, albeit correlative apperceptions". Rather, he points out, "inasmuch as I have a 'strong conviction', I thereby have an abiding I-property as well, a relatively abiding *Héxis* from which acts arise over and over again under appropriate circumstances."[20]

In all the texts quoted, Husserl comes close to Aristotle's theory of habit, since he grasps the deep connection between habit understood as a permanent state and the activity it presupposes. Husserl even explicitly speaks of actualization and potentiality, and in the last passage quoted, he clearly adopts "*héxis*" as the word expressing his conception of habit much better than disposition or habitus. *Héxis* is indeed the only term that retains both original senses of a permanent state and of an activated, albeit not yet effectively actualized, potentiality.

2. The double actualization of phenomenologizing subjectivity

By introducing the distinction between first potentiality (*dýnamis*) and second potentiality (*héxis*), Aristotle complicates his ontological model. Indeed, as Kosman well explains, the category of actuality becomes relative: "second potentiality/first actuality is actual relative to first potentiality, just as second actuality is in turn actual relative to second potentiality/first actuality".[21] At first glance, it seems that the distinction between first potentiality and second potentiality aptly fits processes that in *Metaphysics* Aristotle calls movements (*kinéseis*) and distinguishes from activities (*energheías*) having their own end in themselves.[22] Hence by applying the distinction between first potentiality and second potentiality to the *energheías* too, Aristotle would seem to claim a kind of primacy of first actuality over second actuality. Let me delve deeper into this issue.

When Aristotle tries to explain the concept of *héxis*, he tends to employ as examples processes that do not have their own end in themselves. For instance, processes such as that of building and that of knowing require a preliminary activity that puts a power in the condition to be activated. If I have not learnt the art of building, I cannot activate the potentiality of building, a potentiality that I have by virtue of falling in the class of productive beings. If I have not learnt grammar, I cannot claim to be a knower of grammar. Thus construction and knowledge require a preliminary activity whose only end is to provide skills. Such a preliminary step does not yet actualize the *activity* of knowing or of building, but only the *power* of knowing or of building. After having learnt, I can claim to have the *héxis* of knowing. However, learning is not enough in order to make such *héxis* effectively actual: I still have to actualize the power of knowing that I have preliminarily activated. In other words, I must effectively exercise acquired skills in a correct way.

When Aristotle attributes a kind of *héxis* to activities having their own end in themselves, it seems that there is a primacy of first actuality/second potentiality over second actuality. In a crucial paragraph of *De Anima*, Aristotle claims that *noûs*

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20 Hua XIV, 195: "Sofern ich eine 'feste Überzeugung' habe, habe ich damit auch eine bleibende Icheigenschaft, eine relativ bleibende *Hexis*, aus der immer wieder Akte dieses Inhalts unter geeigneten Umständen hervorzugehen pflegen" (translation mine).

21 Kosman 1992, 331.

22 See *Metaphysics* IX, 1048b18–28, and Kosman, A. 1964, "Substance, Being, and Energeia", in: *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2, 129.

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poietikós becoming all things is "a sort of *héxis* like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours".[23] What does this mean? May we claim, for instance, that seeing requires a condition that must be activated in order for seeing to be effectively actualizable? In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle says that

> [. . .] every virtue causes that of which it is a virtue to be in a good state, and to perform its characteristic activity well. The virtue of the eye, for example, makes it and its characteristic activity good, because it is through the virtue of the eye that we see well.[24]

In this sense, the *héxis* of seeing is achieved when the eye is in a good state, when it is not damaged, for the absence of *héxis* is here due to a privation. It would not depend upon the actualization of a preliminary activity. This entails that in seeing, the first potentiality is one with the second potentiality. Here *héxis* means a state to be kept intact, not an activity that requires a preliminary process in order to be effectively actualizable. In the case of seeing, there is no activity that would not have its own end in itself. Yet consider that in *De Anima* III, 5 Aristotle draws our attention to light rather than to the condition of the sense organ. Given the sense organ in a normal state and the presence of the sensible, we need a third condition to see: visibility. And it is light that makes the visibility of a colour actual. This is what Aristotle is thinking of when in *De Anima*, he likens *noûs poietikós* to light as *héxis*. On the basis of this, we may ask: what does *noûs poietikós* make?

It certainly does not make *noeton*, that is, the thinkable element. Such an element cannot be made. It is a universal, necessary, and essential truth to be known theoretically. Aristotle likens *noûs pathetikos* to matter, but he does not say that *noûs poietikós* is comparable with form. *Noûs poietikós* cannot produce the forms of things. The thinkable forms are rather the matter of *noûs poietikós*. Accordingly, the question remains the same: what does it make?

Following *De Anima* III, 5, a long tradition of scholars claims that *noûs poietikós* makes the disposition of thinking. It makes intellectual forms thinkable just as light makes coloured things visible.[25] But such a view does not solve the issue of whether Aristotle is problematically applying to activities having their own end in themselves a model that is much more fitting for imperfect processes that have their own end outside of themselves.

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23 *De Anima*, III, 5 430a24–25.

24 *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1106a17–20.

25 Alexander of Aphrodisias ushered in this standard view, expressing it as follows: "For as light is the cause of colours that are potentially visible becoming actually, so this third nous makes potential, that is, material nous, into actual nous by producing within it the power to think (héxis noetike)" [Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Bruns, Ivo (ed.) 1888, *De Anima liber cum Mantissa* (Berlin: Reimer), 107.31]. Compare Kahn, Charles 1981, "The Role of *Nous* in the Cognition of Firs Principles in *Posterior Analytics* II, 19", in Berti, Enrico (ed.), *Aristotle on Science: The "Posterior Analytics"* (Padua: Antenore), 400: "What is regarded as problematic and requiring explanation [by *noûs poietikós*] is the acquisition, not the exercise, of *noûs* as *héxis*. This is clearest in *De Anima*, III, 4, where potential intellect is compared to a blank tablet on which nothing is written, and this mode of potentiality '(before it has learned or discovered anything) is contrasted with the potency of an intellect which has become all things, like someone actually in possession of science (*epistémōn*)': it is the transition from the former to the latter stage of potentiality that Aristotle attempts to explain, and it is for this explanation that he requires the agent intellect."

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What is the difference between the potentiality of thinking and the disposition of thinking? If one thinks and has thought at the same time, when would one be in the condition of thinking? Do we need a preliminary activity in order to be put into the disposition to think? These questions led some scholars such as Brentano to consider the comparison of *noûs poietikós* with light as inappropriate.[26] But there is also another explanation that I would like to endorse.

Kosman calls attention to *De Sensu et sensato* 447 a11, where Aristotle straightforwardly claims: "light makes vision (*to phos poiei to horan*)."[27] Here Aristotle does not say that light makes visibility, the condition of seeing, but vision, which is an end in itself. Therefore, "light here seems to be thought of as bringing into existence the full actuality of being seen, and not merely the first actuality of visibility."[28] Turning our attention to *De Anima* II, 7, notice that here light is not merely understood as a medium of seeing. Aristotle argues that "every colour has in it the power to set in movement what is actually transparent."[29] Hence the medium is the transparent, that is, what is not visible in itself, but visible by reason of the colour of something else. This is the case, for instance, with water and air:

> Neither air nor water is transparent because it is air or water; they are transparent because each of them has contained in it a certain substance which is the same in both and is also found in the eternal body which constitutes the uppermost shell of the physical Cosmos.[30]

Accordingly, "light is as it were the proper colour of what is transparent, and exists whenever the potentially transparent is excited to actuality by the influence of fire or

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26 Brentano thinks that the term *héxis* attributed to *noûs* cannot be meant in its usual sense of ability or disposition. It must rather be meant as a form that is at work in a subject: "Die wirkende Verstand dagegen ist eine actuelle, positive Eigenschaft, denn nur etwas Wirkliches kann als wirkendes Prinzip dienen, und Aristoteles bedient sich, um dieses zu bezeichnen, des Ausdruckes *hexis*, Habitus, indem, er dieses Wort hier nicht in dem gewöhnlichen Sinne einer Fertigkeit oder Disposition, sondern in jener allgemeineren Weise gebraucht, in welcher es ihm auch an anderen Orten jede Form, die in einem Subjecte wirklich ist, ja an einer Stelle sogar eine actuelle Privation (von der natürlich hier keine Rede sein kann) bedeutet" [Brentano, Franz 1867, *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles insbesondere seine Lehre vom Nous Poietikos, nebst einer Beilage über das Wirken des Aristotelischen Gottes* (Mainz: Verlag von Franz Kirchkeim), § 32, 169; English translation: *The Psychology of Aristotle: In Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect: With an Appendix Concerning the Activity of Aristotle's God*, trans. George, R. (Oakland: University of California Press 1977)]. Moreover, Brentano takes the comparison of *noûs poietikós* with light to be inadequate, since light cannot be said to be properly at work; it is rather a medium, like air, making color visible: "Aristoteles fügt, nachdem er gesagt hat, der active nous könne, nicht eine blosse Möglichkeit, sondern er müsse eine actuelle Eigenschaft [*héxis*] sein, weil er wirkend die Gedanken hervorbringe, zur Erläuterung eine Vergleich hinzu. Eine wirkliche Beschaffenheit, sagt er, müsse dieser nous sein, ähnlich dem Lichte, den auch dieses mache gewissermassen die Farben, die in Möglichkeit seien, zu wirklichen Farben. Dieser Vergleich ist nach der Aristotelischen Ansicht vom Lichte nicht in jeder Beziehung passend, den das Licht wirkt nach seiner Meinung nicht eigentlich auf den farbigen Gegenstand, sondern es macht vielmehr, dass das, worin es ist, z.B. die erleuchtete Luft fähig wird, von der Farbe in gewisser Weise affiziert zu werden. [. . .] Die Ungenauigkeit des Vergleiche, die darin besteht, dass, während der *nous poietikos* im eigentlichen Sinne wirkend die Phantasmen, die in Möglichkeit intelligible sind, wirklich intelligible macht, das Licht nicht eigentlich wirkend, sondern nur als eine nothwendige Vorbereitung des Mediums bei dem Sichtbarwerden der Farben in Rechnung kommt" [Brentano 1867, § 32, 172].

27 *Aristotle's De Sensu et sensato* (*On Sense and the Sensible*), translated by Beare, J.I., in *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. III.

28 Kosman 1992, 335.

29 *De Sensu et sensato*, 418 b1.

30 *De Sensu et sensato,* 418b 6–9.

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something resembling 'the uppermost body'."[31] Light is the colour of the transparent at work, the activity of the transparent *qua* transparent.

Thus as Kosman well explains, we have to assume that light serves to effect both actualizations—that from merely potential visibility to actual visibility and that from potential vision (given in a condition of activated visibility) to actual vision.[32] This is why light is the third condition (*héxis*) necessary for the activity of vision jointly with the visible coloured object and the visual capacity of the eye. Whereas these last two conditions are first actualities, light does not need further actualization. Light is, at the same time, the condition of visibility and the actualization of vision. This explains why Aristotle employs it in order to describe the nature of *noûs poietikós*. That thinking is a perfect activity means that when we are actually thinking, noesis and noeton are the same thing. Hence once no external thing hinders our thinking, we actually think and what is potentially thinkable is made actually thinkable. If *noûs poietikós* is like light in vision, then what it does is to actualize, at one and the same time, the condition of thinking and the activity of thinking or, put differently, the intelligibility of forms and the thinking itself.

Now I propose to adopt this model of double actualization in order to describe the activity of the phenomenologizing subject. Indeed, it seems to me that the phenomenologizing subject carries out a sort of double actualization, since it simultaneously acquires awareness of its own nature while making the constitutive process visible. Put more explicitly, the activity of the phenomenologizing subject consists of the actualization of the capacity to explore the work of constituting life. Such a capacity belongs to subjectivity in general from the outset of its self-constitution. However, it is only after having taken up a transcendental attitude by practicing the *epochē* that subjectivity makes this capacity fully actual. Therefore the phenomenologizing subject leads the constitutive process to a higher level: by making the work of constituting life explicit, it brings phenomenological knowledge from the first actuality to the second actuality.

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In order to clarify my thesis, let me first focus on the pivotal notion of constitution. Paraphrasing Kosman, we might ask: what does constituting life make?

The meaning of the term "constitution" generally fluctuates between "bringing to light" and "bestowing sense". These two expressions are not equivalent at all. To be sure, "bestowing sense" could be a synonym for "bringing to light", or more accurately, "bringing to light" could be one of the forms of "bestowing sense". But this entails that "bestowing sense" has a broader meaning connected with the production of sense, not simply with the act of making sense explicit. In other words, the act of "bringing to light" is the result of the subject's will to make explicit precisely how a unity has come about, and such an act consequently presupposes the production of sense as already given. Therefore constitution understood as the production of significant unities should be distinguished from the explicative act of illuminating different unities of sense by tracing such unities back to their origin—namely, to the process of that constitution.[33]

31 *De Sensu et sensato*,418b 11–13.
32 See Kosman 1992, 336.
33 On Husserl's concept of "constitution" as fluctuating between "bringing to light" and "bestowing sense", see Sokolowski, Robert 1970, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1970), 99–103, 170–176, 195–203, 214–223.

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In *Ideas* I § 65, Husserl argues that one of the essential features of phenomenology is that of referring back to itself (*Züruckbezogenheit*).[34] In other words, phenomenology refers ex post to its own activity in order to explore it. This means that in phenomenological research there is necessarily a kind of shift that leads the phenomenologist to differentiate his or her own investigation into two stages. At the time of *Ideas* I and as long as Husserl's approach is static, the first stage coincides with descriptive phenomenology, which deals with subjective processes (*cogitationes*) and with the correlative intentional objects (*cogitata qua cogitata*). The second stage coincides with an investigation concerning phenomenological method itself. Now with the advent of a genetic approach, the first stage is already broadened to address constitutive life as a whole, including passive syntheses, but such a move does not automatically accomplish a shift to the second stage. This clearly appears in *Cartesian Meditations* § 13, where Husserl divides phenomenological research into two stages, pointing out that

> [. . .] the scientific efforts for which we found the collective name, *transcendental phenomenology*, must proceed in *two stages*. In the *first* stage the *realm accessible to transcendental self-experience* [. . .] must be explored—and, at first, *with simple devotion to the evidence inherent in the harmonious flow of such experience*, while questions pertaining to an ultimate criticism, intent on apodictic principles governing the range of evidence, are set aside. In this stage accordingly—a stage that is *not yet philosophical in the full sense*—we proceed like the natural scientist in his devotion to the evidence in which Nature is experienced, while for him, as an investigator of Nature, questions pertaining to a radical criticism of experience remain altogether outside the field of inquiry. The *second* stage of phenomenological research would be precisely the *criticism of transcendental experience* and then the criticism of *all transcendental cognition*.[35]

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Here Husserl argues that the realm of the first stage is that of flowing life. The transcendental ego sets aside all questions connected with the form and the principles of its own transcendental self-experience and focuses on the investigation of constitutive genesis, including both passive and active syntheses. However, operating in this way amounts to adopting a naïve approach comparable to that of a natural scientist. In a manuscript of 1930, Husserl distinguishes naïve-straightforwardly oriented phenomenology (*naiv-gerade Phänomenologie*) from the phenomenology of the phenomenologizing I (*Phänomenologie des phänomenologisierenden Ich*), which he also calls phenomenology of phenomenology (*Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie*). As Husserl explains,

> [. . .] by practicing the *epochē*, I carry out a reflexive attitude in which I obtain the transcendental correlate: I as transcendental ego in the life of consciousness whereby I am conscious of the world. Now I exercise naïve experiencing and thinking, and I will become aware of this through a reflection of a higher level in which I grasp the anonymity of the transcendental onlooker.[36]

34 See Hua III/1, § 65, 138, tr. 150.
35 Hua I, § 13, 68, tr. 29.
36 Hua XXXIV, 177: "In der Einführung der Epoché vollziehe ich eine reflektive Einstellung, in der ich die transzendentalen Korrelata: ich als transzendentales Ego im Bewusstseinsleben, worin Welt bewusste ist,

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The object of the first stage of phenomenological inquiry, then, is constituting life as a whole. But this means that at this level, the constitution of an I-pole is already investigatable, but the phenomenological ego has not yet activated the tendency of self-clarification. Thus the naivety of a philosopher in the first stage of phenomenological research does not consist of the absence of any genetic tendency, for the philosopher genetically explores the constitution of the ego as an I-pole and as a substrate of habitualities. However, up to now the philosopher is not concerned with his or her own method, nor does he or she deal with the relationship between subjectivity in general and the phenomenologizing subjectivity in particular. Conversely, in the second stage of transcendental phenomenology, by taking the method to be the object of research, the philosopher delves more deeply into the nature of his or her own phenomenologizing I, leading, for instance, to the question of how a phenomenological attitude arises from flowing subjective life.

Yet the research concerned with the clarification of its own activity is once again a manifestation of constitutive activity. There is no explicative activity that is not simultaneously constituting. The subject that self-critically looks at the genesis of phenomenological method brings to light the eidetic laws of the constitutive process. It judges constitutive activity, and by doing so it constitutes new unities of sense. Its investigation aims at clarifying how the ego has constituted its own explicative and self-critically oriented attitude. But at the same time, one of the eidetic laws that the self-clarifying subject thereby brings to light is that the phenomenologizing life goes through a naïve moment in which it carries out its distinctive work without being concerned with the problem of how and why it sets about this task. The very issue of what it means 'to constitute' emerges after several steps and requires a preliminary activity. Put in Aristotle's terms, in order to move to the second stage of the research, the phenomenological subject has to have acquired the disposition to refer back to itself by adopting a self-critical transcendental gaze. In the last section, I will ask precisely when and how this actualization occurs. Now let me explain why I think that the model of double actualization can help us to account for the transition from the first to the second stage of phenomenological investigation.

When the phenomenologizing subject actualizes the capacity of self-clarification, what is made active is the potentiality of bringing to light the principles ruling constituting life. Hence the question is now the following: does it make this potentiality effectively actual just as, for Aristotle, light simultaneously makes visibility and vision actual? In other words, the issue is whether the moment in which the phenomenologizing subject acquires the capacity of self-critically exploring itself is one with the moment in which subject constitutes itself as actually self-exploring.

My conviction is that the phenomenologizing subjectivity needs a double actualization: the transition from the first potentiality to the second potentiality is one with the process by means of which the phenomenologizing subject constitutes the condition making the constitutive process visible; the passage from the second potentiality/first actuality to the second actuality is one with the moment in which the phenomenologizing subject effectively goes back over its constitutive process by focusing on the

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gewinne. Ich übe nun naiv transzendentales Erfahren und Denken, und werde ich dessen selbst inne, so geschieht es, wie ich durch Reflexion sehe, in einer Reflexion höherer Stufe, in der ich die Anonymität des transzendentalen Zuschauers erfasse" (translation mine).

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constitution of its own attitude and on the formation of its own method. The first actualization coincides with the moment in which the ego not only takes up a transcendental attitude, but attempts to make it habitual.[37] Once the phenomenological *epochē* is carried out, the ego has made constitutive processes visible as such. After reducing all experiences to the life of consciousness and after suspending any natural stance toward the world, the ego becomes a transcendental onlooker.[38] It thereby has the capacity of exploring the genesis of its own doing and being. Hence the first stage of phenomenological research is the actualization of this capacity. At the end of this stage, the sphere of the transcendental ego and the world as its correlate object appear as the outcomes of articulated constitutive processes. At the same time, by describing the activity of constituting life, the phenomenologizing subject makes the capacity of self-clarification active. It gains not only the capacity of exploring the process through which the ego in general constitutes itself as a pole and as a substrate of habitualities, but also the capacity of exploring the formation of its own attitude and method. In the second stage of phenomenological research, the phenomenologizing subject makes this active power effectively actual. It fully exercises a capacity that is the outcome of the first stage.

Applying the Aristotelian model to Husserl's description of phenomenological research, it seems that the double actualization of the phenomenologizing subjectivity does not occur simultaneously. This would be a radical difference from Aristotle's account, for as we have seen, *noûs poietikós* simultaneously makes the intelligibility of forms and thinking itself actual, just as light simultaneously makes visibility and vision actual. On the contrary, it seems that phenomenologizing subjectivity initially makes the visibility of the constitutive process actual and only subsequently actualizes the critical capacity of self-clarification. However, this is only partially true. Husserl's model seems to be slightly more articulated, since everything depends on the subjective function we consider.

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At the point when the phenomenologizing subject makes the constitutive process visible and therefore investigatable, the constitution of the capacities of a phenomenologizing subject has indeed already been carried out: as I have indicated, the first stage of phenomenological investigation makes the capacity of self-clarification active. However, I did not say that this stage constitutes the capacity of self-clarifying. The capacity of self-clarifying is acquired in the course of a constitutive process. The actualization of the transcendental-phenomenological *epochē* coincides with the moment in which the ego carries out and brings to full formation its capacity of self-clarification. It does this by developing the capacity of referring back to the process of its own self-constitution. And yet the capacity of self-clarification needs a further transition in order to be actualized. This transition coincides with the first stage, in which the ego learns to explore the constitutive process by exploring it. In other words, the exploration of constitutive process is an activity having its end in itself.

37 On the necessity of making the transcendental attitude permanent, compare Hua VI, § 40, 153, tr. 150: "It is to be noted also that the present, the 'transcendental' epochē is meant, of course, as a habitual attitude which we resolve to take up once and for all. Thus it is by no means a temporary act, which remains incidental and isolated in its various repetitions."

38 See Luft, Sebastian 2002, *"Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie". Systematik und Methodologie der Phänomenologie in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Husserl und Fink* (Dordrecht-Boston, MA-London: Kluwer), 15–21, 104–142.

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The problem could be also put in the following terms: once the ego makes the constitutive process visible, the capacity of philosophizing is already constituted. One could therefore ask what, precisely, the ego makes by making actual the capacity of self-clarification. Transcendental-phenomenological subjectivity constitutes itself in the course of carrying out constitutive processes. Accordingly, if from the outset of the phenomenological investigation the object of a self-exploring ego is the constitutive process in its totality, then the constitution of the capacities essentially inherent to a phenomenologizing ego should be thematized in the first stage of the investigation. Why should we need a further transition? In my view, Husserl would answer this question by pointing out that at the first stage, the ego certainly already has the potentiality of investigating any capacity belonging to it as a phenomenologizing subject. However, at this first stage, the self-exploring ego is not yet effectively able to recognize what capacities are necessarily swung into play in the formation of a phenomenological attitude. In fact, at this preliminary level, even if the phenomenologist investigates the constitutive process, he or she does not yet investigate human capacities in relation to the issue of the formation of phenomenological method. This explains why Husserl says that in the first stage of his or her investigation the phenomenologist is essentially naïve. Although the phenomenologist is here concerned with the problem of genetic constitution, he or she does not inquire into the role that the different layers of the constitutive process play in the formation of phenomenological method itself. It seems as if the phenomenologist postpones the problem of self-clarification. But from Husserl's perspective, this is not a matter of pragmatic convenience. The preliminary naivety of a transcendental onlooker is rooted in an eidetic law. The genetic self-exploration of the transcendental ego is itself a stage of the constitutive process. It is through this—namely, by bringing to light all constituted capacities—that the ego acquires the capacity of bestowing sense to its habitualities. More precisely, the ego acquires the capacity of connecting the capacities that it has developed within the natural dimension to the capacities that it exercises within the transcendental dimension. The operation of self-clarification therefore coincides with a particular synthesis of identification: after having investigated the constitution of its own capacities, the ego is now able to explain how these capacities contribute to actualizing its phenomenologizing activity.

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Let me sum up the outcomes of this section as follows. By carrying out the *epochē*, the ego effects a double actualization. One is that of making constitutive processes visible and investigatable; the other is that of exploring the capacity of philosophizing. This first actualization is completely carried out when the *epochē* is fully put into practice as the ego strives to make its transcendental attitude permanent. However, by making the constitutive process investigatable, the ego carries out this second actualization only partially. More accurately, the ego can be said to have the capacity of philosophizing from the moment it embarks on a transcendental self-exploration. However, the phenomenologizing ego is not aware of this from the outset of its investigation. In other words, after the *epochē* has initially been carried out, the capacity of philosophizing is active, but not actual. In order to make it effectively actual, the phenomenologizing subject has to become explicitly conscious of its way of operating. It has to turn its investigation from the problem of genetic constitution to that of a clarification of the method allowing the philosopher to investigate such constitutive genesis. The phenomenologizing subject has to decide to focus on the problem of the formation of its own method and attitude. Thus the double actualization occurs simultaneously, but the phenomenologizing subjectivity only becomes aware of this after the further passage of time. It needs to

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investigate its own self-constitution in order to realize that its capacity of philosophizing is an active power and consequently to be able to exercise it fully and voluntarily. This explains why Husserl says that the first stage of phenomenological research is "not yet philosophical in the full sense".[39]

3. The self-consciousness of the phenomenologizing subject

In this last section, I would like to strengthen my thesis by tackling two issues. First of all, I will briefly show that the picture of the history in which the ego constitutes him- or herself for him- or herself[40] becomes much more articulated when the phenomenological ego is self-critically oriented. After that, I will focus on the issue of how the phenomenologizing subject becomes fully conscious of its own activity.

My idea is that in the second stage of phenomenological research, the same subjective faculties and the same levels of the constitutive process that the phenomenologist naively explores in the first stage of its own investigation play different roles. Examples of this are the phenomena of affection and of neutralization.

By affection Husserl means "the allure given to consciousness (*bewußtseinsmäßiger Reiz*), the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego".[41] In *Experience and Judgement* § 17, Husserl says that the stimulus exercised by the intentional object requires and produces an answer from the ego: "with this yielding of the ego a new tendency makes its appearance: a tendency coming from the ego and directed toward the object."[42]

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Prior to the object's stimulus, there is no tendency coming from the ego. One may therefore say that affection is the moment of the constitutive process in which subjectivity, understood in its more general meaning, is actualized. In fact, Husserl distinguishes the "tendency which precedes the cogito, the tendency as stimulus of the intentional background-experience" from the tendency coming from the ego and directed toward the object. The tendency antecedent to the cogito has two sides: "the obtrusion on the ego, the attraction which the given exerts on the ego" and "from the side of ego, the tendency to give way, the being-attracted, the being-affected, of the ego itself".[43] From these processes Husserl distinguishes that of "the turning-toward as compliance with the tendency, in other words, the transformation of the character of the tendency of the intentional background-experience in which the cogito becomes active".[44] Before being-affected, the cogito, understood as intentional subjectivity, is just a potentiality of self-constituting life. At the level of association, the primal ego is one of the emergent unities. Once it is stimulated, its capacity of turning-toward the object is actualized and the ego thereby effectively constitutes itself as a pole:

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> The accomplishment of the turning-toward is what we call *the being-awake of the ego*. More precisely, it is necessary to distinguish being-awake as the factual accomplishment of an act from being-awake as potentiality, as the state of

39 Hua I, § 13, 68, tr. 29.
40 On the ego's self-constituting process as history, see Hua I, § 37, 109, tr. 75.
41 Hua XI, § 32, 148, tr. 196.
42 Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil*, § 17, 80, tr. 77–78.
43 Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil*, § 17, 82, tr. 78.
44 Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil*, § 17, 82, tr. 78.

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> being-able-to-accomplish an act, a state which constitutes the presupposition of the actual accomplishment of the act. [. . .] Insofar as in this turning-toward the ego receives what is pregiven to it through the affecting stimuli, we can speak here of the *receptivity of the ego*. This phenomenologically necessary concept of receptivity is in no way exclusively opposed to that of the *activity of the ego*, under which all acts proceeding in a specific way from the ego-pole are to be included. On the contrary, receptivity must be regarded as the lowest level of activity.[45]

Given this picture, I would like to raise a question: might we say that the affection is the moment in which the capacity of phenomenologizing is made active too? I do not think so. My thesis is that by focusing on this level, the self-clarifying ego sees how subjectivity in general passes from the first to the second potentiality, but at the same time, it realizes that here the phenomenologizing subjectivity is not yet actualizable. When the ego is awakened by affection, the capacity of phenomenologizing still remains at the level of first potentiality and needs a further process to become active.

Thus when we turn our glance to the level of affection, subjectivity appears as characterized by the capacity of intentionality. Such a capacity is surely a requirement for actualizing the capacity of phenomenologizing, but it is not enough to make such a power effectively active. Intentionality is the function of subjectivity in general; in Aristotle's terms, one may say that intentionality is the ultimate genus under which all forms of subjectivity fall. In the second stage of phenomenological research, the philosopher demonstrates that the specific character of the phenomenologizing subject must be sought in another capacity. Processes such as the ego's turning-toward the object or the ego's referring back to itself are already at work in the context of the lifeworld, where subjectivity remains in the natural attitude. Accordingly, it is another process that necessarily makes the difference. This is undoubtedly neutralization, namely, the phenomenon that the ego achieves by carrying out the *epochē*. The ego brackets any position-taking and reduces any process to a pure phenomenon of constituting life. By doing so, the ego makes the constitutive process visible. Therefore the capacity of phenomenologizing cannot be considered active prior to such neutralization.

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Thus whereas in the first stage of phenomenological research the phenomenon of affection appears as the origin of subjectivity, in the second stage the primacy has to be ascribed to the phenomenon of neutralization. This claim could sound trivial, but it sheds light on two crucial aspects of the ego's transcendental history. First, the self-clarifying subject realizes that if it takes the formation of a phenomenological attitude to be the object of its self-exploration, some subjective processes yield their primacy—i.e., the primacy they usually have in the context of everyday life—to other processes. Second, the self-clarifying subject understands that the formation of its own capacity of philosophizing initially occurs unconsciously, without being aware of the role one particular faculty will have in order to actualize the properly philosophical activity. Let me begin with the first aspect.

In *Ideas* I § 109, Husserl says that "among the modifications related to the sphere of belief", the neutrality modification "occupies a completely isolated place".[46] This is

45 Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil*, § 17, 83, tr. 79.
46 Hua III/1, § 109, 222, tr. 257.

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due to the particular manner in which it is related to "doxic positing".[47] Indeed, "it is a matter, now, of a modification which, in a certain way, completely annuls, completely renders powerless every doxic modality to which it is related"; but the neutrality modification is "a modification in a totally different sense than that of negation which, moreover, [. . .] has its positive effect in the negatum: a non-being which is itself again a being".[48] In fact, the neutrality modification "does not cancel out, does not 'effect' anything: it is the conscious counterpart of all producing: its neutralization. It is included in every abstaining-from-producing something, putting-something-out-of-action, 'bracketing'."[49]

Now consider the role that perception plays in the sphere of belief. As is widely known, Husserl gives primacy to perception over other subjective processes. This is due to the fact that perception makes an object originally present in its identity and full existence. On the one hand, this means that perception is the original source of knowledge;[50] in particular, Husserl claims that "seeing" is the ultimate "legitimizing source" of all rational assertions.[51] But on the other hand, this also means that the act of perceiving is strictly connected with that of believing:

> [. . .] belief is nothing in addition to perception; on the contrary, it is perception in its primitive mode. If we live in a perception that has not been subject to any inhibition, then we perceive; we carry out a perception and with it a belief.[52]

Accordingly, perception teaches me about the existence of the object, but perception alone cannot teach me about the possibility of neutralizing any belief, any conviction, any position I take by living naively and straightforwardly in everyday life. When I adopt a phenomenological attitude, I transform the mundane act of seeing: within the horizon of the lifeworld, the act of seeing posits an external object as originally existent; on the contrary, a phenomenological attitude transforms such an act of seeing into the lived experience of having a visual object as its correlate. Moreover, Husserl even extends the notion of seeing to the concept of *Wesensschau*, in which seeing means grasping the essence of an object. In order to be able to carry out this transformation, I need preliminary training. If the act of perceiving is one with that of believing, it cannot be the source of such training. Rather, it is the neutrality modification that makes the seen object a phenomenon and seeing the source of eidetic knowledge.

By carrying out the *epochē*, the philosopher aims to make the neutrality modification permanent. However, the neutrality modification is already actualizable within the horizon of the lifeworld. This means that we may find the origin of phenomenologizing activity in all processes that make a form of neutralization actual, even if naively. Here it is important to note that Husserl distinguishes phantasy from image-consciousness: the former is the neutrality modification of a positing presentification,[53] whereas the

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47 Hua III/1, § 109, 222, tr. 257.
48 Hua III/1, § 109, 222, tr. 257–258.
49 Hua III/1, § 109, 222, tr. 258 (translation slightly modified).
50 See E. Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil*, § 20.
51 Hua III/1, § 24, 55, tr. 44.
52 Hua XXIII, 405, tr. 478. On perception and belief, see: Ferrarin, A. 2015b, *Hegel e Husserl sull'immaginazione*, in: Manca, D., Magrì, E., Ferrarin, E., *Hegel e la fenomenologia trascendentale* (Pisa: ETS), 101–120.
53 Hua III/1, 225, tr. 260.

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latter is the neutrality modification of a normal perception.[54] Accordingly, both these processes contribute to making the subject able to adopt neutralization as a permanent state. But they do this in the context of the lifeworld, where the subject still maintains the natural attitude. This allows the second aspect I have identified above to emerge—namely, the issue of the unconscious origin of the phenomenologizing subject.

At the level of natural consciousness, phantasy is not acknowledged as a condition for actualizing a philosophical attitude. It is not yet seen as leading the ego to make its capacity of neutralizing habitual. In natural reflection, one takes phantasy to be a faculty of the personal ego belonging to the range of possible presentifications. Therefore the contribution of phantasy to making a philosophical attitude actualizable is only recognizable ex post, after long training. In the first stage of research, the philosopher describes the constitution of the phantasy-ego and of its related objects without being able to shed light on the contribution that these processes make to the formation and adoption of a transcendental attitude. Such awareness is only acquired in the second stage of phenomenological research. In light of this, we might conclude that at the beginning, the phenomenologizing ego's self-constitution is unconscious and involuntary. Let me spell out this point by referring to Aristotle and Brentano.

As is widely known, in *De Anima* Aristotle put in question the soul's awareness of its own powers. For instance, he wonders whether "the sense that gives us this new sensation must perceive both sight and its object",[55] and whether the *noûs* is intelligible in itself.[56] That *noûs* is not thinkable in itself clearly appears if we remember that *noûs pathetikós* is essentially undetermined. In Aristotle's view, *noûs* makes itself intelligible indirectly while thinking a determinate form. Even if, while we are thinking, the potentiality of turning attention from the determinate thought to the activity of thinking itself is necessarily activated, the actualization of this potentiality merely appears as a collateral and secondary activity. This argument influenced Brentano in questioning the assumption that an act is defined by a relationship to a single object and in elaborating the thesis that an act of consciousness may have different objects simultaneously. For example, he argues that

> [. . .] the presentation of the sound and the presentation of the presentation of the sound (i.e. hearing) form a single mental phenomenon; it is only by considering it in its relation to two different objects, one of which is a physical phenomenon and the other a mental phenomenon, that we divide it conceptually into two presentations.[57]

As De Warren explains,

> [. . .] on this view, the division between *object* of consciousness (physical phenomenon) and the *act* of consciousness (mental phenomenon), as two objects, is a *conceptual* distinction introduced through an act of reflection which divides the primordial and pre-reflexive unity of mental phenomenon (as a *single* presentation)

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54 Hua III/1, 226, tr. 261.
55 *De Anima III,* 2 425b 13.
56 *De Anima III,* 4 429 b25–430 a9.
57 Brentano, Franz (1874) 1924, Kraus, O. (ed.), *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (Leipzig: Felix Meiner), 179; English translation: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, edited by McAlister, L.L., with a new Introduction by Simons, P., trans. Rancurello, A.C., Terrel, D.B. and McAlister, L.L. (London and New York: Routledge 1973), 127.

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> into "primary" and "secondary" objects of consciousness. The sound is the *primary object* of the act, whereas the act of hearing is a *secondary object*, not, however, in the sense of being a second primary object, but in a secondary or incidental sense of taking itself "on the side", or in Aristotle's language, as a perception *en parergo*.[58]

Considering Aristotle's and Brentano's arguments, my concern is whether we might claim that the mundane ego unconsciously and involuntary acquires the capacity of undertaking a transcendental attitude by training itself through phantasy, and indeed, through any practice making it able to actualize neutralization once and for all.

First of all, we must take into account that Husserl firmly dismisses Brentano's idea that self-consciousness is not a condition for the presentation of an object. In *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, Appendix IX, Husserl claims that "it is just nonsense to talk about an 'unconscious' content that would only subsequently become conscious. Consciousness is necessarily consciousness in each of its phases."[59] However, it is also important to consider what Husserl is focusing on here. Husserl is interested in evaluating the possibility of reflection: he asks to what extent consciousness is able to make itself an object of its own consideration. He starts by focusing on when and how a series of retentional phases emerges and is thematized as an object. Accordingly, he states that retentional consciousness consists in becoming conscious of a phase without making it an object of consideration:

> The beginning-phase can become an object only *after* it has elapsed in the indicated way, by means of retention and reflection (or reproduction). But if it were intended *only* by retention, then what confers on it the label "now" would remain incomprehensible.[60]

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Husserl takes retention to be the act of keeping something in grasp. More specifically, retention keeps a phase as present and operative while elapsing. Saying that reflection is made possible by means of retention means that a phase could only be made an object of investigation thanks to the capacity of keeping it in grasp. By saying that is nonsense to talk about an unconscious content, Husserl means that being an object of an apperception is not the only possibility of a phase of consciousness: there is also the possibility of its being "primally conscious (*urbewusst*)".

Thus my question is the following: might one say that the contribution an act like that of phantasy makes to the actualization of neutralization is, within the sphere of the mundane ego, primally conscious? This in turn would also be nonsense. Indeed, if it were so, then the consciousness of being a pure phenomenologizing ego would belong to the retentional phase and could be made present at will by referring back to the mental process rather than to the physical object. On the contrary, however, within the mundane sphere, natural reflection does not allow the ego to be aware of being the manifestation and self-objectification of self-constituting life:

> [. . .] in my naïve self-consciousness as a human being knowing himself to be living in the world, for whom the world is the totality of what for him is valid as existing, I am blind to the immense transcendental dimension of problems. This dimension

58 de Warren, Nicolas 2009, 79. On *nous*' self-consciousness as indirect, see also Ferrarin 2001, 317–318
59 Hua X, 119, tr. 123.
60 Hua X, 119, tr. 123.

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> is in a hidden [realm of] anonymity. In truth, of course, I am a transcendental ego, but I am not conscious of this; being in a particular attitude, the natural attitude, I am completely given over to the object-poles, completely bound by interests and tasks which are exclusively directed toward them.[61]

Accordingly, this anonymity in which the self-constituting ego operates could be characterized as the level at which the capacity of actualizing a "transcendental reorientation"[62] is not yet made active. At this level, self-constituting life operates latently and unconsciously by employing some mental processes belonging to the everyday life of the mundane ego in order to allow the ego to carry out the phenomenological *epochē* and to make a transcendental attitude habitual once and for all.

Thus the phantasy-ego does not voluntarily contribute to the actualization of neutralization. The mundane ego cannot become aware of the role that the phantasy-ego plays in the actualization of neutralization simply by turning its attention from the phantasy-object to the phantasy-ego through natural reflection. This awareness can be acquired only after carrying out the *epochē*, just as the transcendental ego makes the constitutive process visible and progressively gains the capacity of investigating its own constitution:

> [. . .] a radical, psychological unfolding of my apperceptive life and of the particular world appearing in it, in respect to the *how* of the particular appearances (thus of the human "world-picture")—this, in the transition to the transcendental attitude, would immediately have to take on transcendental significance.[63]

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Regarding the issue of whether the actualization of neutralization is primally conscious at the beginning, one may conclude that the contribution an act like that of phantasy makes to the actualization of neutralization is only primally conscious (*urbewusst*) at the first stage of phenomenological research and that the original naivety of the transcendental self-exploring ego consists of allowing its capacity to turn its attention to its own self-constitution to operate only latently, although it is kept in grasp. Let me put this point in Aristotle's terms: the capacity of self-clarifying characterizes the second stage of phenomenological research. It is an active power. The constitutive process is the primary object of the self-exploring ego, whereas the act of self-clarifying is a secondary object—not, however, in the sense of being a secondary primary object, but in an incidental sense of taking itself "on the side". For at the first stage of phenomenological research, the phenomenologizing subject is an object of investigation *en parergoi*, namely, the phenomenologizing ego's self-consciousness is actualizable only indirectly.

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61 Hua VI, 209, tr. 205.
62 Hua VI, 209, tr. 205.
63 Hua VI, 210, tr. 206.

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12 Aristotle and Husserl on the relationship between the necessity of a fact and contingency

Irene Breuer

Abstract: Aristotle's philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology both give immediate access to effective reality. A full ontology presupposes the facticity or givenness of the world. They both state the necessity of factual existence inasmuch as the presence of a being (Aristotle) or of the self-givenness of the Ego and of the world (Husserl) establishes itself in experience as apodictically evident. Both share the view that worldly beings are characterized by their contingency, though they differ as to its necessity. This chapter will argue that facticity paired with the accidental allows for the irruption of an event as *Ereignis*. It will thus examine the relationship between the absolute and the conditional necessity of a fact, as well as the contingent features involved therein at both authors, insofar as facticity is concerned.

Keywords: Aristotle, Husserl, necessity, contingency, event

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Introduction[1]

Aristotle's philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology both give immediate access to effective reality [*Wirklichkeit*]. Effective reality is encountered in experience, not in concepts: to be is to be actual. Aristotle ascribes both a strong sense of actual reality – i.e. the action develops according to an immanent *telos* – [*energeia*] – and an accomplished reality – i.e. a being's possibilities of development have been fully realized – [*entelechia*] – to independent existing entities or substances. A full ontology presupposes the facticity [*Faktizität*] or givenness of the world which is prior to "transcendental constitution" in Husserl's sense of the term.[2] They both state the necessity of factual existence –

1 L. Tengelyi has the singular merit of having inquired into the possibility of a phenomenological critique of traditional metaphysics. Among the many issues addressed in his book *Welt und Unendlichkeit* and elsewhere, he thematized a real necessity that is not a priori in Aristotle and Husserl, a necessity which he called "a necessity of the fact". His research formed the basis for the present inquiry, which will examine the relationship between the absolute and the conditional necessity of a fact as well as the contingent or accidental features involved therein at both authors, insofar as facticity is concerned. This chapter is dedicated to his memory. We, his former students and colleagues, are still grief-stricken over his sudden death in July 2014. Cf. Lázló Tengelyi, *Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik* (Freiburg/München/Karl Alber, 2014).

2 For Heraclitus, the world is everything that is [*ta onta*] (DK B 31) while Aristotle in *Phys*. IV; 212b15f states that "all things are in the world; for the world, we may say, is the universe." Cf. Heraclitus (DK B 30): "*Diese Weltordnung, dieselbige für alle Wesen, schuf weder einer der Götter noch der Menschen, sondern sie war immerda* [. . .]." The world is conceived as the totality of what is present, i.e. originally given. Cf. transl. H. Diels, ed. W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Dublin/Zürich: Weidmann, 1966) and

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i.e. the necessity of a fact – inasmuch as the presence [*pareinai*[3]] of a being (Aristotle) or of the self-givenness [*Selbstgegebenheit*] of the Ego and of the world (Husserl) establishes itself in experience as apodictically evident, that is, with an indubitable and irrevocable certainty.[4] Both share the view that worldly beings are characterized by their contingency [*Zufälligkeit*] – i.e. they are subject to generation and corruption or decay[5] – although they differ as to their necessity. In earlier writings, Husserl states that the indubitable and apodictical certainty of my cogito [*unzweifelhafte und apodiktische Notwendigkeit des cogito*] is dependent on the fact of the Ego's existence: the existence of the I is ultimately a contingent fact, even though it is apodictically certain. At a later stage, however, Husserl comes to ascribe an absolute facticity [*absolute Faktizität*] to the primal fact [*Urfaktum*] – the groundless being [*das grundlose Sein*] of the I as it is self-given – because the absoluteness of this last-acting I [*letztfungierende Ich*] precedes any categorial distinction whatsoever. Contingency, on the other hand, not only characterizes the "core" of the primal facts – primal I, the Ego's having the world [*Welthabe*], intersubjectivity and historicity – but even the very Ego's essence is due to its "qualitative openness" [*Offenheit*]. As regards Aristotle, he attributes a factual necessity to the existing being, i.e. a necessity that is temporarily conditioned by its existence[6] and can therefore be defined as the "conditional necessity of a fact". Accidental causes, on the other hand, account for the contingency of the real. In what follows I shall argue that facticity paired with the accidental allows not only for beings' contingency, but for the irruption of something new that overwhelms us – an event as *Ereignis*, i.e the event of appearing that establishes itself by itself. In Aristotle's terms, we could define an *Ereignis* or event from two points of view: as it appears in the *Metaphysics*, as the production of results *apo tautomaton*, i.e. one which simulates natural production, as certain partially

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Aristotle, *Physics*, transl. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, ed. J. Barnes, in *The complete works of Aristotle. The revised Oxford translation* (Princeton, NJ/Princeton University Press, 1984). Henceforth cited as *Phys*.

3 R. Brague translates this term as an "être-présent" and refers to the *Odyssey* i, 491, Plato, 2e. Alcibiades, 141 e 4, Demosthenes 46,6. Cf. Rémy Brague, *Aristote et la question du monde* (Paris/PUF 1988), 12. Cf. Diels, Kranz, *Die Fragmente*, 336. The term appears also in Heraclitus B 34, and Parmenides B 2,1 among other places.

4 Apodicticity, in the Husserlian sense of the world, applies to what is "undurchstreichbar", i.e. what is irrevocable. Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Zweiter Teil: 1921–1928*, ed. Iso Kern, Husserliana XIV (Den Haag/Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 154–155. Henceforth cited as '*Hua* XIV' with page reference. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. As for Aristotle, I apply this term to his assumption of the unquestionable presence of man in the world, which is understood as an ontological priority. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, transl. W. D. Ross, in ed. J. Barnes, *The complete works of Aristotle*. Henceforth cited as '*Met.*', VI, 7, 1141a21f: "[. . .] since man is not the best thing in the world." Man is in the world, inasmuch as he is present [*pareinai*] in the world. In Aristotle, *Met*. V, 11, 1019a1, Aristotle discusses the various senses of "being" and connects the priority in definition with the priority in being: "some things are prior in respect of capacity, others in respect of actuality." Cf. Aristotle, *Met*. XIII, 2, 1077b1f: "For those things are prior in substance which when separated from other things continue to exist [. . .]." C. Witt calls this kind of priority an "ontological priority", because actualities are ontologically independent while potentialities are not. Cf. Charlotte Witt, "The priority of Actuality in Aristotle", in *Unity, identity and explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics*, eds. T. Scaltsas, D. Charles, M.L. Gill, (Oxford/Clarendon, 1994), 215–229, here 217. Charles Kahn also stresses that the verb to be [*einai*] has a locative and existential sense: "'N is P' "would justify the translation as 'there is'", i.e. there exists something. Cf. Charles Kahn, *The verb 'be' and its synonyms. Philosophical and grammatical studies*, ed. J. W. M. Verhaar (Dordrecht/Boston, MA 1973), 159.

5 Cf. Aristotle, *Met*. VII, 7, 1032a20f: "All things that come to be either by nature or by art have matter, for each of them is capable both of being and of not being, and this capacity is the matter in each." Contingency is connected to materiality, which at its turn, is connected to movement.

6 Cf. Aristotle, *De interpretatione*, transl. J.L. Ackrill, in J. Barnes (ed.), *The complete works of Aristotle*. Here, *De interpretatione* 9, 19a23–26.

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formed matters have a certain power of initiating change;[7] or from the point of view taken in the *Physics*, which is not concerned with genesis but with *tyche*, i.e. events involving non-substantial change as unintended products or "concurrent outcomes"[8] of a crossing of two heterogeneous causal chains. It generally applies to something that arrives unexpectedly or emerges spontaneously, and whose causes are indeterminate.[9] In order to elucidate this thesis, I shall reflect on the complex relationship between the different sorts of necessity and the accidental insofar as they concern facticity.

1. Aristotle on ontology, contingency and the accidental

Aristotle's ontology is characterized by a "*katholou-prôtologique*" structure,[10] as R. Brague and J.-F. Courtine highlight. That which is the "primary" [*prôton*] being acts as a pivot around which the "universal" [*kathoulou*], i.e. a Being qua Being or a Being as such, revolves.[11] This structure concerns the apprehension of a singular instance or the paradigmatic being in which the essential determinations, which are dispersed among multiple phenomena, are realized to the highest degree.[12] First philosophy deals with Being qua Being [*to on he on*] and "the attributes that belong to it in virtue of its own nature [*kath' hauto hyparchonta*]".[13] The task of first philosophy is to deal with the "highest genus",[14] to be the prior and universal science of the highest and primary unity and of being qua being [*ousía*][15] on which other beings depend, in virtue of which they are named[16] and to which they are referred to.[17] Conversely, it is the task of the philosopher "to grasp the principles and causes" of the substance or *ousía*.[18] Consequently, every other Being or sense of Being – there are many senses in which a thing may be said [*pollachos legetai*] to be one[19] – are related in common to a primary sense [*pros-hen*-relationship],[20] which underlies any other statement of this first science. The one central meaning or "focal meaning"[21] is the *ousia* on which every other being depends.[22] Thus the *pros-hen*-relationship guarantees not only the unity of the first

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7 Aristotle, *Metaphysics. A revised text with introduction and* commentary by W.D. Ross (Oxford/Clarendon 1924, 1997). Cf. commentary of W.D. Ross, cxxi. Henceforth cited as 'Ross, *Aristotle Metaphysics*'.

8 *Aristotle's Physics I, II,* trans. with introduction and notes by W. Charlton (Oxford/Clarendon 1970, 1983), 108. Henceforth cited as 'Charlton, *Aristotle Physics*'.

9 Cf. Aristotle, *Met*. V, 30, 1025a27–30.

10 Brague, *Aristote*, 110.

11 Brague, *Aristote,* 514. Cf. Jean-François Courtine, *Les catégories de l'être. Ètudes sur la philosophie ancienne et médievale* (Paris/PUF, 2003), 194. Cf. Pierre Aubenque, *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote* (Paris/PUF1962), 38.

12 Courtine, *Les catégories de l'être*, 193.

13 Aristotle, *Met*. IV 1, 1003a21f.

14 Aristotle, *Met*. II, 6, 1026b22.

15 Aristotle, *Met*. II, 6, 1026 b30f.

16 Aristotle, *Met*. IV 2, 1003b16

17 Aristotle, *Met*. IV 2, 1004a25f.

18 Aristotle, *Met*. II, 4, 1003b17–18. See Aubenque, *Le problème*, 246f.

19 Aristotle, *Met*. IV 2, 1003a17, and 1003a22.

20 Cf. Aristotle, *Met*. XII, 1075a18: "For all [things] are ordered together to one end." Cf. Dirk Fonfara, *Die Ousia-Lehren des Aristoteles. Untersuchungen zur Kategorienschrift und zur Metaphysik* (Berlin/de Gruyter 2003), 185.

21 G.E.L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in some Earlier Works of Aristotle" in eds. I. During and G.E.L. Owen, *Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth century* (Goteborg/Studia Graeca et Latina, 1960), 163–190, on focal meaning cf. 179–190.

22 Aristotle, *Met*. IV, 2, 1004a33.

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science, universal ontology, but also the characterization of first philosophy as that which grasps "the first causes of being as being" [*protai archai tou ontos he on*],[23] referring them to a primary [*proton*][24] and highest unity, the *ousia*. Thus metaphysics as first science considers every kind of being in its universality or generality i.e. insofar as it is Being for "to investigate the several species is the work of the specific parts of the science",[25] i.e. other theoretical, technical (poietical) and practical sciences.

However, in the first chapter of Book VI, Aristotle outlines a "first" or "primary" philosophy which does not study being as a whole but the highest kind of being, which, like physical substances, but unlike mathematics, exists independently [*choriston*] and unlike physical things but like mathematics is eternal [*aidion*] and unmovable [*akineton*].[26] But Aristotle expresses this view only hypothetically: "If there is an immovable substance [*ousia akinetos*]", it is prior to the movable *ousiai* – the object of physics as second philosophy – and its science is the "first philosophy" [*prote philosophia*].[27] Such a theological science [*theologike episteme*][28] is the "most honourable" [*timiotate*][29] because it describes the "divine" [*theion*] and the first and prior, the unmovable *ousia*.[30] Aristotle himself raises the question of whether first philosophy is universal [*kathoulou*] or deals with a particular class of things [*peri te genos*], i.e. the unmovable *ousia*, which is identified as God [*theos*][31] in Book XII. The answer he gives seems at first sight to be an enigma: it is "universal in this way, because it is first".[32] The clue to resolving this enigma lies in the consideration of the *pros-hen*-relationship.[33] lnsofar as it is the first [*prote*] science it must grasp the first causes [*aitia*] or principles [*arche*] of being qua being.[34] As the *ousia akinetos* is the prior Being, cause [*aition*] of movement[35] and principle [*arche*],[36] the science of it proves to be universal [*kathoulou*]. Therefore, the science deals with "being qua being" and investigates both what it is [*ti esti – the ousia*] and that which are its attributes [*ta hyparchonta*][37].

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While the pros-hen-relationship allows the unification and grounding of the different realms of Being on a first and prior Being, the "qua" or "inasmuch" (in Greek: ᾗ) structure, allows investigation of the way or mode in which the same thing is to be taken under each science's particular point of view. Thus, the realm of the first science, ontology, entails the examination of being in itself, "unity qua unity and of being qua being". There is a universal science of the individual substances because they "contain" a universal: it is possible to gain knowledge from the individual thing, inasmuch as it is considered as a universal. As Aristotle emphasizes:

23 Aristotle, *Met*. IV, 1, 1003a31.
24 Aristotle, *Met*. IV, 2, 1003b16.
25 Aristotle, *Met*. IV, 1, 1003a23.
26 Aristotle, *Met*. VI, 1, 1026a13–16.
27 Aristotle, *Met*. IV, 1, 1003a26.
28 Aristotle, *Met*. VI, 1, 1026a19.
29 Aristotle, *Met*. I, 2, 983a5.
30 Aristotle, *Met*. VI, 1, 1026a30f.
31 Aristotle, *Met*. XII, 7, 1072b25.
32 Aristotle, *Met*. XII, 7, 1072b10–15.
33 Cf. Dirk Fonfara: "Aristoteles' Erste Philosophie: universalistische oder paradigmatische Ontologie?", in ed. K. Engelhard, *Aufklärungen. Festschrift für K. Düsing zum 60. Geburstag* (Berlin/Duncker&Humblot 2002), 15–37.
34 Aristotle, *Met*., IV, 2, 1003b17–18.
35 Aristotle, *Met*., VII, 2,1027a15–19.
36 Aristotle, *Met*., XII, 7,1072b10–15.
37 Aristotle, *Met*., VI, 1, 1026a30–32.

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> Since, then, these are essential modifications of unity qua unity and of being qua being, not qua numbers or lines or fire, it is clear that it belongs to this science to investigate both the essence of these concepts and their properties.[38]

This groundbreaking innovation allows us to locate the difference between these views not in the object itself, but in changes in the mode of observation.[39] This is why things taken as "beings qua numbers or lines" are the objects of mathematics, while the same things taken "qua beings" are the objects of philosophy. Philosophy is therefore characterized by a certain tension between the views its objects are subject to, which can only be partially solved by the *pros-hen*-relationship, namely, a tension between the highest and prior being (the object of the first philosophy or theology) and the self-existent being, "being itself, qua being," (the object of ontology).[40] Another clue to resolving the enigma of how an independently existing i.e. separable and eternal or unchangeable being can be the source of a universal science of being qua being lies in the modal conceptual pair of "potentiality" and "actuality".

The inquiry into the meaning of being – "being as being"[41] and of "unity qua unity and of being qua being"[42] refers us to the connecting structure – the "as", "qua", or "inasmuch as" – which also implies the movement of passage between potentiality [*dynamis*] and actuality [*energeia*] – the being as being-present and as existent and the unity of being as present in the highest degree – on the one hand and on the other, the categorial-predicative distinction between the subject-substance (the being) and the predication-attributes as potentially existing. While the first interpretation attests to actuality, i.e. the reality of, at least, certain potentialities, the second one refers to a possibility[43]or potentiality, a *dynamis*, which moves on the way opened by the actual.[44] The *energeia-dynamis* pair, which encompasses the process of actualization of potentialities, applies to beings which are subject to change or, in a narrower sense, to movement [*kinesis*]. Thus it defines the ontological realm of individual substances.

However, Aristotle's ontology grants the self-existent being not only a dynamic reality [*energeia*] but also an immanent accomplishment [*entelechia*]. Both account for a strong sense of reality. *Energeia* may simply mean an activity,[45] but in both the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle conceives motion in terms of an accomplished motion, i.e. as an actuality. Motion [*kinesis*] is defined in *Metaphysics* as "the actuality of the potential as such",[46] while in *Physics* it is defined as "the fulfillment of what is potentially, as such".[47] Here "actuality" encompasses motion. Some lines later however,

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38 Aristotle, *Met*. II, 4, 1004b6.
39 Cf. Lázló Tengely, *Erfahrung und Ausdruck, Phänomenologie im Umbruch bei Husserl und seinen Nachfolgern* (Doordrecht /Springer, 2007), 6–7, on the sense of the expression "*Etwas als etwas*" for phenomenology.
40 Aristotle, *Met*. VI, 4, 1028a4.
41 Aristotle, *Met*. II, 4, 1003a21–22.
42 Aristotle, *Met*.,IV, 2, 1004b6.
43 Cf. Brague, *Aristote*, 500–504.
44 Cf. Aubenque, *Le problème,* 453: *"[L]'acte et la puissance présupposent toujours le mouvement comme l'horizon à l'intérieur duquel ils signifient*."
45 Cf. Aristotle, *On the soul*, transl. J. A. Smith in ed. Jonathan Barnes, *The complete works of Aristotle*. Here *On the soul*, II, 416b2: "There is a change in the carpenter but it is merely a change from not-working to working."
46 Aristotle, *Met*. XI, 9, 1065b16–17.
47 Aristotle, *Phys*. III, 1, 201a12.

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Aristotle remarks that full actuality and motion "are not the same"[48] and consequently contrasts actuality [*energeia*] not only with motion [*kinesis*] but also with possibility/potentiality [*dynamis*]. He adds that motion is not the fulfillment per se but the process of becoming, what leads him to adjust his definition: motion "is the fulfillment of what is potential when it is already fulfilled and operates not as itself but as movable".[49] This is why every motion "is incomplete – making things, learning, walking, building: these are movements, and incomplete movements".[50] Indeed, movements are on their way towards actualization, i.e. their *telos* lies ahead, because "it is not true that we are at the same time learning and we have learnt, are being cured and have been cured." Thus the key lies in the notion of *telos*: here, the presence of a *telos* is exterior to the movement; the *telos* is present only as a limit [*peras*], at which the movement ceases [*pauesthai*]. On the contrary, actuality [*energeia*] implies that "the end is present"[51] i.e. the accomplishment of inherent potentialities. Indeed, we might say

> [. . .] we are living well and have lived well, and are happy and have been happy [. . .] it is the same thing at the same time has seen and is seeing, or is thinking and has thought: the latter sort of process I call an actuality [*energeia*], and the former a movement [*kinesis*].[52]

Energeia is therefore not a movement towards something other than itself. Here, the simultaneous presence of both present perfect and present tenses indicates not only that the *telos* is immanent to the process,[53] but in my view also indicates a certain type of accomplishment or perfection that has to be reenacted at every "now"-point of the time the process lasts. Indeed, the activity [*energeia*] not only does not cease to end, i.e. the end is reached from its beginning – from the first moment I see, I have seen – but it does not cease to begin – I have seen because I still see – so that "seeing" is not a permanent possession that is definitively acquired but a capacity that once acquired has to be permanently put into practice, as the provisional term Aristotle employs for *energeia* – "*praxis teleia*" denotes. Thus, the perfect tense is used to express an actuality as a perfection or accomplishment of an activity (present perfect tense) that has nevertheless to be repeatedly reenacted as praxis (present tense) in order to last at most as long as the substance exists. As stated above, both the activity's *telos* and its *dynamis* are inherent to the process: it is the indefinite repetition of the action that not only conveys the sense of renewed past accomplishments but opens a horizon for future fulfillments as well.

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While, strictly speaking, *energeia* means activity or actualization, *entelechia* means the resulting actuality or perfection. Aristotle expressly connects the word "actuality" [*entelechia*] with "fulfillment",[54] so that it is conceived in Brague's terms as a "simple

48 Aristotle, *Phys*. III, 1, 201a27–b2.
49 Aristotle, *Phys*. III, 1, 201a27.
50 Aristotle, *Met*. VI, 6, 1048b30–32.
51 Aristotle, *Met*. IX, 8, 1048b23.
52 Aristotle, *Met*. VI, 6 1048b26f.
53 Brague, *Aristote*, 468. Cf. Aristotle, *Met*. IX, 6, 1048b23: "that in which the end is present is an action".
54 Aristotle, *Met*. IX, 3, 1047a30. Cf. *Met*. IX, 3, 1050a22: "For the action is the end, and the actuality is the action. Therefore even the *word* 'actuality' is derived from 'action' and points to the fulfillment." Nevertheless, Ross remarks that Aristotle mostly uses both terms, *energeia* and *entelechia*, as synonyms.

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act of presence".[55] Here "actuality" is seen as analogous to "form". The house is the form of the materials insofar as it is their manifestation or actuality while the materials taken by themselves are potentially the house. Thus *entelechia* does not denote a dynamic activity, an actualization of what is potential, but a complete or fulfilled reality. This is why actuality as *entelechia* remains in itself and is neither in transition to something else (in movement or kinesis), nor in need of constant actualization [*energeia*]. Thus it is characterized by being stationary, an immobility that is analogous to the immutability of the prior Being. Consequently, both notions of actuality– *energeia* and *entelechia* – provide us with a clue for resolving not only the problem of how an inquiry into an independently existing and immutable being [prior or first *ousia*] can be universal but how an independently existing but movable being [an individual substance or *ousia*] may be analogous to the immutable one. On the one hand, if *entelechia* means a complete reality as an absence of movement or a full and simple presence, it can be said to be analogous to the immutability and eternity of the first Being. On the other hand, if *energeia* means an accomplishment that has to be recapitulated in order to become a permanent one, it can be said that individual substances follow the model of the eternal first Being insofar as the constant renewal conveys a sense of continuity, which is however, limited by their own existence. This is why the actuality of an individual substance is analogous, for a finite time, to the eternity of an eternal Being.

Both *energeia* and *entelechia* account for the fact that being is characterized by having "within itself a principle of motion and of being stationary".[56] As that which is real is defined in terms of full actualization of the possibilities or potentialities [*entelechia*] and the highest and the prior being involves no possibility that has not been actualized, it is conceived as an unmovable substance [*ousía akinetos*][57] and is therefore eternal and necessary. Indeed, in Book V,[58] Aristotle applies "necessary" [*anagkaion*], amongst other things, to:

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1) That which cannot be otherwise, the prior being is "always in the same state" and is "of necessity" [*anagke*], i.e. that "which means the impossibility of being otherwise".[59]
2) What others can be referred to: the prior Being is the ultimate cause of any kinesis at all[60] as well as the being to which every other being is attracted to, i.e. the ultimate *telos*.

Summarizing, as potentiality is at the same time potentiality for the opposite (be and not be) and nothing which is imperishable is potentially the opposite, it is of necessity: "Nor can anything which is of necessity be potential; yet these things [imperishable

Ross refers us to Diels, in *Zeitschr. für Vergl. Philol. xlvii*, 200–203 who shows that *enteleches* is a "correctly formed equivalent to *to enteles exon*, 'having perfection'".Cf. Ross, *Aristotle Metaphysics*, 245.

55 Bragues, *Aristote*, 500.
56 Aristotle, *Phys*. II, 1, 192b14.
57 Aristotle, *Met*. VI, 1, 1026a29.
58 Cf. Aristotle, *Met*. V, 5, 1015a20–b6 and Ross, *Aristotle Metaphysics*, 288–289.
59 Aristotle, *Met*. VI, 2, 1026b27–30.
60 Aristotle, *Met*. IX, 8, 1050b5: "one actuality always precedes another in time right back to the actuality of the eternal prime mover."

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things] are primary; for if these did not exist, nothing would exist."[61] Therefore, the prior being is necessary in a strong sense:

> Now some things owe their necessity to something other than themselves; others do not, while they are the source of necessity in other things. Therefore the necessary in the primary and strict sense is the simple; for this does not admit of more states than one, so that it does not admit even of one state and another, for it would thereby admit of more than one. If then, there are certain eternal and unmovable things, nothing compulsory or against their nature attaches to them.[62]

The prior being is necessary in its own right and not derivatively because it is simple, its nature admits of no variation, i.e. in other words, it is eternal and unchangeable. It is not only necessary because it is always in act but also because it is the source of any necessity at all. It may thus be said that unconditional necessity applies to beings that are always in act.

But what sort of necessity applies to beings which are not always existent nor are always non-existent either, i.e. those beings which are subject to generation and decay, those whose possibilities are not fully actualized? In this connection, throughout his works Aristotle speaks of a certain mode of necessity that applies to beings just because they exist. In different works, Aristotle refers to a special kind of necessity for being in general, even for the accidental being insofar as it is not only possible but existent:

> What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not. But not everything that is, necessarily is; and not everything that is not, necessarily is not. For to say that everything that is, is of necessity, when it is, is not the same as saying unconditionally that it is of necessity. Similarly with what is not.[63]

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Being in general is necessary insofar as it is actual, but this has no compelling necessity. It is restricted to the hypothetical condition that being is, inasmuch as it exists, i.e. its necessity is conditioned by its actuality. Consequently, we may infer that, provided that a contingent being is or exists, it is necessary, i.e. its non-existence is excluded. But neither does it have the capacity of not existing while it exists. As Aristotle explains, a being may be or not be, but it does not possess "the capacity of [. . .] not existing at a time when it exists – since then it exists in actuality".[64] J. Vuillemin emphasizes that the aforementioned exclusion is related to the principle of non-contradiction which applies to every contingent being, since according to this principle it is impossible for something to be and not to be at the same time. But, he adds, the second exclusion is "stronger". It prevents the temporal coexistence of a "negative capacity" with an "affirmative actuality" (p excludes the capacity of non-p while p) and symmetrically an "affirmative capacity coexisting with a negative actuality" (non-p excludes the capacity of p while non-p). Aristotle explicitly assimilates actuality and necessity when defining this sort of necessity, which may be called "hypothetical". J. Vuillemin

61 Aristotle, *Met*. IX, IX, 8, 1050b18.
62 Aristotle, *Met*. V, 5, 1015b10–15.
63 Aristotle, *De interpretatione*, 9, 19a23–26.
64 Aristotle, : *On the heavens*, transl. J. L. Stocks, ed. J. Barnes, *The complete works of Aristotle*, Here *On the heavens*, I, 12, 283b9–10.

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concludes that "the actuality of a contingent thing has, for a finite time, the same necessity as that belonging to the actuality of an eternal or sempiternal thing."[65]

This mode of necessity is tied to the precondition that the immanent accomplishment, i.e. the actualization of potentialities of possibilities [*entelechia*] has taken place. From this, N. Hartmann infers that the actual world shows a "universal necessity" [*durchgängige Notwendigkeit*], which is to be attributed to the "law of split of real possibility" [*Spaltungsgesetz der Realmöglichkeit*]. It implies following paradox: 1. What is possibly real, is also actually real [. . .] – law of real possibility [*Realgesetzt der Möglichkeit*] [. . .] 2. what is actually real, is also necessarily real [. . .] – law of real necessity" [*Realgesetz der Notwendigkeit*]. It follows from this that "what is potentially real, is also necessarily real." In this way, the positive modes of the real are separated from the negative ones implying non-actuality. This yields a double law that expresses the ontological sense of being-actual: insofar as being-as-possible becomes actual, its non-being is excluded, i.e. it necessarily exists. Conversely, insofar as being-as-possible is not actual, being-actual is excluded. This means that the real actuality of being presupposes its real possibility. Consequently, being, insofar as it is actual, is also necessary.[66] From both J. Vuillemin's and N. Hartmann's propositions we may infer that only as long as a substance is actual, it is also necessary, i.e. its necessity is temporarily conditioned by its actuality, i.e. its necessity is submitted to a temporal condition. This mode of necessity can be defined as the "conditional necessity of the fact".

It is important to stress that Aristotle does not hold to a causal determinism, otherwise "all things will be of necessity, and chance [*tyche*] and the possibility of a thing either occurring or not occurring are removed entirely from the range of events."[67] The accidental [*symbebekós*] is in a certain sense indispensable, as otherwise "all things will be of necessity, since that which is being generated or destroyed must have a cause which is not accidentally its cause."[68] Therefore, the accidental is not an exception characterized by privation, but it accounts for the contingency of the world of experience. As Aristotle puts it:

> Since, among things which are, some are always in the same state and are of necessity [*ex anagkes*] – nor necessity in the sense of compulsion but that which means the impossibility of being otherwise – and some are not of necessity nor always, but for the most part, this is the principle and this the cause of the existence of the accidental; for that which is neither always nor for the most part, we call accidental.[69]

Accidental being [*kata symbebekos on*] is not studied by any science because science studies things that are always or for the most part [*hos epi to poly*]. The accidental not only characterizes actuality as present but also characterizes the future, for there are potentialities which may or may not become actual; there is no truth-content to

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65 Jules Vuillemin, *Nécessité et contingence* (Paris/Minuit 2004); *Necessity and contingency, the master argument*, California/Center for the Study of Language and Information, 1996), 24–25.
66 Nicolai Hartmann, *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit* (Berlin/de Gruyter, 1966), 117–122.
67 Aristotle, *Met.* XI, 8, 1065a12–14.
68 Aristotle, *Met.* VI, 3, 1027a31.
69 Aristotle, *Met.* VI, 1026b26–33.

Proof

Proof

propositions about the future.[70] Contrary to past occurrences, which can only be recognized *a-tergo*, i.e. retrospectively, as necessary and true, future occurrences are not predetermined because their causes do not yet exist right now. Therefore, we cannot predicate either truth or falsity. As we shall later see, these considerations will lead Aristotle to limit the principle of bivalence.

Chance fulfills three relevant functions, as disclosed below. First, it prevents the infinite search for causes, as otherwise everything would be caused necessarily. Second, it refutes the assumption of absolute necessity in nature, which would result from the reciprocal necessary connection between causes and consequences.[71] Finally, it allows for causes which do not come into being by a process,[72] because Aristotle proves that there are events which are not necessary, but fortuitous.

As to the first function, contingent or accidental beings as well as the causal chains originating them arise and decay. Causal chains are heterogeneous among themselves due to their distinct origins: arising from different events, they are built up of necessary and accidental elements. What has to be elucidated is the "starting-point [*hopoter' etychen*]", i.e. the emergence of something accidental and the sort of cause to which it may be lead back to.[73] Death, for example, is inherent, i.e. necessary, to that which becomes, but the condition that provokes it is not. This condition may even not arise from anything in existence nor irrevocably lead to the event.[74] This means that a causal chain may be "invaded" by accidental causes extraneous to the process that undeniably entail irrevocable changes. Therefore, the accidental may be determined only after "something has happened".[75] In the field of experience, this intrusion or irruption of extraneous causes can only retrospectively be recognized.

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Concerning both last functions, it is important to stress that the accidental is contrary to that "which is always or for the most part".[76] There are causes which do not come into being through a process but arise unexpectedly and suddenly. But where does the accidental come from and from what cause does it arise? To begin with, the accidental causes a side effect that entails not only that a *telos* is missing and the "derailing" of the process, but which is the starting-point of a new causal chain. This possibility can by no means be rejected. The fact that the origin of a causal chain is accidental does not imply that the process thus generated is accidental too.[77] The accidental introduces thus a divergence or discontinuity in an existing causal chain and its cause can never be derived from this causal chain. The accidental "will have nothing else as cause of its coming to be".[78] At this point the accidental seems to be related to the non-being, because it is neither subject to generation nor decay, nor is it the outcome of any process, because it is not congruent with any of the chain's causes. It occurs "by chance [*tyche*]".[79] As against the views of his predecessors, Aristotle remarks that, although

70 Cf. chapter 9 of *De Interpretatione* on the example of there being a possible ship battle on the next day.
71 Thomas von Aquin, commentary to *Metaphysics*. Nr. 1191f., cited by H. Seidl in his commentary to *Metaphysik*, in: *Metaphysik, griechisch-deutsch*, transl. H. Bonitz augmented, introduction and commentary, ed. H. Seidl (Hamburg/Meiner 1978–1980 [3], 1989–1991), 426.
72 Ross, *Aristotle Metaphysics,* commentary to *Met.* VI, 2, 1027a29, 362.
73 Aristotle, *Met.* VI, 4, 1027b13–16.
74 Aristotle, *Met.* VI, 4, 1027b17–22.
75 Aristotle, *Met.* VI, 3, 1027b9.
76 Aristotle, *Met.* VI, 2, 1027a25.
77 Aristotle, *Met.* XI, 8, 1065a6–21. Cf. commentary of H. Seidl, in *Metaphysik*, 535.
78 Aristotle, *Met.* VI, 3, 1027b13–14.
79 Aristotle, *Phys.* II, 4, 196a24.

Proof

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this cannot be ascribed purpose or to necessity, it does not elude nature or reason[80] which are guided by a *telos*. The cause of the accidental, that "due to which", may lie in nature or in human practical action, i.e. in what is originated by our planning nous, but it does not have to. There are events which happen occasionally when certain conditions are present; these are accidental events. Chance results have to fulfill two further conditions: 1) that those conditions have not been brought about so as to produce these events, 2) that they are such as might have been naturally generated for that purpose.[81] This is the case when results that were not aimed at seem nevertheless to have been aimed at.

In the *Physics*, Aristotle clearly distinguishes between two types of accidental causes: "spontaneity [*tautomaton*] and chance [*tyche*]":[82]

a. A spontaneous event [*to apo tautomaton*] is something that appears in a process but is lacking any causal relation to it, such that its cause is external to the process.[83] This applies especially to the biological realm: aimless effects may arise that do not contribute to the fulfillment of the *telos* in spite of resulting from the teleological activity of nature.[84] In spontaneous generation, although an end-like result is produced, the normal teleological action of nature is simulated by nature's producing offspring without seed. The same applies to the productive activity, as is the case for some qualities – for instance, the color – when constructing a house. Spontaneous events are also found in inanimate or reason-lacking beings, as Aristotle explains by means of the example of a horse or of a tripod. Therefore, spontaneous events are those in which an unintended [though end-like] result is produced, since *tautomaton* is only definable as that which simulates the action of nature or of reason.[85] Spontaneity is also the case when something happens in vain [*auto maten]*, that is, without any purpose [a stone striking a man's head].
b. "From chance" [*to apo tyches*] is something that happens as a side effect, when something which "is for the sake of another, [but] does not result in it".[86] This is the case for activities undertaken because of a certain purpose, which was finally not fulfilled: the action was therefore "in vain", [*maten genetai*] i.e. spontaneity working despite us [such as something's being not such so as to produce a bad end but which nevertheless happens to produce a bad end].[87] This sort of causation is

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80 Cf. Aristotle's criticism of his predecessors in *Phys*. II, 4, 196a24f.
81 Ross, *Aristotle Metaphysics*, commentary to *Phys*. II, 5, 196b10–17, 516.
82 Aristotle, *Phys*. II, 5, 197a33–35.
83 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys*. II, 6, 197b15f. Aristotle gives following example: "The tripod fell spontaneously, because, though it stood on its feet so as to serve for a seat, it did not fall so as to serve for a seat."
84 Cf. Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption*, H.H. Joachim (transl.) in Barnes, *The complete works of Aristotle*, Here, *On Gen. and Corr*. II, 2, 329b8. Cf. Aristotle, *Generation of Animals*, A. Platt (transl.) in Barnes, *The complete works of Aristotle*, Here, *Gen. of An*. V, 1, 778a30f. Cf. Wolfgang Kullmann, *Wissenschaft und Methode, Interpretationen zur aristotelischen Theorie der Naturwissenschaft* (Berlin/de Gruyter, 1974) 294f.
85 Cf. Ross, *Aristotle Metaphysics*, commentary to *Met*. 1032a28–32, 524.
86 Aristotle, *Phys*. II, 6, 197a24. This passage has been the object of a long debate: For Ross, the phrase means: "when that which is intended to produce a result other than itself does not produce it", Cf. Ross, *Aristotle Physics*, 523.
87 Cf. Charlton, *Aristotle's Physics*, commentary to *Phys*. 197b29–30, 110. Charlton mentions Ross's interpretation but thinks that his interpretation "is more complicated, but perhaps fits Aristotle's words better".

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> appropriate to activities which are "objects of choice" and happens to beings acting according to reason.[88]

Both chance and spontaneity are "sources of change"; they are not without genesis but rather this may arise from "infinite"[89] possible causes. Owing to this fact, the causes of the accidental are "indeterminable".[90] Aristotle remarks that "spontaneity and chance are causes of effects which, though they might result from intelligence or nature, have in fact been caused by something accidentally."[91] The main difference between chance and spontaneity is that the cause of the spontaneous proper is external while that of the former is internal to the causal chain.[92] What Aristotle means by "external cause" is rather something that "is not in fact due to nature or mind".[93] But when the occurrence happens according to nature or is governed by reason, then the "external" can refer only to those causal chains that run independently of the chain in question. Chance has a proper cause if considered under the light of an outcome due to "a concurrence" of different descriptions, i.e. of different causal chains.[94] The point is that, although chance may arise from infinite causes, its outcome – the effect of chance – is to be ascribed to a concurrent causal chain. Like the case in the hypothetical necessity, the causes can only be traced retrospectively. Aristotle seems to imply this when he speaks of the cause of death, which, although not yet determined, "depends on the happening of something else";[95] i.e. death is due to an occurrence whose causes are external to the process in question. Furthermore, in a well-known passage of *Physics*, Aristotle exemplifies the accidental by the occurrence of a stone or tile falling on a pedestrian:[96]: for each occurrence (A's going to the market and B's falling) there are two different causes (A had a purpose while B was loose), as neither happened for the sake of the other. The crossing of both causal chains results in an effect which is the product of the concomitant chains. Thus the essence of chance is not due to a breach in necessary causation, but to the absence of final causation, which would be common to both.[97] When occurrences in the world happen through the concurring of heterogeneous causal chains, then the accidental product is that what is foreign to both chains. As a product of a chance encounter, it arises unexpectedly.

To sum up, we may remark that hypothetical necessity concerns the necessity of the contingent, which implies the irruption of accidental events, i.e. of unpredictable effects that may even break the continuity of a causal chain by giving origin to a new one, whose *telos* differs from the original chain. This is why the conditions necessary for the achievement of a *telos* can only be determined retrospectively, that is, starting from the achieved *telos*. Consequently, Aristotle limits the principle of bivalence in two ways. On the one hand, as mentioned above, Aristotle subordinates "the necessity to the

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88 Aristotle, *Phys*. II, 6, 197b21f.
89 Aristotle, *Phys*. 198a4.
90 Aristotle, *Phys*. II, 5, 196b28.
91 Aristotle, *Phys*. 198a4.
92 Aristotle, *Phys*. II, 6, 197b35.
93 Charlton, *Aristotle's Physics*, commentary to *Phys*. II, 6, 197a36–b1, 110.
94 Cf. Charlton, *Aristotle's Physics*, commentary, 108: "The same thing under one description may have a definite proper cause, and under another be due to chance."
95 Aristotle, *Met*. VI, 2, 1027b10–13.
96 Aristotle, *Phys*. II, 6, 197b29–32.
97 Ross, *Aristotle Physics*, commentary, 41.

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duration of the act of the event".[98] This sort of necessity depends on a temporal variable and applies to every contingent being: it is necessary as long as it exists. Aristotle introduces here a temporal index.[99] On the other hand, he admits of a third term, the indetermination, to allow for the accidental: "being by accident [. . .] is not necessary but indeterminate; and of such a thing the causes are unordered and indefinite."[100] Chance is an accidental cause of that what happens for the sake of something else or by deliberate choice. But the causes from which the accidental may result, are indeterminate – "chance is obscure to human calculation", as Aristotle puts it.[101] These considerations refer us to the limit case of death. Death is a certainty for all contingent beings, but it is not certain "how" we die.[102] The way a human dies depends on some condition not yet existent or at least not traceable within the causal chain in question. There is a limit in the search for causes, as the accidental arises not by a process but instantaneously, as the effect of concomitance of heterogeneous causal chains. The causal connection goes back to this starting-point but no further. This is the cause of the chance event.[103]

2. Eidetic possibilities and facticity at Husserl

Husserl conceives eidetically based transcendental phenomenology as "first philosophy" and grounds it on the traditional metaphysical notion of *dynamis*. Indeed, in *Ideas I*, Husserl states the following: "The old ontological doctrine that the cognition of 'possibilities' must precede the cognition of actualities is, in my opinion, insofar as it is correctly understood and made useful in the right ways, a great truth."[104] On the basis of the eidetic method, transcendental phenomenology must therefore determine the possibilities from which the realities [*Wirklichkeiten*] should be derived and understood. Even at the time of the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl grounds this conception on the apriority of eidetic laws, out of which the Ego cogito should constitute and understand the de facto world in its reality:

> [A]ll the rationality of the fact lies, after all, in the Apriori. Apriori science is the science of radical universalities and necessities, to which the science of matters of fact must have recourse, precisely in order that it may ultimately become grounded on such radical principles. But apriori science must not be naive; on the contrary, it must have originated from ultimate transcendental-phenomenological sources.[105]

98 Vuillemin, *Necessity*, 145.
99 Vuillemin, *Necessity*, 145.
100 Aristotle, *Met*. XI, 8, 1065a21–26.
101 Aristotle, *Met*, X, 3,1054b30–35.
102 Aristotle, *Met*. VI, 2, 1027b10.
103 Cf. Ross, *Aristotle Metaphysics*, commentary to *Met*. VI, 2, 1027b10, 362f.
104 Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Buch I*, ed. K. Schuhmann, Husserliana III/I (Den Haag/Martinus Nijhoff, 1976,); English translation: *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy, first book*, transl. F. Kersten (Den Haag/Martinus Nijhoff 1982). Henceforth cited as *Ideas I* with German and English page references, respectively. Here, *Ideas I*, 178/190.
105 Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, ed. S. Strasser, Husserliana I (Den Haag/Martinus Nijhoff, 1950); English translation: *Cartesian Meditations: An introduction to phenomenology*, transl. D. Cairns (Den Haag/Martinus Nijhoff 1960), Henceforth cited as *CM* with German and English page references, respectively. Here, *CM* 155/181.

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In concordance with this statement, the uncovering of the factual Egos is mainly made possible by "apodictic principles", i.e. the "essential universalities and necessities".[106] The eidetic concepts are therefore universal and absolutely valid for every accidental individual case. As I. Kern remarks, this foundational order leads to the establishment of philosophy as a universal and pure eidetic science, which retrospectively grounds its own reality on absolute terms by reverting to its own rationality.[107] In the line of this interpretation, Husserl states the "necessity of a fact" as an eidetical necessity, which has to be grounded on eidetic laws:

> It is the necessity of a fact, and is called so because an eidetic law is involved in the fact and indeed, in this case, involved in the existence of a fact as fact. The ideal possibility of a reflection having the essential characteristic of an evidently indefeasible positing of factual existence is grounded in the essence of any Ego whatever and of any mental process whatever.[108]

In this context, Husserl states the "pure I" has an eidetic necessity, inasmuch as each "eidetic predicatively formed affair-complex" [*der eidetische Sachverhalt*], thereunder the I, is a "matter of fact, insofar as it is an individual predicatively formed actuality-complex".[109] In correlation with this, each predicatively formed affair complex is an "eidetic necessity in so far as it is a singularization of an eidetic universality": "Eidetic universality and eidetic necessity are therefore correlates." Husserl still conceives the I as an "eidetic particularization" grounded on apodictic eidetic universalities.[110] Indeed, Husserl conceives factual existence in terms of any example whatsoever:[111] Phenomenology, like mathematics, does not deal with realities, but with ideal possibilities and laws showing a universal structure gained through eidetic variation or intuition. This method of eidetic variation yields the universal, i.e., the *eidos*, as the invariant structure inherent to all the possible factual realities.[112] Pure phantasy is the ground on which the universal is intuited as pure *eidos*, disengaged from every positing of real Being.[113] As K. Held remarks, when an *eidos* is obtained through free eidetic variation, it does not depend on the factual actualization or non-actualization of its *eidos*. The insight into this universal *eidos* allows us to discern a priori every conceivable singularization as a particularization of its *eidos*, i.e. as an example of a chain of singular pure possibilities. "Laws of necessity" [*Gesetze der Notwendigkeit*] can be obtained grounded on this *eidos*, which determine what properties necessarily apply

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106 Husserl, *CM* 106, 72.
107 Iso Kern, *Idee und Methode der Philosophie* (Berlin/de Gruyter 1975), 336.
108 Husserl, *Ideas I*, 98/103.
109 Husserl, *Ideas I*, 19/15.
110 Husserl, *Ideas I*, 19/14.
111 Cf. Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern, Eduard Marbach, *Edmund Husserl, Darstellung seines Denkens* (Hamburg/Meiner,1989, 1996), 74–80. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. In the original: "*hier wird eine Gestaltung des Faktums in die Form des beliebigen Exempels vollzogen*".
112 Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, ed. R. Boehm, Husserliana IX (Den Haag/Martinus Nijhoff, 1959). Henceforth cited as *Hua* IX. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Here, *Hua* IX, §9.
113 Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik*, ed. L. Landgrebe (Hamburg/Meiner, 1972), 426f. Henceforth cited as *EU*. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Here, *EU*, 426f.

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to any object belonging to a particular kind.[114] This is why eidetic universality [*Wesensallgemeinheit*] and eidetic necessity [*Wesensnotwendigkeit*] are correlative terms. Reality [*Wirklichkeit*] is conceived "as a possibility under other possibilities, i.e. as any possibility whatever of the phantasy's activity [*als eine Möglichkeit unter anderen Möglichkeiten, und zwar als beliebige Phantasiemöglichkeit*]".[115] It is important to remark that within the eidetic attitude, the "factual reality" [*faktische Wirklichkeit*] of the singular cases obtained through variation is completely irrelevant,[116] as it is considered only upon the eidetic universality being transferred to its "application" [*Anwendung*].[117] In other words, "the essence of purely eidetic science thus consists of proceeding in an exclusively eidetic way."[118] Contrary to the sciences of matter of fact, the grounding of eidetic sciences "is not experience but rather the seeing of essences",[119] while experience is only an exemplary starting-point for the phantasy variation that does not, however, imply any positing of factual existence. This is why Husserl conceives individual existence as "contingent [*zufällig*]. It is thus; in respect of its essence it could be otherwise."[120] The sense of this contingency, which Husserl calls "factualness" [*Tatsächlichkeit*] is correlative to a necessity that has the character of "eidetic necessity and with this a relation to eidetic universality".[121] This is why all essential predicables of an object necessarily belong to it while any singularization of this object, i.e. any material thing whatsoever may have any temporal/spatial/qualitative determinations whatsoever and is as such contingent. Any real object is at the same time a possible one and can be regarded as an example or case of a pure possibility transformed into a variant. On the contrary, every description of essence "expresses an unconditionally valid norm for possible empirical existence".[122] This is why any eidetic particularization of an eidetic necessity holds for any actual predicatively formed affair-complex, i.e. a matter of fact.

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The consciousness of the necessity is called an "apodictic consciousness" because it involves the consciousness of a particularization of an eidetic universality. The judgment itself is called an "apodictic" judgment as a necessary "consequence" of the universal judgment to which it is related. "Purely eidetic propositions" are "grounded purely on the essence of a material thing" and as such, they have "'unconditional' universal validity'". The fact that "something actual", i.e. something real corresponds to these propositions is not a "mere fact", i.e. something accidental, but an "eidetic necessity as a particularization of eidetic laws. "Only the actual thing itself, to which the application is made, is a matter of fact here", Husserl concludes.[123] Accordingly, the statements – the sense content in the eidetic view – "can be suspended" *[können außer Spiel gesetzt werden*], as they are mere empirical matters of fact.[124] This distinction runs parallel to

114 Husserl, *EU*, 426.
115 Husserl, *Hua* IX, 74.
116 Husserl, *Hua* IX, 74.
117 Husserl, *Hua* IX, 71.
118 Husserl, *Ideas I*, 21/16.
119 Husserl, *Ideas I*, 21/16.
120 Husserl, *Ideas I*, 12/7.
121 Husserl, *Ideas I*, 12/7.
122 Husserl, *Ideas I*, 177/189.
123 Husserl, *Ideas I*, 19/15.
124 Edmund Husserl, *Einleitung in die Philosophie. Vorlesungen 1922/23*, ed. B. Goossens, Husserliana XXXV (Dordrecht/Kluwer 2002). Henceforth cited as *Hua* XXXV. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Here, *Hua* XXXV, 321.

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the delimitation between the "apodicticity of the fact" [*Apodiktizität des Faktums*] – that of the Egos for themselves – and apodicticity "in a common and special sense" [*im gewöhnlichen und besonderen Sinn*] of eidetic laws;[125] a distinction which concerns the "empirical real judging" [*empirisch reale Urteilen*] of the sense-content.[126] The cogito unifies in itself both modes of apodicticity by recognizing and perceiving its individual cogito. This is why the Ego cogito is "an essential eidetic principle and at the same time, is a universal eidetical-apodictical necessity [*zugleich ein eidetisches Wesensprinzip, hat universale, eidetisch apodiktische Notwendigkeit*]."[127]

In accordance herewith, Husserl attributes to the cogito an apodictical certainty which, standing on equal footing with its incontestable necessity, is compared to the contingency of the world:

> Over against the positing of the world, which is a "contingent" positing, there stands then the positing of my pure Ego and Ego-life which is a "necessary", absolutely indubitable positing. Anything physical which is given "in person" can be non-existent; no mental process which is given "in person" can be non-existent. This is the eidetic law defining this necessity and that contingency.[128]

However, no absolute necessity underlies the Ego, as its doubtlessness and apodicticity is dependent on the fact that it exists. We may recall that Husserl characterizes the "ontic necessity of the cogito", that means "of the mental process which is given 'in person'" [*die Seinsnotwendigkeit des jeweiligen aktuellen Erlebnisses*] of the subject as a "necessity of a fact" [*Notwendigkeit eines Faktums*].[129] This necessity of a fact is a special case of the empirical necessity that applies to any *Dasein*, i.e. any factual existence whatsoever.[130] This contingency pertaining to the positing of the world and of any *Dasein* whatever has a special sense. The fact that I live is a contingent fact, but as long as I have *Erlebnisse* or actual present experiences, my existence is necessary. Thus, the indubitable necessity of my cogito, its "absolutely indubitable positing" is dependent on the fact of the subject's existence: "The ideal possibility of a reflection having the essential characteristic of an evidently indefeasible positing of factual existence is grounded in the essence of any Ego whatever and of any mental process whatever."[131]

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We may conclude that the apodicticity and incontestable necessity of both the world and the cogito presuppose their existence – "the existence of the fact as fact"[132] – so that they both remain ultimately contingent facts. It is the necessity of the fact, an empirical necessity, which characterizes both the world and the Ego. We may even conclude that the actuality or existence of a subject is hypothetically necessary in the Aristotelian sense of the word: as long as I have *Erlebnisse*, my existence is necessary. Nevertheless, the stated propositions about the hypothetical necessity of the factual existence insofar as the Ego's activity is concerned have to be framed within

125 Husserl, *Hua* XXXV, 287.
126 Husserl, *Hua* XXXV, 286.
127 Husserl, *Hua* XXXV, 287.
128 Husserl, *Ideas I*, 98/102. Cf. Ludwig Landgrebe, *Faktizität und Individuation* (Hamburg/Meiner, 1982) 120.
129 Husserl, *Ideas I*, 98/103.
130 Husserl, *Ideas I*, 98/103, footnote.
131 Husserl, *Ideas I*, 98/103.
132 Husserl, *Ideas I*, 98/103

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the eidetic sphere, which, implying no positing of factual existence, remains a contingent [*zufällig*] fact.

Indeed, we may recall that in the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl still adheres to his conception of phenomenology as an eidetic science grounded on a priori insights:

> The universal de facto structure of the given Objective world – as mere nature, as psychophysical being, as humanness, sociality of various levels, and culture – is, to a very great extent [. . .] an essential necessity [. . .]. Such an ontological Apriori [. . .] does confer on the ontic fact, on the de facto world in respect of its "accidental'" features, a relative intelligibility, that of an evident necessity of being thus and so by virtue of eidetic laws.[133]

At the end of his *Cartesian Meditations*, however, Husserl briefly outlines the idea of a phenomenological metaphysics that, diverting from the classical metaphysics, must deal with "the problem of the 'accidental factualness'" [*zufälligen Faktizität*], because contingency characterizes the problems of death, destiny, the "'meaning' of history" and even those concerning ethics and religion.[134] Phenomenology has to broaden its horizons and embrace the realms of indeterminacy and contingency, the causes of which being indeterminate disrupt the limits of rationality (as is also the case in Aristotle). These insights lead him, a decade later – at the beginning of the 1920s – to change his understanding of the relationship between *eidos* and fact.[135] Indeed, the later Husserl seems to rework his early insights, insofar as the reflection is no longer restricted to the reality of an "eidetic-phenomenological interpretation of the science of matters-of-fact".[136] Already in a supplementary sheet dated 1923/24, Husserl extends the scope of this problematic to the realm of the "irrationality of the transcendental fact" [*Irrationalität des transzendentalen Faktums*] as the content of a "metaphysics in a new sense" [*Metaphysik im neuen Sinne*].[137] As I. Kern remarks, Husserl deals with the "limit issues" [*Grenzfragen*] of factual life, i.e. "primal facts [. . .] last necessities, the primal necessities" [*Urtatsachen* [. . .] *letzte Notwendigkeiten, die Urnotwendigkeiten*],[138] upon which all eidetic relations are dependent. Indeed, the phenomenologizing Ego is now conceived as the "absolute irrevocable fact" [*ein absolutes, undurchstreichbares Faktum*][139] of the self-reflective process that is involved in any eidetic enquiry. This insight leads him to refer to the apodictic facticity of the world as well as of the I.

At this point, we may briefly describe the process that culminates in the above statements insofar as the Ego is concerned. First, the insights of *Ideas I* regarding the eidetic variation will shortly be outlined in order to, second, display this change of relation between fact and *eidos*. This change dating back to *Ideas I* not only addresses

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133 Husserl, *CM*, 164/137.
134 Husserl, *CM*, 182/156.
135 Cf. Bernet, Kern, Marbach, *Edmund Husserl*, 211–213.
136 Bernet, Kern, Marbach, *Edmund Husserl*, 211. In the original "*eidetisch-phänomenologischen Interpretation der Tatsachenwissenschaft* ".
137 Edmund Husserl, *Erste Philosophie([1923/1924). Erster Teil. Kritische Ideengeschichte*, ed. R. Böhm, Husserliana VII (Den Haag/Martinus Nijhoff, 1956). Henceforth cited as *Hua* VII. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Here, *Hua* VII, 188 fn. 1.
138 Iso Kern, *Idee und Methode der Philosophie, Leitgedanken für eine Theorie der Vernunft* (Berlin/de Gruyter, 1975), 340.
139 Husserl, *Hua* XIV, 154.

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a methodological issue, but in the context of Husserl's later writings about primal facts, turns out to involve an ontological dimension as well. This process implies a fundamental change in the meaning of facticity.

To begin with, we may recall that in *Ideas I*, Husserl still claims the contingency of the world vis-à-vis the "absolutely indubitable positing" of the Ego, i.e. of the mental process:

> Thus in every manner it is clear that whatever is there for me in the world of physical things is necessarily only as presumptive actuality and, on the other hand, that I myself, for which it is there [. . .] am absolute actuality or that the present phase of my mental processes is an absolute actuality, given an unconditional, absolutely indefeasible positing.[140]

The Ego can think himself as other in his being-thus [*Sosein*], but as existent he is apodictically necessary much like it is the "ground of existence" [*Existenzboden*], which shapes the Ego's field of experience.[141] This is so, because

> I am, as the one who rethinks, who detaches himself from the factual reality <through variation>, apodictically the I of the factual reality and the I of the abilities, which I, particularly in so far as thinking and seeing eidetically, have factually procured for myself.[142]

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At this point, as stated above, the relationship between fact and *eidos* changes, as K. Held and L. Landgrebe both point out.[143] While the being of an *eidos*, i.e. the being of eidetic possibilities is free from any actualization and therefore independent of any reality, the "*eidos* of the transcendental I is unconceivable without any transcendental I as factual" [*das Eidos transzendentales Ich ist undenkbar ohne transzendentales Ich als faktisches*].[144] As K. Held explains, the relationship between the factual I and the *eidos* of any I whatever having been obtained through eidetic variation is an exception to the law according to which a universal essence belongs with necessity to any possible single case of this essence. This is indeed the case, because

> [. . .] the last acting I [. . .] is not simply the accidental actualization of one of the infinite number of possibilities, which this *eidos* Ego embraces. On the contrary, this last acting I as the origin of all constitutional work precedes any positing of a difference between fact and *eidos*.[145]

140 Husserl, *Ideas I*, 86/102.

141 Husserl, *Hua* XIV, p. 153.

142 Edmund Husserl, unpublished manuscript Ms. K III 12, S. 34f. (1935), citation in Klaus Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart* (Den Haag/Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 147. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

143 While Held views this turning point as an "exception" [*Ausnahme*] to the general law, Landgrebe regards it as "relinquishment" [*Preisgabe*] of the earlier conception. Cf. Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart*, 147 and Ludwig Landgrebe, *Faktizität und Individuation* (Hamburg/Meiner, 1982), 176.

144 Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil: 1929–1935*, ed. I. Kern, Husserliana XV (Den Haag/Martinus Nijhoff, 1973). Henceforth cited as *Hua* XV. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Here, *Hua* XV, 385.

145 Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart*, 147: "*Das letztfungierende Ich* [. . .] *ist nicht bloß die zufällige Verwirklichung einer der unendlich vielen Möglichkeiten, die dieses Eidos Ego umfasst, sondern es liegt als Quellpunkt alles Konstituierens auch jeglicher Setzung eines Unterschiedes zwischen Faktum und*

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In this context, Husserl stresses the impossibility of going beyond the factual I:

> I am the primal fact in this process, I recognize, that in addition to my factual ability for eidetic variation, these and those own primal stock of components yield to me as primal structures of my facticity in response to my factual retrospective inquiries [. . .] I cannot go beyond my factual I.[146]

Indeed, in concordance with Husserl's statements in the *Cartesian Meditations* outlined above, the Ego's possibility presupposes its actuality, as the monad "can think itself as being other, but it is absolutely given to itself as existent. The positing of its being-other presupposes the positing of its existence."[147] This means that the monad – here the Ego – is an "absolute actuality" [*absolute Wirklichkeit*],[148] whose non-being is in conflict with the other monads. In conclusion, the positing of the facticity of the Ego is necessary to enable any self-reflection leading to the task of the eidetic variation. As such, it seems to be necessary only on methodological grounds.

Seen in the context of his later writings, however, we notice that Husserl goes deeper into the kind of evidence the Ego is endowed with. The Monad, the Ego, as mentioned above, is an "absolute irrevocable fact" [*ein absolutes, undurchstreichbares Faktum*], i.e. it is given with an "apodictic evidence as the primal evidence of the 'I-am'" [*apodiktischer Evidenz als Urevidenz des 'Ich-bin'*].[149] The Ego can think itself as other in its being-thus [*Sosein*], but as existent it is apodictically necessary much like it is the "ground of existence" [*Existenzboden*], which shapes the Ego's field of experience.[150] This is so, because

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> I am, as the one who rethinks, who detaches himself from the factual reality <through variation>, apodictically the I of the factual reality and the I of the abilities, which I, particularly insofar as thinking and seeing eidetically, have factually procured for myself.[151]

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The contingent being-thus of the Ego and the world presupposes their apodicticity and paralleling this the transcendental Ego presupposes the factual Ego because "I think of them [matters of fact], I ask back and in the end I get to them from the world, which I already 'have' [. . .] I am the primal fact in this movement."[152] Husserl comes to see

Eidos voraus." K. Held remarks that a universal essence applies with necessity to any possible singular case thereof. In this sense, a singular factum is contingent as to its essence.

146 Husserl, *Hua* XV, 386: "*Ich bin das Urfaktum in diesem Gang, ich erkenne, dass zu meinem faktischen Vermögen der Wesensvariation etc. in meinen faktischen Rückfragen sich die und die mir eigenen Urbestände ergeben, als Urstrukturen meiner Faktizität* [. . .] *Mein faktisches Sein kann ich nicht überschreiten*."

147 Husserl, *Hua* XV, 386: "*[S]ie kann sich als anders seiend denken, aber ist sich selbst absolut als seiend gegeben. Die Setzung ihres Andersseins setzt die Setzung ihres Seins voraus*."

148 Husserl, *Hua* XV, 386.

149 Husserl, *Hua* XIV, 154.

150 Husserl, *Hua* XIV, 153.

151 Edmund Husserl, unpublished manuscript Ms. K III 12, S. 34f. (1935), citation in Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart*, 147: "*Ich, der Umdenkende, der mich <durch Variation> der faktischen Wirklichkeit Enthebende, bin apodiktisch das Ich der faktischen Wirklichkeit und bin das Ich der Vermögen, die ich insbesondere als eidetisch denkendes und sehendes Ich mir faktisch erworben habe*."

152 Husserl, *Hua* XV, 386: "*ich denke sie* [*die Tatsachen*], *ich frage zurück und komme auf sie schließlich von der Welt her, die ich schon ‚habe'* [. . .] *ich bin das Urfaktum in diesem Gang*."

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that the Ego's "having the world" [*Welthabe*] is a primal fact too, as although every experience can be put into question or modalized, the experience of the world itself is not modalizable. Consequently, the certainty of the world is apodictical.[153] These primal facts refer to the apodictic evidence not only of the world, but of intersubjectivity, of the body and of historicity as well – "the absolute actuality" [*die absolute Wirklichkeit*].[154] Husserl's metaphysics, as L. Tengelyi remarks, differs from the traditional metaphysics insofar as he conceives the primal fact as "original givenness" [*Gegebenheiten*][155] or, in Husserl's terms, as "primal components [. . .] as primal structures of my facticity" [*Urbestände* [. . .] *als Urstrukturen meiner Faktizität*].[156]

In this sense, Husserl states that "my being as that who experiences itself is apodictically included in each experience of the world."[157] The transcendental consciousness is to be regarded as the most universal realm of existential positedness. Its evidence is apodictic, "because without its evidence, all other evidences (those of world and the objectivities) basing on it would be annulled."[158] It thereby turns out that the "I am, I live" (*Ich bin, Ich lebe*) is to be considered as the final primal evidence.[159] This irrevocability characterizes the fact of my own life, i.e. my actual being as embodied subject, because I am the one who remembers, expects something, phantasizes, judges, desires,

153 Edmund Husserl, *Die Lebenswelt: Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–1937)*, ed. R. Sowa, Husserliana XXXIX (Dordrecht/Springer, 2008). Henceforth cited as *Hua* XXXIX. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Here, *Hua* XXXIX, 246: "*Nur auf dem Boden fortgehender Weltgewissheit is für Einzelreales Zweifel und Nichtsein möglich* [. . .] *So ist Welt für mich ständig geltend in Seinsgewissheit* [. . .]. *Wie immer ich mich unfingiere als personales menschliches Ich, ich bleibe also welthabendes und weltlich lebendes in dieser Struktur*." Cf. *Hua* XXXIX, 256: "*Apodiktisch ist die Gewissheit vom Sein der Welt als Welt*."

154 Husserl, *Hua* XV, 386. Cf. Tengelyi, *Welt und Unendlichkeit*, 180–194.

155 Lázló Tengelyi, "Necessity of a Fact in Aristotle and Phenomenology", in *Philosophy Today* 55, [SPEP Supplement 2011], 124–132. Here, 129.

156 Husserl, *Hua* XV, 386.

157 Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologischen Reduktion. Texte aus dem Nachlass. (1926–1935)*, ed. S. Luft, Husserliana XXXIV (Dordrecht/Kluwer 2002). Henceforth cited as *Hua* XXXIV. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Here, 432: "*apodiktisch ist mein Sein beschlossen als selbsterfahrenes in jedem Welterfahren*."

158 Shigeru Taguchi, *Das Problem des 'Ur-Ich' bei Edmund Husserl. Die Frage nach der selbstverständlichen 'Nähe' des Selbst* (Dordrecht/Springer, 2006). Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Here, 199: "*Ohne seine Evidenz würden alle darauf basierenden Evidenzen (die der Welt und alle Gegenständlichkeiten) aufgehoben*." Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/1924). Zweiter Teil. Kritische Ideengeschichte*, ed. R. Boehm, Husserliana VIII (Den Haag/Martinus Nijhoff 1959). Henceforth cited as *Hua* VIII. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Here, 396: "*Andererseits ist es klar, dass das Sein dieser Welt für mich rein im Gehalt dieses Lebens selbst beschlossen ist und dass dieses Sein untrennbar ist von mir als Subjekts dieses Lebens* [. . .] *Mein Leben ist das an sich Erste, ist der Urgrund, auf den alle Begründungen zurückbezogen sein müssen*." English translation: "On the other hand it is clear, that the being of this world is purely self-included in the content of this life and that this being is inseparable from me as subject of this life [. . .]. My life is in itself the first, it is the primal ground, to which all other groundings must refer back to."

159 Husserl, *Hua* XIV, 442: "*So bin ich präsumtiv gewiss, dass die Welt ist – gewiss, solange ich so lebe, wie ich lebe. Die erste Gewissheit: ich bin, ich lebe, absolut undurchstreichbar* [. . .] *Die reine Subjektivität ist für sich selbst absolut, und ihr gehört alles original Erfahrbare und selbst das Präsumtive zu, sofern es eben den Charakter des durch originale Erfahrung zu Erfüllenden hat*." English translation: "I am presumptively certain, that the world is – certainly, as long as I live the way I do. The first certainty: I am, I live, absolutely uncancellable [. . .]. The pure subjectivity is for itself absolute, and all originally capable to be experienced or even presumed belongs to it, in so far as it has the character of that which must be fulfilled by experience."

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feels, etc.[160] What is at issue here is the apodicticity of Ego's existence: "As matters of fact, they are absolute" [*Als Tatsachen, sind sie absolut*].[161]

Egos have a "double being: an absolute being and a being appearing for-itself-and-for-each-other"[162], they are "the absolute [. . .] and all the real substances would not be without their cogitative life."[163] This means, they are apodictically necessary. In the transcendental consideration there lies, as L. Landgrebe remarks, the absolute, that which lies at the basis of all possibilities, all relativities, endowing them with sense.[164] In this context, R. Böhm points out that "the absolutely given is at first the absolutely doubtless being."[165] The "absolute I" [*absolute Ich*] is the Ego in the "immediate present life-evidence" [*unmittelbar gegenwärtigen Lebensevidenz*].[166] We may therefore conclude that some primal facts in their original givenness are ontologically necessary to ground all eidetic investigations.

It is important to remark that the meaning of the concept "fact" changes at this point. The necessity of the fact implies no contingent necessity which distinguishes both the I and the physical things as matters of fact, as it is shown in *Ideas I*, but it denotes now a "primal matter of fact" [*Urtatsache*][167] which precedes them and apodictically makes every positing of reality possible.[168] Primal matters of fact – (I, world, intersubjectivity, and historicity) are therefore now the condition for the possibility and for the existence of every other fact. The factual mental process of judging is apodictically given too; it is a primal evidence [*Urevidenz*]. This change in the meaning of the concept "fact" runs parallel to the inversion of the foundational relations: The eidetic variation as well as the monad's possibilities presuppose this factual, i.e. existing, absolute I, which, as such, is originally given. Phenomenology now is grounded on primal facts.

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Moreover, these primal facts are primal structures of my facticity, they are grounded on the life of the phenomenologizing Ego. As for the I as primal fact, Husserl remarks that it has a "core of 'primal contingency' in essential forms, in forms of facultative functioning, upon which the essential necessities are grounded."[169] In contrast, the ontological necessity of the I is no contingency at all. But what does Husserl mean by

160 Husserl, *Hua* XXXV, 402.
161 Husserl, *Hua* XXXV, 321.
162 Husserl, *Hua* VIII, 506: "*doppeltes Sein: ein absolutes Sein und ein Für-sich-und-für-einander-erscheinen*".
163 Husserl, *Hua* VIII, 505: "*das Absolute* [. . .] *ohne deren kogitatives Leben, alle realen Substanzen nicht wären*".
164 Husserl, *Hua* XV, 669: "*Es ist eben das Absolute, das auch nicht als 'notwendig' bezeichnet werden kann, das allen Möglichkeiten, allen Relativitäten, allen Bedingtheiten zugrunde liegend, ihnen Sinn und Sein gebend ist.*" English translation: "It is just the absolute that can neither be called 'necessary', which lies at the basis of all possibilities, all relativities, all conditionalities, endowing them with sense and being."
165 Rudolf Böhm, "Zum Begriff des 'Absoluten' bei Husserl" in: *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, Band XIII, 1959, Heft. 2, 214–242. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Here, 221: "*Das absolut Gegebene ist somit zunächst das absolut zweifellos Seiende.*"
166 Taguchi, *Das Problem des 'Ur-Ich'*, 115.
167 Husserl, *Hua* XV, p. 385.
168 Cf. Husserl, *Hua* XV: "*Eine volle Ontologie ist Teleologie, sie setzt aber das Faktum voraus. Ich bin apodiktisch und apodiktisch im Weltglauben. Für mich ist im Faktum die Weltlichkeit, die Teleologie enthüllbar, transzendental.*" English translation: "A full ontology is teleology but it presupposes the factum. I am apodictically and apodictically in the belief in the world. The worldliness lies in the factum for me, the teleology is discloseable, transcendental."
169 Husserl, *Hua* XV, 386.

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the aforementioned grounding function of the I in its core of primal contingency? It alludes to the constitutive function of the I: The I is the "source of the constituent work" [*Quellpunkt alles Konstituierens*][170] involved in the contingent actualizations of the infinite many possibilities, which this essence "Ego" may encompass through variation. In this context, the eidetic possibility is "independent in its being from every actuality" [*seinsunabhängig von aller Wirklichkeit*], "free from any actualization of its own possible being or not-being" [*frei von Sein oder Nichtsein irgendeiner Verwirklichung seiner Möglichkeiten*].[171] The factually necessary, absolutely given I carries therefore not only its own eidetic possibilities, but at the same time the transcendental I, which in the first place enables any questioning back – and thereby also the disclosing – of this I as absolute fact. Primal facts can therefore only be grasped through phenomenological reflection.

However, this assertion may be wrongly interpreted as a renewed subject-metaphysics, as L. Tengelyi remarks. The novelty lies precisely in the insight that all eidetic forms obtained through variation have a "core of contingency". Phenomenology turns out to be not only structured by but grounded on these primal facts.[172] These contingencies stand not only for the contingent actualizations of eidetic possibilities but also for the open possibilities of the "irrational"[173] [*irrationalen*] or "senseless contingencies"[174] [*unsinnige Zufällen*] as "undefined, unpredictable probabilities"[175] [*Wahrscheinlichkeiten, nur als unbestimmte, unberechenbare*]. Husserl comes to refer to the contingency of any absolute *telos* as factual[176] as it concerns theological and ethical spheres. Indeed, the very existence of human beings and communities is contingent:[177] destiny, death, illness, misery, and others, "inhabit" these primal structures.

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The result of these considerations concerning the meaning of "facticity" may be summarized as follows. Facticity does not here denote a contingent or accidental fact, whose not-being is possible, as stated in *Ideas I* and the *Cartesian Mediations*, but a fact as "the absolute". Initially, this absoluteness seems to be methodologically necessary for the eidetic variation. According to K. Held, "the last-acting I [*letztfungierendes Ich*] must be considered as an 'absolute fact' as it is the absolute jumping-off point for every act and the apodictic *telos* of every retrospective inquiry."[178] A decade after the *Cartesian Meditations*, this absolute facticity becomes ontologically necessary for Husserl. It is precisely that immanent teleology characterizing the facticity of the actual being which prompts the inquiry about the grounds of its own order-of-being.[179] These grounds are absolute. The absolute, as L. Landgrebe emphasizes, "cannot even be characterized as 'necessary'" [*auch nicht als 'notwendig' bezeichnet werden*] because

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170 Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart*, 148.
171 Husserl, *Hua* XV, 385.
172 Tengelyi, *Welt und Unendlichkeit*, 184.
173 Edmund Husserl, *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie. Analysen des Unbeswusstseins und der Instinkte. Metaphysik. Späte Ethik. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908–1937)*, eds. R. Sowa, Th. Vongehr, Husserliana XLII (Dordrecht/Springer, 2014). Henceforth cited as *Hua* XLII. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Here, *Hua* XLII, 398.
174 Husserl, *Hua* XLII, 409.
175 Husserl, *Hua* XLII, p. 398.
176 Husserl, *Hua* XLII, p. 165: "*Die Teleologie ist ein Faktum*".
177 Husserl, *Hua* XLII, p. 409.
178 Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart*, 148.
179 Böhm, "Zum Begriff des 'Absoluten' bei Husserl", 240.

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it is presupposed by any of these possibilities.[180] This means that Nature's contingency is grounded on the absolute facticity of the I and the world. The absolute lies therefore beyond any categorical distinction, it is apodictic, i.e. irrevocable, that "which cannot be the object of any further reflective questioning" [*das reflektiv nicht mehr weiter Hinterfragbare*].[181] It is only through self-reflection that the phenomenologizing Ego uncovers these originally given primal facts and comes to realize that these primal facts determine its own essential core. Thus we can say that these primal facts are originally given as absolute and become phenomenalized by the Ego's self-reflection itself. In conclusion, we are faced here with the full accomplishment of the aforementioned inversion: not only every essential necessity but every nature's factual actualization as well grounds on the [absolute] primal facts of the I and the world.

3. Necessity of a fact, i.e. of primal facts and immediacy of being in Aristotle and Husserl

Aristotle and Husserl both agree to the factual necessity showing a contingency, i.e. a "core of contingency". As L. Tengelyi puts it, although they both refer to a necessity which is conditioned by a fact, they mean something different by this conception: the factual existence of the actual (Aristotle) and the primal fact of the Ego (Husserl).[182] Besides, both conceptions of "facticity" differ: what the later Husserl implies with this is the absolute, the "groundless being" [*grundlose Sein*] of the factual I – an "absolute fact" [*absolute Tatsache*] whose necessity and actuality are equally absolute. Nevertheless, the absolute carries every essential necessity as "primal structures" [*Urstrukturen*] of its "facticity" [*Faktizität*].[183] Therefore, his conception of "absolute necessity" [*absolute Notwendigkeit*] cannot be paired to contingency as it precedes any categorical distinction whatsoever. This is contrary to Aristotle, whose conception of absolute necessity and of hypothetical necessity involves an ontological distinction.

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Contrary to Husserl, Aristotle analyses the being of eidetic possibilities based on the unquestioned assumption of the factual and contingent reality, which is stated as existing and is endowed with a teleological character. In this sense, Aristotle's hypothetical necessity defines a precondition for the achievement of a *telos*. It concerns the necessity of the contingent, which allows for accidental events. The hypothetical necessity establishes that the actuality of a being excludes any possibility of its non-being, but only as long as this being is or exists, i.e. only in so far it has become actual. The grounding and necessity of a being lies *a-tergo*, i.e. in only departing from the accomplished *telos* is it possible to make out the preconditions which were necessary for this achievement. What is at stake here, is an *a-tergo* grounding, insofar as no facticity, i.e. no primal fact (in Husserl's sense) has to be apodictically presupposed. The starting-point is the actuality of a being. Conversely, Husserl's grounding lies *a-fronte*. Only on the basis of the primal fact of the I's facticity – its apodictical evidence

180 Landgrebe, *Faktizität und Individuation*, 105.
181 Landgrebe, *Faktizität und Individuation*, 106.
182 Tengelyi, *Welt und Unendlichkeit*, 181–191.
183 Husserl, *Hua* XV, p. 386. "*Das Absolute hat in sich selbst seinen Grund und in seinem grundlosen Sein seine absolute Notwendigkeit als die eine 'absolute Substanz'. Seine Notwendigkeit ist nicht Wesensnotwendigkeit, die ein Zufälliges offen ließe. Alle Wesensnotwendigkeiten sind Momente seines Faktums, sind Weisen seines in Bezug auf sich selbst Funktionierens.*"

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and its absolute necessity – may the world, the others and the history be constituted at all.

Aristotle's facticity entails therefore no primal facts, but instead involves a conditioned necessity: a necessity which depends on the potential achievement of a *telos*. The contingency in Aristotle's conception stands for the fact that the achievement of a *telos* relies on conditions which can neither be produced absolutely-necessarily by this *telos* nor, if existent, necessarily lead to it. The accidental is based on contingency insofar as the possibility of the being being-other or behaving-other defines its very essence, exactly as is the case in Husserl. But the essence of the accidental lies not only in the lack of a necessary connection between causes and effects, but it arises from the crossing of two distinct causal chains. The accidental arises here due to the lack of a final cause, which would be common to both heterogeneous chains. As J. Vuillemin remarks, "the only difference between 'essential' and 'accidental' causality is that the former involves a unique and immanent teleology whereas the latter involves several distinct teleologies." Moreover, the accident becomes necessary only upon reinsertion in its proper teleology, as such, it also has a final cause.[184] As something that suddenly and unforeseeably arises, this stroke of fate [*Schicksalfügung*] can be understood as an event with an undefined and contrary-to-reason character.

Conversely, in Husserl's view, the Ego is carrier of the world, the others and the horizons, whose singular actualization is rather possible but not necessary. This is why the openness within the field of eidetic possibilities entails the sense of 'not-necessary actualization', as we have already seen. But this openness characterizes not only the eidetic variation, but the Ego's essence as well. Indeed, by enlarging his conception of openness, Husserl goes as far as to question Aristotle's basic principle of the unchanging *eidos*. He asks:

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> [I]s the thing, as it were, always underway, not at all graspable therefore in pure Objectivity, but rather [. . .] in principle only a relatively identical something, which does not have its essence in advance or graspable once and for all, but instead has an open essence, one that can always take on new properties according to the constitutive circumstances of givenness?[185]

Even the Ego's core, its essence, is open to modifications whose actualization is possible but not necessary. The Ego cannot only think itself as being-other by means of the eidetic variation but can even become other than it actually is thanks to its "essential openness" as we may call it. What remains a pure potentiality in the first case becomes an entelechy – a process of actualization in the second. In this sense, not only the world and physical things, but also the Ego's *eidos* is subsumed to a kinesis, a process of becoming which may entail the unpredictable assumption of new qualities, according to varying circumstances. Events that overcome us may force our essential qualities to

184 Vgl. Dorothea Frede, *Aristoteles und die "Seeschlacht"* (Göttingen/den Hoeck&Ruprecht 1968) 115–117. Cf. Vuillemin, *Necessity or contingency*, 150.

185 Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Zweites Buch, Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, ed. M. Biemel, Husserliana IV (Den Haag/Martinus Nijhoff 1952); English Translation: *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. Second Book. Studies in the phenomenology of constitution*, transl. R. Rojcewicz, A. Schuwer (Dordrecht/Kluwer 1989). Henceforth cited as *Ideas II* with German and English page references, respectively. Here, *Ideas II*, 299/313.

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change. This means that even though the being of our Ego – its essence – is as such absolutely necessary, the qualities invested in it are but contingent – exposed to unpredictable strokes of fate.

In this context, the distinction between accident and disjunctive "being-just-possible" [*bloß-Möglichsein]* demands further analysis. As N. Hartmann highlights, within the realm of not-necessity, the accidental "decides" on actuality and non-actuality while the "being-just-possible [. . .] leaves [both of them] open".[186] The field of open possibilities is governed not only by the non-necessity, but also by undecidability and indetermination. Besides, as N. Hartmann adds, the field of actuality as "the ground of thorough determination" [*der Boden der vollkommenen Bestimmtheit*] admits of no accident. Owing to the fact that the "law of split" [*Spaltungsgesetz*] is only valid within the field of the real – by virtue of which something becomes possible at all – it lacks any abiding force beyond the field's limit. It is just there, beyond the field of the real that the accidental finds its place[187] – at the beginning of a causal chain: "wherever the real has no causal chain 'behind it', there it is possible, without being necessary" [*wo das Wirkliche keine Bedingungskette 'hinter sich' hat, da ist es möglich, ohne notwendig zu sein*].[188] Anything, even what is arbitrary – provided it is not contradictory – is possible. The "real accident" [*Realzufall*] is that which decides on being or non-being. Necessity and impossibility vanish here, because beyond the limits of the field of existent reality there remains only the disjunction "real-unreal" [*Wirklichkeit-Unwirklichkeit*][189] – this is the *Realzufall* space of decision. Herein lies the main reason why Husserl and Aristotle's understanding of the accidental, i.e. the contingent, should be clearly distinguished.

Husserl's conception of the contingent can be characterized as the "just possible": contingency's main features are on the one hand, undecidability, i.e. the impossibility of predetermining a priori the contents of the horizons, and on the other, the openness of the Ego's essence as well as of the eidetic possibilities whatsoever attained through variation. The *Realzufall* located beyond the field of the real is that which decides on the actualization or non-actualization of possibilities. The role contingency plays, is to keep this space of decision open throughout the process of becoming. Conversely, the accidental in the view of Aristotle plays an active role. Insofar as it breaks into the continuity of two heterogeneous causal chains and gives rise to a new causal chain it is creative and unforeseeable. Besides, Aristotle's contingency or hypothetical necessity concerns the conditions which may lead to the achievement of a *telos*, as we can only retrospectively, i.e. only from the achieved *telos*, determine which conditions were ultimately necessary. Finally, the "accidental" expresses in Husserl's view an eidetic necessity of the world, while in Aristotle it overrules necessity by causing a break in the continuity of the natural causality.

In spite of these differences, both authors share the view that at the beginning of every teleology there lies an immediate event [*Ereignis*]. The factual I cannot be traced back to any constitutive I of preceding origin because it is simply "immediately there" [*da*]: "The I bumps into this 'immediately-there', which it is itself" [*das Ich stößt gleichsam auf dieses 'Da', das es selbst ist*].[190] In Husserl's words:

186 Hartmann, *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit*, 136.
187 Hartmann, *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit*, 136.
188 Hartmann, *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit*, 206.
189 Hartmann, *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit*, 207.
190 Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart*, 149.

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> The Ego does not originally arise out of experience – in the sense of an associative apperception in which are constituted unities of manifolds of a nexus – but out of life (it is what it is not for the Ego, but it is itself the Ego).[191]

This is also the case in Aristotle. As R. Brague puts it, the facticity of an actual being "requires" that its being-present be grasped at first as act, so that its underlying *dynamis* can be disclosed.[192] Aristotle's starting-point for the investigation into the conditions that lead to a *telos* is to be located at the actualized being or event under consideration.

Moreover, the arising of an accident is something that overcomes any process of becoming. As such, it is not only unexpected and unpredictable, but something strikingly, overwhelming new. An accidental event can therefore be considered as an *Ereignis* in the phenomenological sense of the word: the event of appearing that establishes itself by itself.[193] However, although spontaneous and chance events in Aristotle's sense both overcome any teleological process, the latter differ from the former insofar as the intended action fails to fulfill a rational being's purpose. Thus, as Hegel and Husserl state, chance events disappoint existing expectations.[194] As such, the action as intended failed and the accomplished *telos* turns out to be something else, i.e. something new, as other to what was intended.[195] The search for the causes leading to the event has to depart from its consequences, i.e. retrospectively, because a thing due to chance is a concurrent outcome rather than a concurrent cause.[196] As stated above, accidental events account for the contingency of the world. Contrary to usual events, which are the necessary immediate or remote results of a teleological causal chain, an accidental event as *Ereignis* does not come into being by a process, but establishes itself by itself.

In conclusion, we may infer that although the facticity refers to something different in both authors – the absolute fact of the I, the world, intersubjectivity and historicity in Husserl and the facticity or givenness of the world in Aristotle – they both affirm the "necessity" of the fact. The difference lies in the modes attributed to this facticity: in Husserl's view the factual necessity of the I is absolute – the I is an immediate givenness – whereas in Aristotle's the necessity of the factual being is contingent, i.e. it is temporarily conditioned by its existence. Both of them share the view that at the beginning of every teleology there lies the event of the origin of the subject, i.e. Ego. "A full ontology is teleology" [*Eine volle Ontologie ist Teleologie*] as Husserl puts it, "but it presupposes the fact" [*sie setzt aber das Faktum voraus*]. Aristotle would agree with this, because the world is in his view an absolutely pre-given fact. He would also agree with

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191 Husserl, *Hua* IV, 252/264.

192 Brague, *Aristote et la question du monde*, 497. Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* VIII, 5, 257b7f., *Phys.* VIII, 1, 251a8f.

193 Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewußtsein (1917–1918)*, in *Hua* XXXIII, R. Bernet and D. Lohmar [Hrsg.], Husserliana XXXIII (Dordrecht/Kluwer 2001). Henceforth cited as *Hua* XXXIII. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Here, *Hua* XXXIII, 11: "[*D*]*as Ereignis selbst kann ohne Vordeutung, gar ohne spezifische Erwartung, 'auftreten'* [. . .]." English translation: "The event may arise without preliminary indication, even without specific expectation."

194 Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik* (Tübingen/J. C. B. Mohr 1960). Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Here, 338. Referring to Hegel's conception of experience, Gadamer states that every experience that deserves this name, strikes out an expectation: "[*J*]*ede Erfahrung, die diesen Namen verdient, durchkreuzt eine Erwartung*".

195 Cf. Tengelyi, *Erfahrung und Ausdruck*, esp. chapter 1: "*Erfahrungssinn und Ausdrucksbedeutung*", 5–21.

196 Aristotle, *Physics I, II*, cf. Charlton's commentary to *Phys.*II, 5, 196b24, 108.

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Husserl's view that the condition for possibility of these teleologies is "the being of the teleological actuality itself" [*das Sein der teleologischen Wirklichkeit selbst*], precisely "the being-referred-to the primal fact of the hyle" [*das Verwiesenwerden auf die Urfakta der Hyle*], which is incontestably irreducible.[197] However, phenomenology is neither characterized by a universal teleology, nor grounds on first causes. On the contrary, contingency characterizes not only any absolute *telos*, but the very qualitative essence of the Ego as well. The phenomenologizing Ego grounds on primal facts which, as such, are originally given to it. The Ego thus runs up against the event of spontaneous emergence of primal facts "which precede and condition it"[198] because it is only through self-reflection that the Ego comes to uncover them. These primal facts are not only given by themselves such that they precede any constitutional work of the Ego but also determine its own essential structures as well. Absolutely given, they become phenomenalized by the ego's self-reflection. Spontaneously given, they can be considered as the events *par excellence*.

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197 Husserl, *Hua* XV, 385.
198 Tengelyi, *Necessity of a fact*, 131.

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13 The ambiguity of the concept of essence (1912/1913)

Adolf Reinach (English translation and introduction by Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray[1]

Abstract: "The Ambiguity of the Concept of Essence" (*Die Vieldeutigkeit des Wesensbegriffs*) is a collection of rough notes Adolf Reinach took during philosophy seminars he led in the winter semester of 1912–13. This fourteen-paragraph piece was assembled by Barry Smith and Karl Schuhmann using materials from three of the seminars in this colloquium and for publication in the Adolf Reinach *Sämtliche Werke* volume. These notes offer us a brief but quite rich examination of the concept of essence as employed in the domains of logic, metaphysics, and epistemology, as well as critical discussion of the terms used by philosophers when talking about essences. Until now, these notes have received very little attention, a sad state of affairs given that these seminars as well as Reinach himself influenced the works of Edith Stein, Jean Hering, and Dietrich von Hildebrand.

Keywords: Reinach, essences, phenomenology, Göttingen, Husserl

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Translator's introduction

For the winter semester of 1912–13, Reinach announced a colloquium for advanced students that would focus on selected questions concerning the theory of cognition: *Phänomenologische Übungen*. In 1912, Reinach along with Moritz Geiger and Alexander Pfänder founded a new journal series, *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, with Edmund Husserl as the main editor. During the fall of 1912, Reinach was accepting and editing manuscripts for the first volume, and according to Winthrop Bell's lecture notes some of these texts became the discussion materials of the colloquium sessions. From November 1912 until February 1913, the group discussed Pfänder's article *The Psychology of Dispositions*, and then starting on or around February 14th and lasting until March 3rd March, they turned their focus to Husserl's newest work, *Ideas I*, specifically to Part I titled: "Essence and Eidetic Cognition" (*Wesen und Wesenserkenntnis*).

Barry Smith and Karl Schuhmann collected the notes Reinach took from the sessions he led during this time into a fourteen-paragraph paper, giving it the title "Die Vieldeutigkeit des Wesensbegriffs" ("The Ambiguity of the Concept of Essence").[2] These

1 Translated Spring, 2016. I must express my deepest, sincerest gratitude to Jeff Mitscherling for all his assistance with the translation of these notes. The hours we have spent talking about them, and then also Plato and Aristotle, were the most joyous and enlightening I have had in a very long time.

2 Barry Smith and Karl Schuhmann assembled the rough notes that comprise *Die Vieldeutigkeit des Wesensbegriffs* using materials from three of the seminars and for publication in the Adolf Reinach *Sämtliche Werke* volume.

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notes offer us a brief but quite rich examination of the concept of essence as employed in the domains of logic, metaphysics, and epistemology, as well as critical discussion of the terms used by philosophers when talking about essences. Since this was an advanced seminar, the discussion would have been guided by Reinach but would have involved contributions from the participants. One of those contributions, as noted by Reinach, was Jean Hering's notion of individual objects possessing an essence. The notes Reinach recorded on the ambiguities found in the discussion of essence come from three of the seminar meetings mentioned here.

We have to make two more brief observations about these notes: First, they serve simply to record suggestions, possible objections, and questions, not to draw any firm conclusions. And secondly, it is easy for the reader to sense the sincerity of the concerns motivating the colloquium, concerns with the direction and future of phenomenology itself: Despite its schematic brevity, this fourteen-paragraph piece clearly conveys a sense of urgency. When considered along with the dates of the colloquium sessions and the appearance of the draft of *Ideas I*, what becomes very clear from "The Ambiguity of the Concept of Essence" is that the early phenomenologists found themselves having to make a hard decision: either to stay the course with realist phenomenology as outlined in *Logical Investigations* (1900–01), or to follow Husserl and embark on the new idealist path of transcendental phenomenology being outlined in *Ideas I*. To a reader familiar with the context, these notes give the sense that the draft of *Ideas I* may just have been the straw that broke the camel's back and finally forced Husserl's students to announce where their philosophical allegiances lay. Of central importance in this decision were questions regarding the being and the cognition of essence.

As Smith and Schuhmann remark in their comments that supplement these notes:

> The significance of these discussions can be seen in the fact that Reinach, who had incorporated expressions like "essence", "essential connections" and "conforming to laws of essence" [*wesensgesetzlich*] into his standard terminological repertoire, did not at all deal with these abstract concepts without further reflection, but was quite capable of seeing their problematic character and undertaking their linguistic-philosophical clarification.[3]

Later, in his 1914 Marburg lecture "Concerning Phenomenology", we see the evidence for this lasting significance in the discussion of essence as well as a clearly articulated response to Husserl's new path and approach to essences.

When reflecting on these notes, we can also suppose a second reason Reinach had for discussing essence in seminars. He was one of the few who paid very special attention to the Aristotelian response to the Platonic notion of participation, as is evident in the technical terms and concepts employed in the discussion of essence, form, and idea. When we notice the names (e.g., Nelson, Hering, Husserl) and theories mentioned in these brief notes, it becomes clear that errors and confusion were quite common

3 Adolf Reinach, *Sämtliche Werke. Textkritische Ausgabe in 2 Bänden,* eds. Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, (Munich: Philosophia Verlag GmbH, 1989). Henceforth *SW*; 33: "Die Bedeutung dieser Diskussionen darf wohl darin gesehen werden, dass Reinach, der Ausdrücke wie 'Wesen', 'Wesenszusammenhaenge' und 'wesensgesetzlich' in sein terminologisches Standardrepertoire aufgenommen hatte, mit dieser Begrifflichkeit durch aus nicht unreflektiert umging, sondern ihren problematischen Charakter sehr wohl zu sehen und einer sprachphilosophischen Klärung zu unterziehen vermochte."

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in philosophy concerning the nature of essence and they stemmed from a failure to understand participation, the relation of particular and universal, and the nature of the distinctions that obtain among essence, idea, and form. In other words, the basics of Plato and Aristotle.

Until now, these notes have received very little attention and yet they capture a pinnacle moment in the history of phenomenology. Given this, along with the fact that Reinach heavily influenced others who continued phenomenological work after World War I (i.e., Hering, Edith Stein, Roman Ingarden, Dietrich von Hildebrand), it is time we give these notes the attention they deserve. In this current renaissance of realist (Munich) phenomenology, and with its necessary goal to return to things themselves, a clear comprehension of the concept of essence and all its ways of obtaining is of the utmost importance.

The Ambiguity of the Concept of Essence –Adolf Reinach (1912–13)

(. . .) = (Reinach's parenthesis); {. . .} = {Schuhmann's insertion}; [. . .] = [Translator's insertion]

Is there an essence [*Wesen*] for every fact [*Tatsache*]? If so, {then it's} strange that there are laws for some of them (extension, color) and not for others (time of day, tree). {There appear} also to be differences among the relations obtaining between essential laws and factual objects [*Tatsachengegenstände*]. Red and orange are similar, but not red and orange objects [*Gegenstände*]. But everything colored is extended, {and also} every colored object is extended. {A} third case: Every straight line is the shortest connection of two points. But {that} does not belong to {the essence of} straightness.

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Must essences [*Wesen*] {always} be acquired with a view to objects whose essences they are? Nelson [for example, identifies] essences and natures [*Beschaffenheiten*] of objects. Do we mean by essence the essential [*das Wesentliche*] {in them}? No. Essence does not consist in distinguished properties [*ausgezeichneten Eigenschaften*]; other things {are thereby} co-{intended}. Is it unequivocal simply [to define] essence as determination [of an object]? Then it would [belong] to the essence of the table that it is brown. One can associate this table not only with the essentiality [*Wesenheit*] [of] browns, reds, but much more [above all] with *this* brown [or] red.

If by "determinations" one means, for example, the individual moments of color, then [however] these too have their essences. [Here one can draw a] distinction between essentiality of *how* and of *what*. This same essentiality [for example, the brown], can be how-essentiality in relation to objects [for example, as the how of the production of this table,] and what-essentiality in relation to [an] instance of things [for example, as the what of this individual shade of brown]. In the case of [a] what-essentiality [one says] always: "This is a case *of* . . .". But the table is not [an] instance of brown.

Essentialities seem themselves to have essences. One says: It is grounded in the essence of brown to be different from red. [A] realization of brown [in an individual instance, on the other hand] is not grounded "in the essence of brown". Could one explain this talk of the essence of essentialities through [the] relation of shades of brown to brown in general?

{There are obviously} two cases of "essence" opposed to that which falls under them. For example, "red and yellow are different by virtue of their essences": {here the

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understanding of} essence of essence {causes} difficulty. {But essence can also mean a} determination in relation to {an} individually fixed moment (the Nelson interpretation is possible only here), {to a} lowest species (lowest shade of brown as determination of the table), {or to a} higher species. But also in relation to itself: "red qua red {is} different from green qua green". Here essence doesn't signify any higher ordered species; essence {is taken} here in the sense of matter.

{Thus becomes clear the} ambiguity of the expression "essence". {Is the concept of essence perhaps an idea that plays a role in phenomenology}, but to which it nevertheless does not {really} belong? Phenomenology and eidetics {are following} Husserl to be distinguished. Eidetics is supposed to investigate relations of essences. {But the} sciences of essences of jurisprudence or national economy {would} never {become} accessible without phenomenological methodology. {Nevertheless it would not} be right to call all propositions achieved in this manner phenomenological. Mathematics {for example, possesses equally well} eidetic propositions as synthetic propositions a priori.

The essence of an object {is} to be distinguished from the object as individual. {To this corresponds the} difference between accidental truths of fact and truths of essences, of individual realizations of a shade of color for example as opposed {to the} moment of color. {This is a} how-essentiality in relation to the thing, in color gradation {in contrast} what-essentiality. But Husserl means, if something holds good of a thing according to its essence, what-essentialities of objects. {But} "essence as associated universality [*Allgemeinheit*]" {and} as "red and yellow are different according to their essence" {are} two quite different concepts of essence. {For this reason it is} impossible to say: propositions of essence are those which hold good of essentialities (in the first sense)". For it is the case with essences for example {also the} proposition that they {may be} realized here or there.

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What is essence? What does it signify? Hering's "essences of individual things"? {Then there would be essences as} constitutive elements of different layers [*Schichten*]; {as} the different constituents {in that} which makes an object an object at all, and so on. {A} limiting case {of this would be the} empirical counting up of constituents where I don't yet know what grounds in the essence of the thing and what doesn't.

[So what is the situation with the] application to things of considerations that make good sense with qualities? {It's a difference between the sentences} "Red and blue {are} different according to their essences" {and} "Red and blue {are} at some place in the world realizable". {Saying this} we refer to "essence" in the two different senses coming into discussion. In the first one could speak of the *material* essence. {But the} question {also arises} whether it doesn't here have to do with different levels of a hierarchy in {or: belonging to} one sense, which one cannot do in the case of things.

{Yet the situation is more precise concerning the} difference between "essence" in "Red and blue are different (but not as universality) according to their essence" {and} "Red can realize itself (as universality [*Allgemeinheit*]) according to its essence". {The} difficulty {is} always to grasp the moment of aspect [*Hinsichtsmoment*] as such in itself (there one would come immediately into {the}form of universality).

{The} actual origin of essential lawfulness {lies} in {the} particular relation of the predicate to the subject in the sentence {of the sort} "Red and green (as such) are different". {The} talk about "grounded in" and the like arises here{in}. Here {is also the} ultimate phenomenological origin of "eternity" of truths and the like (nothing is yet said thereby of necessity!). This "grounding in" is not subjective, not derived or the like; {this sort of assertion would make} no sense. "Apply to" and "ground in" {rather have

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the form}: being-b grounding in A and C coming to it. Essence would here be A, C would be red and blue, b is being different [*Verschiedensein*].

Here {we're concerned} not {with} A and C, but with A and A' or the like. We want to solve {the} problem of the relation of A {and} A'. First {though} we'll leave {that} aside {and consider} foundation of validity [*Geltungsfundament*] and foundation of ground [*Gründungsfundament*] in general. {We have a} contrasting case in the straight line as the shortest connecting line. {The} quality "straightness" is [the] foundation of ground. From that {however} we cannot assert {the} shortest connection. {The} foundation of validity {in this proposition} is {rather} "straight line". {The} question is {therefore}: "It's *valid* [*es gilt*] for the straight line; in what is it [*es*] *grounded*?" In what is it grounded that of all connecting lines of two points the straight line is the shortest? {The} only possible answer: in straightness (or in the essence of that which is straight [*oder in dem Geraden*]).

{What's noteworthy here is the} principle difference {of this case} from the red-green case. Here it is grounded in the *essence* of straightness (as straightness) not that it is the shortest connection, but {only} that the *line* that has it [straightness] makes the shortest connection.

{There now arises the} question of whether our different usage of "grounding" has here different meanings. Straightness, for example, {would be to designate} as *carrier* of ground [*Gründungs*träger] as opposed to foundation of ground [*Gründungsfundament*] and foundation of validity [*Gültigkeitsfundament*]. "Red and Green" [on the other hand]: here grounding carrier [*Gründungsträger*] and foundation of validity [*Geltungsfundament*] coincide. {With that} we have therefore established that this {coincidence} is not in all cases valid [*nicht in allen Fällen gilt*].

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14 Tragedy and phenomenality

Steven Crowell

Abstract: If phenomenality is, broadly speaking, the specific topic of phenomenological investigation, it is also something that is very much at issue in the Greek tragedies that we possess, in which the appearing of what appears is seen to be fraught with danger. In this chapter, I examine the lessons we can learn about the structure of appearing, or phenomenality, in Euripides' *The Bacchae* against the backdrop of a controversy in contemporary phenomenology over the relation between phenomenality "as such" and the transcendental conditions of appearing analyzed by Husserl and the early Heidegger. In contrast to the Fink/Nietzsche idea, drawn from an interpretation of Greek tragedy, that phenomenality is best understood as a cosmic "play of the world," I argue that *The Bacchae* shows how any phenomenality that admits of a distinction between seeming to be happy and only appearing to be so depends upon a specific way of being oriented toward the norms of the *polis*, an *exemplary* commitment to the validity of that order that remains open to what it excludes.
Keywords: phenomenology, appearing, Nietzsche, play, commitment, exemplarity

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§1. Phenomenality and phenomenology

Greek tragedy has been a rich theme for phenomenological investigation for a long time now, and these investigations have cultivated many aspects of the phenomenon. In this chapter, however, I want to concentrate on an issue that is at stake in both tragedy and phenomenology, namely, *phenomenality*. This notion bridges the gap between the dramatic and the philosophical modes of cultural production, but it does so only in the form of a challenge. For while phenomenality is the topic of phenomenology, it is also very much the *Sache* of ancient Greek tragedy, and in that form it has been taken to threaten the very possibility of a certain sort of phenomenology.

Here I will consider Greek tragedy in its aspect as performance for an audience, and as such it is quite obviously something that appears. As Gadamer insists, it achieves its true being in the spectator who completes its "transformation into structure": However much the play

> [. . .] represents a world wholly closed within itself, it is as if open toward the spectator, in whom it achieves its whole significance [. . .] In fact, it is experienced properly by, and presents itself (as it is "meant") to, one who is not acting in the play but watching it. In him the game is raised, as it were, to its ideality.[1]

1 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, second and revised edition, tr. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1989), p. 109. See also pp. 110–119.

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Heidegger noted this role as well in his characterization of the "preserver" of the work of art.[2] As something that appears in a distinct way, Greek tragedy is a topic for phenomenology. At the same time, however, appearing, phenomenality, is itself *at issue* in all the tragedies that we possess; their "transformations into structure" all hinge on the coming to light of what had hitherto remained hidden, and tragic wisdom is chiefly a matter of negotiating our exposure to the contingencies of such coming-to-appearance. Thus, if the phenomenological analysis of Greek tragedy shows that what comes to appearance there has something to teach us (as both Gadamer and Heidegger insist), that "something" seems already to concern the meaning of phenomenality itself. And if that is so, Greek tragedy would seem to lie in closest proximity to phenomenology. Thus, the question cannot be avoided: What is the relation between what phenomenological analysis teaches us about phenomenality and what its transformation into structure in Greek tragedy teaches us about it? Since the truth is one, it is to be hoped that we do not receive contradictory lessons from these two teachers.

It might well seem, however, that we do learn contradictory lessons. For one of the lessons that we seem to learn from Greek tragedy is that phenomenality cannot be analyzed, i.e., conceptualized, understood, clarified. As Hans Blumenberg put it, the mythical material from which Greek tragedy draws already has the form of a displacement; it takes place against the background of a previously vanquished race of gods who represent, in Blumenberg's idiom, the "absolutism of reality."[3] Significance is always the result of a prior overcoming of this absolutism of reality, a fact (in Blumenberg's terms) of "anthropogenesis." The emergence of our simian ancestors from the "shrinking rain forest" into the "savanna" was a "situational leap"; their existential horizon changed from one in which "fear" could be managed by bodily movement aimed at clarifying specific dangers, to one in which the danger became an "indefinite anticipation" registered in anxiety.[4] Danger in this sense becomes absolute, and its management requires indirect means – among them the substitution of the familiar for the unfamiliar that first takes place in images (the "work of myth") and later through concepts ("work on myth").[5] Phenomenality is our name for this new condition, and "whatever starting point one might choose, work on the reduction of the absolutism of reality would already have begun."[6] Mythos in this sense, of which logos is only a late variety, thus resists analysis because it is the latter's condition. Phenomenology, in contrast, insists that phenomenality is constituted (or, if you prefer, disclosed), and that the conditions for constitution or disclosure are available to reflection from a first-person perspective.

Or at least some versions of phenomenology would so insist. Our focus on the topic of tragedy and phenomenality will be motivated by the curious fact that many versions of phenomenology today, in contrast, embrace what might be called the "tragic" approach, treating phenomenality as a kind of primitive – just as mythos, on Blumenberg's reading, enables us to endure the world only on the condition that its origin in anxiety

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2 Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, tr. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 66–68.
3 Hans Blumenberg, *Work on Myth*, tr. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985), p. 1.
4 Blumenberg, *Work on Myth*, p. 4.
5 Blumenberg, *Work on Myth*, p. 48: "[T]he antithesis between myth and reason is a late and a poor invention, because it forgoes seeing the function of myth, in overcoming the archaic unfamiliarity of the world, as itself a rational function, however due for expiration its means may seem after the fact." See also p. 95.
6 Blumenberg, *Work on Myth*, p. 7.

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is not exposed. I have in mind here a bouquet of recent (and not so recent) treatments that all have one thing in common: rejection of the link between phenomenological theses and the *Evidenz* available from the first-person point of view, a displacement of the "subject" from a position of constitutive or disclosive priority so as to foster a mythical stance toward the absolutism of reality. Among these we may list Jan Patočka's "a-subjective" phenomenology, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the "flesh," Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology of "givenness" independent of intuition, Renaud Barbaras's phenomenology of life as "desire," Claude Romano's "event" phenomenology, and many others. If Husserl and the early Heidegger adhere to first-person analysis, these more recent phenomenologies all seek (or rather, insist on having found) a way to break the correlation between what appears and the one to whom it appears, where the latter is characterized transcendentally in terms of those conditions that determine how it is possible for what appears to appear as it does. For them, the one to whom what appears is to be approached mythically, that is, as a function of the (pseudo-) absolutism of phenomenality, appearing, itself. The battle between the old gods and the new always takes place within the frame of phenomenality, so understood, and is never a representation of the latter's emergence.

For instance, if for Husserl it is not possible for a hammer to appear as a hammer unless the one to whom it so appears possesses the ability to anticipate its subsequent appearances according to a rule, or if for Heidegger it cannot so appear unless the one to whom it appears is able to use it, those who advocate the priority of *Erscheinung als solches* reverse this situation: it is because the hammer is given or appears that I am able to learn how to use it or to see it according to a rule. This breaks the sort of correlationalism that phenomenological analysis requires: phenomenality is just there, a *Geschick* that has always already overcome the absolutism of reality, a "gift" that offers more than any intuition could contain. Our task would be to conform ourselves to its just-there-ness by deconstructing the masks of our modern subjective self-assertion and embracing our exposure to such ultimate contingency. Tragic wisdom.

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In this chapter, I will challenge this picture. First, I will discuss Eugen Fink's "cosmological" phenomenology, which provides an example of how this transformation from transcendental phenomenology to the absolutism of phenomenality takes place. Not coincidentally, Nietzsche's interpretation of tragedy provides Fink's point of departure. Second, I will contest this view of the philosophical lesson of tragedy, basing myself on what is transformed into structure in one such tragedy, The Bacchae, as it brings the issue of phenomenality itself to appearance.

§2. Phenomenology, metaphysics, and the play of the world

Fink's study of Nietzsche was published in 1960, the same year as his *Spiel als Weltsymbol* – that is, the same year he articulated his own philosophical vision for the first time, his departure from the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger.[7] The import of that departure achieves expression in his critique of Nietzsche's approach to tragedy. Against Heidegger, Fink will argue that Nietzsche was not the "last metaphysician" but rather that, despite his regrettable use of "masks" and the "sophistry" of his

7 Eugen Fink, *Nietzsches Philosophie*, Stuttgart; *Nietzsche's Philosophy*, tr. Goetz Richter (London: Continuum, 2003). Henceforth cited in the text as NP.

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psychological, anthropological, and biological modes of expression, "Nietzsche is the medium of a new ontological experience" of being itself (NP, p. 11). Fink finds this already in Nietzsche's ambiguous account of tragedy. When stripped of its juvenile "suspicion" of concepts, logic, and Socratism and divested of its proto-transcendental phenomenology – its subjectivism – it can be seen to anticipate Fink's own post-metaphysical thought of the "play of the world," which liberates phenomenality from all first-person conditions. On such a view, the human being is no longer what Foucault called a "transcendental-empirical doublet" but is something called into being, in play, "gifted" in its essence through the cosmic principle of phenomenality itself.

Nietzsche frames his Birth of Tragedy as an exhumation of the origins of the performance of tragic drama, whose elements – the spectacle, the chorus, the characters, the peripeteia, and so on – present themselves as enigmatic. What is transformed into structure here? Nietzsche will unravel the enigma by applying psychological and philological-historical methods until it emerges that "the dramatic scene is entirely concerned with the sufferings of Dionysus" (NP, p. 19). The origin of the spectacle is the human formative power that reveals itself in dreams, the Apollonian, of which the artist is the conduit. The artistry of the plot echoes an earlier communal form of dreaming in which Korybantic revelers, precursors of the chorus, danced themselves into a vision of the god, Dionysus, arising in their midst. Nietzsche understands the connection between Dionysus and tragedy to indicate its connection with the non-Apollonian art of music, which takes over the body and, in frenzy, breaks down the boundaries between self and other, self and world. This "Dionysian" principle, too, belongs to the "soul of the artist"; the Apollonian dream-world thus appears as a hedge against "the terror and horror of existence" which, according to Nietzsche, the Greeks intuited at the basis of "life."[8] From the conflict between the Apollonian and Dionysian impulses in the soul – antagonists that cannot exist without one another – an art form arose whose entire purpose consisted in making the terror and horror of existence present in such a way that the spectators could become reconciled to it. Tragedy justifies suffering existence by making it recognizable, by making it appear as such.

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Such justification differs from the sort that Nietzsche attributes to the Olympian gods, who "justify the life of man" because "they themselves live it."[9] Dionysus is not an Olympian deity, but a foreign one, who does not justify existence by embodying its foibles (anger, adultery, deceit) in a god-like way but by going under, by being torn apart in the vortex of dismemberment. This god's attributes exist only as masks; essentially, he is nothing but a force that undoes form. In Nietzsche's idiom, the tragic drama celebrates this "pessimistic" insight: suffering, coming unstrung, is inevitable, but self-assertion ("active sin") – guilt, creation, form – "has right on its side": "All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both."[10]

Thus Nietzsche's inquiry into tragedy culminates in an aesthetic thesis – that is, a thesis about the meaning of aesthetic appearance; it is something like a phenomenology of art that draws upon a description of human existence as the locus of two principles, one that forms and the other that dissolves, one irenic, one chaotic. But Fink judges all this "psychology" to be beside the point. For him, the fact that "a philological

8 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 43.
9 Nietzsche, *Birth of Tragedy*, p. 43.
10 Nietzsche, *Birth of Tragedy*, pp. 71–72.

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profession" may reject Nietzsche's derivation of tragic poetry is "of minor importance" compared to the book's "most important concern" – namely, that "in his theory of tragedy" Nietzsche "gives an interpretation of the world and constructs a schema of being in its entirety" (NP, pp. 19–20). In doing so, according to Fink, Nietzsche starts from "human artistic drives" and seeks to "establish an analogy for the ontological powers of dream and intoxication (or Apollo and Dionysus) as cosmic principles. What served as a starting point is now interpreted through the attained result," and the human being "becomes the medium and location of a cosmic event" (NP, pp. 18–19).

The fact that Nietzsche first articulates this cosmic event in terms of Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will leads to certain problems. While the "cosmic" nature of the Apollonian, "the principium individuationis, is more easily grasped" because "we live in a world where things and human beings are individuated," Nietzsche's effort to explain the cosmic aspect of the Dionysian, "the ground of the world of appearance," remains "peculiarly foggy." In particular, it takes on a one-sided independence as "the primordial One, the living One"; it is "mystically intuited rather than conceptually grasped" (NP, p. 19). This in turn distorts the cosmic meaning of the Apollonian principle in a fateful way: it makes it seem as though the world of appearances, phenomenality, is a world of representation that "exists only for man" (NP, p. 23) – a "lie," as Nietzsche will later express it. But as Fink notes, it is just this take on appearance that Nietzsche is trying to escape. In the Birth of Tragedy, and in ever greater measure in subsequent writings, Nietzsche wants to articulate how "the primordial ground itself playfully creates the world of appearance" (NP, p. 23). Phenomenality would not arise from man's imposition of the *principium individuationis* on a voracious "will" that eventually brings this imposition to ruin; nor, then, would the Dionysian principle be strictly opposed to the principle of Apollonian form-giving. Rather, both aspects – disintegration and forming – belong to the Dionysian, conceived as the cosmic ground whose "play," prior to reason, is the origin of the world.

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According to Fink, this is the truth intimated in the tragic performance, a truth that, in coming to appearance, stands opposed to the truth that results from a phenomenology of the tragic. The tension between the two is reflected, for Fink, in the tension throughout Nietzsche's works between his cosmic vision of life – phenomenality as the play of the world – and his "thoroughly inadequate" and "sophistical" tendency to analyze it in psychological, biological, and anthropological terms. Throughout his work, Fink argues, Nietzsche's "concept of the human being is ambiguous." On the one hand, he operates with a "purely anthropocentric conception," while on the other he "transcends humanism and understands man through his cosmic mission in which he becomes the medium of universal truth" (NP, p. 27). In this ambiguity, Fink recognizes that Nietzsche, like Dionysus, is "torn apart" – namely, by the "antagonism" between philosophy and poetry (NP, p. 14). Because of his anti-Socratic bias, his view of concepts as mere abstractions, Nietzsche is unable to give conceptual form to the poetic insights he draws from what is transformed into structure in tragedy.

But Fink does not blame Nietzsche for this. Rather, the ambiguity follows from the very turn away from "tragic wisdom" that Nietzsche himself diagnoses in the case of Socrates, though with insufficient insight since "his interpretation exhausts itself in psychological terms" (NP, p. 21). For Fink, Nietzsche's idea that Socratic dialectic is only the latest form in which the work on myth confronts the anxiety produced by the absolutism of reality should not be embraced as the basis for an anthropologistic

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suspicion of conceptual thought. That is, it should not be taken to entail the sort of sophistical, because self-refuting, paradoxes that Nietzsche employs in order to expose the human, all-too-human character of conceptual thought. Rather, it should be recognized as an intimation of a fatal transformation in philosophy itself:

> Perhaps Nietzsche foresaw that we are here concerned with a change in our ontological understanding, that in the disputes between the sophists and Socrates western thinking was turning towards anthropology and metaphysics and that this constitutes an event, which indeed can hardly be overestimated. The philosophical perspective is accordingly redirected away from the ruling entirety of the cosmos to inner-worldly (ontical) being for the next 2000 years.
>
> (NP, p. 21)

The task then for Fink – as it appears to be the task of thinkers from Patočka to the late Merleau-Ponty to Marion to the speculative realists and many others – is to direct philosophy back to the "ruling entirety of the cosmos," to overcome humanism, subjectivism, and transcendentalism and give conceptual form to the play of the world. As in the pre-socratic philosophy of the "tragic age," it is not enough that philosophy pine after the cosmic principle, merely "intuit" it, or bring it to expression in the embarrassing pseudo-poetry of *Zarathustra*'s parody and exhortation.[11] Philosophy must abandon Nietzsche's anthropological positivism, which remains stuck in metaphysics, and develop the "non-metaphysical originality in his cosmological philosophy of 'play'" (NP, p. 171). To take the "playing of the artist and the child" as a "cosmic metaphor" is not to "uncritically apply" a human modality "to being in its entirety." Rather, "the human essence can only be conceived and determined through play if man is conceived in its ecstatic openness toward the existing world" already understood as play (NP, p. 171). Appearing, phenomenality, thus determines what it is to be the being to whom it appears, namely, "the medium and location of a cosmic event" (NP, p. 18). "Tragic wisdom" remains a good name for this reversal.

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But Fink's claim that, in taking the playing child as a "cosmic metaphor" one is not engaging in an anthropological transfer, should be tempered by what he admitted earlier about Nietzsche's approach – namely, that "what served as a starting point is now interpreted through the attained result." As I see it, only if this principle is valid can the "tragic reversal" of transcendental phenomenology into post-metaphysical cosmology be defended. I would argue that this principle is adopted, tacitly or explicitly, by all approaches that postulate the primacy of phenomenality as such: each starts with phenomenology (that is, with "psychology," transcendental reflection on first-person experience) and only then, by "interpreting through the attained result," gives content to what is meant by "event," "gift," "*Erscheinung als solches*," or whatever. I myself do not think that the principle is at all valid, but I won't argue that point here. Rather, I would like to defend the sufficiency of phenomenological analysis – that is, a

11 Fink dryly states that "*Zarathustra*'s literary quality is certainly not as high as Nietzsche believes" (NP, p. 53; see also NP, p. 102: "On the whole, the fourth part is a failure"; its attempt to portray Zarathustra's greatness beyond traditional forms of greatness "remains a mere posture."). Fink asks: "Perhaps the style of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* is the result of a deep non-conceptual perplexity of a thinking blinded by the light of a new question of being?" (NP, p. 52). Again, he is demanding that philosophy move from "poetry" to concept: "Existentialism is the sign of a profound conceptual need" (NP, p. 107).

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philosophy that does not succumb to the temptation to produce a cosmology on the basis of its starting point in first-person reflection – by showing how this very analysis is transformed into structure in ancient tragedy itself.

§3. Phenomenality and subjectivity in The Bacchae

If a certain philosophical understanding of what is transformed into structure in tragic drama seems to lead beyond a phenomenological analysis of phenomenality toward a cosmic or "a-subjective" thinking that simply *affirms* phenomenality as a play of forces which occupy a kind of speculative space indifferent both to causes and transcendental conditions of meaning, then a defense of the unity of truth – phenomenological and tragic – might proceed by showing that tragedy itself offers an analysis of phenomenality, one that confirms what phenomenology discloses about the conditions of appearance. I will argue that just this is what takes place in the one ancient Greek tragedy where Dionysus is not merely the virtual referent of what appears on stage but actually appears there. *The Bacchae* is obsessively concerned with appearing, seeing, recognizing, understanding, knowing; centrally oriented around the epiphany of the god (which is simultaneously his disappearance from the stage); it transforms into structure the conditions of phenomenality as such, that is, the nature and conditions of sight as a way of truth.

The Bacchae concerns the arrival of the cult of Dionysus into Thebes, mediated by Dionysus himself in the form of an effeminate stranger who wears a smiling mask. The mask represents concealment to some – neither Pentheus nor Tiresias nor the Theban women, who have been driven mad by Dionysus, recognize the god in the stranger – and revelation to others, those who are initiates of the cult. The ambiguity of what is concealed in what is revealed drives the action forward, as Pentheus resists what he takes to be the stranger's designs on the established order of the city – designs made obvious by the fact that the Theban women have all been driven mad by the god in the manner of Maenads, though they are not such. Faced with the stranger's "escape" from prison (which is no escape since the captivity itself was an illusion), Pentheus ups the ante by threatening him with death and promising to send the army after the Maenads and the Theban women. The stranger then tempts Pentheus to his doom by playing on the latter's lust to see the secret rites, promising him a glimpse on the condition that he disguise himself as a woman. Pentheus is brought thereby to an intermediate state characterized neither by normal orientation nor by the mania (sacred or destructive) induced by the god, one in which he can see two suns but cannot recognize the god. In this delusional state, he is led to the countryside. Wishing to get a clearer look at the revelers, he is placed at the top of a pine tree, where he is more "seen than seeing." At that point, the stranger disappears from the stage and the god's epiphany is complete – in the form of a voice. The scene shifts to a messenger reporting on the slaughter of Pentheus at the hands of his mother, Agave, who, driven mad by the god, believed herself to have killed a lion. The play concludes with Cadmus bringing Agave slowly to the recognition of what she has done, restoring her genuine sight of the severed head of her son.

Thus one could say that the play is about the consequences of either accepting or rejecting Dionysus in the polis – joy and a certain kind of happiness in the former case, death and destruction in the latter – and about the dangerous situation of the one who must decide between the two. It is thus about the problem of recognition, as so many

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extant tragedies are. But if one digs down into the play's structure and imagery, it is also possible to recognize in it an account of what proper "seeing" is and what makes it possible, an analysis of the nature of phenomenality. In it, a phenomenology of vision is transformed into structure.

Since a full account of the visual imagery and dynamic in the drama is out of the question here, I will simply marshal some suggestions, beginning with the problem of skepticism. Is it possible that the world we inhabit could be an illusion from top to bottom? The question is not whether it exists, but whether the way it appears to us could be systematically distorted beyond any possibility that we could recognize its true nature. The Bacchae raises this possibility when Cadmus, addressing Agave in her delusional state, presents a conditional: if "with luck" your "present madness lasts until you die, you will seem to have, not having, happiness."[12] The alternative, of course, is that she is not lucky, that she will discover the systematic distortion in her vision and learn, too late, that it is really her son's head, not a lion's, on the pike. In such a case, she will neither seem to have, nor have, happiness. What makes the difference, from the point of view of "phenomenality as such," between a systematic delusion and a vision of reality? Upon that distinction somehow depends our happiness and unhappiness – or rather, the difference between seeming to have happiness while not having it, and the very possibility of being either happy or unhappy. From the point of view of *Erscheinung als solches* the very distinction makes no sense; as the play suggests, both "worlds" are fully inhabitable, and it is only from Cadmus's perspective that Agave's consistent "seeming" to have happiness would not be equivalent to actually having it. Thus if the play insists that nevertheless the worlds are importantly different, then so too what is seen in them is importantly different. It matters whether what is seen is seen properly or not. But what can "propriety" mean here? If this is the question that a phenomenological analysis of phenomenality must answer, then Nietzsche was at least addressing the right question (pace Fink's censure) when he opted for a stand in which phenomenality is a kind of "lie." For him, we are all in the situation of Agave all the time. The play, however, provides a better phenomenology.

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In what, according to the play, does proper seeing consist? What conditions must be in place if we are able actually to be or fail to be happy, as opposed to being in a position where the very distinction ceases to make sense – Agave's condition? At a first level of approximation, the play answers: you must be a member of the cult of Dionysus, an initiate. For the difference between Agave and the Maenads is that the latter have seen the god and have made the rituals (rules, practices) of his cult their own, whereas Agave has only been driven mad by the god but has not seen him. Two things, then, need to be considered: what does it mean to see the god, and what does it mean to make the cult one's own?

Beginning with the first, we may draw two sorts of contrast. On the one hand, there is Pentheus, whose vision is of the ordinary (we might say, "everyday") sort; on the other hand, we find Agave and the Theban women, whose vision is deranged, other than the everyday, but not at all *orthotes*. In the middle, so to speak, are the Maenads (and Coryphaeus), whose vision is exalted because they have recognized the god. We do not really know what this sort of vision is like, but the play's representation of the

12 Euripides, *The Bacchae*, tr. Richmond Lattimore (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 210 (line 1260). Henceforth cited in the text according to line number.

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irenic mixing of the orders of polis and nature suggests that it is neither everyday vision nor the sort of delusion to which Agave is subject and which gives rise to the skeptical challenge. Having seen the god, the Maenads enjoy a sort of vision that enhances their actually being happy, not merely seeming so.

In any case, Pentheus's everyday vision is pragmatic, positivistic, and governed by a strict adherence to the letter of custom. But it does not lack its depth dimension, which the play registers in representing his obsession with women. Before meeting the stranger, Pentheus sees only "women leaving home to frisk in mock ecstasies," an "obscene disorder" (218, 232). For him, the "effeminate stranger" is evident only as one who "pollutes our beds" (354). Pentheus is not about to be taken in by any so-called "mysteries." When he finally sees the stranger, what he sees is a seducer of women who hangs back from manly pursuits – "you do not wrestle, I take it" (455) – and whose claim to be a messenger of the divinity is obviously a mere ploy. Pentheus's insistence on the propriety of ordinary vision is equally an insistence on the immutability of form:

PENTHEUS: You say you saw the god. What form did he assume?

DIONYSUS: Whatever form he wished.

PENTHEUS: You evade the question. (475–80)

Of course, it is a commonplace that gods could assume different forms, but the point on which Pentheus insists is that to see the god is to gaze at a particular form. This is not, however, what "seeing the god" is in the case of Dionysus. When Pentheus threatens to throw the stranger in prison and the latter says that the god will set him free, Pentheus pragmatically notes that there will be only women there with the stranger. But the stranger replies that the god "is here now, and sees what I endure from you." When Pentheus replies that "I cannot see him," the stranger answers: "Your blasphemies have made you blind" (495–501). What are these blasphemies?

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Given the way that the stranger later plays on Pentheus's lust to view the women in their ritual madness, we may be forgiven for suggesting that it is not merely Pentheus's rote insistence on the city's customs that is at issue here, but equally his jealousy and, perhaps further, his refusal to recognize a certain ambiguity in his sexual identity. In any case, all of this shapes the way he sees things, what things mean to him, what he takes to be proper, and it suggests, as the stranger's illusory "imprisonment" makes plain, that everyday vision is a kind of wish-fulfillment: "He seemed to think that he was chaining me but never once so much as touched my hand. He fed on his desires" (615–20). From this very brief characterization, I conclude that the play presents everyday vision not as complete illusion but as subject to massive illusion, because it is closed off from whatever it is that enables one to distinguish illusion from reality in the right way. In this sense, then, everyday vision – what "meets the eye," phenomenality as such – is not the opposite of the massive illusion to which Agave succumbs, but a modification of it which tacitly assumes a principle that allows for a distinction between seeming and being without, however, being self-aware enough to employ that principle properly. If the play suggests that Pentheus's lack of self-awareness flows from his desire, does it tell us anything about the nature of the self-awareness that belongs to the proper employment of the principle?

This returns us to the question of what it is to see or recognize the god. It does not mean that the stranger would doff his mask and show his true godly form, as the play makes clear when Coryphaeus encounters the stranger after the false imprisonment and

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exclaims, "O greatest light of our holy revels, how glad I am to see your face. Without you I was lost" (608). To see the god, then, is to see the god in any form; but it is also to see the god "face to face." Were one to take this in a Levinasian direction, one might suggest that to see the god is to acknowledge the command in his face – not to register a perceptual quality of some peculiar object, but to obey, to feel oneself interdicted from certain sorts of behavior and obligated toward other sorts. Such an interpretation would fit well with what takes place in the tragedy, but here we shall draw from it only one point: the kind of vision involved in seeing or recognizing the god is ineluctably first-personal. Thus if "phenomenality as such" is to contain within itself the possibility of proper seeing, it cannot be severed from this reference to the first-person.

If the analysis in The Bacchae is fitting, then, correct or proper appearing cannot be a function of a cosmic principle of phenomenality from which the features of its correlate – human being as an "event of truth" – would merely be derived. As Jean-Pierre Vernant puts it: "So although the epiphany of Dionysus can only be made manifest through the collective orgiastic behavior of a group, for each individual concerned it takes the form of a direct confrontation, a 'fascination'." Each participant "acts on her own account, oblivious to any general choreography"; each, "as one elect, is face to face with the god."[13] Even at its most Dionysian, then, the play of the world must be a matter of individual "election" – or better, individual "fascination" – within an equally necessary social whole. To see the god, to be in a position to distinguish between seeming and being, is to stand in a very particular sort of relation to others – that is, to those among whom one lives in accord with the norms of the polis and also with those (a partially overlapping set, most of the time) who have also seen the god, the initiates, among whom, however, one is always on one's own. What, then, does it mean to be an initiate? This brings us back to our second question: what is it to have made the rituals of the god's cult one's own?

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Here too we must triangulate between several stances that the play offers, each of which has a different relation to the cult and its rules and practices. The first is Pentheus, who stands altogether outside the cult. The second is Agave and the Theban women, who are driven mad by the god but do not see him; they participate in the rituals but it avails them nothing in distinguishing between what is and what merely seems to be. A third is the stance of the Maenads themselves, who are full initiates but whose stance remains closed to us as the audience: we are not initiates and cannot know what it is to be one. But, finally, there is the stance represented by Tiresias and Cadmus, who are open to the worship of the god, accepting of the god, but who have not seen him. Thus, in a kind of good-natured parody of initiation (not motivated by the kind of madness that drives the Theban women), they don what appears to Pentheus to be the absurd garb of the acolyte, unbecoming of their stature. As we shall see, the chorus praises this stance in terms that will allow us better to appreciate what it means to be an initiate. The play thus points us toward a certain stance without being able to describe what it is like to occupy that stance; it remains for us, the audience, a challenge that each of us must face for ourselves. I will try to adumbrate the complexity of the play's phenomenology here by starting with Pentheus's relation to the cult, which stands furthest from the proper one.

13 Jean-Pierre Vernant, "The Masked Dionysus of Euripides' *Bacchae*," in Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece* (New York: Zone Books, 1988), p. 392.

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Pentheus's character is determined by a distinct form of ambiguity. On the one hand, as leader of the city he can see in the stranger only a law-breaker, a destroyer of the norms that keep the city on the right track, a "bringer of new gods" whose newness signifies, to Pentheus, only a cynical justification for doing things that are against established right. And indeed, Dionysus is a threat to established order, an "other" within the city for which (according to the logic of the play) room must be made. Thus in one guise Pentheus represents the idea that social order – normative order – is something fixed and definite, outside of which can exist only error and vice. And this is certainly an aspect of any sort of normative order. If rules are made to be broken, there are no rules; a normative order that allowed anything and everything would be no order at all. On the other hand, Pentheus's character is defined by a desire that already outstrips such order. A "beyond" belongs to any normative social formation precisely in what it excludes, and there can be no guarantee that what has been excluded is properly excluded. Pentheus's desire takes the form of a kind of voyeurism, one that may be described as desire for what is excluded precisely insofar as it is taken to be vice. Early on, Pentheus expresses a desire to know "the benefits that those who know your mysteries enjoy," but the stranger answers that "our mysteries abhor an unbelieving man" (475). Later, however, when the stranger is setting his final trap for Pentheus, he offers to show him those very mysteries. When Pentheus expresses his avidity to see them, the stranger asks "Why are you so passionately curious?" (812), and we cannot mistake the implication that this "lust of the eyes" – curiosity – is precisely the stance that is to be contrasted with that of the initiate. For Pentheus, the mysteries are simply more practices, strange doings that promise a kind of titillation. This brings about his ruin.

The opposite of curiosity, then, is achieved not by mere looking but by the first-person stance of accepting the god: as Vernant puts it, "the band of faithful is thus made up of ones who know, hoi eidotes, and who serve the god by conforming with the ritual practices that have been revealed to them."[14] Pentheus's curiosity floats above such conformity; we may say that he lacks not only a vision of the god face-to-face but equally the commitment to the normative order (cult practices) that such vision entails. In order to understand the nature of such commitment, however, we must pursue a further contrast.

The drama represents the stance of the initiate only in the form of the Maenads, whose otherness is continually emphasized by the exotic character of their vision: the mixing of the orders of city and nature. They are in a condition of divine ecstasy, just as "other" to us as is the god himself, who only "appears" as the god when he is no longer on the stage and is a mere voice. But the drama is not about transcending altogether our everyday life in order to attain some other-worldly condition. As Vernant puts it, Dionysus wants to be "manifest to mortals as a god [. . .] to be known, recognized, understood"; he does not "come to announce a better fate in the beyond" or "urge men to flee the world" but to "accept their mortal condition."[15] He is a god who belongs to this world, not a cosmic principle. Dionysus is certainly alien to the polis's everyday understanding of order and norm, but he is not beyond the human order altogether since he insists on a cult – that is, on new rules and practices which must themselves become part of the polis. It is only through such a cult or practices

14 Vernant, "The Masked Dionysus," p. 400.
15 Vernant, "The Masked Dionysus," p. 391, 411.

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that the destructive side of Dionysian mania is transfigured into joy and blessing. Thus what is transformed into structure by the drama is not an apotheosis of divine mania; rather it gives us to understand the meaning of that commitment to the cult which would characterize an initiate, what it represents vis-à-vis the existing norms of the community. To see what sort of commitment that is, we must turn to Tiresias and Cadmus, and to the chorus who celebrates them.

The most obvious thing about the way the play characterizes the initiate is that such a person experiences the blurring of the binary categories that stabilize everyday existence. Male and female, young and old, frenzy and wisdom, near and far, human and animal, wild and civilized: in each case the play mixes up such cut-and-dried categories. But this is by no means to suggest that such categories are not valid, that in the end all things are one. If that were the point, then Agave's fate would make no sense. Rather, it tells us something about what the proper attitude toward our categorial distinctions (and, more broadly, norms of all sorts) must be like, what the attitude that a commitment to the Dionysian rules must involve.

The play does not suggest that proper seeing is a matter of recognizing the oneness of all things; rather, it stages the demand that, in being beholden to our categories, we must also be open to their possible limits or failure. The blurring of the categories indicates that moment in a phenomenological analysis of phenomenality – a moment which, in the history of phenomenology, was enacted in the move from Husserl to Heidegger – when it is forced to abandon the idea that the norm of proper seeing can be derived from the intentionality of phenomenal consciousness and to embrace the idea that it is grounded in existence as "that being for whom, in its being, that very being is an issue."[16] Commitment to the rules of Dionysian worship entails a certain stance toward norms, one that is resolute in its acceptance of responsibility for their normative force. Such responsibility stands in contrast to Pentheus's insistence that such force is grounded in the law itself. Because normative force is grounded nowhere but in the commitment to it, "resoluteness" – the form of existence that recognizes this truth, presented in the play in all its ambiguity – must be prepared to give itself up, must be open to the new.

This form of existence is represented by Tiresias and Cadmus in a rather absurd way, for they are engaged in a kind of Pascal's wager, as when Cadmus remarks to Pentheus that "even if this Dionysus is no god, as you assert, persuade yourself that he is. The fiction is a noble one" (335). Tiresias and Cadmus are thus in a situation contrary to that of the Maenads. Where the latter have seen the god but care nothing for the city's established customs, the old men have not seen the god (their ancient age, one might suggest, makes this impossible), but seek to make room for the norms of the cult within the customs and traditions of the polis. Nevertheless, whatever absurdity might cling to their characterization in the play, the ambiguity of their stance is the only one unambiguously offered to the audience as its own.

Consider, for instance, the way they justify their welcoming of what the stranger brings. After Tiresias has delivered a long speech in praise of Dionysus's gifts and has sophistically parsed the story of the latter's birth from the thigh of Zeus as a matter of confusing the words "sewed" and "showed," Cadmus joins in, positioning Pentheus

16 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 116–17 (H 84). The phenomenological arguments that support the assertions about the analysis of vision found in the present paper are elaborated in Steven Crowell, *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

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– the self-described defender of the city's laws and customs – as an "outsider, "alone," and urging him to return "home [. . .] with us, with our customs and traditions" (330). But in what sense can the welcoming of a new god, an alien god, be part of "our customs and traditions" which, precisely as customs and traditions, would seem to be closed to the new? This is perhaps an example of the sort of mixing of the categories that characterizes Dionysian perception, but a deeper meaning is suggested by the chorus, which can see the god and which advocates for the cult, censuring Pentheus's "blasphemies." Against his intransigence, the chorus counsels "the life of quiet good, the wisdom that accepts – these abide unshaken, preserving, sustaining the houses of men" (390). But since such acceptance is not the acceptance of the status quo, there is still a paradox here. How can one who accepts the new (as this seems to imply) abide "unshaken," "preserve" and sustain the houses of men? What sort of preservation characterizes this "simple wisdom" (427)? The contrast here is, of course, with the hubris of "what passes for wisdom" among "proud, uncommon men and all their god-encroaching dreams" (430), those who "aspire, who outrange the limits of man. (396). But this cannot mean that a ruler must give way every time a stranger comes to town and drives the women crazy in the name of a new god. Rather, the play is after something philosophically more interesting.

An inkling comes when Tiresias characterizes Pentheus's glib talk: his certainty that the stranger is no god "comes rolling out smoothly on the tongue, as though your words were wise instead of foolish" (268). What is foolish about them? After all, they merely stick up for what the city's customs and traditions sanction. They are foolish in their very certainty; they represent the letter of the law, or, as Tiresias puts it, Pentheus's "glibness" flows from "his conceit of speech" 270). It is the very fixity of the law that constitutes the illusion that sustains such conceit of speech.

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What this tells us is that the kind of commitment that would characterize the initiate to the cult cannot be conceived as a holding fast to a rule, come what may. Commitment to the cult just is commitment to the possibility that one's other commitments (the standards and customs of the polis – or, more broadly, the categories we use to distinguish propriety from impropriety in acting, thinking, and seeing; the categories that constitute phenomenality as something) are not preserved by insisting on them. They are preserved only in that they are put into play, that is, only in that one makes oneself an example of acting in their light. To make oneself an example is to acknowledge that there is an interpretative "beyond" to every rule, norm, or category, and this constitutes the sort of self-awareness that Pentheus (and so also everyday vision as such) lacks. The normative force of norms, standards, customs, and rules allow us to master the distinction between seeming and being only when it operates within a commitment that does not look outside itself for justification (Pentheus's certainty about the law) but takes itself only as exemplary and so always at issue.

Such exemplarity, then, may well involve transforming customs and traditions when they show their limits, when life becomes unlivable in terms of the way they have hitherto been understood. In this way, Cadmus and Tiresias exemplify the meaning of such commitment: to welcome the new god in the name of the old customs and traditions is precisely to mark the point at which commitment to the old customs and traditions understands itself authentically. But it is also a point at which success or failure cannot be measured in terms of a rule. It remains the irreducibly first-personal skill of recognizing the god in the situation, and while an audience can be brought to see this truth of phenomenological analysis, it cannot be instructed on when such a

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welcoming of the new is appropriate. As Heidegger writes, "On what is [resoluteness] to resolve? Only the resolution itself can give the answer."[17]

This first-person responsibility for meaning – and thus also for phenomenality in any sense robust enough to include the distinction between proper and improper seeing, the possibility of distinguishing between seeming to be, and actually being, happy – is, I would argue, what is signified in the play's focus on the figure of Dionysus. Let me summarize:

The condition that makes anything like a proper perceptual or practical orientation in the world possible is two-fold: to see the god (Dionysus) and to become an initiate of his cult, commit oneself to its practices. The fact that seeing the god is not tied to any form (which means not merely that the god can appear in many forms, but that seeing the god is not equivalent to gazing upon any form at all) indicates the radically first-personal character of the conditions in question. More specifically, it represents the condition of *Angst*, in which the ordinary significance of things has become insignificant – or, to use Blumenberg's terminology, when the absolutism of reality breaks through the work of myth. To confront this sort of facticity is not to invite cosmological speculations about principles that govern "what is as such"; rather, it is to be made aware of an aspect of our nature. When Cadmus invokes "Bromius, this god of our own blood" (1250), he is both welcoming the new god into the city and also acknowledging the connection between the god and ourselves. But "seeing" the god in this sense is constitutive of proper seeing, of phenomenality, only if one also becomes an initiate in the cult. This does not mean that one abandons the polis for another way of life; rather, it means that one leads one's ordinary life in a different way, one that makes possible a distinction between appearance and reality, being happy or only seeming to be so. It makes this possible because the cult's "rule" is something like a practice in how to occupy the other rules that govern one's life, a new understanding of commitment as exemplarity rather than simple instantiation of a law.

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Tragic wisdom thus does not consist in recognizing my exposure to cosmic forces beyond my control; rather, it consists in the recognition that the normative distinctions by means of which we live a life in which genuine happiness is possible are not inscribed in the cosmos but are my responsibility, that they (and so also what depends upon them, phenomenality as a "world" of meaning) exist at all only because I can renounce "what the world calls wise" and cultivate the "humility" (that is, the consciousness of exemplarity at risk) of the "customary way, the timeless honored beaten path of those who walk with reverence and awe" (1005–10).

If, as I have suggested here, The Bacchae transforms into structure the very conditions necessary for phenomenality, and so represents something like a phenomenological analysis of vision, does this not merely confirm Nietzsche's dismissal of Euripides as a rationalistic latecomer who no longer understood the true Dionysian essence of tragedy? I think not. Rather, by reaching back to the original anxiety that underpins the mythical material of tragedy, and by linking that anxiety to Dionysus in the figure of the masked god, Euripides provides a critique of rationalistic culture and uncovers the "tragic" – that is, unsecured – basis of our dwelling within a world in which meaningful distinctions can be drawn, a world in which the absolutism of reality both is, and is not, always already overcome.

17 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 345 (H 298).

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15 The goods of ecological communities

Adam Konopka

Abstract: This chapter is an attempt to develop some of the material axiological features of a Husserlian approach to community that incorporates elements from his mature phenomenology of intersubjectivity. More specifically, it attempts to identify and preliminarily clarify certain axiological features of material goods that are structured by practical life as it occurs in a common world. By incorporating several of the practical features of intersubjectivity (namely, those involved in communal life) with Husserl's material axiology, I outline some of the features of a communal axiology of material goods, namely, embodied goods that can be properly characterized through attributes involved in the regional ontologies comprising ecological disciplines, e.g., community ecology. The result of these analyses will be an identification of several axiological features of a particular limit concept of community, one that radicalizes Ferdinand Tönnies's distinction between *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society), comprised of an intersubjectivity that is not reducible to human life. I claim, in short, that there is logical space in Husserlian phenomenology for an evaluatively permeated conception of ecological community.

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Keywords: community, axiology, ecology, Tönnies, Husserl

Introduction

Edmund Husserl's investigations of the evaluative and volitional intentional features involved in moral predications operate with a preliminary distinction between individual and social ethics. In the third *Kaizo* article, for example, Husserl introduces "renewal" [*Erneuerung*] as the principle theme of ethics and claims that the axiological and normative attributes of this theme are properly predicated of both individuals and communities. Ethical renewal, according to Husserl, is not ultimately reducible to the practical conduct of individual moral agents but eventually involves a social ethic, that is, an "ethics of communities as communities."[1]

One of reasons that an account of the "position takings" [*Stellungnahmen*] involved in becoming a morally authentic individual requires references to the axiological and volitional features of the intersubjective life of communities concerns a special type of categoriality at work in moral agency. Moral actions are practical. They are dependent

1 Edmund Husserl, *Aufsätze und Vorträge. 1922–1937*, eds. Thomas Nenon and H.R. Sepp, Husserliana XXVII (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 21. Reference to *Husserliana* volumes will be abbreviated with page numbers, e.g., *Hua* XXVII, 21. See also *Hua* XXXVII, 12–13.

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on and inclusive of concrete performances that are accomplished with a certain "recognitional form" or "mindfulness" that volitionally renders the concrete performance as accomplished "in light of" or "in view of something else." These volitional intentions are categorial and to the degree that they are unified with the concrete performance, the performance itself becomes categorically formed.[2] We take a position, for example, with regard to certain objects to be pursued, roles to be owned and fulfilled, and habits to cultivate or break. These categorial position-takings, however, are not accomplished individualistically. They are often a result of deliberations and habituations that are informed by the concrete encounters we have with others in communal relationships that condition the specific features of those encounters.[3] The axiological and volitional features of these concrete communal relationships, for better or worse, inherently influence and motivate our individual categorial position-takings, e.g., we deliberate with reference to how others evaluate and appraise situations and we adopt or reject, in varying degrees, habits, and traditions that are generatively afforded to us by our friends, family, professional colleagues, and so on. The contents of the categorial form of individual position-takings are thus inherently intersubjective and it is in this sense that Husserl's approach to the theme of renewal necessarily involves two non-independent parts (individual and social ethics). In other words, the proper characteristic of the general relationship between individual and social ethics in a phenomenological investigation of ethical renewal is necessary supplementation.[4]

Husserl's research manuscripts on ethical renewal, however, are largely focused on individual ethics and the project of systematically developing a "social ethics" remained deferred indefinitely for him. This deferral is especially curious, given the extensive attention he devoted to the phenomenology of intersubjectivity more generally. While Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity was critically received by many in the immediately subsequent generation of phenomenologists, e.g., Emmanuel Levinas, Paul Ricoeur, and Alfred Schultz, his mature approach has enjoyed more positive scholarly reception.[5] This renewed understanding of and appreciation for Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity extends Husserl's account of empathy and appresentation found in, for example, *Cartesian Meditations* and *Ideas II* and considers intersubjective features that are basic to individual subjectivity, e.g., the intersubjective features involved in pre-reflective bodily self-awareness (*Hua* VIII, 129; cf. IX, 344, 431).[6] It is now apparent, in other words, that Husserl considered concrete subjectivity

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2 Robert Sokolowski develops the categorial features of practical concrete performances in *Moral Action: A Phenomenological Study* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 54–57.

3 Cf. Aron Gurwitsch, *Human Encounters in the Social World*, ed. Alexandre Métraux, trans. Fred Kersten (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1979), 78.

4 Necessary supplementation defines the relationship among non-independent parts (*Hua* XIX, 233).

5 Cf. Alfred Schütz, "Das Problem der transzendentalen Intersubjecktivität bei Husserl," *Philosophische Rundschau* 5 (1957), 81–107; Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority,* trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Dusquesne University Press, 1969), 67–70; and Paul Ricoeur, "Phenomenology and Hermeneutics," ed. John B. Thompson, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101–128, here 124–125.

6 Cf. Dan Zahavi *Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation*, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999); *Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity: A Response to the Linguistic-Pragmatic Critique*, trans. Elizabeth A. Behnke (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001); "Shame and the Exposed Self," ed. Jonathan Webber, *Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism* (London: Routledge, 2010), 211–226; "Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal," *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 2(3) (2011), 541–558; "Empathy and Other Directed Intentionality," *Topoi* 33(1) (2014), 129–142.

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to be fundamentally intersubjective (*Hua* XIV, 2777; cf., XV, 560; I, 173; VIII, 495; XVII, 248).

This chapter is an attempt to develop some of the material axiological features of a Husserlian approach to an "ethics of communities as communities" that incorporates elements from his mature phenomenology of intersubjectivity. More specifically, it attempts to identify and preliminarily clarify certain axiological features of material goods that are structured by our practical lives as they occur together in a common world. By incorporating several of the practical features of intersubjectivity (namely, those involved in communal life) with Husserl's material axiology, I outline some of the features of a communal axiology of material goods, namely, embodied goods that can be properly characterized through attributes involved in the regional ontologies that comprise biological disciplines. The result of these analyses will be an identification of several axiological features of a certain limit concept of community that is comprised of an intersubjectivity that is not reducible to human life. I argue, in short, that there is thus logical space in Husserlian phenomenology for an evaluatively permeated conception of ecological community.

From intersubjectivity to life-worldly communities

One of the possible approaches in investigating the basic features of (inter)subjectivity is to isolate the direct perceptual relations between subjects. The "inter" of intersubjectivity, as the Latin suggests, targets these direct perceptual relations "between" or "among" subjects. Husserl's mature theory of intersubjectivity offers rich descriptive accounts of the intersubjective features of these relations, accounts that nevertheless abstract from 1) the concrete personal encounters we have with others that are 2) embedded in and shaped by our common lived-environing-worlds [*Lebensumwelt*]. First, these concrete encounters are not merely perceptual, but include intentional features that have, for example, practical, evaluative, and instinctual attributes. We encounter others in concrete relationships, for example, as co-workers, friends, family members, and lovers. In addition to the concrete fullness of these modal features that comprise personal life, our encounters of others are also concrete in that they are embedded in and shaped by common horizons of habituation, deliberation, normalcy, familiarity, and so on, horizons that comprise our lived-environing-worlds (*Hua* XXXII, 163, 207, 241; cf. VIII, 169; XXXIX, 376–378, 527; *Hua Mat* VI, 224).

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We do not encounter others in a vacuum but in motivational situations that, in turn, condition the features of these encounters. Analogous to the fundamental lived correlation between "subjectivity and lived-environing-world" is the correlation between "intersubjectivity and lived-environing-world" (*Hua* XXXIX, 527). To put it differently, the founding relation between "I-and-my-world" and "us-and-our-world" is mutually dependent. To clarify this point concerning the concreteness of "self, other, world," consider several practical features of communal life. Generally speaking, practical experiences of useful objects have specific types of features that comprise the modal structure of practical intentionality. First, we experience various perceptual objects, in varying degrees and different senses, with instrumental attributes such as "in-order-to" [*Um-zu*] and "for-the-sake-of." The pasture on a small rural farm, for example, is used for grazing animals and as possible locations for garden crop rotation. When we perceive the pasture in this agricultural context, it is originally apprehended with the "in-order-to" and "for-the-sake-of" grazing and crop rotation. Second, the individual

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objects of the pasture, e.g., varieties of vegetation, topography, and tree line, are given in horizons of association that referentially imply their instrumental value. For example, the latch on the gate is instrumental toward the security of the gates' closure and the gate, in turn, is instrumentally associated with the territorial movement of the grazing sheep, goats, and cows. The instrumental attributes of individual use-objects thus contribute to and are informed by horizonal associations of instrumentality between and among individual objects.[7]

Third, these horizons of instrumentality practically function intersubjectively in at least three preliminary senses – they are what I will call, for lack of better terms, coordinative, cooperative, and incorporative. Co-workers and family members who use the small farm pasture experience and act together with a common apprehension of the horizonal associations of instrumentality. The first sense in which these horizons are common is that they coordinate habitual experiences and actions. When two or more pasture workers shift the portable fencing in order to rotate the grazing patches, the workers share a common apprehension of the horizons of instrumentality. The common horizonal objects, e.g., the latch and the gate, are experienced with what Husserl called "co-validities" or "shared assents" with regard to their instrumental functions. The partnership between the co-workers who together are involved in the common project of rotating the herds is coordinated by these shared assents of the horizons of instrumentality. When I look across the field and see my partner walking toward the gate after the sheep have passed through it, I apprehend her motivational displays in relation to the practical and horizonal attributes of the gate. In other words, I experience her concrete performance in the motivational situation of "closing the gate" which, in turn, is a sequential moment in broader motivational situations on the farm. The shared assents in common projects afford coordination among co-workers and this becomes especially apparent when the habitual features of these shared assents are thematized in what Husserl called "horizons of normalcy."[8] Like many of the habituated routines of life on a small farm, shifting the grazing patches in the pasture may be a common project that habitually coordinates the concrete performances of the co-workers. These habituated routines become reinforced through a specification of tasks that comprise the overall common project, e.g., while one partner closes the gate, the other partner might typically fill the watering basin and so on. These specifications of tasks become sedimented in a horizons of normalcy that harbor the concrete performances of the communal projects.

The second sense in which the horizons of instrumentality are common is that they condition the cooperation between and among individual agents. Co-workers do not merely have shared assent with regard to the instrumental value of individual practical objects and their horizonal associations, but they also have a shared assent with regard to the goals of their common projects. The shared assent proper to the goals of common projects often determines the various ways that co-workers perform tasks together that would not be achieved through respective individual performances. Shifting the herd's grazing patch may not be a project that is feasible to do individually – the gate

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7 Adam Konopka, "The Worldhood of the Perceptual Environing World," eds. Pol Vandevelde and Sebastian Luft, *Phenomenology, Archaeology, Ethics: Current Investigations of Husserl's Corpus* (New York: Continuum Press, 2010), 120–131, here 128–130; Gurwitsch, *Human Encounters,* 77.

8 Anthony Steinbock, *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1995), 125.

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might be too heavy, the portable fencing too long, and so on – and cooperation is required to achieve the mutually desired goal. This cooperation thus involves a special type of intersubjective relation – one in which the concrete performances of the co-workers converge through the common motivation arising from a mutual understanding and shared evaluative assent regarding the task.

Third, the unifying associations that function in horizons of instrumentality cohere in varying degrees of overall unity and incorporate individual members into this whole through the determination of various forms of commonly habituated roles and identities. The normalcy and familiarity of the coordinated and cooperative concrete performances of our encounters with our fellow farm co-workers synthesize in higher degrees of unity inclusive of various common projects, e.g., not only shifting the grazing patches of the herds, but milking the cows, weeding the garden, fixing the tractor, and so on. Together these increasingly general horizons of instrumentality have an overall unity that is proper to an indeterminate overall horizon of instrumentality. The farm itself accomplishes this overall unity as the indeterminate horizon of instrumental horizons. It is the unity that is accomplished by what Husserl termed a "home-world" (*Heimwelt*), namely, the environing world that we most intimately inhabit. While the event of this unity is not reducible to the (inter)subjective achievements of those to whom the home-world of the farm is given, it nevertheless organizes the complex projects and goals of the farm as it is lived together, e.g, a specification of tasks. One farm co-worker may assume or be delegated the habituated tasks of tractor maintenance and, in so doing, become incorporated as the primary farm "mechanic." Another farm co-worker may assume the primary roles and responsibilities involved in tending the garden and thereby become incorporated as the farm's primary "gardener." The point here is that the overall practical situation conditions the habituated roles and identities of individual participants such that these roles become non-separable or dependent parts of these identities. The concrete performances of these participants become habituated in horizons of normalcy such that these participants are originally encountered on a busy day at the farm as mechanics and gardeners, even though their other forms of identity, e.g., friend, family member, citizen, do not collapse into these roles.[9]

There is, furthermore, an even more holistic form of identification that emerges at the highest degree of communal participation (practical association) among the habituated roles of the individual participants – they are incorporated as fellow farmers, that is, as having a broad form of identity in common that is not reducible to the aggregation of individual coordinations and cooperations of practical concrete performances. There is a whole proper to the farm as a home-world that is not merely a collection of individuals, but an organized and organizing collection in which features of individual identity are constituted by virtue of their place in the whole and, indeed, the unified whole itself.

Unbuilding social mediation as an essential attribute of community

As we have seen, one of the concrete forms of intersubjectivity occurs in communities with practical horizons of instrumentality that comprise the associative nexus unified by a common world. One of the essential features of communities that does not

9 Gurwitsch, *Human Encounters*, 108.

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significantly change over the course of the broad investigations that comprise Husserl's mature theory of intersubjectivity is that communities are comprised of common practices, e.g., habituated concrete performances inclusive of shared assent to common objects, goals, and horizons. As we have seen above, the way in which these shared assents or mutual understandings are common is determinative of how a community is functionally organized, e.g., as coordinative, cooperative, and incorporative. One thing is generally clear, Husserl could not have conceived of a communal form of intersubjectivity without practical modalities of intentionality. To put this point in the language of social ontology, a community without a practical lived-environing-world does not exist.

There is, however, a significant change that occurs over the course of Husserl's development from the "*Gemeingeist* I and II" research manuscripts and *Ideas* II, on the one hand, to those that comprise the recently published Husserliana XXXIX and a more comprehensive consideration of the three volumes on intersubjectivity edited by Iso Kern, on the other. This development could perhaps be introduced through Husserl's appropriation of Ferdinand Tönnies's distinction between *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society).[10] Husserl initially develops a phenomenological account of community that is largely consistent with Tönnies' conception of *Gemeinschaft* as an all-embracing and organic rural village life formed by mutual dependencies, affective bonds, communal ownership of primary goods, and productive of an essential will (*Wesenwille*) in which individual members see themselves as functionaries of the goals of the group.[11] While Husserl's narrow conception of community phenomenologically radicalizes and supplements Tönnies's position, it nevertheless preserves the community/society distinction as a descriptive point of departure.

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As Husserl's investigations develop, however, the function of this distinction becomes mitigated. As demonstrated below, one of the changes in this development concerns social mediation as an essential feature of community in the narrow sense. Husserl's broader use of the term *Gemeinschaft* and its cognates are inclusive of communal types of cooperation, coordination, and incorporation that do not necessarily require the inducement of motivation to concrete performances through mutual understandings of determinate social acts. There are forms of communal life, in other words, that lack or

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10 Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Civil Society*, ed. Jose Harris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 132ff. On Husserl's indebtedness to Tönnies, see Matteo Bianchin, "Reciprocity, Individuals, and Community: Remarks on Phenomenology, Social Theory, and Politics" *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 29(6) (2003), 631–654, here 646; John Drummond, "Forms of Social Unity: Partnership, Membership, and Citizenship," *Husserl Studies* 18 (2002), 141–156, here 143. For general approaches to Husserl's conception of community, see Philip Buckley, "Husserl's Notion of Authentic Community," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 66(2) (1992), 213–227 and "Husserl's Göttingen Years and the Genesis of a Theory of Community," eds. Lenore Landsdorf and Steven H. Watson, *Reinterpreting the Political Continental Philosophy and Political Theory* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 39–49; David Carr, "Phenomenology of Social Relations," eds. William L. McBride and Calvin O. Schrag, *Phenomenology in a Pluralistic Context* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 263–272; John Drummond, "Political Community," eds. Kevin Thompson and Lester Embree, *Phenomenology of the Political* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 29–53; "The 'Spiritual' World: The Personal, the Social, and the Communal," eds. Thomas Nenon and Lester Embree, *Issues in Husserl's Ideas II* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), 238–254; James G. Hart, *The Person and the Common Life: Studies in a Husserlian Social Ethics* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), 123–140; Ulrich Melle, *"Selbstverwirklichung und Gemeinschaft in Husserls Ethik, Politik und Theologie," Tijdschrift voor Filosfie* 57(1) (1995), 111–128; Karl Schuhmann, *Husserls Staatsphilosophie* (Munich: Verlag Karl Alber Freiburg, 1988).

11 Tönnies, *Community and Civil Society*, 18, 36.

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have limited sociality, even though they are functionally and practically integrated in generative horizons of instrumentality. While the features of these types of community may not generate "interpenetration of willings" through the mutual understandings of social acts, they nevertheless organize common concrete performances in "interpenetrations of activities" (*Hua* XIV, 194). Cultural and ecological communities, I will submit below, are instances of such communities.

Husserl described several basic constitutive features that comprised his more narrow conception of community:

1) communities are composed of and founded upon individuals (*Hua* XXVII, 22, 48);
2) communities are not reducible to the collection of individuals nor are its achievements reducible to separate individual achievements (*Hua* XXVII, 48);
3) the founding of a community on individuals is mediated by what Husserl calls "social acts" (*Hua* XXVII, 22; cf. XIV, 166ff.);
4) communities are constituted through intersubjective volitional intentions that interpenetrate one another and form an "essential will," that is, a striving life of their own, analogous with that of an individual person (*Hua* XXVII, 22, 48–49; cf. XIV, 170, 174; IV, 192–194; XIV 169–170, 200–201);
5) communities are not merely a collection of individuals (*Gesellschaft*), but an organized collection of intersubjective practical concrete performances and some communities can even have "a personality of a higher-order" (*Hua* XXVII, 22, 53; cf. XIV, 194–195);
6) individual community members are representatives of (*Träger*) and functionaries in a common essential will (*Hua* XVII, 22; cf. XIV, 178–81).[12]

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The third constitutive feature of communities – concerning their social mediation - is initially most relevant to Husserl's broader conception of community, so let's unpack it first. All communities are social and have features beyond this sociality that are not reducible merely to the social. What does a community have that a society does not and in what sense are communities thoroughly social? The answers to these questions lie in the constitutive features of what Husserl called "social acts." Guided by the methodological individualism of his overall phenomenological approach, Husserl's more narrow approach to the constitutive features of social acts occurs through analyses of the intersubjective presentations involved in empathy. The first constitutive feature of sociality concerns common objects, e.g., the latch on the farm gate. Social acts are founded on objects that are apprehended by and given to two or more individual subjects (*Hua* XXXVII, 295). Second, in apperceiving that the object given to me is also given to another lived body, I appresent the other as a subjectivity with, minimally, a first-person perspective. I become aware, in other words, that the latch of the farm gate is not only perceptually given to me, but subjects of other lived bodies. Third, my apprehension of objects that are also perceived in common with other subjects become specifically social through verbal and non-verbal types of communication. The other responds, gestures, and speaks, for example, in embodied displays that not only presuppose common objects of two or more individuals, but also

12 This list is developed from and expands Drummond, "The 'Spiritual' World," 237–238.

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include a communicative performance. For example, as my co-worker walks over to the gate, she makes eye contact with me, nods her head as if to say "I got it this time," or simply verbalizes "I will close the gate." Fourth, these communicative acts make possible what Husserl called "co-validities" and "mutual understandings" (*Hua* IV, 192). When my co-worker proceeds to the gate in a manner that is inclusive of various communicative performances, I come to understand the motivational features of her responses, gestures, and speech and she can come to understand that I understand them. We thus have a motivation prompted by agreement (*Hua* XIV, 475; cf. XV, 472, 477).[13] This mutual understanding, more specifically, occurs when 1) I recognize the communicated motivational intention of the other in and through concrete performances in a unified motivational situation, 2) I come to accept or reject the other's communicated motivational intention through an assent that is the result of my own motivational intention, and 3) the other's intention is thus realized in me – the content of my assent is identified with the other's communicated motivational intention – and the communicative act has an understanding that is mutual (*Hua* XV, 477). The interaction is thus fully social.

Husserl's more narrow conception of community necessarily includes the constitutive features of social acts. Without sociality, there is no community and where there is community, there is sociality. What, in addition to sociality, constitutes a community? Husserl's answer concerns what he called the "interpenetration of willing," a process that can lead to, in certain communities, a "personality of a higher order." This process is founded on the constitutive features outlined above in that the mutual understandings generated in communication can induce or influence concrete performances among the communicative agents. When my co-worker states, for example, "I will close the gate" and waits for my response, I am pulled and drawn by her communicated motivational intention, part of which includes her intention to elicit or influence my response. Her verbal performance has a categorial feature, which is to say, her communicative act is done "in light of" or "in view of something else," e.g., eliciting my response. To the degree in which the other's motivational influence is successful, e.g., through the use of affective and gestured force or rhetorical and cognitive persuasion, not only is our understanding mutual (as we have seen above) but our volitional intentions are also mutual (*Hua* XIV, 194; cf. IV, 192). There is a shared assent with regard to what is to be done. This, then, is one of the senses in which we have interpenetrating volitional intentions that motivate concrete practical performances that are common in a variety of senses, e.g., coordinative, cooperative, and incorporative. Unlike societies, communities are thus comprised of a socially mediated "interpenetration of willing" through practical concrete performances (*Hua* XIV, 169–170; cf. IV, 192–194; XXVII, 22, 48–49). This social mediation, then, is one of the essential features of Husserl's narrow conception of community.

One of the differences between Husserl's narrow and broader conceptions of community concerns the social mediation involved in mutual understandings and activities (*Hua* XIV, 165–166). While it may be that the majority of communal experience and activity arises in and through social acts, Husserl eventually recognized the possibility of minimally social or non-social communities. More specifically, while social communication is a basic kind of common practical experience and activity that is coordinative

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13 Bianchin, "Reciprocality, Individuals, and Community," 638–639.

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and cooperative, not all common practical experience and activity is mediated by coordinative and cooperative social communication, e.g., what Husserl called "effect communities" or "communities of influence" (*Wirkungsgemeinschaften*) with "limited" or "open" sociality (*Hua* XIV, 193–194). As Molly Brigid Flynn has argued, Husserl broadened his more narrow understanding of the coordination and cooperation at work in the interpenetration of volitional intentions (willing) to include the coordination and cooperation of activities of influence that do not require motivation of concrete performances through determinate mutual understandings (e.g., shared assents and co-validities) (*Hua* XIV, 165–166).[14] They are operative communities, if you like.

Consider, for example, a small farm in relation to its broader cultural community of influence. Life on a small farm participates in horizons of generative influence that comprise, for example, a common cultural world, e.g., agricultural traditions, technological developments, public policy regulations, and financial opportunities and realities. Some of these horizons of generative influence are directly and determinately social, that is, the association among individuals is mediated by the mutual understandings of communicative performances (*Hua* XXXIX, 299). Individual farmers participate in these socially generative horizons of influence when they, for example, read almanacs and agricultural periodicals, adopt or avoid new forms of bio-technology, abide by agricultural regulations, make their mortgage payments, and so on. These forms of participation in the generative horizons of influence of a cultural community are either directly socially mediated or founded on the mutual understandings of social communication. However, farmers also participate in their cultural communities through concrete performances that are not mediated by or founded on the mutual understandings of social acts.

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Consider, for example, the gate latch in the illustration above. The farmer's relationship to the manufacturer and distributor of the latch could be considered social in varying degrees. First, this relationship would be considered fully social if the farmer's purchase of the latch was motivated by a volitional intention elicited by communicatively achieved mutual understandings with those involved with the production, marketing, and distribution of the latch. The farmer's purchase might be motivated, for example, in response to a conversation with a sales representative at the wholesale farming store. Second, the latch could also be constituted as a cultural object in a more socially mediated or less directly interactive relation, e.g., the purchase might be motivated in response to a manufacturer's or distributor's advertisement in a farming magazine. In this case, the mutual understandings generated in the advertisement are not necessarily reciprocal or directly interactive, they are nevertheless socially mediated, albeit more diffusely. Third, at the furthest end of the manifold of degrees of (non)social mediation in cultural communities concerns the constitution of cultural objects that occurs with "limited" or an absence of social acts. The farmer might have discovered the latch in a back corner of her own barn, presumably left there by the previous owner of the farm. In such a case, there is a distant and non-reciprocal influence of the previous farmer to the current farmer, even though this influence is not mediated by the mutual understandings of social communication. Indeed, this non-social influence could be manifest in a variety of cultural objects on the farm,

14 Molly Brigid Flynn, "The Cultural Community: A Husserlian Approach and Reproach," *Husserl Studies* 28 (2012), 25–47.

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e.g., the general design of the barn, landscaping of the property, soil health, and so on. In such cases, the influence between the previous and current owner occurs through generative horizons of habituation that coordinate the concrete performances of the current farmer.

In summary, much of the effort of this section has been to open a space in Husserl's mature phenomenology of intersubjectivity for a concept of generative communities of influence that do not require the mutual understandings and shared assents of social communication. Ecological communities, as I will suggest below, are comprised of influential activities among its members, activities that are not necessarily socially mediated. In making this point, however, I do not mean to suggest that the influential activities of ecological communities are necessarily non-social. On the contrary and as I will explore further below, much of the influence that occurs in ecological communities is deeply social. However, the sociality proper to ecological communities presupposes and forms a unity with a nexus of instinctual evaluation that is not necessarily social.

A formation of the ecological community concept

The contemporary cultural concept of ecological community is a prime example of what Husserl described as a scientific accomplishment that flows into (*einströmmen*) the life-world. In the process, the concept of community is extended beyond its descriptive application to common human life and applied to the "life together" of group interactions that are not reducible to the human sphere. This concept is used, for example, to describe the human relationship to its natural environment as a part of a larger communal whole in a variety of forms of public policy, e.g., United Nations charters, federal statutes such as the U.S. Clean Water Act, state and local conservation initiatives, and neighborhood farmer's market councils. As we will see below, not only is there logical space in Husserl's broader conception of community for cultural communities that are constituted with a limited or lack of sociality, but ecological communities in the contemporary cultural sense.

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In addition to the ethical and political features of the cultural concept of ecological community is a specifically scientific formation of it. The concept plays an important role in the contemporary configuration of the sciences of ecological investigation and comprises one of the foundational concepts in the developing field of community ecology. In this field, the ecological community concept remains especially contested.[15] One of the naturalistic problems associated with ecological communities concerns the extent to which holistic interactions possess causal properties. More specifically, in a recent iteration of this problem, the question concerns the extent in which holistic interactions proper to an inter-specific community causally determine the structure and function of component elements within the community, e.g., the abundance of organisms in a given population, the stability of nutrient distribution, and so on. I think

15 Cf. Daniel B. Botkin, *Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Shahed Naeem et al., *Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functioning: Maintaining Natural Life Support Processes* (Washington, DC: Ecological Society of America, 2000); Kim Sterelny, "Local Ecological Communities," *Philosophy of Science* 73 (2006), 215–231.

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Husserl's development of the traditional theory of wholes and parts through the logic of fitness has much to offer this contemporary debate.[16]

There are several preliminary ways that the following analysis of Husserl's account of the instinctual and axiological attributes of ecological communities is related to this contemporary debate in community ecology. First, the debate occurs in a methodological naturalism oriented by a theoretical interest in causal explanation. Husserl's account is descriptive and is methodologically warranted even though the causal features of, for example, emergent properties remain naturalistically un-clarified. In so doing, the following analysis can remain agnostic about the debate. Second, Husserl's development of the discipline of phenomenology occurred at a time when the nascent fields of biology had not gained traction, particularly in comparison to their burgeoning development in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. Even though Husserl could not have foreseen the iterations of the holism/reductionism debate in community ecology, he nevertheless anticipates several of their problematics and, generally speaking, has resources to contribute to their resolution. However, the following analysis defers doing so. Rather than investigating the regional ontologies of contemporary scientific investigation in which the concept is employed, the following analysis examines the logical space in Husserl's phenomenology for the ecological community concept in a life-world ontology. Third, a phenomenological description of ecological community, as Kim Sterelny has suggested, is not initially all that different from what is found in local field guides that generate descriptive properties of ecological communities rooted in experiential phenomenon.[17] While local field guides largely provide descriptions orienting readers in the identification of particular plants and animals, however, my Husserlian-inspired descriptions of the goods of ecological communities are motivated by a theoretical interest in the axiological attributes of common ecological goods that have normative significance for the contemporary cultural concept of ecological community. Fourth, what follows is, nevertheless, a phenomenological description of the same spatio-temporal material objects and states of affairs investigated in local field guides and the discipline of community ecology. Husserl's account of instinctual valuation does not consider these objects and states of affairs, however, within a "naturalistic attitude." He considers them with a "phenomenological attitude" that is also interested in the instinctual and axiological attributes of ecological community that are not reducible to the spatio-temporal and material attributes of these objects – objects that I will poignantly call "ecological objects." Let's turn to Husserl's analyses of 1) the evaluative features of the drive intentionality of instinctual experience in a lived-environing-world, 2) the intersubjective features of these modes of intentionality, and 3) the practical influences of these intersubjective features that coordinate, cooperate, and incorporate ecological community members.

Husserl's surprisingly extensive manuscripts into the evaluative features of the drive-intentionality (*Treibintentionalität*) of instinctual experience can be useful in highlighting several features of instinctual and axiological experience that are particularly relevant to the common goods of ecological communities. His analyses operate with a rather broad conception of instincts, one that extends well beyond the behavioristic accounts

16 Cf. John C. McCarthy, "Parts, Wholes, and the Forms of Life: Husserl and the New Biology," in eds. Lee Hardy and Lester Embree, *Phenomenology of Natural Science* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), 135–156.

17 Sterelny, "Local Ecological Communities," 216.

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of instincts of his time, and he investigates several experiential features of instincts through structures of drive-intentions. Generally speaking, Husserl conceived of drive intentions as embodied impulses or strivings of practical material performances that proceed more or less automatically toward the evaluative resolution of a tension that is instrumental for the preservation and welfare that is achieved in and through embodied equilibrium (Ms E, III, 9, 36, 56b; cf. Ms E, III, 10, 6a; *Hua* XXXIX, 316, 510; XV, 661).[18] Let's reflect on these conceptual features in turn. First, drive intentions are more or less automatic in that they do not require conscious determination or awareness in the course of the action (*Hua* XIV, 334). Instincts can thus be given through a basic embodied passivity and could thus even be considered "pre-egoic." Second, drive intentions are embodied strivings that are fulfilled through a resolution of an embodied tension. When a bodily drive is emptily intended, the embodied sensations are given in pre-reflective self-awareness as an unresolved tension. The drive animates these feeling sensations with an orientation toward their cessation, which is to say, the sensations are negatively valued and can even be uncomfortable and dis-pleasurable. Third, the drive's striving cannot properly be described without considering this orientation toward resolution, which is to say, instrumentality or task orientation is another essential feature of drive intentionality (*Hua* XI, 91, 135).[19]

The fourth feature of Husserl's conception of the drive-intentionality concerns the evaluative attributes of instinctual experience, attributes that also have a founding relationship with axiological attributes of ecological communities. Let's consider it in more detail. The embodied strivings of drive intentions are not only instrumentally orientated toward the resolution of a tension; these resolutions are evaluatively permeated. What are some of the axiological features of instinctual experience? Much of Husserl's answer to this question is consistent with his earlier material axiology, one that is significantly indebted to Brentano, that understands evaluative experience, generally speaking, to be 1) intentional, 2) object directed, 3) emotionally permeated, and 4) inherent in concrete performances.[20] First, the value attributes fundamentally indicate features of the internally unified correlate between the experience of the valuable object and the objects of evaluative experience. Second, value is an experiential accomplishment that is not reducible to either subjective or objective attributes of experience. A good that is valued always already involves an evaluator and vice versa.

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18 Cf. Nam-In Lee, *Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993); Ulrich Melle "Husserl's Phenomenology of Willing," eds. James Hart and Lester Embree, *Phenomenology of Values and Valuing* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 169–192; James R. Mensch "Instincts: A Husserlian Account," *Husserl Studies* 14(3) (1997), 219–237.

19 These features of Husserl's conception of drive-intentionality are developed in my "The Environed Body: The Lived Situation of Perceptual and Instinctual Embodiment," *Studia Phaenomenologica* 12 (2012), 296–302. Also see Lee, *Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte,* 133–137.

20 Cf. Franz Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, trans. Antos C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1995), 45, 80. Husserl's position can be differentiated from Max Scheler's that maintains that values are a priori objects ontologically distinct from empirical goods that serve as their bearers and the willing activity of an evaluator. See Scheler's *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik* in *Gesammelte Werke, 2*, eds. Maria Scheler and Manfred S. Frings (Bern: Francke, 1954), 88–89; *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 68. For a statement of axiological intentionality in an ecological context, see Charles S. Brown, "The Real and the Good: Phenomenology and the Possibility of an Axiological Rationality," in eds. Charles S. Brown and Ted Toadvine, *Eco-phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself* (Albany: State University of New York, 2003), 3–18.

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Moreover, the attributes of a valued object arise in a founded relationship with non-evaluative "presentations" of objects that provide the evaluation with what could be considered in a contemporary context as a "cognitive content." Evaluative attributes thus "track" or "map onto" non-evaluative features of objects. Third, evaluative experience is emotionally permeated in such a way that what Husserl and Brentano called "emotive acts" (*Akte der Gemütsbewegung*) contribute to the salience and prominence of evaluative objects.[21] Fourth, evaluative features of experience motivate volitional components of concrete performances.

The emotional permeations of evaluative intentions can themselves be a particular form of instinctual phenomenon and can be a point of entry into the fifth component of Husserl's conception of drive-intentions highlighted above – embodied equilibrium. While the evaluative attributes of instinctual experiences are not reducible to corresponding emotive attributes but extend to include a variety of feeling-sensations, e.g., kinaesthetic and tactile sensations, Husserl considers several basic emotional contents, e.g., the fear associated with acute stress response, disgust over disease-prone phenomenon, and olfactory poignancy, to be instances of the broader attributes of instinctual experience (*Hua* XIX, 109–112). To illustrate and extend this important point, consider again the example of rotating the herd in the pasture of a small farm. Consider first some of the overall endeavors of animal husbandry, endeavors that can be described through the several types of instrumentality, e.g., meat consumption, soil cultivation, recreational enjoyment, and so on. The evaluative features involved in meat consumption, specifically, are overlapped, intertwined, and saturated with the features of drive-intentions that are instinctually experienced, e.g., hunger. When "hunger cries for satiety," there are a variety of associated physiological responses, e.g., tightening of stomach muscles, increased bodily temperature, and the flush of the face, that contribute to unfulfilled bodily tension (*Hua* XIV, 334). These unfulfilled bodily tensions are passively given and their drive-intentions have "rays with no determinate origin." They are pre-egoic, if you like. Minimal degrees of hunger can often go unnoticed, for example, by remaining in pre-reflective bodily self-awareness. They remain "blind" intentions. In the intensification of the unfulfilled bodily tension of hunger, the drive-intentions can become emotionally permeated with, e.g., anxiety and increased vigilance, which contributes to the intensification process. What are the instrumental features of the drive-intentions of this process? These features comprise the renewal (Erneuerung) of an equilibrium achieved through bodily regulation. The resolution of the embodied tension of drive-intentionality, in short, makes an instrumental contribution to embodied horizons and systems of indication whose goals are set forth by the lived body's self-regulation.

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In addition to this sketch of the long instrumental chains of instinctual evaluation of hunger drive-intentions associated with the meat consumption of animal husbandry, consider a second instinctual experience more closely related to the concrete performances involved in feeding the herd – the intersubjective experience between the farmers and sheep in the pasture. Not only do the instinctual evaluations in the encounters decisively cut across species boundaries, but they also contribute to forms of coordination and cooperation in inter-specific generative horizons of influence (*Hua* XXXIX, 270, 376–378; cf. XV, 381). These contributions of instinctual evaluation are

21 Cf. Franz Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 45, 80.

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manifest in the concrete performances of the farmer and sheep. More specifically, the affective features associated with instinctual evaluation, e.g., tactile sensations, emotional content, and moods, are displayed in concrete bodily performances in communal lived-environing-worlds. Consider a sheep's habituated response to the sound of the opening latch. The concrete performances of the sheep display a variety of features of instinctual evaluation, e.g., the sheep's posture and peaked ears display an increased attentive alertness, the speed of her trot displays heightened experiential salience and motivation, her vocalized "baas" and "mehs" display possibilities for the mutual understandings of social interactions with the other sheep in the herd and, indeed, the farmers. When the farmers see the herd trot toward the gate with these heightened motivational displays, they not only have mutual understandings, but shared assents that coordinate, cooperate, and incorporate the concrete performances involved in the feeding. The farmer recognizes, in other words, that the sheep are hungry and, through habitual and generative processes, the sheep recognize that the farmer possesses this recognition (*Hua* XV, 184; cf. *Hua* XXXVII, 296; *Hua* XXXIX, 270).[22] Their encounters are thus social. But they are also, and more fundamentally, practical in such a way that generates shared assents with regard to the instinctual evaluations involved in, e.g., hunger. The farmer coordinates and cooperates with the sheep according to a shared assent of the instinctual evaluation manifested in the sheep's hunger.

Bringing in the herd from the pasture for the night is one example of many intersubjective horizons of influence inclusive of instinctual evaluation that constitute the farm as an ecological community. The example is chosen in my analysis because it is easier to describe the intersubjective features of the common horizons of instinctual evaluation in social encounters of the practical situations comprising a lived-environing-world. There is an important difference, however, between such habituated social situations with so-called "domesticated" inter-specific encounters and other non-domesticated encounters with inter-specific forms of life in which there are perhaps fewer degrees of possibility for mutual understanding and shared assent. Consider, for example, some of the top predators, birds, and insects whose instinctual evaluation contributes to the horizons of influential activity of the farm. There are at least three preliminary senses in which the coordinated, cooperated, and incorporated forms of instinctual evaluation are also properly attributed to the coyote that hunts the chickens, the cardinal that consumes berries, and the bee that pollinates the spring apple blossoms. First, the appresentations involved in such intersubjective encounters have a higher degree of indeterminacy with regard to their mutual understanding and shared assents. It is less clear, for example, to what degree that the tactile sensations and emotional content that I experience when hunting are properly paired with the stalking coyote. Amidst this indeterminacy, however, is the persistent recognition of an instinctual evaluation for nourishment in the coyote's predatory activity. More generally, whatever the degree of indeterminacy proper to the drive-intentionality of instinctual experience of interspecific forms of life, it is nevertheless possible to attribute nutrient provision as a good that is shared by each individual member of the ecological community. Nutrient provision is thus a common good in a specific sense – it is a good that is shared by each

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22 For a more extensive treatment of inter-specific encounters, see Samuel Cocks's "Husserl on Type, Animal Life, and Cross-Species Morality: A Prolegomena to a Husserlian Account of Human-Animal Relationships," *The Yearbook on History and Interpretation of Phenomenology* 1 (2014), 79–96.

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individual member and associates various forms of inter-specific activity, e.g., predation, anti-predation, and so on. These horizons of association of the shared values of common goods proper to ecological community coordinate influential activity.

A second sense in which instinctual evaluation occurs in common horizons of influential activity concerns a type of common good that is realized in and through the converging influential activities between and among inter-specific individual community members. There is a mutual benefit between the cardinal that eats the bush's blackberries and disperses the bush's seeds in and through defecation, creating enhanced possibilities for the bush's reproduction. The cardinal benefits in the nutrient provision of the berries and the bush benefits from the seed dispersal. Even though there is not a mutual understanding or shared assent between the cardinal and blackberry bush (and their relationship is not social in any specific sense), there is nevertheless a mutual influential activity that benefits each in what ecologists call "mutual symbiosis." There is thus a convergent valuation that is attributed to both, a valuation that is realized in and through the influential interaction and not reducible to the accomplishments of either the cardinal or the blackberry bush exclusively. It is a convergently valued common good. These convergent valuations contribute to cooperative associations involved in the horizons of influential activities proper to ecological communities.

The illustration of the cardinal/blackberry bush interaction is provocative in that it attributes goods to a non-experiential form of plant life that extends beyond the account of instinctual evaluation outlined above. It thus not only illustrates a type of common good that is convergent (realized in and through membership interaction), but how Husserl's account of the communal life of instinctual valuation can be analogically extended to vegetative life, that is, life-forms without discernible experiential attributes. The evaluative apperception of plants is an implicit, regulative norm of the agricultural life of the farmer, not to mention gardeners and conservationists. The attribution of goods to plants like a blackberry bush is a result of second-hand identification of goods manifested in such evaluative apperceptions. The farmer that waters and prunes the blackberry bushes, for example, apperceives in the morphological features of the bush's wilting foliage, lack of new stem growth, and presence of comparatively minimal berry buds that water provision, nutrient-rich soil, and appropriate sunlight are goods properly attributed of the plant. While the farmer may not necessarily attribute thirst or hunger to the blackberry bush, the recognition of the goods proper to the blackberry bush include an indeterminate pairing with the farmer's own instinctual evaluation that is itself inclusive of thirst and hunger. The farmer recognizes, in other words, these vegetative goods even though she does not determinately attribute the experiential attributes of instinctual evaluation to the bush. This recognition is conditioned by the indeterminate pairing of the farmer's own instinctually evaluated vegetative functions with the goods proper to the self-preservation and welfare that is displayed on the morphological surface of the plant, e.g., foliage, stem and berry bud abundance, and so on. Moreover, the blackberry bush displays its vegetative goods in the inter-specific interaction with the cardinal. The salient coloration and sweetness of its berries are indicative of its vegetative striving for the welfare achieved in seed distribution – dispersed reproduction. The salience of the blackberries influentially targets the cardinal's instinctual evaluations in a way that does not necessarily involve mutual understanding or shared assent. The material performance of the cardinal's dispersal of blackberry seeds is not accomplished with categorial intention that is "in light of" the bush's benefit. However, the salience of berry coloration and sweetness is a categorial

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manifestation of the vegetative striving toward dispersed reproduction. Berry salience functionally operates "in light of" seed dispersal in a way that implicates the cardinal's activity through influencing its instinctual evaluation. While this co-operation is not a joint operation of categorial intentions, it is nevertheless a co-operation that is manifest in the influential activities that have been generatively afforded in the cardinal/blackberry bush interaction. This co-operation is not merely the coincidental operation of two cause-effect relations, but involves convergently valued goods that are realized in and through the influential interaction.

A third sense in which in which instinctual evaluation occurs in common horizons of influential activity concerns a type of common good that is proper to a holistic ecological community itself. Like the shared valuations that coordinate and the convergent valuations that cooperate influential activities, holistically valued common goods are not reducible to the goods of individual ecological community members. Indeed, holistic value attributes are primarily predicated of the community as a whole and only indirectly attributed to individual members. Consider, for example, the holistic benefits of biodiversity achieved in and through the concrete performances of honeybee pollination. Biodiversity is an attribute of the farm as an ecological whole, an attribute that is dependent on the instinctually evaluated performances of pollination that have an influence on the functional and structural integrity of the overall farm. Like the berry salience of the blackberry bush, the performances of honeybee pollination do not have categorial features, which is to say, they are not manifested "in light of" the functional processes and structural composition that comprise the farm's biodiversity, e.g., population abundance and dynamics, nutrient recycling, and the inter-specific redundancy that contributes to community stability. Nevertheless, the instinctually evaluated performances of honeybee pollination manifest an influence on them that is accomplished in the overall and indeterminate horizons proper to the ecological community as such. If honeybee pollination did not exercise this beneficial influence, in other words, the farm would cease to be preserved as the kind of ecological community that it is. It is in this sense that the holistically valued influence of honeybee pollination is incorporative (*Hua* XXVII, 53). These overall horizons of incorporated influence proper to the common lived-environing-world of the ecological community have value that condition the maintenance of the associative unity of the influential horizons themselves. Honeybee pollination is thus a non-independent part of a broader system of evaluative indication that itself is not reducible to the pollination benefits of individuals and inter-specific populations. It is a holistically valued common good incorporated in the ecological community.

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Conclusion

There is logical space in Husserlian phenomenology for an evaluatively permeated conception of ecological community. On the one hand, Husserl has a narrow conception of socially mediated community in which he initially conceived of the generative horizons of influence in inter-specific lived-environing-worlds as "natural societies" bound together by associations of instinctual evaluation that lack an essential unity. Even though the shared, convergent, and holistic common goods proper to the coordination, cooperation, and incorporation of generative horizons of influence in inter-specific lived-environing-worlds might not have an "essential will" comprised of socially mediated interpenetrations of volitional intentions, Husserl nevertheless increasingly recognized

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in them an organized collection of instinctual evaluation with an essential associative unity. It is the unity of the plurality of kinship, if you like.[23] He thus radicalizes Tönnies's conception of *Gemeinschaft* and employs the term and its cognates in reference to the correlation between "inter-specific intersubjectivity and lived-environing-world." Husserl thus has a rather full sense of *Lebensgemeinschaften*, one that can productively engage the contemporary cultural conception of ecological community.

In Tönnies's discussion of a "communal possession" as an essential feature of community, he uses a well-known example of a pasture on a small rural farm.[24] The pasture is a "communal possession," in Tönnies's illustration not merely because it is legally owned by two brothers, but because the brothers use the pasture together in their respective and collective agricultural endeavors. As we have seen above, these endeavors can be phenomenologically described as concrete performances that are variously coordinated, cooperated, and incorporated such that they are not reducible to a mere aggregated collection of individual pursuits. These concrete performances, moreover, involve collective categorial volitional intentions and comprise an overall nexus that phenomenologically clarifies Tönnies's conception of the essential will (*Wesenwille*). Husserl also supplements Tönnies's account. Tönnies conceived of *Gemeinschaft* as an all-embracing and organic rural village life formed by mutual dependencies, affective bonds, communal ownership of primary goods, and productive of an essential will. Husserl's phenomenology of the personal attributes involved in communal life – and particularly his early material axiology – grounds (*Boden*) the motivational structures of volition in evaluation. The valued goods of ecological communities – goods that have cognitive content – thus provide the motive for the volitional structures of those communities in a way that avoids the voluntaristic shortcomings of Tönnies's account.

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16 Leonard Nelson and Edmund Husserl on the foundations of scientific philosophy

Biagio G. Tassone

Abstract: Leonard Nelson, like Edmund Husserl, believed that rigorous and reliable, i.e. genuinely 'scientific', knowledge claims should be established through recourse to immediate knowledge and clear insights. Unlike Husserl, however, Nelson regards our access to immediate grounds of certainty and truth to be non-intuitive. The two philosophers, therefore, end with very different and incompatible conceptions of scientific philosophy. If Nelson is correct than the immediate insight Husserl demands and introduces his methods of reduction to try to attain is impossible. If Husserl is correct, than Nelson's anti-intuitive foundationalism is incoherent. In my paper I attempt to show how Nelson's neo-Friesian approach and Husserl's phenomenological strategy might have gained from mutual interaction.
Keywords: Leonard Nelson, Edmund Husserl, phenomenology, neo-Kantianism, philosophy of science, J. F. Fries, transcendental philosophy, transcendental phenomenology, reductions, regression (method of).

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1. Introduction

A relatively unexplored aspect of Husserl's philosophical development during his Göttingen period concerns his professional interaction with the self-proclaimed 'neo-Friesian' Leonard Nelson.[1] Given the small world of professional philosophy in Germany in the early twentieth century and the close-knit nature of the intellectual communities at Göttingen, Nelson and Husserl (the former being the latter's junior colleague in the philosophy department) should have been familiar with each other's work. However the impression one receives, after consulting available secondary sources, is that the two men had very little to say to one another.[2] The reasons for the

1 Leonard Nelson (1882–1927) was appointed to the 'Natural Science Division' of the faculty of philosophy at Göttingen as *Privatdozent* in 1909. Nelson's appointment came largely on the strength of the strong recommendation he received from the mathematician David Hilbert and *against* the wishes of Husserl. The most detailed available biography of Nelson can be found in *Neue deutsche Biographie* Bd. 19 (Berlin, 1999), 60–62, Online, www.muenchener-digitalisierungszentrum.de/. Last retrieved October 20, 2013. For secondary sources giving accounts of the relationship between Nelson and Husserl, cf. Constance Reid's biography of Hilbert, reprinted in the volume: *Hilbert-Courant,* (New York, Berlin, Heidelberg, Tokyo: Springer-Verlag, 1986), and Edith Stein's autobiography *Life in a Jewish Family 1891–1916, The Collected Works of Edith Stein, Volume 1*, Edited by Dr. L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven, OCD, English translation by Josephine Koeppel, OCD, (Washington, DC: ICS Publications, 1986), see especially Chapter 7, 263–4.

2 Sonia Rinofner-Kreidl characterizes Nelson's work and thought as being at odds with that of Husserl. Nelson's philosophical position she describes as characterized by the following tenet: '[a]ny search for

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above lack of communication between Nelson and Husserl can be made somewhat more intelligible if we accept the claim that the Friesian project heralded by Nelson represented a psychologistic attempt to establish the foundations of all philosophical thought.[3] In the present paper I will challenge the purported psychologistic nature of Fries' regressive method but maintain that there is nonetheless at least one purely philosophical factor that might have accounted for the animosity that existed between the two German thinkers. To wit: Nelson's systematic criticism of 'epistemology' and dismissal of all intuitionist strategies for securing philosophical knowledge. The latter, I will argue, presents a serious challenge to the Husserlian phenomenological project.[4]

The real force of Nelson's challenge is rooted not so much in its critique of the phenomenological method, or even in its accuracy regarding analysis of Husserl's actual thought, but rather in the criticism of all methodological intuitionism and the corresponding suggestion that any truly scientific philosophy must be established on the basis of non-intuitive immediate knowledge. In particular, Nelson's neo-Friesian critical rationalism appears to strike at the heart of Husserl's own methodological strategy of achieving a complete reduction to an intuitively accessible phenomenological sphere of immanence upon which to establish philosophical clams. After examining Nelson's challenge to phenomenology as first philosophy, a Husserlian response to Nelson is given and then comments are made regarding the relationship between Husserlian phenomenology and Nelson's neo-Friesian project.

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criteria that seeks to guarantee the objective validity of our knowledge necessarily gets entangled in an infinite regress, a circular structure or contradiction.' Nelson's '*Über das sogenannte Erkenntnisproblem*' (1908) and '*Die Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie*' (1911), are cited as substantiating the above. See her article 'What's Wrong with Naturalizing Epistemology? A Phenomenologist's Reply', in Richard A. Feist, editor, *Husserl and the Sciences: Selected Perspectives, Philosophica* 55 (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2004), 63 n8. Rinofner-Kreidl also notes how Nelson's circularity objection, raised against Husserl's phenomenological project, is quite different from more recent but similar criticisms raised by thinkers such as W. V. O. Quine and Richard Rorty. For one thing Nelson is not antagonistic to metaphysics or anti-naturalist strategies in philosophy, as the above are, yet he nonetheless also rejects Husserl's brand of phenomenological foundationalism. Husserl, apparently, paid even less attention to Nelson in his writings than Nelson did to Husserl. Roman Ingarden, a notable exception to the belief that Husserl and Nelson had nothing to say to one another, writes 'Husserl's ideas must have completely crystalized [in the period during which Nelson was a dozent at Göttingen] from the Year 1909'. See R. Ingarden, *On the Motives Which Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism* translated by Arnor Hannibalsson, *Phaenomenologica* Vol. 64, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 11 n10. Ingarden subsequently recalls how: 'Husserl, so far as I know, never spoke nor wrote about [the opinions expressed by Nelson, i.e. about the 'impossibility' – as Nelson phrased it—of epistemology] but he certainly knew of Nelson's book' (ibid, 11–12). Ingarden's suggestion seems to amount to the following claim: On some level, Husserl was, even if only implicitly, directly responding to Nelson. For reasons that will be articulated below pertaining to Nelson's rather inaccurate understanding of Husserl's phenomenological project, Ingarden's claim is difficult to substantiate. Nonetheless, as also argued below, neither can it be said to be entirely false.

3 Friesian philosophy can (and has) been described as a form of 'psychologism', moreover of a kind that Husserl effectively attacked and showed to be seriously flawed in his Prolegomena to Pure Logic from 1900. See Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Text der 1. und der 2. Auflage. (Halle: 1900, rev. ed. 1913). Edited by Elmar Holenstein, Husserliana XVIII, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975). [Henceforth: cited as Hua XVIII]. English translation as: *Logical Investigations*, two volumes, translated by J.N. Findlay, latest edition with a new preface by Michael Dummet and Introduction by Dermot Moran, (London: Routledge, 2000). [Henceforth cited as LI].

4 The only existing hint that I could find in the secondary literature that Husserl's Göttingen work was on some level a response to Nelson's criticisms is, as mentioned above, Roman Ingarden's claim that Nelson's attacks on the very possibility of a theory of knowledge or epistemology motivated Husserl's later thought (again cf. Ingarden 1975, 11–12).

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2. Husserl and Nelson: Background and Nelson's challenge to phenomenology

Reflecting briefly on the relationship between science and philosophy in early twentieth-century Germany, selected movements and thinkers quickly jump to mind. Amongst these, the Marburg neo-Kantian school led by Paul Cohen, the positivist program of the Vienna Circle, promoted by the writings of Moritz Schlick, and the phenomenological movement initiated by Edmund Husserl can all be mentioned. A less well-known, and historically less influential, attempt to engage philosophically with the empirical sciences at the time was the neo-Friesian approach taken by Leonard Nelson.

Much like the Marburg neo-Kantians and the Göttingen phenomenologists, the neo-Friesian school attempted to evaluate the project of empirical science philosophically. Leonard Nelson was arguably the most famous twentieth-century follower of Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843) and as such devoted a great deal of time and energy using Friesian principles to establish a suitable theoretical foundation for the positive sciences. The mathematician David Hilbert, who had earlier ensured the approval of Husserl's candidacy for associate professor of philosophy at Göttingen, had by 1907 also come to champion Nelson. When Nelson arrived at Göttingen, in 1903, he was already familiar with Husserl's writings. By 1908, Nelson had read and critically responded to Husserl's *Logical Investigations* in print. There is, however, strong existing evidence that Nelson did not study Husserl's later or transcendental phenomenology.[5] Furthermore, from available evidence, we also know that Husserl was aware of the writings of the neo-Friesians including the criticism of his phenomenology stemming from Nelson. One consequence of the above may have been Husserl's active (but ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to boycott Nelson's teaching appointment at Göttingen.[6] Aware only of the fact that Husserl was strongly critical of Nelson, the uninformed reader may jump to conclude that Nelson's philosophical work was somehow in fundamental opposition to Husserl's phenomenology. At the very least, for those with some knowledge of phenomenology but with little or no acquaintance with Nelson's writings, it is tempting to think that Nelson's thought was somehow lacking in qualities that Husserl and the Göttingen phenomenologists frequently promoted as characterizing 'good' philosophy.[7] It might perhaps come as a surprise to learn that Nelson's writings prove the opposite to be the case. In fact, assessing the content of Nelson's Göttingen writings alongside the work that Husserl produced from 1909 to 1917, it quickly becomes apparent that the two thinkers actually had a good deal in common.

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5 Edith Stein, who studied with both Husserl and Nelson at Göttingen reports: '[Nelson] . . . was not too familiar with Husserl's writings and declared that to learn to understand such difficult terminology was too time-consuming. I asked whether he had not at one time had a discussion with [Adolf] Reinach; that surely would have been much easier. The answer was laconic: 'Reinach is easier, but correspondingly, less deep' (Stein, 1986, 264).

6 For an excellent account of Nelson's interactions with Husserl at Göttingen, see Peter Andras Varga's '*Ein bisher unbekanntes Porträt von Edmund Husserl*' online: http://hiw.kuleuven.be/hua/Media/mitteilungsblatt/portrait, last retrieved September 15, 2013. Varga cites many private letters of Nelson's wherein the latter recounts the diffident attitude Husserl bore towards him from early on. For details about Husserl's attempted boycott of Nelson's teaching position at Göttingen, cf. Reid, 1986, *op. cit.*, 144–5.

7 These qualities included (but were not limited to): the clarification of fundamental principles, the constant application of theory to immediate experience and life, and a theoretical understanding of the philosophical project treating it as the search for ultimate truth.

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These existing commonalities between Husserl and Nelson are both interesting and worth pursuing in themselves. No less important, however, and in many ways just as essential for placing the common elements holding between the theories of Nelson and Husserl into context, are their differences. These differences can be said to begin with the respective intellectual backgrounds and early influences on the two thinkers. Where Husserl began his intellectual career as a student of mathematics and then studied with the neo-Aristotelian, and avowed anti-Kantian, Franz Brentano in Vienna, Nelson established his reputation in Heidelberg and Berlin by 'rediscovering' and vigorously defending and then promoting the (at the time) forgotten works of J. F. Fries. The relative obscurity of Fries' thought, even to philosophers today, makes a brief summary of its philosophical contributions necessary.

The name of 'J. F. Fries' is known to most philosophers today, if at all, mainly as standing for the work of an early opponent of Hegelianism or as a precursor to later 'neo-Kantian' approaches.[8] In the latter role, Fries' writings provide what are, in many ways, original and important criticisms of Kant. Fries maintained that Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, for example, was to be properly understood as a descriptive program or a psychological and 'anthropological' attempt to establish validity claims for *a priori* knowledge.[9] Fries then further departs from Kant by criticizing any attempt to 'prove' the categories of the understanding as valid by reference to, 'the possibility of experience'. In effect, Fries rejected the objective deduction of the first *Critique*. According to Fries, the former strategy is 'circular'. Instead, rejecting Kant's 'transcendental deduction', Fries maintains that only a metaphysical deduction of the categories is tenable. This amounts to the belief that, for finite thinkers — such as we are — no intuitive proof of any kind can be discovered upon which to establish a ground or foundation for the first principles of philosophy. Instead, if we want to establish sound foundations for philosophical thought, our attention must focus towards the task of clarifying metaphysical or philosophical 'principles' by means of what Kant called 'regressive analysis'. In Fries' hands, the Kantian regressive search for exploring possibility conditions subsequently took the form of the attempt to clarify how the validity of the immediately true propositions of metaphysics (arrived at *through* subjectively apprehended and descriptive results of reflection on empirical data) can be affirmed and then seen to be valid. Empirical propositions, according to Fries, cannot be deduced logically or arrived at through any inductive inference or syllogism. Induction can, at best, indirectly justify empirical claims by recourse to the contingent evidence of past experience, whereas knowledge of facts must be seen as necessarily stemming from immediate lived experience grasped through psychological observation.

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Although the above strategy has frequently led to accusations of 'psychologism' being leveled against Fries' thought and system, as Nelson correctly realized, Fries was actually attempting to establish an anti-psychologistic 'theory of method'.[10] This

8 For brief overviews of the Friesian position see Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, 'Fries, Jakob Friedrich,' in Paul Edwards (editor). *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Volume 3 (New York & London: Macmillan, 1967), 253–55. Also see: Allan W. Wood, 'Fries, Jacob Friedrich (1773–1843)' in the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume Three: Descartes to Gender and Science*, Edited by Edward Craig (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), 798–9.

9 See Fries, *Neue oder anthropologische Kritik der Vernunft*, 3 Band (Heidelberg: Christian Friedrich Winter, 1828–31).

10 Psychologism for our present purposes can be understood as the claim that we can somehow derive and justify (and therefore possibly reduce) the normative and necessary or essential validity of metaphysical

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method, if successful, would be appropriate for grounding philosophical knowledge as objective and scientific. How did Nelson develop Fries' insights? Beginning by closely following the Friesian method of regressive analysis, along with the psychological critique outlined above, Nelson sought to make philosophy 'scientific' by re-establishing its original Socratic mission. This Socratic mission is characterized by Nelson as one of using innate 'faith in reason' to support the Friesian reinterpretation of Kantian critical rationalism. In the spirit of Socrates, Nelson promoted the quest of seeking out definitions, i.e. determinate and scientific, but nonetheless dialectical, foundations for our rational beliefs.

The above task was furthermore undertaken with a correlative existential agenda of applying these philosophical discoveries to life.[11]As will be shown, it was not the aim or goal of Nelson's neo-Friesian project as an attempt to establish philosophy on scientific grounds (broadly construed) that could be strongly objected to by Husserl.[12] Instead, the potential reason for Husserl's manifest theoretical antagonism towards Nelson was most likely due to the latter's relentless criticism of any kind of methodological intuitionism as useful for the purpose of establishing the foundations of philosophical thought. The above, together with Nelson's accompanying 'psychologically grounded' regressive theory for articulating first principles (directly borrowed from Fries) could only have been viewed with suspicion by Husserl.[13] Nelson, in turn, strongly rejected the goal of

and logical principles and claims from the empirical content of mental activity. The charge of 'psychologism' in the existing reference or commentary on Fries' work is pervasive. According to Julius Kraft, it can be found in the writings of Kuno Fischer and Ernst Cassirer, for example. See Kraft's introduction to Leonard Nelson, *Socratic Method and Critical Philosophy*, Translated by T. K. Brown (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1949), xviii. But even a sympathetic reader, such as Karl Popper, levels the charge of psychologism against Fries. See Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London and New York: Routledge, 1959), 75. In the second half of the twentieth century finds somewhat more charitable readings of Fries' project appearing in print. Fries anthropological critique of reason, for example, has even been described as an early attempt to establish a 'phenomenological' ground for science and logic by Alexander Mourelatos. See Mourelatos, 1967, *op. cit.*, 255.

11 Nelson's ethics and 'philosophy of right', in fact, dominated his program at Göttingen. Although we are here far more interested in the theoretical foundations of Nelson's critical method, readers desiring a more complete picture of Nelson's critical rationalism in available English translations can consult, Leonard Nelson, *System of Ethics*, Translated by Norbert Guterman, Forward by H. J. Paton, Introduction by Julius Kraft (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1956). Leonard Nelson, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Translated by Norbert Guterman (Scarsdale, NY: The Leonard Nelson Foundation, 1957). Also worth consulting, for assessing the full scope of Nelson's thought, his various published writings on politics and education, samples of which can be found in Leonard Nelson, *Politics and Education*, Translated by W. Lansdell, with a foreword by W. J. Roberts (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1928).

12 This becomes clearer when we note of how, by the time he established himself in Göttingen, Husserl had learned to appreciate Kant and the neo-Kantian project to a far greater extent than he had been able to while studying under Brentano in Vienna or even when composing the *Logical Investigations* at Halle.

13 Husserl thoughtfully and consistently sought to develop his foundationalist insights on intuitive grounds. Through this intuitive method, later characterized in *Ideas I* as the 'phenomenological principle of principles' during his Göttingen period; transcendental phenomenology was born. See E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. Edited by Karl Schumann, Husserliana III (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), English Translation: *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book. General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology.* Translated by Fred Kersten, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1982) [Henceforth 'Id' with English and German page numbers following]. For example, in *Ideas I* Husserl writes: '. . . *every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition . . . everything originarily* (so to speak in its 'personal' actuality) *offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there* (Id. 24/*Hua* III, 43–44). Husserl's foundationalist trademark as a thinker is arguably this trait of clarifying the epistemological grounds of logical and

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establishing any intuitive foundations for philosophy and therefore could only have viewed Husserl's approach as 'a regress'. Husserl's phenomenology was a regress, however, not to the true Kantian critical spirit but to the epistemological preconceptions of Cartesianism and therefore manifesting both a mystical 'neo-Platonic' form of intuitionism, on the one hand, and a 'Scholastic Logicism', i.e. the attempt to establish a science having as its own conceptual content the constitutive basis of metaphysics, on the other.[14]

3. Nelson's theory of immediate, non-intuitive, knowledge

Turning our attention more directly onto Nelson's writings and examining the only existing references to Husserl there, we see that the above is precisely how Husserl's phenomenological method is characterized. According to Nelson, Husserl's phenomenology is said to be tied to an untenable form of 'intellectual intuition'. In *Über das sogenannte Erkenntnisproblem* from 1908, Nelson directly cites the *Logical Investigations* at length, and writes of how Husserl is essentially an intuitionist and a logical dogmatist.[15]

Criticizing what he calls the 'vagueness' of Husserl's characterization of psychologism in the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* (and throughout the later *Investigations*), Nelson goes on to accuse Husserl of actually lapsing into a form of psychologism in the later *Investigations*. In effect, Nelson argues, in the phenomenology of the *Investigations* Husserl is attempting to establish a science of 'inner experience' (a descriptive psychology) in order to justify the foundations of pure logic. In using this descriptive and factual (read: empirical and contingent) basis as foundation for insights into logical and necessary truths, Husserl, despite his protests to the contrary, is forced to rely and depend on descriptive psychology to establish the foundations of logic. Nelson goes on to maintain

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philosophical categories in his research. To a large extent, the phenomenological method therefore rests on bringing available evidence to intuitive clarity. Husserl's 'principle of all principles' in the *Ideas I* can also be seen to reformulate an insight already arrived at in earlier writings such as the *Logos* essay of 1911 where Husserl writes: 'what has been grasped from an intuitive point of view . . . can be understood and verified only from an intuitive point of view.' See E. Husserl, *Aufsätze und Vorträge. 1911–1921. Mit ergänzenden Texten.* Edited by Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, Husserliana XXV (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 3–41. English Translation, 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science' Translated by Quenten Lauer in *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 71–147. [Henceforth PRS followed by relevant English and German page numbers; cf. PRS, 119/*Hua* XXV, 39]. The origins of this principle can even be traced back to Husserl's earliest period culminating with the publication of the *Investigations* wherein the sense of the term 'intuition' (*Anschuauung*) is already quite broad. Husserlian intuitions, for example, take in direct observations of every aspect of what can be called 'lived through experiences' (*Erlebnisse*) whether theoretical or natural. For details, see Husserl's posthumously published essay: 'Introduction to the Logical Investigations: A draft of a Preface of the Logical Investigations (1913)', Edited by Eugen Fink, Translated by Philip J. Bossert and Curtis H. Peters (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 8. [Henceforth: Husserl, 1975].

14 Cf. Leonard Nelson's lectures '*Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Metaphysik*' originally delivered at Göttingen from 1919 to 1926, later collected as '*Fortschritte und Rückstritte der Philosophie*', Translated by Humphrey Palmer as *Progress and Regress in Philosophy: From Hume and Kant to Hegel and Fries*, edited by Julius Kraft, in two volumes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970–71). See Volume 2 (1971), 47–48.

15 Leonard Nelson, *Gesammelte Schriften in neun Bänden*, Herausgegeben von Paul Bernays, Willi Eichler, Arnold Gysin, Gustav Heckmann, Grete Henry-Hermann Fritz von Hippel, Stephan Körner, Werner Krobel, Gerhard Weisser, *Zweiter Band*: *Geschichte und Kritik der Erkenntnistheorie*, Mit einem Vorwort von G. Weisser und L. F. Neumann (Felix Meiner Verlag: Hamberg, 1973), 60–391, [Henceforth Nelson, 1973 followed by relevant page number(s)]. All translations from the German are my own. See especially Part Two, Section XII, 'Husserls phänomenologische Methode und die intellektualle Anschauung', 171–177.

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that because the acts of knowledge that form the content of the phenomenological studies undertaken by Husserl are, in reality, of an empirical origin (as they focus on individual facts, i.e. the 'real existence' of our experience), this position is actually psychologistic. Nelson remarks:

> This consequence [of the modal difference between the logical knowledge itself and "the phenomenological foundation of logic"] could only be circumvented when one, as Fichte does, denies the empirical character of internal intuition while grasping the assumption of intellectual intuition as self-intuition (*Selbstanschauung*). And in fact, one finds represented in Husserl the assumption of a 'categorical intuition'.
>
> (Nelson, 1973, 172–3)[16]

Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition is subsequently explored and criticized. Categorial intuition we discover is tantamount, on Nelson's reading, to a kind of intellectual intuition as found in post-Kantian idealism. At this point, the defender of Husserl could respond by pointing out that Nelson has both misunderstood the distinction between genetic or empirical and descriptive psychology (underlying the phenomenology of the *Investigations*) as well as erroneously attributed an egoistic reading to the essentially non-egoistic doctrine of mental life presented by Husserl in the *Prolegomena*. Yet the criticisms that Nelson raises above are of interest nonetheless. For example, they loosely agree with Paul Natorp's criticisms of Husserl's *Investigations*. Nelson, like Natorp, anticipates critical shortcomings that would later lead to some of Husserl's own mature developments (more precisely: the turn to Kant and the regressive analysis initiated at Göttingen). However, given the misunderstandings present throughout Nelson's critique, it is perhaps not surprising when we learn that Husserl's categorial intuition is said to be both unnecessary and confusing. Nelson complains that Husserl wants to use phenomenology to:

> . . . lay bare the 'sources' from which the basic concepts and ideal laws of *pure* logic 'flow', and back to which they must once more be traced, so as to give them all the 'clearness and distinctness' needed for an understanding, and for an epistemological critique, of pure logic.
>
> (cf. LI as cited in Nelson, 1973, 175)

Nelson proceeds to criticize Husserl for not separating (empirical) psychology and (at this stage a still descriptive) phenomenology. This is said to be a problem because any attempt to arrive at epistemological foundations by relying on phenomenology that simultaneously assumes phenomenological insights to be both self-grounding *and* able to establish philosophical principles, is said to be circular. Husserl subsequently, Nelson maintains, gives circular arguments.

16 The German reads: 'Diese Konsequenz der modalischen Ungleichartigkeit zwischen der logischen Erkenntnis selbst und der "phänomenologischen Fundierung der Logik" ließe sich nur umgehen, wenn man, wie dies FICHTE tat, den empirischen Charakter der inneren Anschauung leugnen und zu der Annahme einer intellektuellen Selbstanschauung griefen wollte. Und in der Tat findet man bei HUSSERL die Annahme einer der sinnlichen koordinierten, "kategorialen Anschauung" vertreten.'

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Nelson's critical evaluation of the *Logical Investigations* concludes by summarizing how Husserl blurs psychology and philosophy together and ends up establishing a dogmatic position upon which he hopes to establish foundations for knowledge. Ultimately Husserl's 'logical dogmatism', as the methodology of the *Investigations* is characterized by Nelson, is held to be self-defeating. This is because, we are told, there is a lack of separation of 'critique of reason' from pure phenomenology. Nelson concludes that Husserl fails to establish the possibility of critique of reason deemed necessary to reconcile the systematic independence of logic from empiricism. The latter can be done, Nelson adds, 'not through the limitation of critique to a pure description and through the exclusion of all theory alone, but solely by pointing out that critical reasoning does not contain the foundation of logical principles' (Nelson, 1973, 176).

Before replying to these more detailed criticisms of Husserl's *Investigations*, and in order to better understand Nelson's polemical dismissal of the doctrines contained therein, we should here say something more about Nelson's form of critical rationalism and how it presents a challenge that effectively extends to Husserl's mature thought no less than to his earlier phenomenology.

Much like the later Husserl, Nelson systematically distinguishes between uncritically held common sense or everyday convictions and what he calls the 'Friesian' critical procedure. It is, in fact, by means of the latter that the previous convictions can be articulated and made part of a rational or philosophical system to begin with. This position leads Nelson to reject and condemn all attempts to make *Erkenntnistheorie* or epistemology the foundation of philosophy. Nelson's critical rejection of epistemological foundationalism furthermore, leads him to declare that theory of knowledge is 'impossible' (cf. Nelson, 1949, 185–205). For Nelson, this inevitably follows from his initial assumptions, since there are no 'validity criteria' available for establishing any epistemologically foundationalist claims.[17] The above conclusions are claimed to be compelling once it is realized that any immediately true cognitions we affirm are already presupposed by all mental activity. This conclusion not only makes theory of knowledge 'impossible', it also immediately initiates the critical method of regress underlying Nelson's neo-Friesian methodology (Nelson, 1949, 189). Against this context it can be noted that, from Nelson's point of view, all genuinely philosophical disputes are always about principles. Nelson writes: 'Every significant philosophical controversy is a controversy over principles. We are all in agreement on the application of these principles to experience and life; it is only when we begin to philosophize about them in *abstracto* that differences appear' (Nelson, 1949, 106).

The above differences, furthermore, are said to be precisely those necessary for philosophy to arise. Nonetheless, even if disagreements about principles can be said to stand at the heart of any truly philosophical method (according to Nelson) they must still be reconciled if philosophy is to be made scientific. Nelson therefore concludes that any philosophy with claims to being 'scientific' must in turn simultaneously be 'dialectical' and 'critical'. Here we might ask 'What', precisely, 'do these requirements amount to?'

In effect, Nelson would answer that they amount to nothing less than the rules of the regressive method (as originally established by Kant) and must be applied in order

17 In other words, there are no possible statements or propositions that can be put forward to stand as apodictically true 'foundational cognitions' and also shown to be so-grounded in any merely epistemological study of 'cognition' or experience.

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to enable genuinely philosophical thought.[18] The *art of philosophizing*, also referred to by Nelson as truly scientific metaphysics, depends essentially on nothing less than 'the methods by which we can trace philosophical judgments back to their ultimate sources' (Nelson, 1949, 87). This leads to a methodological problem however. In short, 'how [do we] get hold of the basic philosophical principles', since, according to Nelson, 'they are grounded on no intuition' (Nelson, 1949, 100)? The problem of securing suitable foundations for what are, evidently, the obscure original sources of philosophical thought can in turn only be overcome once we accept that philosophical knowledge is already present as underlying common-sense everyday knowledge. The confusion here, unacknowledged according to Nelson by far too many philosophers, is that philosophical claims must be arrived at in a direct but non-intuitive manner. Only through the various blind or obscure judgments that we necessarily make about the surrounding world, and our own day-to-day concerns, can we establish original and true grounds for all science and philosophy. Nonetheless, this attempt to secure a deeper justification for the mundane knowledge claims manifested in immediate lived experience can only be made clear and evident through reason. Thus, as Husserl also will later claim, the theoretical standpoint is the starting point of philosophy, but it only emerges from the natural attitude in the life-world. In contrast to Husserl, however, Nelson maintains that the only available method for establishing philosophy as a science '[starts] with judgments whose truth we are certain of even though we cannot explain what this truth rests on' (Nelson, 1949, 100). Thereafter, we must carefully seek to justify these basic judgments. But we only do this precisely by analyzing the presuppositions and implicit or tacit assumptions already taken for granted and assumed in order for judging and knowledge to occur in the first place.

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At this point, the need for regressive analysis emerges. Regression means 'moving back'— 'from the particular to the general, from the conclusions to the premises' (Nelson, 1971, 169). Nelson lays a great deal of stress on how use of the regressive method allows philosophy to become a science with its own content and method.[19] The method of philosophy hereafter becomes that of regress, but the regressive method is actually two-fold. The first type of regress is based on real reasons or facts. The second rests on merely epistemological reasons. When we regress in order to establish 'real reasons', we thereby (and simultaneously) establish proof in the form of articulating theorems for explaining the unfolding of events in the world of facts. This is called 'induction'. The second mode of regress, called 'speculation' by Fries, is labeled 'abstraction' by Nelson. In abstraction we regress to the discovery of principles. Abstraction, however, is 'not really a method of proof . . . [as it is] concerned with analyzing a train of thought' (Nelson, 1971, 169). In abstracting, therefore, we start from particular judgments (recognized as true) and analyze the presuppositions behind

18 Or what is the same in Nelson's terminology, the 'art of *philosophizing*'. The regressive method, Nelson also believes, must be taken up not as a rule for establishing, grounding, or teaching philosophy— but instead in order to teach us the art of *philosophizing*. Here we see the explicit and strongly Kantian connection between theory and practice that Nelson inherits from Kant and Fries.

19 In 1919, Nelson wrote, 'Philosophy's scientific task . . . is the logical assessment of the principles on which our general view of the world and of life is based. Arbitrary principles will not do, if philosophy is to be a science. Come what may, philosophy must try to justify its principles, otherwise we shall call it dogmatic, as resting on assumptions that are arbitrary. Rigor of argument within the system is here beside the point; one can, after all, argue consistently from assumptions which are true, and are seen to be true, proved true. Critical philosophy, which tries to justify its own principles, is thus distinguished from dogmatic philosophy of every sort, which takes its principles for granted arbitrarily . . .' (Nelson, 1970, 5).

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these solely for the purposes of ascending to principles. What do we gain from this? For one thing, Nelson explains, in using abstraction in this way we are not basing the principles being sought upon any concrete experience (which would, in any case, be a contingent or, in Kantian terms, 'synthetic *a posteriori*' form of judgment). Instead we can arrive at a non-intuitively grounded 'general rule' the results of the application of which, Nelson holds, can be seen to hold good independent of any particular or real experience. In this way alone are true principles revealed (Nelson, 1971, 169–170). According to Nelson's theory, therefore, abstraction reveals principles because the general rules of judging are also general propositions that form the possibility for experience and abstraction in the first place (or, once again to use Kantian terms, they establish the 'synthetic *a priori*' grounds of essential knowledge). Therefore, rather than bringing principles or grounds to intuitive presence, the critical method merely points to them by moving from the particular to the general. In this way, Nelson believed, his critical strategy avoids the charges that any aspect of what is an essentially psychological method actually *justifies* our principles in any way. For if the psychological ground or the subjective activity of abstraction itself is what justifies our principles we would, of course, be dealing with a science of facts. We would, for example, be engaging in psychology and therefore utilizing simply another mode or kind of empirical induction to justify induction. This would not only result in, at best, a question begging method; it would also fail to justify the validity of the principles which must underlie all inductive and deductive propositions. It would, in effect, lead directly to psychologism. Through Nelson's doctrine of abstraction, by contrast: 'a single example may be adequate for discovering a law' (Nelson, 1971, 169–170).

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Nelsonian abstraction, therefore, can be said to discover general rules and principles for grounding philosophy but not in anything like a self-evident way, as would be the case were it based on intuitive knowledge (as this was understood by Nelson). What is immediate or directly given on the above framework is instead the data of consciousness as immediate psychological awareness of objects. This includes also mental states as presented to us in immediate experiences. It is only through *reflection* (which Nelson holds is not intrinsically intuitive) that the method of abstraction can actually be applied. Thereafter, reflection also helps us elucidate and clarify the sources of our *a priori* knowledge. However, these sources or 'grounds' can still be said to be both (a) different in kind and (b) *temporally prior* to any empirical (psychological) knowledge. If empirical knowledge is obtained after experience occurs (in the classic terminology: *a posteriori*), and if no ideas are innate, then all knowledge must be based on experience. Accepting the above, the validity of scientific laws – since they aspire to nomological and universal validity – even if confirmed by experience – can be said *not* to directly derive from experience.[20] In his lectures on the history of philosophy, Nelson notes:

> Metaphysics stands in the background of all empirical research, and directs the inductions there performed. It does not, however, stand in the foreground of

20 As an example, we can take the law of the free fall of bodies first formulated by Galileo. Nelson would argue that it was not about any idea Galileo himself held pertaining to the nature of falling bodies, but rather about the (objective) reality of how bodies behave independent of anyone's thinking or not thinking about them. But the law of free fall is nonetheless an empirical scientific law and therefore determined to hold by experience and observation and derived by means of inductive inferences. When we inquire into how mathematical or scientific laws are possible in the first place, however, we cannot rest content with examining contingent (psychological) experience or induction of particulars in observation.

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the researchers mind. That is why he can make mistakes about this element in knowledge, even though the whole structure of his research is based upon it.[21]

Nelson further maintains that it is from pure reason alone that we deduce the principles of philosophy. This is accomplished by using a non-sensory faculty of the mind (reason) and indirectly securing the ground of all knowledge. The establishment of foundations, however, is also accomplished by knowledge that is both necessarily non-intuitive (because it relies on Fries' version of Kant's subjective deduction to establish the categories of thought) but still immediate. Foundational knowledge is immediate because there is no recourse to proof other than what is given in the directly apprehended contents of our experience. Nelson, as a supporter of the mathematician Hilbert, understands the regressive method (described above) precisely as one analogous to the distinction in meta-mathematics between 'model theory' and 'proof theory'. Critique, properly understood, never attains to the grounds of our philosophical claims, or what is the same, it cannot constitute metaphysical judgments directly in any way because it must take the former as its object.[22] In effect, the most basic claims of our knowledge are only grasped indirectly and dialectically as *non-intuitive principles*. Nelson's neo-Friesian project of continuing the 'anthropological critique of reason' can therefore be read as potentially and quite seriously undermining Husserl's claim that a complete reduction to an intuitively accessible phenomenological sphere of immanence is either possible or even justified. According to Nelson, we can conclude, no intuitionist methodology can be appealed to as the proper ground for establishing philosophical claims and principles.[23]

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4. Husserl at Göttingen: From *Logical Investigations* to the discovery of the phenomenological reduction

At Göttingen, Husserl made use of his phenomenological method to establish the validity of theoretical propositions, on the one hand, but also sought to clarify the ultimate

21 Leonard Nelson, *Progress and Regress in Philosophy: From Hume and Kant to Hegel and Fries*, Translated by Humphrey Palmer, Edited by Julius Kraft, Volume 1, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), 56.

22 To give another example, if we assume that experience is governed by the principle of causality and the temporal association of mental acts, then, according to Nelson, these connections within experience can never be proven through any single or even collected cases of actual experiences. Instead what would be required is a turn to psychological critique. This would be necessitated if only for the reason that any 'grounds' of the principles we seek to establish (their axiomatic basis) can only be taken as an 'object' presented in a non-intuitive but immediate way, i.e. insofar as it is assumed to be true. The principles, according to Nelson, are in this way objectified and brought to light through introspective acts that are empirical and psychological in essence (and in this way the psychological claims verify and make clear the objective claims of metaphysics and philosophical science). However our mental acts in no way directly justify our theoretical claims. Instead they serve as the 'factual grounds' upon which we affirm our commonly accepted principles. It is precisely for this reason that Nelson's Friesian method can be said to avoid psychologism.

23 A more detailed overview and outline of Nelson's project can be found in essays such as his '*Die sokratische Methode*' originally an address delivered to the Pedagogic Society of Göttingen on December 11 1912, later published in *Abhandungen der Fries'schen Schule*, V, No. 1 (Göttingen, 1929). Translated as 'Socratic Method' in Leonard Nelson, *Socratic Method and Critical Philosophy*: *Selected Essays by Leonard Nelson*. Translated by Thomas K. Brown III, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1949), 1–43. See also Nelson's 'The Impossibility of the 'Theory of Knowledge" in the same volume, 185–205. On Nelson's relationship to Hilbert's project, cf. Volker Peckhaus, *Hilbertprogramm und kritische Philosophie* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990).

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or basic foundations for all philosophical claims. Husserl's Göttingen appointment was secured largely on the strength of his just-published *Logical Investigations* (1900–01). But as Nelson was developing and articulating his version of critical rationalism and critique of epistemology, Husserl had already begun to develop some of the most original aspects of his own later phenomenological method. In the process, Husserl effectively transformed his earlier 'analytic' and descriptive phenomenology into something new. These innovations included new methodological tools, such as the transcendental and phenomenological reductions, as well as the broadening of his phenomenology to encompass themes such as 'internal time-consciousness' and 'inter-subjectivity'. It was at Göttingen, for example, that Husserl published *Ideas I*, which oversees the transformation of phenomenology from the descriptive system of the *Logical Investigations* (already criticized by Nelson) to its mature transcendental version grounded on the methods of reduction.

Thus while there is some truth to Nelson's claims that the descriptive phenomenology of the *Investigations* displayed a clearly articulated epistemological bias (one with a foundationalist mission to lay bare 'the sources of rational thought' in intuitive acts), it is nonetheless untrue that Husserl aimed to establish or give validity to logical principles in themselves by somehow 'containing them', as Nelson maintained, in phenomenological intuition (Nelson, 1973, 178).[24] In fact, the phenomenology of the *Investigations* had nothing to say about the actual or real foundations of logic or theory. For example, the 'species' model of meaning that Husserl articulates in the *Investigations* is tacitly assumed (but never proven) to be necessary. Subsequently, the phenomenological studies presented by Husserl therein were clearly described as being 'metaphysically neutral'; meant merely to articulate 'the basis for a more systematic grounding of the epistemological clarification of pure logic' (Husserl, 1975, 9). However, Husserl's transcendental turn, undertaken at Göttingen (especially after 1907) did lead to changes in his earlier notion of categorial intuition.[25] These changes moved his thought (in some ways) closer to that of Kant and Fries. Although Husserl's account of the foundations of logic and genuine science or philosophy nonetheless demanded phenomenological analysis, this later analysis differed from the earlier method of descriptive phenomenology. For one thing, Husserl had become much more explicitly aware of the immanentist and epistemological bias of his earlier descriptive phenomenology.

In a series of five lectures delivered between April and May 1907, while still forcefully maintaining the clarification of epistemological matters as central, Husserl

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24 Nelson writes of how, on Husserl's intuitionistic method, '*any type of critique of reason* is illusionary and is led back to an unlimited dogmatism, because knowledge that is immediately clear does not need a special science for its explanation.' Again this seems to presuppose that phenomenological insights, lying in descriptive psychology, are empirical. For an excellent account of the exact meaning and aim of the doctrines Husserl had articulated during the *Investigations* period, see Husserl, 1975. That Husserl was, however, very much aware of shortcomings with the still descriptive phenomenology of the *Investigations* is a matter of public record. See, for example, his published comments on this matter in E. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Translated by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), see paragraphs 56 and 57, 151–155.

25 As Husserl later recounts in 1913, for further documentation of this aspect of Husserlian thought, cf. Thomas M. Seebohm '*Kategoriale Anschauung*' *Phänomenologische Forschungen*, XXIII (1977), 9–47. Furthermore, Iso Kern writes of how the transcendental turn (from 1907 onwards) is marked precisely by a more intense preoccupation on Husserl's part with Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, cf. Kern's study, *Husserl und Kant: Eine Untersuchung über Husserls verhältnis zu Kant und zum NeuKantianismus*, Phaenomenologica 16 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 29–30.

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publicly begins the process of reinterpreting his earlier notions of 'immanence' and 'transcendence'. These lectures are important to us not only for the implicit transformation of the descriptive phenomenology of the *Logical Investigations* witnessed therein, but also for heralding (through their introduction of the method of reduction) a more transcendental approach. Finally, for our purposes here they are an important source because Nelson himself was in attendance as Husserl delivered them.[26] In these lectures, later collected as *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl describes how the earlier distinction between *adequate* and *inadequate* knowledge articulated in the *Logical Investigations* (and determined there by the above described relative fulfillment of the contents of various 'sense bestowing' intentional acts) must now be questioned.[27] In the *Logical Investigations*, empirical or transcendent objects were said to be given inadequately or incompletely, while ideal objects such as universals or essences (the abstracted 'species' of the act) were described as adequately and apodictically given and thus capable of being fully instantiated and immediately presented within fulfilling acts of consciousness. These distinctions are also critically reassessed here. In effect, Husserl now undertakes revisions of his earlier phenomenology that effectively makes the ontological separation of the empirical and the ideal, as presupposed in the *Investigations*, problematic.[28]

To begin, in the *Idea of Phenomenology* lectures, Husserl radically reinterprets the notion of 'immanence'. This is an important step if only because it was a sense of immanence that was earlier said by Husserl to be necessary for the proper clarification of 'adequate' knowledge in the first place.[29] Husserl now takes 'immanence' to imply that the ontological status of objects known outside of psychic acts must be effectively suspended. Therefore what is immanent is now said to be that which is *originally given*, without question, in pure seeing (*rein schauend*) (IP, 24/*Hua* II, 30). In point of fact, Husserl now distinguishes between two kinds of immanence, 'real' and 'absolute', and these are now said to correspond to 'real' and 'absolute' notions of transcendence (IP, 5/*Hua* II, 44). The mental sphere of psychology and empirical experience, according to Husserl, is now said to be the *immediately given* sphere of genuine immanence, i.e. it is composed of '*reell*' psychic acts having determinate constituting features.[30]

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26 Nelson was present for at least for the May 11th lecture, and perhaps earlier ones as well. On this again see Varga's '*Ein bisher unbekanntes Porträt von Edmund Husserl*'. Nelson, who was at the time planning his Habilitation in Göttingen was apparently not very impressed by Husserl's talk that day. The most notable feedback provided by Nelson's available notes from the talk, preserved in the '*Archiv der sozialen Demokratie*' archives, is a caricature of the lecturer (Husserl) looking somber and serious as he stands behind his podium.

27 Edmund Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen.* Edited by W. Biemel as Husserliana II (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973). English Translation by Lee Hardy as *The Idea of Phenomenology*, cf. E. Husserl, Collected Works VIII, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999) [Henceforth: 'IP', followed by the English and German Husserliana edition page references].

28 The basis for the new distinctions that lead Husserl to develop his doctrine of the reduction are directly tied in therefore to the reconceptualization of the immanence and transcendence of psychic or mental acts.

29 IP, 24/*Hua* II, 30.

30 'Real' [*reell*] here does not mean objectively real (*wirklich*) rather the term '*reell*' is used by Husserl precisely to denote the phenomenal quality of an immediate part of consciousness, a non-transcendent and therefore purely immanent experience within the greater whole of operative functioning intentional conscious life. The *real* (corresponding to *Realität*), on the contrary, would be the psychological contents of the experiencing subject, apprehended for example upon reflection (*Reflexion*) in the natural attitude. Thus, what is real according to Husserl is causally determined and transcendent of the purely immanent *Originalspäre* of the phenomenologically reflecting ego. Cf. also *Ideen I*, § 88 (Id. I, 213/*Hua* III, 181) where the same framework is refined.

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Although within the measurable and determinate activity of these psychic acts, what is called 'real immanence', and through which all contingent psychological facts are given, can be determined (IP, 5/*Hua* II, 44). This so-called 'real' (*reell*) immanence is nonetheless not an absolute immanence. At this stage, it is the turn to the intentionally directed and reflecting ego that is said to hold the key to the mystery of properly grasping the relation between consciousness and meaning, such that meaning is said to rest on an intuitively and immediate given foundation. After the transcendental turn, the analysis of the subject or ego introduces what Husserl also calls an 'epistemological reduction' of the field of enquiry into a study of only immanent phenomena as appearances for the subject. This early method of reduction was later expanded considerably in Husserl's mature thought, e.g. in the *Ideas I*. Originally the reduction to givenness is used by Husserl to illuminate the important form of *transcendence within immanence* that characterizes the meaning-giving acts of constitution that make knowledge possible. In thematizing these acts Husserl is, in a sense, embracing introspection. However, in another sense, given the radical nature of examining the *sense* or meaning of how objects are given, he is also, arguably, much more forcefully rejecting psychologism.

Phenomenology is now called by Husserl the 'specifically' philosophical attitude and method (IP, 19/*Hua* II, 23). According to Husserl, phenomenology must therefore critique all merely factually given objects even as they are studied in direct (i.e. naïve) experience or systematically categorized by the positive sciences. The realm of immanence that Husserl finds himself concerned with now (and what will later become the focus of his fully transcendental phenomenology) is a deeper *actual immanence*. Husserl writes of how this deeper immanence is the repository of 'absolute givenness' and, as such, held to be distinct from any 'real immanence'. The former (real, i.e. 'non-absolute' immanence) is now described as: 'immanence as real containment,' and, according to Husserl, better studied by psychology. Phenomenology, by contrast, will be interested instead in immanence as *absolute adequate givenness* (called by Husserl 'the sum of our *cogitations*'). (IP, 23/*Hua* II, 29). Absolute adequate givenness is different from immanence as 'real' containment, not in the least because it is said to be the basis for the ultimate (and ideal) norms governing the validation of all *acts of positing* within experience. The absolute and actually immanent (what is now said to be both *adequately and apodictically* given) is called here: 'the sphere of pure self-givenness' (IP, 45/*Hua* II, 60) and is also referred to as 'a sphere of pure evidence' (IP, 47/*Hua* II, 61). Originally this sphere of pure givenness is ambitiously claimed by Husserl to exclude all transcendence; later, in the *Ideas* and other writings, it came to be viewed as a dynamic temporally unfolding 'living present'.

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Essentially it can be said that what Husserl is attempting to articulate in his Göttingen writings is a reworking of the 'real'-'ideal' distinction as this was formulated in the *Investigations* and other earlier writings.[31] In this way Husserl radicalized his earlier notion of meaning-giving acts. Transcendence, for the later Husserl, can therefore be said to be intelligible solely by reference to experience and therefore viewed always as

31 And see also *Hua* XXII (Husserl, 1979 *op. cit.*), 92–123, 303–348, 151–61 & LI. Prol: § 22 (LI, Vol. 1, 48–51/*Hua* XVIII, 76–80); Inv. II. Chp. 2, § 8 (LI Vol. 1, 249–50/*Hua* XIX/I, 128–131), etc. This point is important to stress as many commentators seem to equate the 'real'– 'ideal' distinction of the *Investigations* as continuing into Husserl's mature thought. Cf. for a recent example, see Brian Elliot *Phenomenology and Imagination in Husserl and Heidegger*, (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 60.

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a necessary correlate of the intentionality of the subject. Furthermore, the object as intended (as we shall also see), in Husserl's mature theory of intentionality, is not in any way to be conceived as contained *within* the psychic sphere of the *cogito* (IP, 21/ *Hua* II, 27). The forms of authentic immanence and transcendence, as outlined earlier in the *Logical Investigations*, are therefore reformulated and replaced by these new descriptions of what Husserl calls '*intentional immanence*' and '*intentional transcendence*'.

Intentional objects for Husserl can now be described as '*irreell*' in the new sense of that term, i.e. as genuinely transcendent of the acts that manifest them. However, and more importantly, this change in terminology prefigures Husserl's systematic critique of what comes to be seen as 'the naturalistic prejudice'.[32] The 'objects' or 'things' given immanently, i.e. in absolute immanence, in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology can be said to be present themselves not as intentional contents (that were earlier said to be 'objectivated' by or within intentional acts),[33] but rather as the 'appearances' (*Erscheinungen*) or phenomena that allow access to the objects of experience (the *phenomena*) for the ego in the first place. (IP, 52, *Hua* II, 71).[34] Therefore the new notion of immanence or *subjective constitutional activity* is introduced with a new sense of 'transcendence' accompanying it, i.e. the transcendence found within the sphere of pure consciousness. The main problem for Husserl, at this stage, is that of coherently accounting for the notion of transcendence at play here. In effect, this new understanding of transcendence is still quite ambiguous. The term 'transcendence,' in *The Ideas of Phenomenology* lectures has (as was mentioned) two distinct senses: (i) transcendence in the act – the real (*reell*) transcendence correlating to real immanence, or 'transcendence in immanence' and (ii) absolute transcendence or 'transcendence as correlated to absolute immanence'. However, and somewhat problematically, the second (stronger) sense of transcendence seems to be presupposed and thereafter abstracted from, but in this way excluded from close study, in these earliest formulations of the phenomenological reduction.

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By Nelson's criteria, however, even Husserl's notion of transcendence in the *Idea of Phenomenology* lectures can be described as deficient. This is because it is still presupposed to be a worldly or natural kind of transcendence. Allowing only a transcendence within immanence (which can be viewed as a merely negative kind of transcendence) and in presupposing the conditions and limits of all transcendence beforehand, Husserl's early *epistemological reduction* can still be said to harbor presuppositions that render it subject to critique. Nonetheless, Husserl's thought quickly moved beyond this early epistemological articulation of the reduction. Within his essay, 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science',[35] for example, Husserl's position, for the first time, becomes much more

32 The same naturalist prejudice that was in play in his own earlier writings and will come to be dealt with *via* the fully elaborated transcendental or phenomenological reduction.

33 Cf. LI, Vol. 2, 158–165.

34 This seems to be the earliest known exposition of the controversial Husserlian notion of 'constitution' in its mature form. In his study of Husserl's theory of constitution, Robert Sokolowski traces the term to Kantian and neo-Kantian influences at work on Husserl from about this time. See R. Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 214. A specifically consistent influence on Husserl during this period was Paul Natorp. It would probably not be going too far to say that Husserl borrowed the term 'constitution' from Natorp. However, Husserl will expand the sense and in effect change the meaning that this term has for either Kant, Natorp, or other neo-Kantians (ibid., 216, and cf. also again Kern, 1964).

35 *Op. cit.* See n.13 above.

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explicitly transcendental in a self-consciously Kantian sense.[36] This growing interest in Kant that dominated his later years at Göttingen also allowed Husserl to step even closer towards the philosophical position of Nelson. However, instead of coming to formulate doctrines similar or identical to Nelson's (and adopting a Friesian form of Kantian critical rationalism), Husserl explicitly rejected the Friesian anthropological strategy and attempted instead to develop the, arguably much more radical, transcendental-phenomenological reduction.

The guiding theme of transcendental phenomenology, as Husserl would come to formulate it, therefore became the radical overcoming of *all* naturalist and objectivist prejudices.[37] The real transformation of Husserl's earlier phenomenology therefore appears in the *Ideas I*. Here Husserl combines the method of reductions with close and detailed descriptions of the nature of givenness (*Gegebenheit*) in all its complexities (cf. Id I, §§ 19–26, 43, 149, etc.). In the *Ideas I*, the precise manner of how genuine physical things are given in profiles (*Abschattungen*), for example, while noetic processes or experiential contents (*Erlebnisse*) are available for consciousness all at once, are explored. This strategy leads Husserl beyond the eidetic and into the transcendental phenomenological reduction; eventually to an understanding of the radical correlation of knowing acts with objective correlates. In attempting to analyze experience beginning from the pure temporal givenness of the 'subjective' conditions of conscious experience itself, Husserl came to believe that even the study of epistemological problems needed to be radicalized.[38]

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36 Building on 1905–06 lectures, the *Logos* essay is, in effect, the first published manifesto for the emerging project of transcendental phenomenology. Although there is a strong case to be made that Husserl's attacks against psychologism and relativism in epistemology within his earlier writings, culminating in the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* and the *Logical Investigations*. See E Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen. Erster & Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. In zwei Bänden*. Edited by Ursula Panzer, Husserliana XIX. I–II (Halle: 1901; rev. ed. 1922) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) [Henceforth: *Hua* XIX]. The later *Investigations*, elaborated from an explicitly phenomenological position, anticipate the later transcendental turn in important respects. We cannot argue the above in any lengthy manner however, as it would take us too far off topic. We have, nonetheless, already examined the new focus on the transcendental that emerges in Husserl's writings on epistemology after the *Investigations* period and here we can add that what is left unexplored and unthematized in the *Idea of Phenomenology* writings, as we claimed above, is precisely 'the problem of naturalism'.

37 These naturalistic prejudices are even explicit in the *Logos* essay (from the same period) where Husserl describes phenomenological and psychological analysis as parallel methods: 'Phenomenology and psychology must stand in close relationship to each other, since both are concerned with consciousness, even though in a different way, according to a different "orientation"' (PRS, 91/ *Hua* XXV, 17).

38 Although the formal parallel relationship of phenomenology and psychology will always remain, later the introduction of 'transcendental' and 'eidetic' forms of psychology and different fundamental attitude for transcendental phenomenology will separate the methodological role of phenomenology from psychology (cf. *Hua* VII, 262, and *Hua* IX, 294–295). Nonetheless, the exact relationship between psychology and phenomenology would always remain convoluted. As Herbert Spiegelberg comments: '. . . Husserl himself, during the whole of his philosophical development, did not find it easy to determine once and for all his attitude toward psychology, and to define the exact function which he assigned to it within the framework of his changing conception of phenomenology.' See H. Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*. Second Edition, Fourth impression, Vol. 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 149. And see E. Ströker, 'The Role of Psychology in Husserl's Phenomenology' in *Continental Philosophy in America*, Edited by T. Seebohm, H. J. Silverman, & J. Sallis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1983).

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5. A Husserlian response to Nelson

Using the phenomenology of the *Ideas*, called by Husserl a fully transcendental phenomenology, we can here give a response to Nelson's criticisms. Does phenomenology try to establish the grounds of all science or the principles of the real by deriving them somehow logically or essentially from the descriptive content of the structures it surveys? The answer is negative. The reduction is not interested in deducing 'the being of the world' or in establishing principles for real existence. In the purely phenomenological studies of mental acts, undertaken in his mature philosophy, Husserl is very clear that the being or 'existence-status' of the world is left *unchanged* by the reduction. What is instead affected is the *sense* of the world as experienced. Does this mean that the reduction blocks out the empirical world and cuts us off from being or makes us skeptical of the existence of a world outside of our minds? Once again this reading is not justified by what we find in Husserl's texts. Writing of his mature phenomenology, in a lecture delivered at Freiburg in the 1920s, Husserl stated:

> Nothing lies further from our intention than to play skeptical paradoxes off against the natural rational activity of life – or against natural experience and its self-confirmation in its harmonious continuation, or against natural thinking (and also valuing, active striving) in its natural methods of reasoning (and, therefore, also against natural science), and it is not intended that any of these be depreciated.
>
> (KI, 22/*Hua* VII, 246)[39]

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There is, therefore, within the transcendental phenomenological reduction, what is described as a 'pure directedness' essentially connecting to correlates given in perception. After the reduction however, intentional consciousness is known precisely or essentially through *how* it is given: 'we can faithfully describe the "appearing as appearing" in complete evidence [*Evidenz*]' Husserl writes in *Ideas I*. The 'sense' of an (outer) perception (taking Husserl's example from *Ideas I* of a tree) is here described as transcendent and ideal in the new sense of that term articulated in his Göttingen lectures. Accordingly not even the destruction of the corresponding 'objective' or 'transcendent' physical object (beyond the noetic process) will effect its sense. Husserl writes: 'The tree *simpliciter* can burn up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense-the sense *of this* perception, something belonging necessarily to its essence – cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties' (Id. I, 216–17/*Hua* III, 184).[40]

All perception, on the above view, is to be viewed as a source of original *Evidenz*. However, because (outer) perception is presumptive and never complete *in essence*, this

39 See, the supplementary text '*Kant und die Idee der Transcendentalphilosophie*' in E. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/1924). Erster Teil. Kritische Ideengeschichte*, Edited by Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana VII (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 230–287. Translated as 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy' by T. E. Klein and W. E. Pohl in *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 5, (Fall, 1974), 9–56. Henceforth KI, followed by English and German page numbers.

40 Earlier, in the *Logical Investigations* (LI, Vol. 2, pp. 119–122/*Hua* XIX/I, 425–431), Husserl wrote of acts having the same matter or content as not being reducible to the same intentional object. As was already claimed above, within his mature phenomenology the talk of mental content gets dropped as does the straightforward act-object description of perception.

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kind of perception is, in reality, actually a form of apperception. That is, external perception, according to Husserl, harbors an essential contradiction in the following sense: for it to be meaningfully interpreted it must be referred back to its essential source.[41] All transcendent perception therefore (in principle) has an anticipatory non-presentable aspect, and it should be stressed here that this element of absence in the perceptual act is just as important as the intuitive *presence* that critics such as Nelson accuse Husserlian phenomenology of privileging. Therefore we must turn to the *structure of perception* and recognize it (and by analogy all of experience) as essentially bounded by temporality in order to grasp what Husserl calls essential and eidetic insights. In a real sense, therefore, Husserl agrees with Nelson that philosophy starts in immediate experience and must grasp *a priori* truths upon which to establish principles.

These immanent insights that Husserl explores are, in his case, what the transcendental phenomenological reduction purports to disclose and only these eidetic insights can form a sound basis for rational cognitions. Within his mature thought, starting in *Ideas I* however, Husserl also made a sharp distinction between *formalization* and *generalization* (cf. Id. I, 27/*Hua* III, 27). This distinction can be seen to roughly parallel what Nelson calls the difference between inductive generalizations and abstraction. According to Husserl, formal generalizations (of a purely logical kind) are distinguished from constitutive '*fillings in*' of the same. Formalization, in effect, amounts to the phenomenological elimination of all references to particular entities from a given body of knowledge in a way that only singular and general judgments are left. Ideal essences will be the correlates of these judgments. Generalization, on the other hand, also leading to an elimination of singular or existential judgments, gives us morphological or general essences. Formal ontology, for Husserl, is thus not the same as what was called 'general ontology' historically, i.e. by thinkers such as Wolff and Kant. While formalization plays a marked role in eidetic sciences (such as mathematics), the pure logical essences are not as widely applicable as higher level (i.e. generic) essences are said to be. For example, 'triangle' would fall under the higher genus: 'spatial shape', 'red' under that of 'sensory quality' (Id. I, 27/*Hua* III, 27). For Husserl, the highest genus (being) cannot itself be a genus.[42] In effect, every essence has an eidetic extension except the *infima species*. Eidetic singularities would thus seem to be the limits of ideal being and thus 'the ascertainment of eidetic phenomenology concerns not realities but essences' (Id. III, § 8/*Hua* V, 47). These high-level essences are made thematic precisely through the method of epoché and the application of the transcendental phenomenological reduction. What is left unclear, from a realist perspective such as Nelson takes, is the precise relation between the morphological and ideal essences. One thing is certain however, Husserl never anywhere maintains that the constitutive activity of consciousness that reveals the essences also brings them into being or existence. Furthermore, the logical structure of the essential insights, as determined in the reduction, are not analytic truths or merely deduced in an abstract way from an 'unpacking' of abstract meanings alone. Within phenomenological analysis, these eidetic insights can be more precisely described as 'synthetic *a priori*' structures

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41 E. Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918–1926,* Edited by Margot Fleischer, Husserliana XI (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 3.
42 Here Husserl seems to agree with what Aristotle says in the *Posterior Analytics* (92 b10) and *Metaphysics* (998 b22).

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of experience unfolding in a temporal horizon. Thus the structures of experience determined in the reduction are, in actuality, very close to the 'principles' said to be arrived at through abstraction by Fries and Nelson.

Where Husserlian thought sharply divides itself from the neo-Friesian version of Kantianism, however, is in the very different interpretation of Kant's subjective deduction that Husserl makes. Although Kant is, according to the mature Husserl, the first philosopher to undertake an 'original regressive way' of deducing basic concepts and transcendental principles (KI, 50–51/*Hua* VII, 280–281),[43] nonetheless Husserl maintains that (in criticism that could be applied directly to Nelson), Kant remains 'ontologically interested'. Because Kant narrows down 'concretely full conscious life' in the process reducing the normative aspects of thought and experience to naturalistic categories, according to Husserl this undermines attempts of Kant, as well as the later Kantian tradition, to articulate a consistently transcendental approach to the problem of knowledge. In Kant's case, this ontological reduction is to objective categories derived from *sensuous* experience. In the case of Nelson, it is to direct psychological critique of experience that eschews phenomenology. Furthermore, the regressive and deductive Kantian strategy can be said to also distort essential constitutive aspects of the transcendental ego. In this way, the non-phenomenological strategy of regression can again be seen to display what Husserl would call 'a naturalist prejudice', viz. the division of the world into 'object realm of nature' and 'subjective (receptive and passive) consciousness'.

For the mature Husserl, against the above, the 'inner'-'outer' distinction rests within, or rather creates its legitimate sense *out of*, a cognizing consciousness (KI, 48/*Hua* VII, 277). The Kantian presupposition that sensibility is receptive to an outer cause, a 'determinable X' of transcendental experience is ultimately taken to be phenomenologically naïve by Husserl. Kant's entire conception of the transcendental is subsequently labeled 'peculiar' (*eigentümlich*).[44] This is partly because no fully articulated transcendental logic, demanding a *transcendental noetics*, can be found in Kant's writings, but also – we are told – because Kant's prejudice towards the natural sciences as models of grounded knowledge must be overcome. Kant, in brief, never penetrated to presuppositionless and self-evident beginnings (KI, 52/*Hua* VII, 283).[45] Ignoring the radical reflection needed to undertake the epoché, according to Husserl, Kantianism and neo-Kantian thought misses the fact that 'transcendental subjectivity . . . is the field

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43 We are even told of how phenomenology sees itself: '[as] completely at one with Kant in [the] endeavoring to actualize transcendental philosophy in the spirit of a rigorous science striving towards the idea of ultimate validity' (KI, 56/*Hua* VII, 287).

44 In the *Crisis* Husserl further protests against Kant's exclusively regressive method and what he there calls its accompanying 'faculty psychologizing' that he claims to find at work behind the Kantian 'principles of the understanding'. See Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die trascendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*. Edited by Walter Biemel, Husserlian VI (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954). English translation as, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* by David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970). [Henceforth: *Crisis* with English and German page references respectively]. (Cf. *Crisis*, §§ 30–31, pp. 114–118/*Hua* VI, 119–121). These same criticisms could have been leveled against Nelson, but one wonders how fair they are. As Nelson could have pointed out, the term 'faculty' in Kant is almost always simply synonymous with 'mental activity'.

45 Here again we can apply these Husserlian criticisms directly to Nelson.

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in which all method originates' (KI, 54/*Hua* VII, 285). Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, therefore, seeks to establish a consciously guiding teleological idea, using the reduction to 'disclose the entelechy of genuine self-vindicating rigorous science' (KI, 54/*Hua* VII, 285).

Nonetheless, both the (neo-) Kantians and Husserl were in agreement that any attempt to acquire metaphysical knowledge through concepts alone is doomed to fail. According to Kant (and Nelson would agree), 'concepts without intuitions are empty' (*KrV*, A52/B76), while Husserl often writes of the senselessness of assertions that are not justified by phenomenological analysis. In contrast to Kant and the Friesian approach, however, Husserl attempts to bridge the strict separation between conceptual and intuitive thought. It was for this reason, and no other, that Husserl early on introduced his notion of *categorial intuition* that forsakes any kind of (what Kant called) 'analytic of principles' or schematism of the categories through a transcendental deduction. Husserl's position, finally, differs perhaps most radically from the Kantian critical tradition in philosophy in its rejection of the dichotomy of a *phenomenon-noumenon* interpretation of existence. For Husserl, the distinction between 'objects of possible experience' *versus* 'things in themselves,' is said to be a 'mystical construct'. On a more strictly Kantian approach, such as Nelson takes, the above can only be read as promoting a conception of some form of intellectual intuition. And this criticism no doubt has much truth to it.[46] Nonetheless, Husserl refuses to accept Kant's (and Nelson's) faculty psychology and brands it inadequate due to its failure to expand and clarify the notion of intuition (i.e., the strict Kantian notion of intuition taken as a '*repraesentatio singularis*'). Husserl, instead seeks to expand the concept of intuition to include 'states of affairs,' categorial objects, and later on, elements of passive (*genetic*) synthetic processes. As such, on Husserl's model of mental activity, there is no fundamental distinction between the passive 'givenness' of sensation to intuition *versus* the active synthesis of experience in the 'categories of the understanding,' nor, we can point out, the subsequently problematic dualism this same distinction can bring with it. However, as Nelson would argue, it is precisely this aspect of Husserl's intuitionism, when made use of in concert with his attempt to establish a realist foundation for science, that introduces problems into Husserl's phenomenological philosophy.

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6. Conclusion

Nelson's work, it was argued above, is probing, rigorous, and systematic. Husserl would not have been able to realistically label him either 'muddle-headed' or 'unsystematic'. However, Nelson seemed unable to take in the full depth and complexity of Husserl's phenomenology, for which reason certain of his own presuppositions and methods can be challenged from a phenomenological perspective.

Having articulated Nelson's philosophical position above, it can be noted how, although it contains many valuable insights as well as offering very relevant criticism of Husserlian phenomenology, Nelson fails to take into consideration important

46 However, these deeper metaphysical problems can merely be suggested and not dealt with here due to lack of space.

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aspects of Husserl's later transcendental phenomenology. For one thing, *pace* Nelson, the reduction is not an escape from nature or being, but can instead be interpreted as another way of thematizing what Nelson himself calls the basis for 'immediate knowledge'. Husserl's work, in exploring the horizons of our connection to being and elucidating the essential sense of how meaning is given in conscious acts, has no real parallel in modern philosophy. Nonetheless, the real crux of the challenge that Nelson presents, it can be argued, lies in how to understand phenomenological propositions or, what is the same, in how the knowledge claims made available to us through the phenomenological reduction are to be interpreted. As we have seen, these cannot be viewed as tautologies or self-grounding statements of a dogmatic kind. These 'meaning structures', as they can be called, should instead be understood to involve a complex analysis of experience that does not exclude the reflective application of immediate insights to the world-horizon. Since phenomenological propositions deal with immediate experience *and* its connection to transcendent objects in the world, it is precisely some form of phenomenological clarification that seems to be required to establish a more thorough philosophical exploration of the foundations of experience. However, even if Nelson's criticism of Husserl's thought is far too hasty to condemn its shortcomings and too easily dismisses the above important insights, nonetheless he did accurately predict the disintegration of the 'phenomenological school' at Göttingen. More pointedly, Nelson's criticism of intuitionism seemed to have hit the mark in rightly curbing the hopes for a universal and rigorous system of complete reductions that Husserl believed would establish phenomenology as an intuitively clarified foundation for all science. This never happened and according to Nelson's system it never could. Later phenomenologists, starting with Heidegger but including thinkers such as Paul Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty, were themselves equally skeptical of the strong Cartesian aspect of Husserl's thought. However, Nelson could nonetheless have learned something from Husserl. Husserl's patient reflective method applied to the analysis of experience in the form of allowing the facts to come to light and reveal themselves regardless of ideological convictions or cherished beliefs, is an important lesson in itself. This lesson is even more important regarding the benefits of careful and detailed foundational work in philosophy The fervent adherence of Nelson to his neo-Friesian framework, one senses, too often acts as a strait-jacket of sorts to his ability to appreciate non-Kantian and non-critical modes of thought.

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In conclusion, we should take Husserl's attempts to work through and carefully scrutinize (rather than reject) epistemological problems as important and in many ways similar to Nelson's critical and regressive strategy. If the above is correct, then Nelson's critical and 'regressive' method has something valuable to gain from interaction with Husserl's phenomenology. Although Nelson's anti-intuitionism is ultimately incompatible with Husserl's strictly phenomenological version of foundationalism, it can nonetheless be maintained that certain aspects of Nelson's project actually complement and (as was argued above) even correct doctrines in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Alternatively, Husserl's phenomenological elucidation of the foundational structures of experience underlying theoretical acts can, when properly understood, strengthen Nelson's view of philosophy as a rational enterprise. It can be added that Nelson's complete and abrupt rejection of intuitive or phenomenological foundations for examining knowledge claims is, on a very real level, counter-productive. Husserlian phenomenology has many conceptual resources available to help clarify and bring to

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light the subtle details and aspects of the structural qualities that make rationality and rational thought what it is. Therefore it is in many ways unfortunate that Husserl and Nelson neither attempted to understand each other more thoroughly or read each other's works more carefully.[47]

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47 An earlier version of this chapter was delivered as a talk: 'Leonard Nelson's Challenge to Phenomenology and a (Husserlian) Response' for the June 13, 2013 meeting of The North American Society for Early Phenomenology at Western University, London, Ontario, Canada. I would like to thank all the participants who were there and especially those who participated in the subsequent discussion. A special thank you to Isabel Cranz for help with the translation of passages of Nelson's writings and Peter Andras Varga for reading an earlier draft of this chapter and providing important feedback and helpful suggestions.

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17 Perceptual constitution in Husserl's phenomenology

The primacy of tactual intentionality

Fotini Vassiliou

Abstract: It is generally accepted that, in his phenomenological theory of perceptual constitution, Husserl privileges touch over vision. This can be easily detected in certain places in the *Ideas* II (especially §§36–38). At the same time, there are other contexts in which Husserl seems to treat these two sense modalities as being equal. This is the case with some further sections of *Ideas* II (especially §18c) and in the elaborate analyses of *Thing and Space*. A hasty reading of this apparent inconsistency impedes a proper understanding of the crucial theme in Husserl of the primacy of tactility. The present chapter restores and elucidates the details of Husserl's account. A careful examination of the different levels of constitutional analyses—something that has not yet been highlighted in the manner it deserves—will reveal the compatibility and complementarity of allegedly conflicting Husserlian ideas. It will be shown that at the level of *res extensa*, vision and touch are equal with regard to the constitution of thingly phantomatic spatiality. Touch, however, is elucidated as essentially privileged in a double sense, as regards the constitution of the lived-body as one's own (primarily at a phantomatic level), and the constitution of the percept's and the lived-body's full material reality.

Keywords: constitution, Husserl, localization of sensations, materiality, phantom, practical kinaesthesis, primacy of tactility, vision.

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§ 1. Introduction

How do the senses, and in particular vision and touch, contribute to perceptual constitution? Are they equiprimordial, or is one in some sense pre-eminent and fundamental? It is generally accepted that Husserl promotes the priority of the sense of touch over that of vision. This can be easily detected in certain texts from *Ideas* II (especially §§36–38).[1] At the same time, there are contexts in which Husserl seems to

1 See, for example, Jenny Slatman, "The Sense of Life: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on Touching and Being Touched," *Chiasmi International* 7 (2005), 305–324; Matthew Ratcliffe, "Touch and the Sense of Reality" in Zdravko Radman, ed., *The Hand an Organ of Mind*; *What the Manual tells the Mental* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), 131–157. The Husserlian texts of *Ideas* II to which I refer here are included in Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, ed. Marly Biemel, Husserliana IV (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1952); English translation: *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), henceforth cited as *Hua* IV, followed by the German then English page references. I will generally adopt this form of citation for Husserl's

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deal with these two sense modalities as being equal. This is the case with some other sections of *Ideas* II (especially §18c) and in the elaborate analyses of *Thing and Space*.[2] This apparent inconsistency may lead to accounts like that of Mattens, who diagnoses ambiguity in Husserl's view, and claims that §§36–38 of *Ideas* II obviously conflict with §18c of the same work and with the phenomenological descriptions in *Thing and Space*.[3] On the whole, Mattens contends that Husserl's claim about the priority of touch is not phenomenologically substantiated, and that it remains, in the end, unexplained.[4] Mattens, instead, urges that "[v]ision is, in an obvious way, the most important of all the senses."[5]

Husserl's texts are no doubt often dense and to some degree confused. But this is far from signifying "plain conflict" between different aspects of Husserl's argumentation, at least as regards our present concern, the privileging of tactility. It is the aim of the present paper to restore and elucidate the details of Husserl's account. A careful examination of different levels of analyses—a task that has yet to be carried out with the care it deserves—will reveal the compatibility and complementarity of supposedly conflicting Husserlian ideas.

I will begin (§2) by presenting some basic elements of Husserl's theory of perceptual constitution regarding the stratification of the percept into *res extensa* and *res materialis*. I will then investigate (in §3) the role played by vision and touch at the level of the constitution of thingly spatiality. We will have the opportunity to realize that at this level, and as regards their presentational function, these two sense modalities are equal. Then, in the following section (§4), I will deal with the first essential asymmetry between vision and touch, introduced with the dimension of the lived body's ownness. The next section (§5), on the constitutional level of the percept's materiality-causality, will reveal the second essential asymmetry between vision and touch. It will be shown that according to Husserl, touch is not only a sense of mere contact but also a sense of effort, and that precisely this dimension opens the way to the constitution of natural things in the full sense.

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§ 2. Phantoms and causal-material things

In everyday life, perceptual things embedded within practical, cultural, theoretical, and intersubjective horizons are primordially given. Perceptual things are always invested with practical, axiological, and cognitive-judgmental characters, the meaning of which we share with other subjects. In his phenomenological analyses, Husserl proceeds with the unbuilding (*Abbau*) of the order of givenness, with the aim of disclosing the

works: *Hua* A, B/C, where A is the Latin number of the Husserliana series, B the German page reference, and C the English page reference, when available.

2 Edmund Husserl, *Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907*, ed. Ulrich Claesges, Husserliana XVI (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973); English translation: *Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997).

3 See Filip Mattens, "Body or Eye: A Matter of Sense and Organ," *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* 8 (2008), 93–125. As Mattens himself notes, "[o]n several occasions in this text [in *Ideas* II], [. . .] [Husserl] advances the privilege of touch for thing-constitution. This is in plain conflict with his earlier descriptions of 'thing-constitution,' such as the 1907 'Thing Lectures' in which, even though sight takes up most of his attention, touch and sight are treated equally. Within the studies gathered in *Ideas* II, Husserl's position is, at best, ambiguous" (Mattens 2008, 95; see also 96 n. 7).

4 Ibid., 104, 116.

5 Ibid., 95.

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stratification of the correlates of consciousness in the order of intentional constitution. As products of such "analytical" disclosure, the different constitutional levels become subjects of phenomenological scrutiny regarding their pertinent typology, their foundational relationships, and their interactions.

The first stage of this phenomenological unbuilding is the abstraction of all praxio-axiological and theoretical meaning and affinity, and the disclosure of the percept as *natural thing* (*Naturding*). Furthermore, the perception of natural things, as the central core of our transcendent experience, is itself stratified.[6] Husserl discerns two basic sub-layers: (i) merely sensuous perception, and (ii) material(-causal) perception.

(i) At the constitutional level of sensuous perception, we perceive things consisting of a temporal structure (or "schema"[7]), a spatial schema ("corporeal Gestalt"[8] or "spatial form"[9]), and a sensuous filling (color, smoothness, etc.) that fills up the unity of the temporal and spatial schema. Husserl calls these sensible unities *phantoms* (*Phantome*), and provides examples such as the sky, the sun, the rainbow, and the stereoscopic images in kaleidoscopes.[10] The crucial point, however, is that *every* concrete natural thing has such a founding phantom-stratum: "Phantoms [. . .] are thus in fact concrete unities of experience. And they form an *a priori* necessary sub-layer in each external experience of things" (*Hua Mat* IV, 174).

The "mere" phantom, as a sensibly qualified spatio-temporal schema, is the "full schema" or "sensuous schema" that is constituted, as mereological unity, out of the manifold of sensuous adumbrations. This is, in other words, the percept phenomenologically interpreted as *res temporalis* and *res extensa*.

(ii) At the constitutional level of "material perception,"[11] we "see" the thing in its material-causal interactions, as *res materialis*. We see it not as mere sensuous givenness, but apprehend it as *having the ability* (*Fähigkeit*), *the power* (*Kraft*), *the disposition to* . . ., i.e., as having causal properties in its relation to other things.[12] We apprehend it as capable of exercising effects and of being effected. In this sense, we can "see" the power of a man's muscles, as we can "see" the power of a raised hammer or a compressed spring. We can "understand" the behavior of the fall of a stone or of a

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6 See, e.g., *Hua* XVI, 341ff./297ff.; *Hua* IV, section 1, chapter 2; Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*, ed. Karl Schuhmann, Husserliana III/1 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), §149; English translation: *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy, Book I: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. Fred Kersten (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), §149; Edmund Husserl, *Natur und Geist. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1919*, ed. Michael Weiler, Husserliana Materialien IV (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002), 172ff. (henceforth cited as *Hua Mat* IV, followed by page reference).

7 *Hua* XVI, 341 n. 2/297 n. 2. In this chapter, I will leave aside the temporal parameter and focus on the spatial schema and its filling qualities.

8 Ibid, 66/55.

9 Ibid.

10 See, e.g., *Hua* IV, 37/40; *Hua Mat* IV, 172, 174; Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen. Ergänzungsband. Erster Teil. Entwürfe zur Umarbeitung der VI. Untersuchung und zur Vorrede für die Neuauflage der Logischen Untersuchungen (Sommer 1913)*, ed. Ullrich Melle, Husserliana XX/1 (Dortrecht: Kluwer, 2002), 151.

11 Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*, ed. Marly Biemel, Husserliana V (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), 2; English translation: *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Third Book: Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences*, trans. Ted E. Klein & William E. Pohl (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980), 1.

12 See *Hua* XVI, 343/299.

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feather. We "know" that *when* a thing is given, under certain perceptual circumstances and in affinity with certain other things, *then* this or that thing or behavior will emerge within this perceptual affinity. This is what Husserl calls "intuitive causality":[13] "Thingly (nature-real, natural) causalities are given intuitively as well. We *see* how the hammer forges the iron, how the drill bores the hole" (*Hua* IV, 230/242).

Such types of relatedness between bodily occurrences are themselves moments of everyday experiencing intuition. They are experienced as that which gives the character of *belonging together* to bodies which *exist together* simultaneously and successively, i.e. as that which *binds* their being to their being-such.[14]

The stratum of *res materialis* forms an upper layer that is unilaterally founded on the givenness of schematic appearances. But this unilateral relation of dependence of *res materialis* on *res extensa* should not be considered in terms of a temporal sequence. It has, rather, an ontological-constitutional meaning: phantomatic givenness does not presuppose the ability of things to effect and to undergo effects, and this last ability always already presupposes the perceptual constitution of phantoms.[15]

It is true that materiality is intuitively given in a "supersensuous" way. However, this "higher-order" intuitive givenness still belongs within the range of primordial perception, without presupposing any mediation of subsumptive conceptualization or acts of predication.[16] More particularly, the material-causal thing is constituted as the mereological unity of the manifold of schematic appearances. "[C]ausal apprehension,"[17] or else "realizing apprehension,"[18] unites the sequential schematic appearances that become states (*Zustände*) of "the reality-thing, the unitary material 'substance.'"[19] This

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13 Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus den Nachlass. Zweiter Teil (1921–1928)*, ed. Iso Kern, Husserliana XIV (The Hague: Nijhoff), 281.

14 Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die tranzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana VI (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954), 28; English translation: *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 30.

15 See, e.g., *Hua* IV, 37/40; *Hua* XVI, 343/299.

16 See, e.g., *Hua* XVI, 345/301; *Hua* IV, 20 n. 1/22 n. 1; *Hua Mat* IV, 181f., 185f.; Edmund Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana IX (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), 95–96; English translation: *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures Summer Semester 1925*, trans. John Scanlon (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), 72. The idea that the constitution of the material-causal thing is a matter of conceptual thought is quite widespread among Husserl scholars. To give an example, Drummond holds that the perception of material things presupposes the activation of categorial acts. See John Drummond, *Husserlian Intentionality and Non-foundational Realism: Noema and Object* (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1990), 158ff., 166ff. In the same vein, Soffer characteristically claims that, were not perception mediated by the proper judgment, we would see mere phantoms and not solid objects. For example, were not our perception mediated by the judgment concerning the object's resistance to touch we wouldn't see a solid hammer. See Gail Soffer, "Revisiting the Myth: Husserl and Sellars on the Given," *The Review of Metaphysics* 57/3 (2003), 301–337, here 308.

17 *Hua* IV, 44/47; see also 340/351.

18 Ibid., 43/46; see also 65/70.

19 Ibid., 44/47; "The *realizing* is then completed in such a way that the sense-things [phantoms] become states of real things." (*Hua* IV, 65/70); see also *Hua* IX, §13. Interestingly, Husserl relates directly the notions of reality, materiality, causality, and substantiality. In *Thing and Space* we read: "Is the thing not a substance exclusively insofar as it is the bearer of a causality?" (*Hua* XVI, 345/301) In *Ideas* II: "Substance signifies here nothing more than the material thing as such, considered to the extent that it is the identical something of real properties, that which actualizes itself temporally in regulated manifolds of states in regulated dependency on concomitant circumstances." (*Hua* IV, 47 n. 1/44 n. 1; see also ibid., §17, 340/351). In *Ideas* III: "[T]he cognition of reality and the cognition of materiality are inseparably one [. . .] The cognition of causal relationships is not something secondary to the cognition of the real, as if the real were first of all in and for itself, and then only incidentally, as something

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realizing-causal apprehension is not a function of conceptual thought (intellectual or 'theoretical' operation of subsumption, etc.), and the material "substance" is not an empty logical point on which we attribute determinations. Husserl clearly distinguishes the primordial experience of material things (their connections and their causal interactions) from conceptualization and predication. Furthermore, materiality-causality (and also phantomatic spatiality), which pertain to the essence of the perceptual thing, are not characterized by the exactness of the relevant physicalistic and geometrical notions. Husserl repeatedly stresses the difference between his eidetic descriptive phenomenology and the *a priori* exact sciences. Eidetic phenomenology captures spatiality and materiality in their morphological inexactness, which is a presupposition of every subsequent act of idealization that aims at mathematically exact determination and scientific theoretization.[20]

§ 3. Vision, touch, and the constitution of spatiality

Among the sensuous qualities that fill up the extended phantom, visual and tactile qualities are of special significance. They actualize corporeal expanse "in the primary and proper sense,"[21] and Husserl calls their complex *materia prima*.[22] Color in vision and, e.g., smoothness in touch is, in an essential way, necessary in the fundamental constitution of primordial spatiality. Other determinations, like sound, temperature, odor, etc., do not suffice for such a constitution, as they always "presuppose an already constituted thing, to which they can then be appended."[23] These "appended"[24] sensible qualities contribute to the constitution of the phantom in a broader and secondary sense, and comprise its so-called *materia secunda*.[25]

Vision and touch, then, play a fundamental role in the constitution of sensuous phantoms. Visual and tactile sensations are *primordially* presentational, i.e. they are

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extra-essential to its being, came into relation with other realities [. . .]." (*Hua* V, 3–4/3) "[Reality] is what it is only in its causal relations. It is something *fundamentally relative*, which demands its corresponding members, and only in this connection of member and corresponding member is each a 'substance' of real properties" (ibid., 4/3).

20 On these last two points, I am in basic agreement with Theodorou, in Panos Theodorou, "Perceptual and Scientific Thing: On Husserl's Analysis of 'Nature-Thing' in *Ideas II*," *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* 5 (2005), 165–187.

21 *Hua* XVI, 67/56.

22 Ibid., 67/56. Notice here that the materialization of spatiality (the sensuous fulfilling of *res extensa*) is not the realizing (*Realizierung*) of the phantom as—the aforementioned—*res materialis*, about which we will talk in greater detail in §5.

23 *Hua* XVI, 79/65.

24 Ibid., 67/56, §23.

25 A terminological clarification is needed here. Husserl often uses the terms "phantom" and "full schema" synonymously to refer to the sensibly qualified extended thing. But, when he takes into consideration the difference between *materia prima* and *materia secunda*, he distinguishes the two terms. More specifically, he calls "full schema" (or simply "schema") the sensuous Gestalt in its unity with those qualities that fulfill it with necessity; namely, with those materializing determinations that render the Gestalt concrete. The full schema then refers to the optically or/and tactually fulfilled extended thing. By abstracting in thought all fulfilling materializing determinations, we are left with the abstract moment "empty schema [*Leerschema*]" (*Hua Mat* IV, 173), the mere (optical or/and tactual) Gestalt. And if "full schema" names the necessary core of the sensuous thing, then "phantom" names, for Husserl, this core together with the "peel," as it were, of the contingent appended determinations (*materia secunda*). (See ibid., 174.) In what follows, I will use the terms "phantom" and "(sensuous) schema" equivalently, without taking into consideration the possible appended determination of the percept.

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capable of presenting the percept's primary—in the Husserlian sense—qualities.[26] Now, the sequence and modification of visual and tactile sensations in their presentational role is motivated by the flow of another group of sensations, the kinaesthetic ones. These kinaesthetically motivated sequences are intentionally interpreted, so that unitary phantoms (that can be moving or stationary and, correspondingly, can have stable or changing features) come to appearance out of the manifold of sensuous adumbrations. The detailed lectures of *Thing and Space* offer exemplary analyses of this well-known and much discussed aspect of Husserl's theory of perceptual constitution. But throughout Husserl's *oeuvre* as a whole, we find constant and more or less extended references to the hallmark theme of kinaesthesis and its motivational role.

An examination of a concrete example of perceptual experience will be helpful for present purposes. Let us consider the visual perception of a thing, e.g., a book, in abstraction from all nexuses of life-worldly interactions within which the thing participates. What we see, according to Husserl, is the optical phantom consisting partly in what is genuinely given in vision and partly in what is emptily co-intended, namely its non-authentically given parts and moments. The visual phantom "book" is not only what is presented by the actual sensuous adumbration. It is schematically given as a united whole that has parts and moments not currently visible, not genuinely seen, like the back (and its color), the side, etc. This phantomatic givenness has a certain degree of intuitional determination, richness, and clarity, pertaining also to the thing's hidden aspects. Moreover, the always already somehow determined visual phantom is still undetermined as regards other possibilities of its givenness, but is always embedded within an open horizon of further determinability. Through our moving and exploratory gaze, this inner horizon is unfolded. The phantom can be determined better or differently than initially intended, it can be intuitively explicated, etc.

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Analogous remarks can be made about tactual perception. Let us suppose that we close our eyes and touch the book, and that our hand slides over its surface.[27] Here, once again, we have a motivational nexus holding between kinaestheses and presentational sensations, where the latter are in this case tactual. Here, we also have the authentic givenness of the actually presented surface and the inauthentic givenness of tactual parts and moments that are emptily co-intended. Here, the tactile phantom is given as always already somehow determined, with a certain degree of richness, clarity, and intuitional explication. Moreover, the tactually given phantom-book is here embedded within an open horizon of further determinability and anticipative orientation that our exploring hand can unfold.

26 Husserl recognizes that a synthetic *a priori* theory about the constitution of the phantom, as part of a Phenomenological Transcendental Aesthetic, has a character of relevant contingency, as long as it concerns the *eidos* of *our* world and *our* specific sensibility. A *General* Transcendental Aesthetic would, then, concern fulfilling qualities *in general* including also everything that counts, for us humans, as just empty possibilities. So, *in general*, we can say that every possible thing of any kind of sensuous perception is necessarily fulfilled by *some* kind of primary quality. Correlatively, any possible sensuously perceiving subject is endowed with at least one sense that provides primarily presentational data. (See *Hua Mat* IV, 154f., 174ff.) All this goes contra Kant, who accentuated the merely contingent character of sensations, which he thought could not form the subject-matter of his Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant thus sought *a priori* conditions exclusively on the side of the form of intuitions. See also n. 51 below.

27 At this abstractive level of the constitution of the tactual phantom, all interaction among things is kept out of consideration. We should note that, for Husserl, merely "touching the thing," e.g., with our hand, is *not* such an interaction. This point will be better clarified later, when we turn to the issue of the constitution of the material-causal thing, and seek the pertinent conditions of possibility of its constitution.

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Husserl makes clear that visual and tactile interpenetrated strata of any given phantom are not two sensuous unities with different extensions; the phantom has *one* spatial form that is both seen and touched: it is "one single thing having a manifold filling."[28] Vision and touch stand in constant interplay and integration with each other, and operate in tandem to constitute one sensibly qualified spatial form. This becomes evident in cases where both senses are in actual use. So, returning to our previous example, let us suppose that we simultaneously see the book and touch it with our palm. In §22 of *Thing and Space*, Husserl provides us with a phenomenological description of just such a mixed perceptual experience, distinguishing the following two branches of inauthentic or "improper" givenness:

(i) *Intra*sensible co-givenness concerns the emptily co-intended parts and moments of the hidden aspects of one and the same phantom-stratum. For example, the front seen side points beyond, towards the back unseen side, and the front touched side points to the back untouched side. We are here dealing with the extensional continuation and complementation of the thing in the manner of contiguity.

(ii) *Inter*sensible co-givenness concerns emptily co-intended strata that are not properly (authentically) given. For example, the authentically seen part of the phantom "points to" the co-intended tactile stratum of this same part or, vice versa, the actually touched part to the inauthentically seen. We are dealing here with the qualitative supplementation of the extended thing in the manner of interpenetration.

In every mixed perception, both *intra*sensible and *inter*sensible co-apprehensions contribute to the constitution of the one, identical, visual, and tactual phantom. The book that we simultaneously see and touch is given as having a continuous surface, partly inauthentically seen and partly inauthentically touched, due to empty intentions of intersensible contiguity and empty intentions of intrasensible interpenetration. Even where the palm touches and covers the front side of the book, "there is color as well, but the color is not seen in the proper sense."[29] And even where the palm does not actually touch the book, some tactual quality, e.g. smoothness, "is in a certain sense there in the proper [visual] appearance, but yet it is only detected, almost as if seen and yet not seen."[30]

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Suppose, now, that we remove our hand and all that remains is the visual perception of the book, i.e., our vision is not accompanied by actual touching of the book at all. This, in fact, is the usual way we perceive things at a distance, and this might give the impression that vision works alone without the coordination of touch. This, moreover,

28 *Hua* XVI, 77/64; see also *Hua* IV, 69–70/74–75; *Hua* IX, 155/119, 173–174/133; Edmund Husserl, *Phantasie, Bildbewustsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898–1925)*, ed. Eduard Marbach, Husserliana XXIII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980), 68f., 75; English translation: *Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898–1925)*, trans. John Brough (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 74f., 82; Edmund Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918–1926*, ed. Margot Fleischer, Husserliana XI (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966), 300; English translation: *Analyses concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, trans. Anthony J. Steinbock, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 587.

29 *Hua* XVI, 73/61. Husserl explains that "[t]he sensations pertaining to the seen parts are apprehended in such a way that the paper [The particular example is Husserl's] is constituted according to its visual properties and, more precisely, such that the visual properties produce a complete filling of space. The unseen parts of the front side, including the ones hidden by the hand placed on the paper, also have their visual filling; it is just that this is not a properly appearing one. The same applies, conversely, to the tactile aspect with regard to the non-tactually appearing parts of the front side" (ibid., XVI, 76/63).

30 Ibid., 74/62.

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supports the tendency to regard vision as the dominant sense. What such a consideration overlooks, though, is the constant and continuous contribution of *potential* touch and our empty tactile intentions that are *always* at work in our perceptual life.

We always see things *as if we were also touching them*. Vision and touch, even if this last is for the most part only potential, always work together. As Husserl points out in *Ideas* II, "each thing that we see is [apprehended as potentially] touchable and, as such, points to an immediate relation to the Body, though it does not do so in virtue of its visibility."[31] So, even in the case of the absence of tactual stimulation, where there is no actual tactile fulfillment, we continue to "see" the tactual stratum of the phantom *as emptily co-intended*, and as accompanied by an open horizon of corresponding determinability.[32] The book of our example is tactually given in an inauthentic perceptual way, yet to be turned into an authentic way through reaching our hand out and touching the book. Every appearing thing, even at a distance, always has a haptic sense-stratum, a tactile meaning, and is "seen" as, e.g., rough or smooth.[33] Of course, conversely, the same applies to the tactual perception of a thing and its corresponding inauthentic visual co-apprehension. Let us turn once again to Husserl's own words in *Ideas* II:

> Every perception (and series of perception) of that kind [i.e., regarding one sensuous stratum] has its complements of parallel apperceptions of other strata, which constitute a "*co-givenness*" (not an actual givenness) making possible a subsequent fulfilling in actual perception. The given optical fulfillment of the visual schema refers to the tactual side of the schema and perhaps to the determined fulfillment of it. "Associatively" the one recalls the other.
>
> (*Hua* IV, 40/43)

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He also provides some relevant examples:

> [S]moothness is given tactually; just as brightness is visually. Wetness cannot be seen—only touched. It can at best be "co-seen," just as the apprehension of silky

31 *Hua* IV, 150/158.

32 The issue of the absence of actual contact with the percept is intriguing, and is amenable to significant phenomenological observations and disputes. We should note, though, that talk about the horizon of tactual givenness, or about non-authentic tactual givenness should *not* lead us astray into thinking that contact is after all not essential to touch. Cf. here Ratcliffe's argument, in Matthew Ratcliffe, "What is touch?," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 90/3 (2012), 413–432; see also Ratcliffe 2013.

33 See, e.g., Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus den Nachlass. Dritter Teil (1929–1928)*, ed. Iso Kern, Husserliana XV (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), 304f., 308. Also, in the 1904/05 Winter Lectures, titled "Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis," Husserl draws attention to this aspect of visual perception. The properly seen side of the thing always points to tactile qualities such as roughness or smoothness. See Edmund Husserl, *Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1893–1912)*, eds. Thomas Vongehr & Regula Guliani, Husserliana XXXVIII (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004), 37f., 208f. There, Husserl also mentions the example that Alexander Pfänder shared with him of the "softness of velvet" (ibid., 209). Note, though, that at the time of these lectures, Husserl still gives an account of what is "improperly" co-given in a perceptual act using the mistaken language of his *Logical Investigations*. See Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen. Elemente einer phänomenologischen Aufklärung der Erkenntnis*, ed. Ursula Panzer, Husserliana XIX/2 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1984), §§14b, 15, 22, 23. More specifically, he thinks that the perceptual parts and moments that do not authentically appear are presented in the act "symbolically" by contiguity. (Regarding this view, see also *Hua* XXXVIII, Text n. 1, §§9,10.) In *Thing and Space*, Husserl explicitly rejects this mistaken thought, and instead puts forward the idea of (intuitional or authentic) "empty intentions." (See *Hua* XVI, §§17,18; see also *Hua* XX/1, 91.)

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> tactuality co-presentifies a dull lustre. Roughness can be touched and "seen" as well; and so can a ribbed surface.
>
> (*Hua* IV, 38/41–42)

In another passage, Husserl tells us that the images seen in the stereoscope are apprehended as extended spatial optical, but also *tactile*, schemata; as, e.g., to use the particular paradigm of *Ideas* II, a "red, rough pyramid."[34]

But there is something of special importance to remark upon here as regards the coordination of vision and touch, and the issue of empty intentions and inauthentic givennesses at the level of the perception of the spatial phantom. Vision and visual qualities *per se* cannot reveal the inauthentically given tactual features of a perceptual thing. Were touch absent in the first place, vision could never be accompanied by tactile co-intentions that 'present' the thing as touchable, i.e., in its inauthentic tactile givenness. Potential touch—and everything it carries with it—always presupposes some previous tactual actuality. To say with Husserl that "each thing that we see is touchable," means we presuppose that the sense of touch has always already been at work in an actual way. Of course, this also holds for vision and the possibility of visual inauthentic co-intentions.

The interaction and coordination between vision and touch can be further elucidated by examining cases where one of the two modalities has been diminished or even lost. This is actually one of Husserl's main concerns in §18c of *Ideas* II, where he discusses the synergy of vision and touch in cases of abnormal perception. So, for example, when vision is reduced, touch provides a better presentation of the percept but, as Husserl tells us, "it is not that the sense of touch as such has a priority."[35] The first does not by itself necessarily entail the second. He offers the clarification that *each* sense can function in a supplementary or even in a rectifying or surrogative way in relation to the other, depending on the specific conditions of sickness or abnormality. In any case, both senses work in a cooperative manner; touch informs and "calibrates" vision, and vice versa. Moreover, restoration of the impaired sense and/or the use of artificial aids (e.g., eyeglasses) can restore balance to the coordinated senses. We should notice, though, in accordance with the previous remark, that in no way can a sense function as a "surrogate" (or in any other synergetic or quasi-synaesthetic way) for another sense that is radically absent from the beginning. If we look carefully, we can see that in §18c of *Ideas* II, Husserl does not discuss vision and touch in terms of their essential role in the constitution of perceptual things. Such a discussion would require a variation in phantasy that would necessarily take into consideration the possibility of the, in principle, absence of each of these sense modes. Only then could we realize the primacy, if any, of one sense over the other. But this is not Husserl's concern in §18c. In discussing the coordination of the senses, he there deals with vision and touch as functioning (more or less properly) at some previous point. This means that in all cases of the reduction or even complete loss of a sense, this last continues to be presupposed, even if in an empty manner contributing inauthentically to perceptual apprehensions.

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34 See *Hua* IV, 36/39; also *Hua* XV, 306ff.
35 *Hua* IV, 69/74.

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And it is precisely in this respect that Husserl argues that "[b]y itself each partial system [vision and touch], as a perceptual system, has equal rights."[36]

Undoubtedly, vision and touch each have their peculiar character. Thus, for example, in visual perception, the percept is always given at a smaller or greater distance from the perceiver, while touch is characterized by "closeness" or "tangentness" between the perceiver and the perceived thing.[37] In addition, and relatedly, eyesight has a different figure-background structure than touch. Vision can at the same time and in an actual way present a perceptual thing together with its near but also distant perceptual environment. It can simultaneously present a plurality of near and distant perceptual things, whose phenomenal appearance will change depending on the distance from the zero point of the eyes. On the other hand, the sense of touch properly presents the actually touched surfaces, which may also form the background tactile givennesses, but these surfaces are always restricted within the vicinity of the lived-body's extensionality and presented without modification of their phenomenal size.[38]

To some degree, these differences and particular characteristics provide the basis for talk of certain "advantages" that each particular sense modality has over the other. For example, the distance between the viewer and the seen thing is supposed to suggest a certain indifference of the sense of vision, which is therefore taken as the sense that allows things to be given as they really are. And this leads to the quite widespread ocularcentric view, according to which vision offers the right model for explaining knowledge.[39] On the other hand, the closeness that characterizes touch is also supposed to provide the most direct route to the true presentation of things. It is in this sense that touch is sometimes regarded as helping to correct vision.[40]

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However, the advantageous character of vision as a *distance-sense* or of touch as a *sense of closeness* does not provide any kind of primacy for *the constitution of the phantom* in particular. For Husserl, vision and touch are *equally* primordial as regards the constitution of sensuous spatiality. When he claims that visual and tactile qualities are necessary for the actualization of corporeal expanse, and thus comprise the *materia prima* of sensuous things, he means that vision and touch can each, independently and even in the radical and in principle absence of the other, provide the pertinent sensuous phantom in its spatiality. It is true that in *Thing and Space*, where the constitution of thingly spatiality is most notably investigated, Husserl chooses to deal with the constitution of visual phantoms. The perceiving subject is examined there as an

36 Ibid., 66/71; see also *Hua Mat* IV, 175f.

37 See Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus den Nachlass. Erster Teil (1905–1920)*, ed. Iso Kern, Husserlian XIII (The Hague: Nijhoff), 285ff.

38 See, e.g., *Hua* XV, 304f.; *Hua* XIII, 285.

39 Thus, for example, Hans Jonas claims vision as the model of thought. For him, vision is the sense that pre-eminently renders possible a distancing toward the object and, therefore, objectivity and theoretical truth. See Hans Jonas, "The nobility of sight," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 14/4 (1954), 507–519.

40 Husserl refers, for example, to the well-known case of the straight stick that looks bent when immersed into water. He says: "The bent stick in water is a fiction, an illusion: for in deceptive perception the visual apprehension is supplemented by certain tactile apprehensions. Actual investigation by touching and grasping yields a 'straight' stick which, for its part, normally requires a different visual appearance" (*Hua* XXIII, 48/52). See also 133 n. 1/147 n. 43; the same example is also found in *Hua* XXXVIII, 212f. See here also Edmund Husserl, *Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus den Nachlass (1916–1937)*, ed. Rochus Sowa, Husserliana XXXIX (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 399.

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eye-subject that has only visual and the pertinent kinaesthetic sensations.[41] However, Husserl could have offered us a separate and independent corpus of analyses dedicated to the constitution of the tactual phantom and tactual spatiality without presupposing vision in any way. Such a work would have elucidated elements that pertain specifically to the motivating tactile kinaestheses and the motivated sequences of tactile sensations, and would have pointed out the characteristic particularities of tactile schematic constitution.

But if, as I am presently arguing, there is a relative independence between the sense of vision and the sense of touch as regards the constitution of the visual and the tactual phantom respectively, in what sense does Husserl advance the *primacy* of the sense of touch in his theory of perceptual constitution? In fact, Husserl formulates a *twofold* claim. The privileging of touch concerns, on the one hand, the constitution of the lived-body (*Leib*) and, on the other, the constitution of external things at the level, as we will see, not of *res extensa* but of *res materialis*.[42] I will discuss the first of these occasions in the next section (§4), exploring the first essential asymmetry between the sense of vision and the sense of touch. Immediately afterwards (§5), I will deal with the second, which is admittedly much neglected in the secondary literature, and will explore the ensuing second essential asymmetry between vision and touch.

§ 4. The localization of sensations and the lived-body

One particularly significant aspect of Husserl's theory of constitution concerns the subject's body and its double realization, on the one hand as physical thing (*Körper*), and, on the other, as lived-body, as aesthesiological body.[43] These are two dimensions we abstractly distinguish from one another in our phenomenological consideration. Husserl remarks that "[i]n the abstract I can sunder physical and aesthesiological strata but, indeed, only in the abstract. In concrete perception the lived-body stands there as a new kind of unity of apprehension" (*Hua* IV, 155/163).

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But what can we say from a phenomenological point of view about the role that vision and touch play as regards the double realization of the body?

Suppose we continue to move at the lowest constitutional level of transcendent spatiality. In accordance with what we have already pointed out, it is arguably the case that at this level of schematic givenness of *res extensa*, the "human body" is constituted in an equal way in vision and touch. It is given schematically, a spatial phantom among other spatial phantoms. With the motivational help of the sequences of kinaesthetic sensations of the eyes (but also of the head, the trunk, etc.), color sensations are objectifyingly apprehended so that the seeing subject sees "its" appearing arms, hands, feet, etc., as optical, spatially extended phantoms. Likewise, tactual sensations in their kinaesthetically motivated succession are interpreted in an objectifying way and present the human body as a tactual phantom. When, for example, the right hand touches the

41 *Hua* XVI, 279–280/241.

42 Husserl states that "[t]he role of the visual sensations in the correlative constitution *of the Body* and *external things* is [. . .] different from that of the sensations of touch" (*Hua* IV, 148/156; emphases added).

43 "[T]he Body is originally constituted in a double way: first, it is a physical thing, *matter*; it has its extension, in which are included its real properties, its color, smoothness, hardness, warmth, and whatever other material qualities of that kind there are. Secondly, I find on it, and I *sense* "on" it and "in" it: warmth on the back of the hand, coldness in the feet, sensations of touch in the fingertips" (ibid., 145/153).

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left, touch sensations are interpreted objectifyingly and constitute the tactual phantom of the left hand. Leaving out of consideration all secondary determinations like odor, temperature, etc., we can say that, overall, the body is constituted schematically—indeed in its peculiar way, e.g. without the possibility of distancing and always given in perspectival restricted appearances—as something itself seen and/or touched.

The most intriguing element arises, however, when we take into account the issue of the localization of sensations. Husserl is emphatic in pointing out that there is no such thing as a localization of the experiencing of colors. Color sensations present the optical qualities of perceptual objects, but are not localized as sensations; *we cannot see our seeing*.[44]

On the other hand, tactile sensations, besides their objectivating or "extensional apprehension,"[45] are apprehended in another, this time subjective way.[46] Subjectivating apprehension renders tactual sensations "'subjective' determinations"[47] of the human body that is revealed as the organ of perceiving, as the "subjective Object"[48] that perceives tactually and at the same time perceives itself, that senses itself sensing. As is often particularly underlined by scholars, this reflexive relation of the body to itself, between the touching and the touched, is radicalized in the case of double sensations—when, for example, the right hand touches the left, etc.[49]

Motivational kinaesthetic sensations do not themselves function in a presentational manner, but can also be apprehended in a subjectivating way. In a sense, they "appear" in the lived-body.[50] Husserl also mentions the localization of sensations of pleasure and pain, of temperature, of taste, and smell, claiming that in all these cases, it is always *due to the close relation to touch sensations* that localization in the human body is rendered possible.[51]

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44 See, e.g., *Hua* XVI, 162/137; *Hua* IV, 147ff./155ff.
45 *Hua* IV, 57/62.
46 See, e.g., *Hua* XVI, 162/137; *Hua* IV, §36; *Hua* V, 12/10, 118ff./104ff; *Hua* XIII, 42ff., 114f., 331f., *Hua* XV, 295ff.; *Hua* XXXIX, 614ff., 628ff., 631ff.
47 *Hua* XVI, 162/137.
48 *Hua* V, 124/111.
49 See *Hua* IV, 145f./152ff., §§36, 37, 39, 40. Since visual sensations are not localizable, they don't offer the phenomenon of double sensations: "in the case of an *Object constituted purely visually we have nothing* comparable" (ibid., 147/155).
50 See *Hua* XVI, 282/242–241; *Hua* V, 123/111.
51 See *Hua* IV, 150/158; *Hua* V, 123/110. We see that the sense of touch is necessary for the constitution of the lived-body because tactile sensations primarily lend themselves to the double (objectivating and subjectivating) apprehension. Husserl explains, though, that this fact is "understood only under conditions that are fulfilled in the case of us humans" (*Hua* V, 122/109). We can note here that other subjects are thinkable that would have none of the senses accessible to us: most importantly, that would have no touch. If such subjects were to be embodied, sensations of such a kind would be necessary that would lend themselves to both objectivating and subjectivating apprehension, that besides their presentational role would also be perceived as localized. (See also n. 26 above.) And, according to Husserl, "what is localizable is not just anything and everything, but rather it is predelineated according to essence" (ibid., 6/6). More specifically, Husserl argues that "the basic condition for the possibility of localization lies in being spread out and that thereby every species of sensation that offers itself mediately or immediately in the manner of being spread out could be perceivable as localized" (ibid., 7/6). Visual sensations, even though they fulfill this condition, as they "are spread out in a field" (ibid., 6/6) and thus "are fundamentally localizable" (ibid., 6/6), are not *factually* localized. As Husserl notes, "the possibility of the perception of localized visual sensation is excluded or, empirically speaking, is lacking in us humans" (ibid. 6–7/6). Further investigation should probably be concerned here with whether the simultaneous localization of more than one primary species of sensation is possible, and in what sense it is possible. For instance, is it possible that the localization of more than one species of sensation at the same time and with the same way of spreading out on the same phantomatic extension could lead to the constitution of more than one

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The tactual field is the "*Urfeld*,"[52] in the sense that it founds the localization of all other localizable sensations and their fields. The localized sensations, the *sensings* (*Empfindnisse*) after Husserl's neologism, are inserted into the lived-body in the manner of a "spreading-out" (*Ausbreitung*) that differs from the extensionality of objective features like, e.g., color or smoothness.[53] "Outspread" sensings thus enable the subject to be bodily self-aware at a pre-thematic level as the bearer of sensations and kinaestheses.

"[T]he privilege of the localization of the touch sensations"[54] and the primacy of the formation of the tactual field mean that, in the absence of touch, no localization of sensations in general is possible, and therefore that the human body cannot be constituted in its organicity: it cannot be felt as one's own lived-body. Husserl explores this idea, at the same time bringing out the contradistinction to the non-localizability of vision, in both *Ideas* II and *Ideas* III.[55] There, he asks us to imagine a bodily subject that has only the sense of vision and the relevant kinaestheses that are necessary for the constitution of visual phantoms. Because of the absence of tactile sensations, kinaesthetic sensations cannot be interpreted in a subjectivating way and localized in "its" body. This hypothetical subject can see "its" body as it can see other perceptual phantoms, but it cannot have the experience of this body as its own: "I do not see myself, my Body, the way I touch myself. What I call the seen Body is not something seeing which is seen, the way my Body as touched Body is something touching which is touched" (*Hua* IV, 148/155).

The way that the body and its parts are given to vision is not differentiated from the way any other perceptual phantom is visually apparent, e.g., from another's subject body or from, say, the branch of a tree. Indeed, the givenness of the eye-subject's body is restricted within a certain field in relation to the zero point of the eyes. This can, at best, lead to the constitution of the subject's body as a constant optical schematic appendix to the eyes; yet this appendix is not any differently given than, e.g., the clothes that the seeing subject wears. On this point, Husserl is explicit: "A subject whose only sense was the sense of vision could not at all have an appearing Body" (*Hua* IV, 150/158; see also *Hua* V, 122/109).

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The subject's body cannot be felt as one's own unless sensations and kinaestheses are localized on and in it. This always presupposes that the sense of touch is at work. What merits our attention here, though, is that the analysis of §37 of *Ideas* II, where Husserl expands this aspect of the thesis about the primacy of touch, is conducted at a totally different level than that of, e.g., §18c of the same work. In the previous section of this chapter, we saw that in §18c of *Ideas* II, vision and touch are comparatively investigated within the context of the examination of perceptual abnormalities resulting from the reduction or loss of one of these sense modes. We also saw that Husserl places particular emphasis on the synergetic relation between vision and touch. For the purpose of bringing out this synergetic relation, in all of his paradigms, Husserl presupposes the function of both vision and touch, if not properly then at least in a reduced

lived-bodies? Could there be two, or more, primarily localized species of sensation but probably in the way of "the-one-out-of-the-other?"

52 Ibid., 5/5.

53 See also, e.g., *Hua* XXXIX, 628ff.

54 *Hua* IV, 150/158.

55 See ibid., §37, entitled "Differences between the visual and the tactual realms"; *Hua* V, Supplement I, §4f. titled "The constitutive role of the movement-sensations in comparison with other sensations and the relation between the constitution of animate organism and of physical thing."

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form, and if not currently then at least at a previous temporal point. However, in §37, Husserl has a different aim. There, he does not consider the reduction or even the loss of the previously functioning tactility in particular. Rather, he examines *the radical exclusion of the possibility of touch*; we might describe this as a congenitally "tactual-blindness." It is only with the help of this limit phantasy variation that he manages to examine the essential role of touch and to reveal its necessity for the constitution and givenness of the lived-body's ownness.

So, we have now seen that the first *essential* asymmetry between vision and touch surfaces at the level of the constitution of the lived-body, and this is due to the primary localization of tactile sensations and tactile kinaestheses. According to Husserl, vision alone is not enough for the constitution and givenness of the lived-body as *one's own* sensing body. Admittedly, this aspect of Husserlian theory has received much attention from scholars. For present purposes, I will refer only to the positive account developed by Mattens. Mattens agrees that touch plays a significant role for the givenness of the lived body as one's own. He explains that a subject with eyes only cannot see its "body," for, as he characteristically claims, "its body would precisely lack 'its specific distinctive feature as body.' Visually, its proper body would appear as any other material thing."[56]

However, Husserl's claim about the primacy of touch also has another significant fold that we are yet to examine, since he argues that the sense of touch "is indeed obviously privileged amongst the contributors *to the constitution of a thing*."[57] Even if not appropriately elaborated in the *Ideas* II, from which the last quoted passage is taken, this idea is a constant element of Husserlian thought. Dorion Cairns tells us that he asked Husserl, in a conversation on July 11, 1931, whether the constitution of a world would be possible if there were no reflexive perception on the part of the subject's body. In other words, Cairns asked Husserl whether we would have a world if the only sense we had was vision. Husserl's express answer was "no."[58]

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For his part, Mattens emphatically questions this aspect of Husserl's claim. Mattens argues that a subject endowed only with the sense of touch can perceive material-causal things, and just so an eye-subject can *equally well* perceive material-causal things around it. According to Mattens, "[t]he motivational nexus of voluntary movements and changes in the visual field enables this eye-subject to perceive 'real things,' that is, spatial objects in causal interaction with other objects" (Mattens 2008, 106).

In what follows, I will address the details of Husserl's claim and, contra Mattens' interpretation, will attempt to elucidate the pre-eminence of the sense of touch with regard to the constitution of the thing at the level of *res materialis*. We will see that, according to Husserl, a subject endowed exclusively with eyesight could not perceive things in their material-causal reality, and that it is precisely at this level of perceptual constitution that the second essential asymmetry between vision and touch occurs.

56 Mattens 2008, 106. See also Filip Mattens, "Perception, Body, and the Sense of Touch: Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind," *Husserl Studies* 25 (2009), 97–120, where Mattens remarks that "[c]learly, when I look at my own limbs they do not appear to be any different than someone else's. Actually, there is no essential difference between seeing my own feet, someone else's feet, the feet of a doll, or any other material object" (Mattens 2009, 101). Mattens adds that "[i]t is the tactile experience of body contact that constitutes my body as such: in feeling that something touches me, my body appears to me in a way that it cannot by simply looking at it" (ibid., 101).

57 *Hua* IV, 70/75; emphases added.

58 See Dorion Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), 4.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

§ 5. Vision, touch, and the constitution of materiality

As already mentioned, the sub-layer of materiality is unilaterally founded upon the ultimate core of transcendent givenness, that of schematic spatiality. To perceive a thing in its materiality means to intentionally and unifyingly interpret the flow of its schematic givennesses and to apprehend it as affecting and being affected; as being within causal nexuses of interaction with other things, under certain perceptual circumstances. But how exactly does this "realizing apprehension," as Husserl calls it, become possible? What motivates the *change* (*Wandlung*) from the merely sensuously given visual and tactual phantoms to causal-material things?[59] Clearly, this change is not a matter of the *mere addition* of schematic appearances, and nor can it be a matter of the *quantity* of such appearances. A material-causal object could never be built up out of the mere flow of phantomatic givennesses, however rich this flow may be and whatever phantomatic aspects it can bring to appearance. The same holds if we take into consideration simply the schematic changes of a plurality of concrete phantoms. These can form an intuitive unity of a sensuous configuration, but they are not enough for the givenness of material-causal dependencies. Furthermore, the *change* to material perception is not a matter of the coordination of the senses. In *Ideas* II, Husserl clarifies this as follows: "[t]o appeal to the existing coordination of different senses would come down to a misunderstanding of our problem."[60] Givenness of more schematic dimensions, of more schematic or else phantomatic strata of the thing, would contribute to the enrichment of the constitution of the phantom, but not to the perception of its causal materiality. The coordination of vision and touch, for example, would lead only to the givenness of the one identical phantom in its optical and tactual schematic aspects. But this is far from having reached or achieved material perception.

What, then, is the crucial differential factor that opens up the way to material perception? Where is the materiality of the thing given from in the first place? Do the senses of vision and touch play any role here, and what role in particular? Husserl categorically rejects the idea that vision could somehow be decisive for material perception. He states that "[i]mpact and pressure cannot properly be [visually] seen; one can only see what results from them as regards space and form."[61] Is it, then, the sense of touch that renders material perception possible? Husserl objects: "Nor is it by pure and simple touch that pressure, pull, and resistance are to be perceived. One has to 'exert the muscles,' 'brace oneself against,' etc."[62] In order to better understand what Husserl means here, we can turn to one of his later manuscripts, where he raises this important issue in greater detail.[63] He asks: "Could a purely optically constituted world be practical, be an actual real world?" (*Hua* XXXIX, 399; trans. mine).

59 The constitutional level of *res materialis* is not founded on the constitutional level of *res extensa* as something totally new and external to this last. We do not have a procedure of *transition* but, as Cairns notes, conveying a conversation with Fink, a procedure of *change* (*Wandlung*) – a term that is approvingly used here. See Cairns 1976, 24.

60 *Hua* IV, 40/43.

61 Ibid., 45/48.

62 Ibid.

63 This is a manuscript from 1931, published in *Hua* XXXIX as *Beilage* XXX titled "Zur haptischen Konstitution der praktischen Welt. Der Vorzug der Tastwahrnehmungen vor den visuellen Wahrnehmungen."

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He immediately goes to provide an answer: "*The haptical* [mere] *touching is still unpractical* (*unpraktische*) *as mere seeing*" (*Hua* XXXIX, 399; trans. mine).

Husserl tells us that vision is *unpractical*; it is not an effortful handling, a manipulation that can affect things. We can say, in other words, that vision *per se* is causally "neutral." But touch—and this is of special interest—considered as effortless *surface-touch*, as mere contact with the touched surface or survey of it, is for Husserl also unpractical in this same sense, and so cannot contribute to the constitution of the thing in its substantial materiality-causality. For example, by just passing our hand over the surface of a thing, the tactual phantom is constituted as a tactual *Oberflächending*,[64] as, so to speak, the tactual *epidermis* of the thing, and not as the thing that is rigid or elastic, heavy or light, fragile or unbreakable, and so on:[65] "From merely perceptual touch [. . .] [i.e.,] haptically [*haptish*], merely the phantom, the *res extensa*, is constituted, by which, together with the mere seeing, we constitute a perceptual field of [tactual and optical] *res extensae* [. . .]" (*Hua* XXXIX, 399; trans. mine).

All in all, mere seeing and mere (surface-)touching bring to appearance visual and tactual phantoms, not material-causal things. Seeing by moving the eyes and mere (surface-)touching by, e.g., attaining minimal contact or the slight movement of our hand, do not count as causal occurrences that bring about any real changes.[66] It is clear that Husserl distinguishes a dimension of mere *unpractical* perception, in which the perceiving subject does not cause any effect on things by changing their "specific way of being" (*Eigensein*) or their "characteristic determinations" (*eigenschaftlichen Bestimmtheiten*):[67]

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> Mere perception, thereby, is such an inner moving of the lived-body, whereby just normally—speaking purely within the bounds of experience—no objective change of the perceptual object emerges, whereas, and because of this, such a change appears as incidental.
>
> (*Hua* XXXIX, 271; trans. mine)

Husserl also calls kinaestheses that motivate the unfolding of vision and the unfolding of mere surface-touch *unpractical*. Movements of the eyes and movements of the bodily parts that contribute to the perceptual constitution of the visual and the tactual phantom without causing any real changes belong to *mere perceptual kinaesthesis*, or, as we could also say, to *schematically functioning kinaesthesis*.[68] We should note, however, that, for Husserl, unpractical perception—realized on the basis of the pertinent schematically

64 See, e.g., *Hua* XV, 306, 310.

65 The psychologist David Katz, Husserl's student and colleague at Göttingen (clearly influenced by Husserlian phenomenology), deals largely with what he calls "surface touch" (*Oberflächentastung*), and attempts to bring to the fore and determine the surface qualities that are given to it, namely the surface's material structure (*Materialstruktur*) or texture. Katz stresses the importance of movement in the perception of texture [see David Katz, *Der Aufbau der Tastwelt* (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1925), §§3, 16, 47; English translation: *The World of Touch*, trans. Lester E. Krueger, (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1989)] and argues that the resistance felt when moving, e.g., the hand on a surface, has no effect on the perceived tactual quality (see, e.g., ibid., §§6, 23, 24.3, 47).

66 See, e.g., *Hua* XXXIX, 81.

67 See ibid., 271.

68 In another manuscript from 1933–34, Husserl even speaks of a "ground-sphere" of perception, where causality is counted as insignificant. See ibid., 81.

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functioning kinaesthesees—is already a bodily *Tun*, a bodily activity that lets the percept be self-presented. It is the *Urpraxis* that underlies every other *praxis*.[69]

Whereas the constitution of tactual phantoms (the subject's phantomatic body included) necessarily presupposes the schematically functioning kinaesthesis and surface-touch, the constitution of materiality presupposes the function of what Husserl calls *practical* (*praktische*) kinaesthesis. Through practical kinaesthesis, we act upon things inducing (i) changes as regards their spatial position by altering their kinetic condition, and (ii) deformations and/or qualitative changes of their material. Husserl observes that practical and unpractical kinaestheses are not different kinds but two different functions, which work together within the unity of the total kinaesthetic system.[70] He explains that at each immanent temporal point, every actively functioning kinaesthesis is characterized by two different moments: (a) the moment of location (*Lage*), and (b) the moment of force (*Kraft*). The first can change in various ways, out of a manifold of locations. The second is characterized by intensity, ranging from zero to an extreme high limit. The loosening of the tension of the effort always leads to the zero point in the climax of force.[71]

It is therefore evident that the constitution of Husserlian pre-theoretical *res materialis* presupposes a body that can exert muscular force, that can manipulate by the hands, can grab, press, bend, lift, strike, throw, etc., etc. At this point, the second essential asymmetry between vision and touch surfaces. This relates precisely to the element of force, phenomenologically understood as the experienced feeling of resisted effort and not as an empty concept that somehow corresponds to interactions between different materials or bodies:

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> [Unlike vision] *touching* [*Berühren*] *has the peculiarity of being able, through tension of force* [*Kraftspannung*], *to become pressing, shoving, pushing, etc.,* but also compressing of the fingers that at the same time touch a thing from different sides, whereby this [touching] is able to become a grab of the object, a seizing, and then, with the contribution of other kinaestheses, a *lifting*, a *carrying*, etc.
>
> (*Hua* XXXIX, 399; trans. mine)

Practically functioning kinaesthesis motivates the succession of the schematic tactual appearances of the percepts in their dependence on the schematic tactual circumstances, such that material apprehension is rendered possible. This last does indeed concern percepts, but also the lived-body. The human body is also apprehended in its material-causal reality; it is apprehended "as the point of intersection of real causalities in the real (exclusively spatio-thingly) nexus."[72] Moreover, practical kinaesthesis is localized

69 See ibid., 365, 382f. For two different and to some degree opposing views of the meaning of action and praxis in Husserlian perceptual constitution, however, see Nam-In Lee, "Practical intentionality and transcendental phenomenology as a practical philosophy," *Husserl Studies* 17 (2000), 49–63 and Panos Theodorou, *Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction Primordiality and the Categorial: Phenomenology Beyond its Original Divide* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), ch. 4.

70 See *Hua* XXXIX, 397, 271f.

71 However, Husserl seems to admit that the absolute elimination of all tension is questionable, since there is always some background support (*Unterstützung*) of the body parts or of the whole body, as it remains still against some underlay surface. See ibid., 398 n. 1.

72 *Hua* IV, 63/67; also 156/163.

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in and on the lived-body, which is not experienced as merely perceiving, but also as *practically (inter-)acting*:

> Beyond the fact that the body is experienced as exercising perceptual functions in all external experience, it is also experienced as pushing and shoving, etc., in the spatial world, as interfering in the course of nature by objectively altering it.
>
> (*Hua* IX, 197/151)

We can then say that the lived-body is constituted in its material reality and at the same time becomes self-aware *in a fuller sense* while constituting real-material things.

Regarding the lived-body's constitution more particularly, it is also worth pointing out that it is characterized by its plasticity. The lived-body is a dynamic system that can be expanded. Husserl puts the point nicely in *Ideas* III, when he says that "the animate organism can grow larger."[73] He gives the examples of clothes, of a stick, or of tools that enlarge the animate organism as sensing, but also, we could add, *as an acting body*. Merleau-Ponty is probably most known, in this regard, for the enlightening examples he gives when he speaks about *habit as a motor acquisition of a new signification*.[74] A woman knows (bodily and pre-thematically) how to move elegantly, despite the fragility of her hat's feather; a car driver does not compare or calculate distances while driving, but pre-theoretically knows their magnitude; a blind man "sees" with his stick without thematizing it as a middle term.[75] The hat's feather, the car, and the stick are not mere inert or "dead" annexes. They are "sensed" as organic parts of the lived-body. They belong to the lived-body's enlarged and expanded organismic space. The woman "feels where the feather is just as we feel where our hand is,"[76] writes Merleau-Ponty. The driver has incorporated the car into the bulk of her/his own body. The end of the stick is, for the blind man, the end of his hand.

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This expanded space of sensitivity necessarily goes parallel with a change and expansion of kinaesthesis.[77] We find such a claim explicitly expressed in the descriptions of *Thing and Space*. In §83, Husserl deals with the fact that in several cases we can have the same perceptual results both by the self-movement and by being-moved of the lived-body. Being-moved by a car would yield the same series of appearances as, for example, running beside the moving car. But, as Husserl remarks,

> [. . .] instead of the kinaesthetic motivation of running, there is now the shaking of the car, the noise of the rolling wheels [. . .], etc. [. . .] [W]e can say that the role normally played by the kinaesthetic circumstances [. . .] are now played by other circumstances, although of course not directly but instead through the fact that they are apprehended as vicariously standing for the normal ones.
>
> (*Hua* XVI, 283–284/244)

73 *Hua* V, 6/7.
74 See Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la Perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), 166ff; English translation: *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), 142ff.; henceforth cited as *PP*, with French and then English page reference.
75 For the paradigms see *PP*, 167/143.
76 *PP*, 167/143.
77 See, e.g., *Hua* XV, 299f. There, Husserl discusses the enlarging of the kinaesthetic body, and explores the example of touching, in a mediate way, with a stick. A stick, like any other tool, cannot but be a "mediate 'organ'" (*Hua* XXXIX, 616 n. 2), whereas bodily parts are immediate organs within the total organic unity of the lived-body.

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What is of significance here is that the incorporation of instruments, tools, sticks, clothing, vehicles, etc., into the bulk of our body, and so the enlargement of the lived-body and its kinaesthetic system, take place with the *use-engagement* of the instruments, the tools, the sticks, etc. "A *tool* [for example] is an enlargement of the animate organism, namely, when it is 'in use'."[78] This also means that this incorporation and enlargement has degrees that depend on factors like the amount of time and the frequency of use, physical abilities dictated by age, the actual situation prevalent at the time, and the extent of the user's involvement. So, for example, someone incorporates the quasi-kinaesthetic motivation of the car differently when she/he is the driver than when merely observing or even sympathetically participating as a co-driver. The driver and the car become to a larger degree *one*. The "incorporation" is also different for the young, the aged, the professional, the drunk, and so on.

A lot can be said regarding the expansion of the lived-body and its kinaesthetic fields. A lot could also be said regarding the limits of such an expansion, about the kinds of medium that can provide it and, consequently, about our relation to technology, about human freedom. But each of these issues requires and deserves its own analysis. What is important to keep in mind here is that Husserl clearly regards the sense of touch as fundamental for the constitution of the material thing. Tactility is the necessary point of departure for all further practical action of the lived-body, for every further interaction between it and the percepts. Within the context of such practical interactions and through the experience of phenomena of resistance, *res materialis* is constituted in a primordial and *authentic* way.[79] Material-causal intentional interpretations are fulfilled authentically through the double constitution, on the one hand, of the real tactual lived-body that, for example, grabs, lifts, presses, pulls, etc., and, on the other hand, of the real percepts that are grabbed, lifted, pressed, and pulled, respectively. Whenever such an authentic material-causal apprehension is absent, namely in cases where the lived-body in its practical kinaesthetic function is not directly participating, a co-apprehension takes place, due to which we perceive things materially in a non-authentic way.[80] Husserl writes in *Ideas* II:

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78 *Hua* V, 7/6.

79 See *Hua* XV, 313.

80 In *The World of Touch*, Katz tells us that: "People sometimes say that they can see elasticity (or brittleness) in an object. To be sure, one can say something like this, but it must not be overlooked that the experience of elasticity is rooted in the tactual or kinesthetic domains, which provide the interpretation of the visual impressions" (66/82). Also: "The tactual-kinesthetic primacy in the formation of elasticity is indicated by the fact that visually-perceived elasticity is subject to verification by our sense of touch, but not vice versa" (67/82). In order to explain how in sight we also "see" tactual qualities of things, Katz draws on Hering's theory on *memory color* and speaks about "memory touch" (*Gedächtnistastung*). A memory touch is, for Katz, a tactual image used by memory as representative for a certain material (see 47/64). Such tactual images can be invoked by visual means and contribute to the representation process as autonomous elements. Katz gives the example of visually perceiving a leaf of a washstand, a visual experience that must have evoked the memory touch of marble, since he was greatly surprised when by touching the surface and while waiting to feel the "cold smoothness" and "inelastic hardness" of marble, he realized that he was dealing with wood paint in imitation of marble (see §12). Merleau-Ponty places particular emphasis on the "synesthetic" way we perceive things: "Synaesthetic perception is the rule" (*PP*, 265/229), writes Merleau-Ponty, pointing to the primal intertwining of the senses, to inter-sensory syntheses accomplished by the bodily subject: "The senses intercommunicate by opening onto the structure of the thing. One sees the hardness and brittleness of glass [. . .]. One sees the springiness of steel, the ductility of red-hot steel, the hardness of a plane blade, the softness of shavings [. . .] The form of a fold in linen or cotton shows us the resilience or dryness of the fibre, the coldness or warmth of the material" (*PP*, 265/229–30).

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> The thing which appears at rest and unchanged qualitatively "shows" us no more than its schema or, rather, than the apparent, whereas it is nevertheless *apprehended* at the same time as something material. But in this respect it does not "show" itself, it does not properly come to view, to originary givenness.
>
> (*Hua* IV, 37/40)

Earlier, in §3, we pointed out the crucial role empty perceptual (visual or tactual) intentions play for the inauthentic givenness of parts and moments of perceptual phantoms, and even of a phantomatic stratum itself. We underlined that, for example, a thing seen at a distance is always given as having visual aspects not properly seen (like its back colored side), but also as having tactual though inauthentic qualities, e.g. smoothness. The percept at a distance is always seen as a "complete" visual but also tactual phantom. Here we arrive at an analogous observation. Provided that some realizing apprehension has already been fulfilled at a previous temporal point in an authentic way, we always co-apprehend a thing that we, for example, see at a distance *as if* we grabbed it, bent it, pushed it, and so on. We see it with all the anticipative material-causal characters in which our co-intentions "clothe" it, and it is in this sense that Husserl claims that "materiality can, from the outset, be co-apprehended and yet not [authentically] co-given."[81] It is in this sense that we perceive "intuitive causality" not only as involving our acting body authentically, but also, in inauthentic and anticipatory ways, as pertaining to the surrounding things and their interrelations:

> When, for instance, the hammer is given in intuition as forging the iron, and the "what follows," the result, the effect of the force is "seen," and with respect to the hammer, its weighty force. It is obvious that every thing-perception is only the perception of something material by virtue of such properties *being co-intended in perception* [. . .].
>
> (*Hua* XI, 300–301/587, emphases added)

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In general, then, we can say that fulfilled material-causal experience of things *close at hand* becomes the measure for every material co-apperception of every other thing, of the bodies of the others we communicate and live and act with, of distant things, even of heavenly bodies and occurrences.[82] The experience of the worldly reality with the phenomenology of appearance and givenness we are so familiar with would be impossible if touch had not already supplied us, in an authentic way, with the materiality of the things perceived.

81 *Hua* IV, 38/41.

82 See, for example, *Hua* XXXIX, 184ff., 303ff., 512f.; *Hua* XV, 308. Several references in Homer, where the sky is described made of copper or iron, show that according to the then popular conception, even the sky was apprehended as impenetrable, as a solid hemisphere like a bowl (literally as *στερέωμα*). (See, e.g., *Iliad* XVII, 425: *χάλκεον οὐρανόν* (brazen heaven); *Iliad* V, 504: *οὐρανόν ἐς πολύχαλκον* (brazen heaven); *Odyssey* XV, 329: *σιδηρέον οὐρανόν* (iron heaven). Kirk, Raven and Scofield remark that "[s]olidity as well as brightness is presumably conveyed by these metallic epithets" [Kirk, Raven, and Scofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 9]. The writers also refer to Anaximenes and Empedocles, who treated the sky "as ice-like or solid" (ibid., 11).

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§ 6. Conclusion

With the help of our previous examination regarding the different levels of perceptual constitution and the clarification of the fundamental role played by the sense of touch, we can now also critically confront the objection Mattens raises against Husserl's thesis of the primacy of tactility. As already mentioned, Mattens claims that Husserl does not substantiate his idea about the privileging of touch, and that this idea conflicts with other Husserlian analyses in which it seems that vision and touch are treated as being equal.

In this chapter, I have attempted to show that in the relevant Husserlian texts, two different levels of phenomenological analyses are involved, and insufficient attention to the distinction between these levels may lead to misunderstandings. On the one hand, the comparison between vision and touch can be conducted while considering both modalities as active, either currently or at a previous time. As I have argued, this is Husserl's way of thinking in the analyses of §18c of *Ideas* II. Within such a methodological context, and given his particular interest there, Husserl observes that the perceptual systems of vision and touch have equal rights and stand in a constant coordination and synergy.

On the other hand, the comparison between vision and touch can be conducted by taking into account the possibility of the radical absence of each of them in the first place. This thought is followed in §§36–38 of *Ideas* II, and in the analyses of *Thing and Space*. But one should be particularly careful with this latter way of phenomenological inquiry. As I have attempted to show, the layers of *res extensa* and *res materialis* should be examined separately. Only then can the role played by the senses of vision and touch for perceptual constitution be adequately revealed and estimated. And what we then realize is that, for Husserl: (a) vision and touch are equal and independent from one another as regards the constitution of thingly general spatiality and of thing phantomaticity, while (b) touch is essentially privileged in a double sense, i.e., as regards (b_1) the constitution of the lived-body as one's own (primarily at a schematic level), and (b_2) the constitution of both the percept's and the lived-body's full material reality.

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Mattens' phenomenological observations about the constitution of visual objects are particularly detailed and insightful. But his programmatic argument for the restoration of eyesight's importance and the demonstration of its independent role in the constitution of *res materialis* is based on a misreading of Husserl's argument. For Mattens not only intermingles the different levels of phenomenological analyses we have distinguished, and which should be kept apart, but also fails to pay attention to the differences in the constitutional role of vision and touch on the separate levels of *res extensa* and *res materialis*. Mattens claims that

> After all, the priority of vision partly relies on exactly the same skill, namely when I let go of the object's surfaces and all tactile contact is interrupted, I can still perceive them by sight—this is precisely what enables me to perceive any number of objects at the same time, and even at large distances.[83]

83 Mattens 2008, 96. See also Mattens 2009, where Mattens notes that "Husserl treats vision and touch equally as far as their dependence on kinaesthesis is concerned" (ibid., p. 100) Mattens continues: "insofar as perception is concerned, Husserl does not suppose a special connection between kinaesthesis

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However, in considering the case of an eye-subject that sees things from afar without touching them, Mattens constantly and mistakenly *presupposes* a tactually informed vision that continues to inauthentically "clothe" things with tactile and material-causal meanings. Given this presupposition, Mattens's conclusion, namely that tactility is not essential for the constitution of material things because it could be absent while vision does all the work, simply cannot be correct. The careful examination of Husserl's thinking has made it clear that a subject with eyesight only (and no actual or potential touch in the first place) would never be able to apprehend tactual phantomatic aspects, let alone material-causal aspects of "its" own body and perceptual realities in general. A subject lacking touch is a subject lacking its primordial *reality* sense, its real anchorage to the fully concrete world.

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and the sense of touch" (ibid.). After what we have said, we can understand now that this is half true. As far as the practical dimension of kinaestheses is concerned, Husserl does not treat vision and touch as equal.

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18 Review of S. Centrone, *Versuche über Husserl* (Meiner Verlag: Hamburg, 2013)

Daniele De Santis

In *Phaedrus*, while Socrates and his young friend are walking by the Ilissus, he explains that “every discourse must be organized, like a living being, with a body of its own, as it were, so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members, composed in fitting relations to each other and to the whole” (*Phaedrus*, 264c). If this must be the case, let us ask ourselves what kind of members and fitting relations the recently released volume *Essays on Husserl* is composed of. In the *Vorwort*, the editor Stefania Centrone describes the content as “Contributions from analytic and phenomenological Husserl scholarship”. In more general terms, the anthology revolves around the Husserlian contribution to the “20th Century history and philosophy of logic”. One might already be wondering whether the distinction between “phenomenological” and “analytic”, on the one hand, and “history” and “philosophy of logic”, on the other, is tantamount to a distinction between, say, *method* (analytic vs. phenomenological) and *content* (logic)—*historical*, in one case, and thereby attached to those traditional issues belonging to what has been dubbed “historical phenomenology”, *theoretical*, in the other, and hence more sensitive to solicitations coming from the so-called analytic tradition (in some case pre-analytic or, better, belonging to the pre-history of that tradition). Yet, as we shall see, the two distinctions above (analytic vs. phenomenological; history vs. theory) are not like two parallel lines running in the same direction, but intersect one another several times and on several occasions—in so doing, giving the volume the look of an arabesque, whose different motives call for a careful analysis and meticulous treatment. The richness of the arabesque, of its rhythmic patterns, is also due to the twofold meaning of the notion of logic—alternatively meaning, in full conformity with Husserl’s approach, “formal” as well as “transcendental” logic, involving thereby problems of “constitution”. It is not by chance that the editor opens her introduction by quoting from a letter from Husserl to his master F. Brentano, in which the former describes his philosophical and intellectual path (*meine Bahn*). Indeed—as we will point out—one of the leading themes about which the essays of the book revolve, is precisely the problem of intentionality, of its definition and articulation in a critical comparison with Brentano, Bolzano, or Twardowski’s conception (let alone Heidegger’s). Some of the contributions, in a sort of unperceived variation on that very same theme, deal more directly with peculiar applications thereof and specific constitutive dimensions.

This being said, in what follows we will not be commenting upon each essay individually (we will leave the reader with the burden of engaging them step by step in a thorough confrontation), but we will be trying to thematically group the texts so as to provide the reader with thematic clusters, with sort of conceptual bulbs, each of which might be then further and separately developed.

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The contributions are, in their order, Wolfgang Künne, *Edmund Husserl. Werk und Wirkung* (9–31); Markus Stepanians, *"Es war mir nicht gegeben, Mitglied seiner Schule zu bleiben". Husserls Kritik an Brentano* (33–64); Stefania Centrone, *Aspekte des Psychologismus-Streits: Husserl und Frege über Anzahlen und logische Gesetze* (65–96); Wolfgang Künne, *Intentionalität: Bolzano und Husserl* (97–143); Dagfin Føllesdal, *Husserl und Heidegger über die Rolle des Handelns bei der Konstitution der Welt* (145–166); Dagfin Føllesdal, *Rechtfertigung bei Husserl und Wittgenstein* (167–192); Eduard Marbach, *"Wer hat Angst vor der reinen Phänomenologie?". Reflexion, Reduktion und Eidetik in Husserls Phänomenologie* (193–217); George Heffernan, *Vom Wesen der Evidenz zur Evidenz vom Wesen. Eine kritische Analyse der methodologischen Reduktion der Evidenz auf adäquate Selbstgegebenheit in Husserls* Die Idee der Phänomenologie (219–254); Christian Beyer, *Einfühlung und das Verstehen einer Person* (255–276).

We do not discuss here the opening contribution by Künne, a sort of short and concise, yet at the same time very rich, intellectual biography of Husserl, which also has the merit of mentioning several of his students who have nowadays almost fallen into oblivion (e.g., the Hungarian Aurel Kolnai). We will, rather, start considering the essay by Stepanians on Husserl on Brentano and Künne's second paper, containing an analysis of the status of intentionality in Husserl (*via* Bolzano).

Stepanians dwells on Husserl's criticism of Brentano in the appendix to the *Logical Investigations* on external and internal perception, physical and psychical phenomena, the aim being to explain Husserl's replacement of Brentano's distinction between *internal* and *external* perception (with its epistemological as well as ontological consequences) with that of the distinction between *adequate* and *inadequate*. Before plunging into the motives of the appendix, Stepanians sketches an overview of Brentano's overall project and his place in what, along with Windelband, he calls *der Kampf um die Seele* (38). In a nutshell, Brentano's project might be described in terms of finding a way to secure, by analogy with natural sciences, a scientific base for psychology. Such a base, as we shall see, is to be granted from a gnoseological as well as an ontological perspective. Indeed, the distinction between *external* and *internal* perception is, for Brentano, precisely a distinction between two sources of cognition: the former belonging to *Naturwissenschaften*, the latter being, on the contrary, the one and only form of perception by means of which we can be granted access to our mental (i.e., internal) life.

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Now, it is worth pointing out the correspondences between the epistemological, gnoseological as well as ontological sides of Brentano's distinction. If there is an epistemological (in the strong sense of *episteme*) distinction between "sciences of nature" or *Naturwissenschaften* and "psychology", it is because such a distinction is rooted in the gnoseological distinction between two sources of knowledge, notably, *external* (for sciences of nature) and *internal* perception (for psychology). This distinction, in turn, is itself related to the ontological difference between the *phenomena* of the two forms of perception. As is indeed well known, only internal perception can be really granted the name of *perception* in the etymological, and strong, sense of the German *Wahr-Nehmung* ("true-grasping") whereas external perception can only improperly be called perception. It would be more adequate to call it *Falsch-Nehmung*, rather than *Wahr-Nehmung*: only the phenomena given in "internal perception" are then true "in themselves" (*sind wahr in sich selbst*) (47); they *are* exactly as they *appear* ("Wie sie erscheinen—dafür bürgt die Evidenz, mit der sie wahrgenommen werden—so sind sie auch in Wirklichkeit" (47)). On the one hand, there is the *epistemological* distinction

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between two different kinds of science (science of nature; psychology). On the other hand, there is a *gnoseological* distinction (between two kinds of perception) due to the *ontological* discrepancy between phenomena, such as mental phenomena, where we have strict coincidence between *Erscheinung* and *Wirklichkeit* ("Wie sie erscheinen [. . .], so sind sie auch in Wirklichkeit") and others, like the physical ones, where this is not the case (*Erscheinung* ≠ *Wirklichkeit*). This is why exclusively psychology can be lifted up to the level of a "philosophical fundamental discipline" (*eine "philosophische Fundamentaldisciplin"*), namely, of a "first philosophy" in the most traditional sense of the expression.

We could diagram this as follows:

Figure 18.1 The epistemological/ontological distinction

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Now, when it comes to Husserl's attitude vis-à-vis Brentano's distinction, if, on the one hand, the father of phenomenology traces the distinction between external and internal perception back to J. Locke, he has to acknowledge, on the other hand, the novelty of Brentano's own "descriptive" approach (48). Unlike Locke, who drew the distinction between the two forms of perception upon the basis of the metaphysical distinction between "bodies" and "souls", Brentano is exclusively driven by the desire to descriptively determine the "characters" (*Merkmale*) of the two corresponding acts (49).

What are such "descriptive characters" (*deskriptive Merkmale*) distinguishing physical phenomena from psychical ones? Now, even though Brentano enumerates six *Merkmale*, Stepanians—in his hermeneutical strategy being quite faithful to Husserl's reading—focuses mainly on two:

(i) upon the notion of "evidence" proper to internal perception (49), which is a necessary yet not a sufficient criterion to discriminate the two kinds of perception;
(ii) on the renown "intentional in-existence" which, as a character, is able to clearly mark out the distinction at stake, thereby to divide the two scientific territories or domains: "Jedes [psychisches Phänomen] enthält etwas als Objekt in sich [. . .]. Diese intentionale In-existenz ist den psychischen Phänomen ausschliesslich eigentümlich. Kein physisches Phänomen zeigt etwas Ähnliches]" (cited on page 50 by the author himself from *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*).

What is usually referred to as "School of Brentano" might be described as nothing but a series of variations on the excerpt quoted above—not on the adjective *intentional*

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(*intentionale*), but on the noun of which such an *intentional* is predicated, notably the "in-existence". What the passage is describing is an *In-Existenz*, notably an "improper" (as Brentano would put it) form of *Existenz*. In other words, what characterizes our mental or psychical phenomena, in contrast to physical phenomena, is precisely the presence (*In-*) of a "content" whose existence is merely "intentional". The phrase "intentional in-existence" does not at all refer to the *psychische Phänomene*'s own mode of existence (where indeed *Erscheinung* = *Wirklichkeit*) but to the mode of *in*-existence of physical phenomena as correlates, or "contents", of the former (*Erscheinung* ≠ *Wirklichkeit*). Rather than directly describing our mental phenomena, Brentano is providing us with a characterization of the mode of existence of their contents, the physical ones (whose existence is *intentional*).

Brentano is not primarily concerned with the topic of intentionality (and therefore with the difference between phenomena that have intentionality and those that do not), but with the distinction, as we already mentioned, between two modes of existence (one merely intentional, the other not). It is worth pointing out that, while at the time of his *Psychology*, Brentano merely distinguishes between *existence* (mental phenomena) and *in-existence* (physical phenomena); in his later essays and letters he also makes a distinction between physical phenomena (whose "existence" is intentional yet not "merely" intentional) and the *entia rationis* (which are exclusively and "merely" intentional).

Now, to get back to our essay, Husserl—Stepanians claims—recognizes the novelty of Brentano's treatment, the appeal to evidence as well as his freedom from any presupposition. Yet, Husserl does not accept Brentano's double equivalence of "internal perception = evident perception" and "external perception = non-evident perception" (54). Stepanians shows Husserl's major point very clearly. In effect, in Husserl's mind, Brentano's chief mistake consists in reiterating Locke's failure to make a sharp distinction between *Erscheinung* in the sense of "living experiences" (*Erlebnisse*) and in the sense of appearing object or object of perception (*Wahrnehmungsgegenstand*) (56). In so doing, by following and sticking to a truly phenomenalistic tradition, Brentano is unavoidably led to consider "sensations" (*Empfindugskomplexionen*) as "presenting contents" and real components of the act of external perception just like any other physical phenomenon, that is to say, as a non-evident phenomenon. He confuses, in more Husserlian jargon, what *appears* (an external object, in case non-evident) with the *appearing* (which then becomes itself misleading): "Als solche ist ihre Existenz nach Brentano nicht evident und ebenso täuschend wie das Dasein von Häusern, Bergen und Wäldern" (57). As a consequence, by breaking the above described double equivalence once and for all, Husserl makes the difference between *adequate* and *inadequate* perception cut across that between *external* and *internal* perception: as there are "internal" perceptions which are "inadequate", so too can there be "external" perceptions whose object is nevertheless "adequately" given. In so doing, Husserl takes Brentano's own departure from Locke's metaphysics to the next level and extends it: if Locke was indeed still relying on the metaphysics of substances, Brentano introduces a strictly descriptive method, and Husserl, in turn, can finally get rid of the distinction itself between internal and external which was so central to modern philosophy and theory of knowledge.

Let us consider Künne's analysis before raising a couple of questions as to Husserl's conception. Now, his main purpose is to tackle Husserl's "theory of intentionality" against the backdrop of Bolzano's "representations" and "propositions" in themselves and in the light of Twardowski's distinction between "content" and "object" of our

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Vorstellungen. Künne's starting point is the issue of the so-called "objectless representations" (*Gegenstandlose Vorstellungen*) and of the various and different solutions offered by Bolzano, Twardowski, and Meinong, respectively. Once the problem as to what "intentionality" might mean *in relation to such a specific topic* is worked out, Künne aims at generalizing the upshot in order to provide a more general account of intentionality itself.

As Twardowski comments in his *On the Doctrine of the Content and Object of Re-Presentations*:

> Bolzano hat mit grosser Consequenz an diesem Unterschiede [i.e., between *content* and *object*] festgehalten [. . .] Bolzano gebraucht statt des Ausdrucks "Inhalt einer Vorstellung" die Bezeichnung "objective Vorstellung", "Vorstellung an sich" und unterscheidet von ihr einerseits den Gegenstand, andererseits die "gehabte" oder "subjective" Vorstellung, worunter er den Act des Vorstellens versteht.
>
> (Quote from the author on p. 100)

Künne hastens to remark, however, how Bolzano does not simply make a distinction between *content* and *object* but, so to say, between two notions of *content*: there is indeed what he properly calls *Inhalt* (which is indifferent to the mode of composition) and *Stoff* (or *matter*, in Husserl's latinization thereof) which is the content itself, but according to a specific order and composition (in this sense, the following propositions "Anna is the stupid daughter of her father" and "Anna is the daughter of her stupid father" have the same *Inhalt*, yet different *Stoff* (100–101)). Now, according to Bolzano, the phrase "objectless representations" can embrace two cases: there is the case of representations involving "contradictory determinations" (*widersprechende Bestimmungen*; or *Beschaffenheiten, welche einander widersprechen*) as well as, the second possibility, cases of representations which, even without being contradictory, have no corresponding objects (e.g., "golden mountain") (103).

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Now, the problem that Künne is going to raise throughout the rest of his paper does not simply concern *the status* of such non-existing or impossible (or, to use more neutral terminology: "missing") objects, but first and foremost, by appealing to Husserl's own approach, *the status of our intentional acts*, thereby of *intentionality itself* expected to be directed toward them.

The first attempt to be mentioned is Meinong's, according to which "every representation" has its corresponding object, yet in some cases such an object is a non-existing one (104). There are, according to Meinong, *Gegenstände, die nicht existieren*. The same holds true for Twardowski's construal: every representation has at least "one object", *the one being represented* ("einen Gegenstand, der in ihnen vorsgestellt wird"), yet in some cases *the corresponding represented object* does not exist ("aber die vorgestellte Gegenstände existieren nicht immer"). In both cases—even in Meinong's theory, with its heavier ontological commitment—one can also speak so to say, to the contents of our own representations, of objects which nevertheless do not exist.

Twardowski's attempted solution is particularly interesting: indeed, the distinction between *object being represented* and *represented object* is precisely to be considered as a variation on the already, yet briefly, discussed Brentanian problem of *intentional* "content" or "in-existence". Indeed, in order to avoid confusion, rather than employing the word "in-existence" to characterize the content (that is, the *object being represented*), yet not the *represented object*, Twardowski employs Brentano's distinction between

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"attributive" and "modifying" (*attributive* and *modificierende*) "determinations" to better mark that difference. Accordingly, the *object being represented* does certainly *exist*, but only in an "improper" way—being the determination *represented* used in a *modifying* sense. Being more explicit than Brentano himself, Twardowski speaks of a merely "intentional" or phenomenal *existence* (instead of the more ambiguous *in*-existence)—in so doing, confirming once again that for Brentano (and for himself as well), the primary concern is the problem of existence and the notion of *intentional* is appealed to only to discriminate proper existence from a mode of existence in an improper sense (to which Brentano used to refer to as "in"-existence).

At this point, one might sum up what has just been said and maintain that the project worked out in the famous *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* is better described as a sort of *existential* (or *ontological*, meaning *Sein* for Brentano, that is, the same as *Existenz*) enterprise, aiming in other words at displaying different modes of existence according to different corresponding kinds of evidence of the relevant acts of perception.

Now, what is Husserl's position in such a late nineteenth-century version of the Platonic *amphisbetesis peri tes ousias*? As Künne explains with superb clarity (106–107), Husserl completely rejects the main presupposition of the aforementioned (Brentanian and the like) solutions: the distinction between *intentional* and *real* or *existing* objects is just a pseudo-distinction, concealing the actual distinction between *Vorstellungen* for which the existence of an object being represented by them holds true and other *Vorstellungen* for which this is not the case (as Künne put it, "manche Vorstellungen, aber nicht alle, sind so beschaffen, dass es einen Gegenstand gibt (m.a.W. dass ein Gegenstand existiert), vom dem gilt, er wird in ihnen vorgestellt" (107)).

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The main point that Künne, following Husserl, strives to make is *precisely the impossibility of thinking of intentionality in relational terms*. As Husserl himself notices, if a relation obtains, then also the two elements and poles involved in the relation must obtain; now, if what is usually called "intentionality" is to be broadly construed in terms of "relation", then in the case of impossible or, say, non-existing objects, there would be a relation between something *existing* (our consciousness) and something *non-existing*—which is utterly impossible (107–108). *Either* the relation itself is not possible *or* it must involve two existing objects, rather than an existing and a non-existing one.

If Künne seems at first to agree with Husserl's own solution in terms of *assumption* ("Urteile unter einer Assumption") according to which, for example, the god Cthulhu can be taken as "existing" under the assumption of Lovecraft mythology (108) and we can maintain that, in Lovecraft's world, a god called Cthulhu lives beneath the Pacific Ocean—such a solution does not really seem to work in the case of *me representing the god Jupiter* ("Ich stelle mir den Gott Jupiter vor"). Now, since the explanation of the latter case cannot appeal to any assumption, nor is intentionality to be construed as a relation, how can we understand the example "I do have a representation of Jupiter"?

As Künne goes on to explain, the "I do have a representation (of the god Jupiter)" (*Ich habe eine Vorstellung*) does not entail nor describe any *relation* to a Roman god. Künne employs the following formalized language in this section of the paper:

$\exists x$ (x ist eine Vorstellung & *ich habe x* & *der Gehalt von x* ist [der Gott Jupiter])

What this maintains of the concept ("the god Jupiter") is nothing but its *being the content* of a subjective representation (*Ich habe eine Vorstellung*). Accordingly,

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concludes Künne, the often misleading metaphor of (intentionality as) directionality (*intentio* meaning *at aliud tendere*) simply refers to the *intentional act* having a *content* (113–114). It is worth remarking here that Künne refers to the methodological tool known as "epoché" (116) precisely to insist upon the circumstance that, once the "epoché" is accomplished, the phenomenologist is allowed to consider what is given only as long as it is so given, without any consideration bearing upon its existence: "Für das Bewusstsein ist das Gegebene ein wesentlich Gleiches, ob der vorgestellte Gegenstand existiert, oder ob er fingiert und vielleicht widersinning ist" (quote on p. 115). Yet it is not clear whether Künne is claiming that the problem of the "objectless representations" can be solved *only by appealing to the method of epoché* (which nevertheless is not present in the early writings) or if, by contrast, Husserl was led to that methodology after tackling the former issue. According to the first hypothesis, the solution to the problem cannot be found in the writings where the problem itself is actually stated; in the second hypothesis, on the contrary, the introduction of the method of *epoché* is to be considered as a sort of consequence of the solution to the puzzling *gegenstandlose Vorstellungen*.

We leave the duty of exploring the second section of Künne's paper to the reader (*Attribute und Akt-Materien als Spezies*), where the author follows the same path and employs the same strategy to make sense of Husserl's theory of idealities as species in close confrontation with Lotze. For the sake of our analysis, it is better to stop here and raise a couple of points concerning Stepanians's and Künne's interpretations. If we insisted over and over again that, for Brentano (and Brentanians like Meinong and Twardowski), the problem of the "intentional" turns out to be foremost about the notion of *existence* (and eventually a distinction between two different modes of existence: proper and improper, or merely intentional), it was to better appreciate Künne's *de-existentialization*, as it were, of "intentionality". Indeed, Künne's chief burden was to discuss a very "specific" and "circumscribed" topic (i.e., objectless representations) only in order to provide a more general and wider interpretation of intentionality. Nevertheless, if Künne is clear on what intentionality *is not* (it is not to be construed in terms of relation), it is not evident *what it exactly is* or should be.

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Moreover, (and here we can finally touch upon what is really at stake in Husserl's approach) if in Brentano and Twardowski the *intentional* is exclusively (even from a grammatical point of view) an adjective (either modifying or attributive determination) characterizing a mode of existence (the one to which Brentano refers to as "in"-existence), it is Husserl who is the first one to make it a *substantive* and thereby introduce the noun *intentionality* to contemporary philosophy. Intentionality is now no longer employed to accompany a mode of existence, but possesses an autonomy of its own (Künne himself seems to partially recognize this state of affairs in his opening essay (23)).

The *substantivization of the Bestimmung* intentional *into the noun* intentionality, *and along with it the corresponding "de-existentialization" (what one calls "intentionality" does not describe just a mode of existence) is Husserl's true departure from Brentano and his school*. In other words, when Husserl replaces the Brentanian distinction between "external" (where *Erscheinung* ≠ *Wirklichkeit*) and "internal" (*Erscheinung* = *Wirklichkeit*) perception with the distinction between adequate and inadequate perception (this being a feature of intentionality itself), it is precisely—like Cassius in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* ("Cassius will free himself from slavery")—*to set intentionality free from the slavery of existence*. (From such a perspective, even if Künne's contribution is astonishingly helpful to shed light on the discrepancy between Husserl's

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and Brentano's understanding of the *intentional*, his emphasis on *intentionality* as meaning nothing else but the *presence of a content* and thereby on the subjective side of the purported relation (*Ich habe eine Vorstellung*), seems, at least at first glance, to bring Husserl extremely close to Brentano's late "reism".)

Let us now approach the essay written by the editor herself, S. Centrone, who devotes all her efforts to comment on the dispute between Husserl and Frege and their fight against "psychologism" with respect to "numbers" and "logical laws". Centrone opens her analysis by reminding the reader of the "polemic" meaning of the expression "*Psychologismus*" in the late nineteenth-century German philosophical environment, in which "psychologism" used to label any attempt to make psychology the basic and most fundamental of all disciplines—a sort of empirical *Ersatz* of what historically was called "first philosophy" (65). Given the specific topic of the essay, Centrone focuses in particular on logic and its alleged relation to psychology by carefully distinguishing two possible versions of "psychologism": there is the "logical psychologism", according to which the "validity" of logical laws depends upon the mental and psychical acts that grasp them; there is also the so-called "gnoseological psychologism" (*der erkenntnistheoretische Psychologismus*), claiming by contrast that questions as to "epistemology" and "theory of knowledge" are to be addressed, and eventually resolved, in the light of the analysis of the empirical genesis and developments of those acts involved in the process itself of knowledge (66).

When it comes to Husserl, he himself acknowledges in his late *Formal and Transcendental Logic* that the "psychologism" discussed and ruled out in the *Prolegomena* was exclusively the "logical" one, not the "gnoseological psychologism", which—as he goes on to explain—involving problems of knowledge, could be dealt with only within the framework of transcendental philosophy. In the essay, Centrone addresses, first, the discussion between Frege and Husserl in relation to the latter's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and concerning the status of "numbers" and then, in the second section of her analysis, she switches to the issue of "logical laws".

Now, given the (Brentanian) psychological background of his first work, it is not surprising to learn that, in relation to every "concept", Husserl distinguishes between three aspects: there is its "content" (construed of as a collection and conjunction of characters (*Merkmale*)); the "extent" of the concept (*Umfang*) as the sum of all the objects falling under it and finally, what we can translate as "origination" or "genesis" (*Entstehung*) of the concept itself, that is, the "formation-process" that brings about the concept in a "human psyche" (*im Geist eines Menschen*) (68). The last aspect is in particular of vital importance to Husserl because it is what makes it possible for the concept to be granted a kind of "intra-subjective" and "inter-subjective" *constancy* (68): different subjects, or the same subject at different times, can be said to possess "the one and the same" concept because the psychological formation-process, namely the genesis of the concept, is always the same.

According to the Brentanian overall project of making psychology "the most fundamental" of all sciences, Husserl claims that arithmetic too, and its central concept (that of "natural number") has to find its roots (and foundations), so to say, in relevant psychological investigations concerning those acts that are responsible for it, as it were. The notion of *Anzahl* is defined by Husserl as a "multitude composed of unities" (*die Anzahl ist eine Vielheit von Einheiten*). Now, since "multitude" (*Vielheit*) and "unity" (*Einheit*) cannot be further defined, there is no way to clarify what a number "is", other than displaying and referring back to the "concrete phenomena" out of

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which they are abstracted. In Husserl's psychological jargon, we need to trace the "number" back to a specific psychological act (what Husserl defines as *kollective Verbindung*) wherein several objects (that is, a multitude) are "unified" (70). In so doing, we obtain the concepts of *Menge* (a "set" or "quantity") and *Vielheit* and all the elements therein "unified" are the relevant "unities" (*Einheiten*). Moreover, every *Einheit* is an *Etwas*, an "anything whatsoever" under which falls anything that can be thought of by means of an "abstraction" from all its "qualities".

If it is the case then that the number is to be traced back to the elements unified in a collecting act, *what exactly is a number?* To this question, Husserl would answer to the effect that a number is a "finite set of unities" and that "every set consist of *n* unities" (*eine Menge besteht aus* n *Einheiten*).

Centrone hastens to point out that, at the time, such a conception was not peculiar to Husserl alone, and that also the great mathematician Cantor (a colleague of Husserl's in Halle) held the same view, especially for what concerns the act of abstraction. As the American philosopher Kit Fine (quoted by the author on p. 71) remarked: "What [Cantor's and Husserl's] accounts have in common is a view of abstraction as the process of freeing an object of its peculiar features and a conception of number [. . .] as the product of such a process."

Having provided an overview of Husserl's effort to "psychologically" clarify the notion of number, Centrone moves on to highlight Frege's harsh criticism and dismissal of that early writing.

Frege, as is well known, rejects the very same conception of grounding arithmetic in psychology. Now, when it comes to stating what *numbers are not*, Frege cannot be clearer: (i) numbers are not properties or qualities belonging to space-temporal objects; (ii) they are not *Vorstellungen*, namely subjective representations, nor mental images, because they are something "objective" absolutely independent from our representing, sensing, or intuiting activities and faculties; (iii) they are not sets or collections of unities, otherwise one could not make sense of the numbers like 0 and 1 (72–73).

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Centrone stresses that, rather than focusing on defining the notion of number (like Husserl), Frege switches the topic of his analysis to what he calls "statement of number" or "attribution of number" (*Zahlangabe*) (74): "Jede Zahlangabe enthält eine Aussage von einem Begriffe". Hence, it is not the psychological analysis that can explain what numbers "are", but the logical one bearing on such an *Aussage von einem Begriffe* or "assertion about a concept".

Frege is not at all concerned with the psychological acts bringing about numbers as sets of unities given in a collection, but rather with the logical query as to what *statements of numbers* amount to. As Centrone explains, Frege holds concepts to be "bearers of numbers" (*Träger einer Anzahl*): for instance, if we consider the statement "Jesus had 12 apostles", the *number 12* is being predicated on the "concept" *Jesus' Apostle* ("Eigenschaft des Begriffs eines Jüngers Jesu ist streng genommen nicht *die Zahl 12*, sondern die Eigenschaft, *12 Gegenstände unter sich zu fassen*" (74)). If we ask now what a "concept" is for Frege, the answer is that a concept is neither something cognitive nor a mental representation, but *Sinn eines Prädikates* (yet Centrone hastens to warn the reader that *Sinn* means here what *Bedeutung* would mean in Frege's post-1891 texts, namely after the introduction of the distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*). Now, properly speaking, "numbers" are "objects", meaning *Gegenstand* is not something to be intuitively represented, but something defined by strictly "identity-conditions" (*Identitätsbedingungen*). To quote a couple of passages from Frege: "Wenn

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uns das Zeichen a einen Gegenstand bezeichnen soll, so müssen wir ein Kennzeichen haben, welches überall entscheidet, ob b dasselbe sei wie a" (75); "In unserem Falle müssen wir den Sinn des Satzes 'die Zahl, welche den Begriff F zukommt, ist diesselbe, welche dem Begriff G zukommt' erklären" (76).

From this moment on, Centrone strives to follow and make it clear to the reader what might be described as the theoretical duel between Husserl's and Frege's respective analyses and positions.

Given the above recalled "identity-conditions", one might maintain—according to Frege—that G and F are *equi-numerous* (*gleichzählig*), if there obtains between G and F a reversible correlation (*umkehrbar eindeutig Korrelierbarkeit*). It is precisely against such a definition of number that Husserl raises his objections. Husserl's rejection entails a twofold claim: on the one hand, he aims at turning, so to say, Frege's definition upside down—it is not the case that two sets (*Menge*) are *equi-numerous* because of a reversible correlation obtaining between them, but the other way around: two sets can be said to display "a reversible correlation" precisely because they are *equi-numerous*. As Centrone points out very explicitly: "Zwei Mengen einander umkehrbar zugeordnet werden können, *weil* ihere Anzahlen gleich sind, und nicht umgekehrt" (77). Moreover, Husserl's objection relies also on what we might designate as a sort of pre-phenomenological meaning-analysis of questions: indeed, if we ask "how many disciples did Jesus appoint?", we do not want to know, as claimed by Frege, the "extent" (*Umfang*) of the concept *gleichzählig mit dem Begriff eines Jüngers Jesu* (78). Indeed, conceptually speaking (*gedanklich*), the two questions (or, if we were to employ Roman Ingarden's terminology, the intentional or "formal" states of affairs posited by the two questions respectively) "are not equivalent" (*glechwertig*).

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Without entering into the last part of the first half of the essay, where Centrone briefly deals with the so-called "paradox of analysis" and with the question as to *whether* Husserl actually discovered or touched upon it, we will directly jump to the second half, concerning the status of logical laws, notably Husserl's understanding of them in the *Prolegomena*. Broadly considered, Husserl's chief fourfold burden is to discuss whether (i) logic is a theoretical or practical discipline, (ii) if it is self-sufficient or dependent upon psychology, (iii) if it is formal or material, and (iv) if it is a priori or empirical.

Centrone provides a very clear and satisfactory account of Husserl's major reasons for rejecting any form of psychologism, whether *moderate* (according to which logical laws are normative laws, and thereby logic, as claimed by the Munich psychologist T. Lipps, would be better described as the ethics of thought), or *radical*(which reduces logical laws to natural regularities) (84). Logical laws have absolute certainty and exactitude and cannot be construed as empirical generalization deriving from psychological, that is, natural regularities.

In Husserl's view, the main (and in many cases unperceived) misunderstanding upon which any psychological or reductionist attempt relies on is the confusion between the *real* act of judgment (a temporal event occurring within the sphere of a human psyche) and the *ideal* logical laws which, on the contrary, represent the content of the former: the latter are indeed *intemporal* and not subject to any cause-effect chain of relationships. As a consequence, no logical laws as "ideal contents" presuppose the existence of representations (*Vorstellungen*) or judgments (*Urteilen*) (87).

"Logic" turns out then to be the fundament of all sciences, a truly *Wissenschaftslehre* in Bolzanian sense: a condition to be met for a theory to be a theory (notably, a system of propositions mutually connected to each other according to the objective relation

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Grunde-Folge) (88). Centrone moves on toward the conclusion by recalling Husserl's three-layer understanding of logic (sketched in the early *Logical Investigations* and further developed in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*): (1) on the first level there is the logical morphology or logical grammar which distinguishes non-sense from sense (*Unsinn* from *Sinn*); (2) "logic of consequence" to avoid any form of counter-sense (*Widersinn*), and (3) finally the upper level stating the conditions only under which a deductive theory is possible as such.

Centrone's essay, so to speak, perfectly mirrors, and in a way integrates the two layers already discussed. Indeed, if Stepanians's and Künne's contributions have helped us understand, as we tried to show, to what extent Husserl departs from Brentano (the former focusing upon the notions of perception and evidence, the latter on the concept itself of intentionality), Centrone lays out very clearly the issues (such as the necessity of addressing not only the "logical psychologism" but also the so-called "gnoseological psychologism") that would later lead Husserl to embrace a transcendental conception of philosophy and thereby develop his own phenomenology.

The next three essays force us to step into the transcendental side of Husserl's phenomenology. In his first writing, Føllesdal tackles an issue widely discussed in the 1970s: the alleged difference between Husserl's mainly "theoretical" approach to constitution and Heidegger's own practical or "pragmatical" conception (145). After reviewing some basic concepts of Husserl's philosophy, such as the concept of "noema" and its relation to "object", Føllesdal contrasts Husserl's idea of constitution, as it is performed and accomplished by pure consciousness, with Heidegger's "*In-der-Welt-Sein*", according to which the Husserlian transcendental constitution turns into a possibility of the concrete and mundane "self" (152). Yet, while Føllesdal speaks of "isomorphism" between the two understandings of constitution (150), he also refers to Husserlian, so to say, "anticipations" (*Antizipationen*) (159) of some Heideggerian motives, in so doing revealing a sort of "teleological" movement underlying his interpretation. He considers Heidegger's conception to be more "complicated" than Husserl's (152–153), most of all because the "practical relation" and *commercium* with the world is "more fundamental" than its merely theoretical contemplation: "Der Hauptunterschied besteht in meinen Augen darin, dass die Welt laut Heidegger durch alle Arten von menschlicher Aktivität konstituiert ist, während Husserl in seinen publizierten Werken die Welt als etwas auffasst, was letztlich durch theoretische Aktivität konstituiert wird" (150–160). Before moving on to this conclusion, Føllesdal hastens however to underline how Husserl himself, especially in his unpublished manuscripts and lectures on Fichte, extensively deals with the idea of "agency" and the problem of how to integrate pragmatic aspects of our being into transcendental constitution.

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In his second contribution, Føllesdal focuses by contrast on a more "analytic" sensitive material, namely a confrontation between Husserl and Wittgenstein as to the issue of "justification". Here too Føllesdal starts out by providing an overview of some basic concepts and Husserliana analyses, such as those of perception, *hyle* and fulfillment or of the role played by "values" (*Werte*, *praktische Rollen*) in the constitution of our surrounding world. Before actually plunging into the confrontation, Føllesdal sketches the main traits of what John Rawls called *reflective equilibrium* as the true state or condition of justification (175–176) and then moves on to briefly introduce and discuss concepts such as "coherence", "revisability" (*Korrigierbarkeit*) (176–177), and the "holistic" approaches to empirical sciences (in Duhem and Quine, for example). At this point, Føllesdal goes back to Husserl in order to show how he perfectly fits into

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this picture and to also underline the importance and significance of his understanding of *Lebenswelt* (183–185) for the problem of justification. The last pages of the essay are devoted to Wittgenstein (185–189) and to stressing analogies and differences with respect to Husserl's position—the main distinction, argues Føllesdal, being the inconsistency for Wittgenstein of the (Husserlian) idea of propositions (*Sätze*) that are absolutely "certain" and not subject to further revocability and revisability (189–190).

With Marbach (one of the most competent and appreciated Husserl scholars) and his text, we make a further step into transcendental phenomenology and its main theoretical tools. The essay is indeed devoted to working out three fundamental concepts: "reflection", (transcendental) "reduction", and the idea itself of phenomenology as an "eidetic" science of pure consciousness. Marbach's starting point is a sketchy presentation of Husserl's overall philosophical project and of what he means by "phenomenon" (196–198)—in its twofold sense of what is *objectively* given and of the *subjective* experience wherein the former actually presents itself. The method of reflection is precisely what allows the phenomenologist to move her gaze "backwards", so to speak, from *what appears* to the *appearance* itself, the subjective experience which constitutes every sort of objectivity. This is why, as Marbach poignantly stresses (198–199), Husserl can define the notion of "object" (rather than, we would say, in the Heideggerian way of "what lies before us") as the "pole" of the synthetic unities of the *Leistungen* of consciousness. Yet, as Marbach hastens to remark again, the so-called "method of reflection" is not at all enough to discriminate a mere psychological investigation from the pure phenomenological analysis—the reason being that, psychologically considered, "consciousness" (as *psyche*) is still a part of the world, still belongs to the mundane horizon of our everyday experience, and is thereby unable to bring about the process itself of constitution (202). That is why we need the method of reduction, which is thought of by Husserl as able to truly differentiate psychology from phenomenology (204). Once the phenomenological reduction is accomplished and "consciousness" in its empirical apperception is thereby excluded from our analyses (205), a new field of investigations opens up: the realm of transcendentally reduced phenomena belonging to the original "region" of pure consciousness. If the reduction discloses the "subject matter" of our phenomenological inquiries, the methodological side of such a "new" species of investigation (Husserl speaks in effect of *eine neue Eidetik*) consists precisely in the so-called "eidetic method". Indeed, once we have before us the new, and potentially infinite, field of subjective life, we cannot but confine ourselves to ascertaining a Heracliteian flux of flowing phenomenon (206) without any stable point or fix anchorage. It is the query as to make such a science possible, precisely as a science, namely aiming at universally valid truths, that leads Husserl to embrace and recast the Socratic and Platonic way of questioning: "Was ist das überhaupt, 'Wahrnehmung'?", "Was ist das überhaupt, 'Urteil'?" (211). Marbach shows very clearly how there cannot be any phenomenology without eidetic inquiry or without reduction: the two methods are like two sides of the same coin, the former opening up and disclosing the new object of such a new science, the latter defining the method as based upon intuitive givenness.

It is then with Heffernan's essay that we finally reach the level not only of reconstruction, but of a critical and meticulous analysis of Husserl's theory of evidence as it is developed in the famous and groundbreaking lectures on *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Heffernan's main concern being to show what he calls Husserl's "reductionist approach to or treatment of evidence" (219). In these lectures, Husserl tackles the problem of

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"the essence of knowledge"; now, the evidence is itself defined in terms of self-givenness (*Selbst-Gegebenheit*), then as evidence of the essence itself. As Heffernan clearly argues and explains, Husserl switches from the essence of knowledge, namely from the need for an eidetic inquiry into what knowledge and cognition properly are, to the evidence of essence, which seems to be accepted, without any further ado, as a matter of fact. Husserl's opening question reminds the reader of Kant's famous letter to Herz: "Wie kann Erkenntnis ihrer Übereinstimmung mit den an sich seienden Sachen gewiss werden, sie 'treffen'?" And such a puzzling question is, for Husserl, precisely the problem of evidence: indeed, by working out an eidetic science of knowledge, that is to say, a science concerning the essence of cognition (a *Wesenslehre* of knowledge), Husserl presupposes the givenness itself of the essence (223).

Heffernan's meticulous descriptions makes the following very clear:

- there is a non-sharp distinction between *apodictic*, *adequate* and *absolute* evidence;
- there is equivalence between the notions of *Selbst-Gegebene*, *Selbst-Gegebenheit*, *das Evident* and *die Evidenz*;
- "evidence" is not yet worked out in terms of "intentional" *Leistungen* of consciousness (as Husserl, for example, will do in his later *Formal and Transcendental Logic*);
- Husserl's analysis is almost "noematic" directed.

Without following Heffernan's commentary step by step (which shows an uncommon familiarity with the text and its conceptual nuances) throughout the five lectures, we will confine ourselves to summing up the main outcomes of his *Auseinandersetzung*.

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Husserl's own search for a pregnant concept of evidence is due to the necessity of differentiating phenomenology and psychology. What is peculiar to phenomenology in opposition to any factual investigation, is precisely the evidence of the essence, thereby the distinction between *Tatsache* and *Wesen*. It is worth pointing out that if, as claimed by Heffernan, Husserl makes use of a still unclear conception of evidence, the concept itself of essence seems to suffer from an analogous indeterminacy: there is no trace of the later distinction (see, for instance, *Ideas I*) between essence broadly construed (as a collection of "features")—in the sense of an individual essence belonging to an individual object—and "pure" essence or *eidos* (which Husserl takes as the true subject matter of the phenomenological descriptions). Phenomenology is not at all concerned with (individual) essences, but exclusively with pure essences or universals as *eide* (as Husserl says in his lectures on *Phenomenological Psychology* and *Experience and Judgment*): "Vielmehr handelt es sich um 'die Erkenntnis', dass nicht nur Einzelheiten, sondern auch *Allgemeinheiten*, *allgemeine Gegenstände und allgemeine Sachverhalte zu absoluter Selbstgegebenheit gelangen können*" (232).

Yet, such an unclear and undecided status of essence allows yet Husserl to move (and as Heffernan remarks, maybe too quickly) from the essence of "red" to the much more complicated essence of the phenomenon of cognition. Indeed, even though Husserl speaks of evidence and self-givennness, and of self-givenness of essence, that does not mean that the essence itself is self-evident (239).

When it comes to explaining such an ambiguity of the notion of essence, upon which the entirety of the Husserlian argument seems to rely, Heffernan is very clear. The concept of horizon, thereby that of horizontal intentionality, does not play any role whatsoever in these lectures. Husserl therefore forgets, precisely in the aftermath of

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that inattention, to consider the phenomenon of evidence of what is given along with what is non-given and which inevitably surrounds the former (243). As a consequence—once the non-given is stripped out of what is given and what is not, or less, evident is stripped out of what is evident—the one and only evidence deserving of attention or consideration is the evidence of essence at the expense of the essence of evidence (243–244). Heffernan himself remarks: "Also ist Husserls Reduktion auf Evidenz in *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* zugleich eine Reduktion auf absolute, adäquate und apodiktische Evidenz, und diese Reduktion stellt auch eine Ausklammerung von relativer, inadäquater und zweifelhafter Evidenz dar" (245). Husserl pretends to be working out an eidetic science of knowledge (as evidence) without any previous inquiry into the essence itself of evidence.

The major merit of Heffernan is precisely that he brings our attention to one of the most familiar, and at the same time less investigated (even within phenomenological circles), concepts. Any analysis that aims at recasting Husserl's phenomenology, and his theory of knowledge, cannot take concepts such as evidence, givenness, intentionality, essence, *eidos*, and so on for granted.

The ninth essay, which concerns the notions of "person" and *Einfühlung*, finally forces us to step into a concrete case of phenomenological constitution. Beyer focuses not only on *Ideas II* and the constitution of the *geistige Welt*, but also emphasizes the role of values and value-perception (*Wert-Nehmung*) in our everyday *commercium* with other persons (256–257). The contribution offers a valid reconstruction of Husserl's notion of *personalistische Einstellung* as well as of the concept of "motivation". Unlike Føllesdal's essay about Husserl and Heidegger, which we have already discussed, Beyer also invites us to consider some of Heidegger's conceptions as already present in Husserl (and not just *in nuce* and in need of being further developed), without accepting any ready-made opposition between the former's pragmatic approach and the latter's theoretical constitution.

The recently released volume *Versuche über Husserl* edited by Stefania Centrone is not only to be considered as a vehicle to approach some of the main themes discussed in contemporary philosophy and Husserl scholarship, but also as a valid attempt not to bridge, but to overcome the, in a sense, extremely outdated distinction between the so-called "analytic" and "continental" traditions.

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19 Edmund Husserl's *Socrates-Buddha*

An English translation

Arun Iyer, translator

Abstract: This is a translation of a manuscript by Husserl titled *Sokrates-Buddha* in which he seeks to isolate the eidetic forms of Indian and European thought and juxtapose them as two forms of transcendentalism in order to draw some conclusions about the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two forms. Not surprising for a European of his time, Husserl finds Indian thought inferior to its European counterpart because of its inability to produce, what he calls, a universal science of being. The translation is accompanied by a detailed translator's introduction, which explores the implications of Husserl's reflections for the question of the very nature of human rationality.
Keywords: Indian thought, Greeks, Husserl, theory, praxis, knowledge, autonomy

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Translator's introduction

The following is a complete translation of a very interesting manuscript by Husserl purely for its subject matter, which at first glance would seem quite un-Husserlian, namely, the nature and style of Indian thought in contrast to European thought. The current translation is based on the manuscript, whose pages were compiled and published as a whole in the right order for the first time by Sebastian Luft under the title Husserl gave them: *Sokrates-Buddha*.[1]

Luft in his editorial report mentions footnote 52 in Karl Schuhmann's "Husserl and Indian Thought,"[2] where Schuhmann informs the reader about finding only the first seven of eleven pages attributed to it by Husserl. Taking the rest as missing, Schuhmann crafts his assessment of this article on the basis of the seven pages he possessed. The remaining three pages having been found by Luft, he then goes to claim that this finding would entail some revision to Schuhmann's conclusions about the content of the manuscript.[3]

1 Edmund Husserl, "Sokrates-Buddha," ed. Sebastian Luft, *Husserl Studies* 26, no. 1 (2010): 1–17. Subsequently cited as SB.
2 Karl Schuhmann, "Husserl and Indian Thought," *Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy* (New York: SUNY Press, 1992), 20–43.
3 The missing pages are B I 21/79–82. Luft writes: "However, contrary to Schuhmann's assertion (based on his assumption that the manuscript is incomplete), the topic of Indian thought is indeed taken up again in the latter pages (8–11) of the manuscript. For instance, on p. 79b (p. 8 verso in Husserl's pagination), Husserl writes 'Der Inder ist praktisch autonom eingestellt . . .' [see below, p. XX], and on p. 81b (p. 10 verso in Husserl's pagination), 'Der Inder sagt: . . .' [see below, p. XX]. Husserl ends the manuscript on a general reflection summarizing the comparison between Greek ('Socratic') and Indian ('Buddhist') thought . . . if this reconstruction of this manuscript is correct, he is wrong to assert that Husserl makes merely an

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The translator would however like to bring to notice a source of confusion in this matter. Although Schuhmann claims in his article to have not found the last three pages of the manuscript, in his discussion of this manuscript he undoubtedly quotes a phrase that is to be found only in the last three pages that Luft claimed to have discovered.[4] Not only that, Schuhmann directs us to an article by Debabrata Sinha, which, he tells us, explicitly addresses the content of this manuscript.[5] In Sinha's article, one again finds portions from the missing pages translated and discussed.[6] So it is very unclear as to whether these pages were really missing, given Schuhmann's and Sinha's clear references to them. It is more likely that Schuhmann had the order mixed up and this gave him a different impression of Husserl's overall argument than what we now have before us.[7] But it still remains unresolved as to why Schuhmann would count them as seven pages instead of eleven.

Let us now turn to the content of Husserl's reflections. Husserl in this manuscript seeks to isolate the eidetic forms of Indian and European thought and juxtapose them as two forms of transcendentalism in order to draw some conclusions about their relative strengths and weaknesses. He concludes that while Indian thought is universal practical in its form, European thought is universal theoretical. Moreover, European thought in its universal theoretical form also encompasses practice and can give rise to a rigorous though not absolutely universal practical ethics based on axiomatic first principles analogous to those in pure theory. On the other hand, Indian thought in its universal practical form cannot give rise to a universal science of being because in its universal practical form it has no pure theoretical interest, which is necessary in order to develop a universal theoretical science. Indian thought thus remains inferior to its European counterpart. Indeed, Indian thought distils itself into a single, absolutely universal imperative of world renunciation. This can only result in single-minded solipsism and a self-destructive quietistic disengagement from the world. Paradoxically then, even though Indian thought has the form of the universal practical, its practical principles are non-practical prescribing absolute inaction as the only way to individual bliss. On the contrary, European thought, although having the form of the universal theoretical, can provide viable prescriptive principles for practical action as a way towards a fruitful engagement with the world. So Indian thought although practical in form is completely non-practical while European thought, although theoretical in form, is actually practical. Husserl's conclusions should not surprise us because they follow in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessors, Hegel and Marx. In fact Husserl's

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opening gesture in this manuscript towards Indian thought (to then 'go beyond the theme of confronting European and Indian philosophy'). Instead, the text displays a rather intricate and intimate reflection on the nature of Indian thought, the character of which he has gotten to know through the Neumann translation" (SB, 3).

4 Schuhmann writes: "Under the title 'Sokrates-Buddha' he sets out to compare European and Indian thought. His conclusion is that both are motivated by the fact that in our natural life both rational and irrational factors are intertwined. The Greek project of rationalism, on the other hand, is to eliminate irrationalities by building a universal science. The Indian, in contrast, is motivated by the same experience, is more skeptical about the chances for realizing such a project and opts instead for 'a way out in transcendentalism'" (Schuhmann, "Indian Thought," 30). This phrase "a way out in transcendentalism" is clearly a translation of "*ein Ausweg im Transzendentalismus*" which is found on B I 21/82a, which is p. 11, the page Schuhmann claims to be missing.

5 Debabrata Sinha, "Theory and Practice in Indian Thought: Husserl's Observations," *Philosophy East and West* 21, no. 3 (July 1971): 255–264.

6 See Sinha, "Theory and Practice," 258, 261–62.

7 I owe this clarification to Sebastian Luft.

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conclusions would only surprise us if he were to somehow conclude that Indian thought is equal to or superior to European thought. Despite the rather predictable conclusion what is unique however are Husserl's efforts to engage not in a historical-cultural comparison but to put into practice the phenomenological reduction and try to strip away the accidental accretions of culture and history in order to arrive as it were at the eidetic core of Indian and European thought.

Let us elaborate a bit. Thought for Husserl is essentially autonomous and the purity of thought is gauged by the extent of its autonomy. Husserl thus tries to show how such autonomy emerges within a life that is constrained by the exigencies of the everyday demands of a community that is mediated by tradition. Husserl here carefully sketches the form of communal life, the emergence of free thought in communal life, and reintegration of free thought into communal life as applied science and professional scientific sub-disciplines. The purest form of this autonomy of thought is philosophy.

This autonomy can be manifested in two ways. In European society, this autonomy takes the form of a desire to understand the world for its own sake and arrive at its true nature. This is the autonomy of theoretical activity at its purest. In Indian society, on the other hand, this autonomy takes the form of the desire to understand and pursue the kind of actions that would to lead to universal bliss for the individual irrespective of its worldly consequences. What we get is the autonomy of pure inactivity, absolute world-renunciation, which would never be frustrated by the accidents of this world (death, disease, failure, loss, and suchlike) and would thus never be confronted with unhappiness.

One could correctly show that Husserl is incorrect about the supposed difference between Socratic and Buddhist thought by emphasizing the similarities in the way Socrates and Buddha envisaged the relationship between thought and life.[8] One could also point out the rigidity of Husserl's distinction between Indian and European thought as theoretical and practical and note the strains in European thought that privilege the practical over the theoretical, as well as the fact that Indian thought, even if it is fundamentally practical, does pursue theoretical reflection.[9] One could in addition point to the strengths of the practical orientation of Indian thought and its imperviousness to theoretical crises, like the crisis the European sciences are experiencing.[10] These criticisms are not invalid but I am not sure how deep they go and whether they really grapple with the decisive issues raised by Husserl's reflections. Indeed, one could respond to the last of these criticisms by using Mill's refrain that a Socrates dissatisfied is better than a pig satisfied. Indian thought might not suffer from crisis, but it is better to venture a higher and more autonomous form of reflection and suffer crisis than remain unaware of it or timidly refrain from it for such mundane worldly concerns such as happiness and overall satisfaction. The second point is that the criticism overlooks the real thrust of Husserl's distinction. Husserl is not at all saying that the superiority of European thought lies in its exclusive concern with theory and by contrast the inferiority of Indian thought is in its being exclusively practical. At least in this article, Husserl, as I have already explained, makes a far more sophisticated point. He argues that European thought, because it is theoretical, is able to provide for an ethics that lead to a fruitful engagement with the world and its inhabitants. Hence it is more oriented towards

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8 See Shuhmann, "Indian Thought," 31.
9 See Sinha, "Theory and Practice," and J.N. Mohanty, "Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy: The Concept of Rationality," *Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy* (New York: SUNY Press, 1992), 8–19.
10 See Sinha, "Theory and Practice," 263.

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praxis than its Indian counterpart, which sees resolute inaction as the only absolutely universal imperative. Indian thought is thus profoundly non-practical in actuality. However, European thought, which is not exclusively oriented towards practice, turns out to be far more practical than its eastern counterpart which, while remaining resolutely practical, turn out to be nothing but nihilistic inaction.

The real and most serious concern Husserl raises is about the autonomy of the two forms of thought. While both Indian and European thought are autonomous, the nature of the European autonomy of thought (the pinnacle of which is phenomenology) is superior to the Indian autonomy of thought. The autonomy of Indian thought is nothing but the abrupt stoppage of human history in its tracks, with the nihilistic devaluation of all engagement with the world. The autonomy of European thought is the beginning of the march of human history in the forging of a more fruitful revaluation of our engagement with the world. Can we answer Husserl's concern about the nihilism of Indian thought and his confidence in the humanism of European thought?

Let us begin with Husserl's reflections on the inherent humanism of European thought, i.e. its potential for a fruitful practical engagement with the world on the basis of a theoretical knowledge of the world as such. Can an autonomous theoretical will to know simply translate into will to the good as Husserl suggests? Is it enough for the will to know to simply provide axioms of actions from which specific imperatives can be derived? We could argue that it is not. An autonomous will to know alone does not necessitate right action. To produce the right actions, it seems, requires more than the simple knowledge of axioms. It seems to require a transformation of the knowing subject into an ethical subject. This transformation, it seems, cannot be accomplished at the theoretical level. Indeed, such a transformation, it seems, calls for nothing short of some kind of *askesis* on the part of the subject.[11] We could argue that the crisis of the European sciences diagnosed by Husserl is the result of sciences becoming ungrounded. In other words, the crisis is the result of the will to know getting unmoored from the world in the fullest sense. The world is reduced to the object of the formal manipulation and becomes impoverished in sense.[12] Husserl of course attempts feverishly to recover this lost ground. But can this ground be recovered through simply greater theoretical understanding alone? Does the recovery not demand a radical transformation in the very subject of science, a transformation that may very well encompass the moral-spiritual dimension? The theoretical will to know, isolated in its impoverished world, can be a recipe for nihilism as well.

Finally, Husserl claims that Indian thought is concerned solely with the universal path to individual bliss. What he seems to overlook is the fact that in Indian thought this concern is nothing but a concern with the very nature of individuality and the nature of the ego.[13] Bliss here is not a simple attainment of individual happiness.

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11 But even after such an ethical transformation there is no guarantee that the subject will fruitfully engage with the world. Seeing its knowledge abused in the world of personal and professional advancement and profit, the ethical subject could become world-weary and decide that the best course of action might be to stop pursuing a theoretical inquiry that is bound to be abused in the world of mundane concerns. Such a subject might think it legitimate to withdraw from the world into a personal sphere in order not to be the cause of further harm to the world. One only has to read Book VI of Plato's *Republic* to see the manifestation of this world-weariness that ensues from a theoretical will.

12 Husserl's attempts to reverse the Copernican revolution clearly hint at his concerns about the nature of the scientific subject and its impoverished nature.

13 See for example in Sankara the distinction between *Atman* and *Ahamkara*.

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In fact, it involves a transformation of one's whole subjectivity and seeing who one really is and what one's relationship to the world actually is. It cannot but involve a theoretical understanding of being as a whole.[14] Husserl of course acknowledges the fact that Indian thought is obliquely concerned with the nature of reality. However, for him, Indian thought is merely concerned with showing that the world is nothing but appearance so that it can be wilfully neglected. But it could be easily argued that Indian thought is not interested in showing the world itself as an appearance. It is interested in showing that our everyday understanding of the world is invalid. The world as we encounter it in our everyday life is an appearance. But this entails not a simple rejection of the world itself but rather a renewed engagement with and understanding of the real nature of the world – the nature of reality.[15] We can grant that this inquiry never took the exact same form as European modern science. However, this does not imply that Indian thought is just a solipsistic turn inwards. Of course it has manifested itself in some cases as a dangerous solipsism, a quietistic renunciation of the world as a whole.[16] But there is nothing in Indian thought that necessitates such a course of action, as Husserl seems to suggest. Indeed, we can argue that this world-renunciation results only because the overzealous subject mistakes the nature of the self and its relationship to the world.

In conclusion, Husserl's own reflections contain the realization that will to know and the will to the good are the two indispensable aspects of rationality. Indeed if we follow Husserl and accept Indian thought as the manifestation of the will to the good and European thought as the manifestation of the will to know then Husserl's own conception of humanism calls for a synthesis of the two.

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Socrates–Buddha

21. und 22. January 1926

<B I 21/88a> What is the status of knowledge in *Indian thought*? How does the latter stand in relation to *Socratic* thought? Indian thought advances towards emancipation [*Erlösung*][17]

14 See Debabrata Sinha: "When we seek to characterize the motive of Indian philosophy as 'practical' the deeper life-motive of freedom or liberation (moksa) comes into question. Now this liberation or freedom is to be understood as neither a theological concept nor an eschatological one, although the notion of spiritual freedom is involved. Rather it is to be considered as a genuine philosophical concept. This should not mean that the notion signifies, the satisfaction of a purely theoretic interest; rather it signifies a deeper demand of human life itself. The exact understanding of what this liberation should mean varies with the different systems of classical Indian philosophy. But common to all is the endeavor to establish and fulfill a 'philosophical culture,' that is, an orientation of living to the philosophic ideal" (Sinha, "Theory and Practice," 256). Unfortunately, Sinha does not explore the implications of this observation more thoroughly in his paper.

15 To name just a few examples here, we have Sankara's commentary on the *Brahma Sutras*, the *Yoga Sutras* of Patanjali, the works of Nagarjuna.

16 The examples from the Bhakti movement of Jnyaneshwara and Ramadas immediately come to mind, although the matter is by no means settled.

17 Husserl uses the word "Erlösung" which in the German Indological tradition tradition led by Max Müller, Hermann Oldenberg (who was acquainted with Husserl), and Paul Deussen, is used to translate the Sanskrit "moksha" and "mukti" and the Pali "nirvana" employed by Gautama Buddha. See for example, Paul Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*: *Erster Band, Zweite Abteilung: Die Philosophie der Upanishads* (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1894), XII. It is translated into English in different ways as emancipation, deliverance, liberation, or salvation. For examples, see Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, trans. Rev. A. S. Geden (Edinburgh: T & T. Clark, 1908), xiv, where it is translated as

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and bliss[18] by means of an unrelenting cognition [*rücksichtlose Erkenntnis*]. It also assumes a truth that is valid in itself. Indian cultural life also tends in this way towards autonomy – towards autonomous knowledge. This is the kind of knowledge through which one can acquire a path leading to bliss that is true in itself and thus a truth in itself that governs right action, autonomous truth concerning the knowledge of ethical-religious norms. Theory – knowledge as authentic knowledge – has for Socrates too the function of producing knowledge of a true praxis and its norms and only this. He does indeed presuppose an objective cosmological truth, what we could more generally call a truth valid in itself that pertains to being in its concreteness. However, Socrates does not hold it to be something that can be universally known but only to the extent that a practical rational action requires it, which, according to him, does not go very far. One could say that the relative truth of experience suffices for such an action and what goes beyond experience is practically irrelevant and so of no consequence in general. We therefore miss nothing from the lack of such a knowing what is beyond experience.

Has *Indian thought* produced a science of being or did it ever have the possibility of such a science in view? Did it deem it to be irrelevant and therefore not develop it? Was it aware of a science of being as something fundamentally new although grounded in experience just like the science that leads to bliss? But even in the latter case, for the Indians, the thought of the doctrine of emancipation [*Erlösungslehre*] is not to be distinguished from naturalistic thought through its form (and in its logic, so to speak), but rather in its consequence, its lack of prejudice, its resolution to exclude all interest pertaining to natural life and the disinterested evaluation of these life interests as well as the distinctiveness of the values in the judgements of essence.

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In Greek philosophy, however the specificity of scientific thinking and knowing is radically distinguished from the knowledge of life principally through its logical form and method. Socrates, without himself being aware of it, made the first attempt in this direction. Plato created in his dialectic the method of the contemplation of ideas [*Ideenschau*] and the knowledge of ideas and through ideas. He founded the beginnings; he forged a way towards a theoretical knowledge and science in the new sense of a scientific knowledge by means of ideas, a logical science.

In the Greeks, as well as in the moderns, theoretical interest does not free itself from practical interest in social life. It does so only in the vocational life of philosophers.

emancipation. See Paul Deussen, *The System of Vedanta*, trans. Charles Johnston (Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing, 1912), 457, where it is translated as salvation. See ibid., 20, where it is translated as deliverance and ibid., xii, where it is translated as liberation. See also Böhtingk-Roth *Sanskrit Wörterbuch*, s.v. *moksha*.

18 Husserl uses the word "Seligkeit." In the German Indological tradition, the words "Wonne" and "Glückseligkeit" have been used to translate the Sanskrit "ānanda." See, for example, Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte, X, 130 who uses "Wonne" and characterizes it as the highest happiness (höchstes Glück). It is translated into English as bliss. See Paul Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, trans. Rev. A. S. Geden (Edinburgh: T & T. Clark, 1908), xii, 143. See also Böhlingk-Roth Sanskrit-Wörterbuch, s.v. ānanda. In this text, I translate "Seligkeit" as bliss or happiness depending upon the context, "Glückseligkeit" throughout (see p. 17, 18 below) as bliss and the antonym "Unseligkeit" as unhappiness. However "Seligkeit" in the context of Indian thought has also been translated as salvation. See, for instance, Johnston's translation of the term in Deussen, Philosophy of the Upanishads, 126–127. We must understand that there is a connection between the terms "moksha" and "ānanda." If moksha is emancipation, then this state of emancipation has been characterized by certain Indian thinkers as bliss (ānanda). Although the word "moksha" means emancipation from a state constrained (bandha) by the illusions and cares of worldly affairs, it is always an emancipation towards a state that is characterized by bliss (ānanda). Hence "moksha'" (salvation) and "ānanda" (bliss) can be used interchangeably in some contexts.

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Scientists pursue science purely for its own sake, even the science of the right kind of life. They leave it to others, to individuals, to the politicians, etc. to eventually find applications for their sciences. However, they do not concern themselves with it and also not with the "health of their own soul." They pursue a philosophical science but they are themselves not philosophers. The reason they are not philosophers is that they utilize the norms of their life exclusively[19] for philosophical theory but not for philosophical life (as opposed to the ancient philosophers).

But even after all this we are still not clear as to what the peculiar achievement of the Greeks is. We are still not clear about the scientific and general cultural development that issues forth from the Greeks with respect to the specific idea at the basis of this development.

1. Natural life in a community has its common tradition. Every individual grows into this tradition through education. The unity of the worldview of the community – what is "commonly" valid – what is inherited, is something that is not questioned. It is just something that everyone knows to be unquestioningly inherited. It is not something completely determinate because it differs from individual to individual but it is constituted as an unquestioned truth which stands above factical, individual "perceptions," as something that can be determined for "everyone," which the individuals of this community can know more or less definitely, that can manifest itself in the individual in the expressions that define him or her. It is the thing about which the oldest and the wisest communicate as heralds of tradition. We must inquire decisively into this [unity of worldview]. This noteworthy structure has to be explicated. For children the elders are ones with knowledge, for the youngster the mature men. The elders are the ones who know. To that knowledge is added what is still new. These are the new experiences, which are significant for communal consciousness. But then the ones who know are again the elders who have experienced this communal consciousness and have actively contributed to it. With it we have the praxis common to all in its typical forms, what is generally practically valid, which is also to be generally valued, detested or esteemed etc.

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The way towards autonomy. The autonomy of knowledge – practical autonomy[20]

Curiosity, cognitive interest

1. *First and foremost on the grounds of tradition*. To learn to know "the" world. To fixate knowledge. To define/establish knowledge, present and develop knowledge and draw conclusions out of it, knowledge of being [is] intertwined with knowledge of the ought. What are heaven and earth, humans and peoples and Gods etc. What the gods demand, what humans ought to do, what custom is, what is lawful. *The human being as "disinterested spectator."*

2. How does *consistent* theoretical interest arise? First of all, a distinction between individual curiosity and the desire for knowledge and joy in its *universal* scope. Human

19 [Editor's note: Instead of "excluded" in manuscript "included."]
20 Autonomy of destiny.

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beings dissociate themselves from the entanglements of their praxis and their habitual and momentary needs. Thereby they are restrained by the new that would possibly require taking specific practical stances. But such dissociation is also accomplished in play, in fantasy. Here the strain of practical endeavour is relaxed and human beings delight in the calm in their play of fantasies. Another way of relaxation is curious observation, spectating. In both cases, there emerges a new kind of striving and activity and thus a new kind of straining oneself, exerting and being concerned. First and foremost the "cares of life," the exigencies of life distinguish themselves from life in its tranquil stillness, in the liberation from life's exigencies, in the freedom that it permits as the time of recreation. We either treat ourselves to this time of recreation or, as someone who has renounced everything, we free ourselves by renouncing what the life of responsibilities promises.[21]

Here we can see develop: the *free theoretical interest* that is dissociated from all material interests, freed from all interests of "self-preservation" – *play* of cognition. On the other hand, the free and consistent life in the play of fantasy, i.e. in a playful praxis of the objective formation of fantasy structures. <90a> What does such consistency consist in? First and foremost it consists in the fact that the person who frees herself creates an uninterrupted life of freedom within the life, which remains bound because she cannot actually free herself from the traditionality of community and from the "exigency" of life. Interest in free knowledge and in the free praxis of fantasy becomes something habitual and what also becomes habitual is the praxis that springs out of it. This is the praxis that in free activity exhilaratingly produces cognitive and fantasy structures and playfully manipulates objective structures.

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Yet we still lack a more precise determination of the traditionality of life. I spoke of the exigency of life (i.e. of traditional life), of the "self-preservation" of the human being in the traditional world, who not only himself lives traditionally among traditional human beings, but also – and this is implied – stands under the norms of traditionality and knows himself to be constrained at all times. We know very well the *conflicts* between what the individual in the given moment aspires and wishes in so far as he is himself sustained within the framework of traditionality and the "ought that transcends the individual" [*überindividuellen Sollen*], that which the norms of tradition, consequently "the people," the community demand of him, are well known.[22] The human being becomes tired of "work," of "duties," tired of the bustle in which she finds herself enmeshed. The world in general concerns her in so far as she is thoroughly entrenched in her position from which she has to actualize and produce, in order to support herself and care about needs that emerge from the exigencies of life in order "to achieve

21 Seriousness and play (in the widest of senses): Here – compare the marginal note on following page [compare below, page XX (pg. xxx below, Tr.), text from "The relaxation" to "in the widest sense"] – we have to first distinguish:

1. Leisure in purposeless passivity (spectating)
2. <Leisure> *in play* as purposeless activity, praxis. Thereby divided into:
    a. serious praxis in original and serious care
    b. praxis of play, "purposeless":
        α). purposeless knowing,
        β). purposeless doing and shaping in the as-if and from the formations of the as-if.

22 Naturally no absolute norms have dissociated themselves from tradition or opposed themselves to it – as "autonomous" norms.

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something." Here she is completely dependent upon the world in its apperceived form as the communal worldview <90b> and dependent upon the personal community itself and its norms. The community possesses for her a specificity in its effective form when seen from the standpoint of her position. In this position she has her particular relationships, her particular connections to and dependencies upon those near her and indirectly to and with those who are distant. Her effort is always conditioned. In her specific position she has the typical structural form of the community <corresponding> to her particular vocation, her particular habitual life goals,[23] her particular habitual function in the community. This life of obligation keeps itself going through intervals of freedom in the day and the year through festivals, themselves celebrated in traditional form: the human being demands *panem et circenses*, also relaxation, in opposition to the always accumulating tension that is forever making new demands. This relaxation itself has a traditional form in communal celebrations and festivals. Furthermore, these festivals, as religious festivals, themselves have an original imperative form [*Sollenform*]. To begin with, the festival, as an expression of religious life, takes the form of a "play."

One peculiarity here is the individual's making-himself-free in the habituality of "free" activity, free of duties, free of social ties, but certainly also free of physical wants and necessities. That the latter are sufficiently satisfied through essential provisions is the condition of possible detachment. The relaxation from the cares of life, life in temporary free leisure can have a dual form: 1) that of passivity. Leisure ought to be enjoyable, one can delight in purposeless fantasizing, seeing, watching, curiosity (also watching of games) 2) activity of play in the widest sense.

The structure of knowledge and this is always the case with the structure of knowledge: it also demands exertion, exertion of energy, care. However, it is a "free" exertion and action; it is freedom from the continuing tyranny of duty[24] that traverses the whole of one's life without end. Knowledge strives towards truth, towards a realm inhabited by the value of pure beauty. One toils and worries and yet it is not a toiling under a burden, it is being careworn without care. One arrives at something beautiful that no one can rob, that no one can annihilate, degrade, something that is freely communicated, given away, yet remains in one's possession as one's property and thereby does not lose anything, but gains even more: precisely in the sharing of the beautiful to make others happy. <91a> We have the same thing in the activity of fantasy and the fantasy creations of free art. Yet in both cases [knowledge and fantasy, Tr.] there needs to be a connecting link between the development and the positing of goals.[25]

The mere talk of fantasy and the formation of fantasy is objectionable. Curiosity attends to the new as something actual, as a being, as that which results in knowledge. Lust and love for beauty is the pleasure in the beautiful manner in which factual realities appear, which is uninteresting for the knowledge of being. In the case of the love

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23 [Editor's note: above "particular profession" and "habitual goals of life," Husserl notes respectively "2" and "1" as an indication that their order ought to be swapped.]

24 An original concept of "freedom" – "I am free" means I am now free from my duties, my daily timely obligations. They are fulfilled. "I have made myself free, I have let myself be released or have freed myself arbitrarily from them (at my own peril)."

25 One can say: knowledge and praxis generally as "play" lead in regular and even vocational activity to *free art*. The art of knowledge also falls under the concept of art just like the art of producing works of fantasy. Free art stands in opposition to art in the realm of common sense, the art of handymen, of statesmen, of soldiers, etc. In accordance with this, we also have a division between *vocations concerned with life's cares* and the *free vocations*.

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of beauty there exists the possibility of freedom in the transition toward more beautiful manners of appearance and ultimately towards the most beautiful and practical formations, for instance, from easily alterable things, in the sense that these are possible things of such a kind, which could indicate the more beautiful and the particularly beautiful manner in which something could appear. In this way we can intertwine pleasure in the picturesqueness and pleasure in the "imitation" of things that are given to us through pictorial presentation. We see here how the altering fantasy functions. It transforms and produces a fantasy formation of the most pleasing form. Finally pleasure in the pure in the sense of the formations produced through pure fantasy – the possible alterations of realities in "mere thoughts" – comes to fixed expressions in words and speech. As the love for such beautiful things becomes a matter of habit, we have the dawn of critique. In valuing beauty and striving after beauty there opens up a telos, the idea of a most complete, perfect beauty and a realm of beauty with many such perfections, which in its turn can exhibit a hierarchy of degrees and types of value.

It may very well not be right to say (as I have occasionally meant) that the autonomy of knowledge must have initially led to an autonomous art (see further below). <91b> Striving for knowledge and beauty creates within the scope of a constrained life its own form of a life of freedom and creates therein a tradition of its own, which then immediately intertwines itself with the *common* tradition. Both forms of life of care and freedom and both traditions are from the very beginning, soon after this novelty [of freedom] has taken root, interwoven together. But they do not remain in the state where the new is a relatively independent layer of the old without altering the old itself. The structures of knowledge and art receive social significance and enter into the realm of the cares and the duties of life. One earns one's bread through science and art. Artistic formations can at the same time become forms of practical utility, and the useful is required to be beautiful as well. The temple builder creates a structure with a purpose – the temple; as an artist he has dedicated his life to beauty, but brings into form something that has a purpose in traditional life, in a form which he loves, which he strives for above all and in accordance with his life's calling and so does the community now want it. Scientific knowledge proves to be useful. Purposes pertaining to utility will be realizable in a more perfect utility if scientific knowledge is exploited. The scientist can therefore still be a pure scientist, but science can become the handmaiden of praxis in community. On the other hand, he can himself pursue science out of practical motives. The pure theoretical attitude is then only relative and dependent upon praxis. He researches as a member of the community of knowledge, which is directed towards pure truth ad infinitum, but he does it *personally* out of personal reasons, out of ambition, out of a need for glory, wanting personal gains. <92a>

Praxis limits – in general, the need for glory has a horizon of infinity.[26] To want to solve tasks of knowledge that have a finite practical purpose will never amount to a science. The liberation of theoretical interest produces an infinite horizon, motivating the formation of communities of knowledge *in infinitum*. Once these have been formed however, a reformation can ensue precisely through the experience of the general utility of a "free" or, shall we say, an infinitely progressing science not bound by a particular purpose. Any individual can then recognize the idea of science as a practical idea and choose it as a profession. Any individual can choose it for personal reasons that do not

26 Thus there are affects of infinity.

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conflict with this idea of an infinitely progressing science. Science becomes a practical profession in traditional community and transforms into a traditional form of professional life with the distinction that in this professional life of the many scientists a unity of achievement is constituted, which progresses infinitely and is useful for innumerable other purposes of the community and its individuals. Out of pure science emerges the Baconian science with the motto "Science is power."

In the same way, *art* too can take on a dual form: on the one hand pure art, perhaps even chosen in a higher sense out of a calling, in any case out of a pure love of beauty; on the other hand, as one of the traditional practical professions falling into a general system of traditional praxis fitting into the system of utilities, practical desires, purposes, duties, cares in the warp and woof of the community of persons. <92b>

Within the general, tightly knit tradition, the traditional worldview and the traditional form of practical living, striving, working, there crystallizes a pure and consistent life of knowledge. The sense of its consistency is comprised of the always purer liberation of knowing from what is pre-given in the form of tradition, the appreciation of free critique, the conscious setting of goals purely in the direction of the pure evidence of authenticated truth. This consistency is first of all witnessed in individuals and it then goes on to constitute a new form of community. Its progressive form is "philosophy," which produces the idea of the world as it is in itself in "pure" knowledge. This is a worldview that transcends tradition. A scientific knowledge of the world is supposed to come into being in it.

A consistent aesthetic life is constituted in a similar way in communities of artists. However, art is certainly not a unity in the same sense as knowledge of a systematically unified structure of super-temporally valid beauties, increasing and integrating into an ideal whole ad infinitum, which grants every individual artistic formation its structural element. Let us consider the way science liberates itself from tradition, the unleashing of radical critique and the growth of a steadily progressing autonomy. It is accomplished in two great phases: first as liberation from contingent tradition, the latter varies from community to community and over large periods of time even within the same community. Science is the supra-national, common good of all peoples, who want to raise themselves to an autonomous knowledge. It is so even though everything that arises within the individuality of a nation has its individual traditional form, analogous to how everything the personality of a single individual produces has its personal individual form. But this individual or national form is something secondary in contrast to the form of the truth content of science (even what pretends to be the truth content of science). The second phase characterizes the liberation from that tradition, which traverses all particular peoples as the universal, a liberation from the all-encompassing human concept of world as the necessary structural form of *all* worldview and of all particular tradition. We are freed from this necessary form that lies at the core of all tradition for the first time by phenomenological reduction.

Philosophy in its universality, in accordance with its interest in a knowledge that steadily strives towards universality, also encompasses human praxis, the factical and the ideal.

Human life is once and for all one of knowing, evaluating, striving and realizing. Traditional life has its flashes of knowing and occasionally also flashes of universality directed towards facts – to facts in the surrounding world: to nature (even if it is now apperceived as something living), towards animals, towards human beings, towards gods, social facts, the state and so on. Human life however values these facts and the

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supposed values thereafter themselves become objects of knowledge and possibly become objects of predication. Just as knowing in general grasps particulars and universals so is it also the case with values. We have the universally valuable, which is the generally favourable in the case of the individual subject, but also the "generally valid," the traditionally valid. Likewise the life of desiring and striving and what is realized through action is a field of acts of knowing and evaluating along with the corresponding judgements. Let us acknowledge in this regard that even fantasy, the consciousness pertaining to the as-if, sometimes connected to facts and sometimes allowed to indulge freely plays its role in life. In addition to this, the achievements of fantasy offer possible bases (through corresponding changes in attitude) for cognitive accomplishment. If we take an overview of all this, then it appears that the considerations pertaining to the essential possibilities of all liberation would have to or could be formulated philosophically in a still more systematic and comprehensive manner. <93b>

Knowledge liberates itself. It begins with the knowledge of facts, then goes beyond that to the knowledge of each and every thing and consequently even of norms and value norms, of what is good and the norms for what is good, of individual and of universally valid purposes with the corresponding positivities and negativities and the levels of rank that belong to them. But now the functions of evaluation and of the setting of purposes and of the praxis that realizes these purposes have a universality of possible scope, which is equivalent to that of knowledge itself. Instead of evaluating particulars, instead of evaluating specific generalities, the human being by having an overview of his whole world as a world of manifold individual values and non-values can evaluate it *as a whole*, and he can not only evaluate its total beauty but also evaluate it as a world of goods, as a practical world. In a certain way he can correlatively evaluate his own purposes not only individually but also in view of his life and struggles, in relation to his unified overview of the surrounding world and inquire into the highest purpose of his life or the best type of purpose that can be set by him individually, which in his individual case would not only be the most beautiful and practically the most worthwhile, but in its form and consequence would give rise to the most beautiful and best kind of what is a whole life. So [it is] for individuals and again for the community if we take into consideration accident and fate as "powers" that disturb values and destroy.

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The human being questions here as someone who is "interested," he questions *in the process of evaluation* and *in* the course of practical striving. He strives towards the most beautiful and the best. As a philosopher he liberates himself, however, from actual distress, inhibits all decision and undertakes a comprehensive consideration of values and goods, reflecting on the universally best purpose that could be posited for worldly life. <94a> But how, if we examine the possibility, does the human being who is not a philosopher, not in the theoretical attitude, but remaining in an evaluating attitude accomplish these considerations. He is even in this case someone who knows what is universal. However, this universal knowledge is only a layer that serves in the concrete constitution of a practical deliberation whose evaluations are universal in scope as well as of a striving that aims for what is universally the best [*Auf-ein-universal-Bestes-Hinstrebens*]. Willingly one cannot free oneself from willing or deliberately will oneself free of the function of striving and willing as such. But one detaches oneself from the facticity of particular situations and suppresses particular evaluations and volitions. In a certain sense one can and one must also suppress this universal striving in order, first of all, to direct a pure, knowing and universal view towards the factual world in

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general, towards the possibilities of modifying it in accordance with fantasy; in order to direct this universal view towards the deliberation of practical possibilities, towards the form of a factual world of a possibly greater scope and finally as such a world, which through the practical transformation of the agents, could become a world of such a kind.

Motivated by an attitude of the will, there emerges here, it seems, again a universal science. This science is first of all a science of facts (in order subsequently to evaluate the facts) and a science of universal beauties and goods and of the highest good. But it is certainly not a science that ensues from a theoretical interest, a "free" science, a "purposeless" science, a "play" of leisure in opposition to the "seriousness of life." Rather this striving for knowledge, which is directed towards a universal truth, is now only for the sake of what is best in practice, which actualizes the very highest of interests; thus for the sake of one's own "bliss." This striving for bliss is motivated, for its part, as something universal through the awareness not only of individual unhappiness but also through the cognition of the general unhappiness of natural life. <94b>

This is the style of Indian science or philosophy. What kind of differences from Greek science or philosophy do we have here?

The practical human being finds herself in a world that is oriented around her, which can be causally influenced only by means of her corporeality (the central object, which she alone immediately sets in motion) and through which alone she can experience effects.[27] The physical effects of the human being on the external world enter into consideration through the physical effects of her body on other physical objects, the effects of human beings on other physical organisms through communication, and subsequently, effects on the external physical world, mediated again through communication – distant effects in particular – that go beyond the narrow sphere of her proximity into which the direct physical effects of her body noticeably extends.

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Is universal knowledge motivated out of practical grounds here to widen the practical sphere of effects so that the best thing to be sought may be obtained? Will the practical individual not distinguish between the field of relevance and that of irrelevance and thereby limit himself?

And will he be motivated towards a knowledge free of myths, to a radical freedom from traditional prejudices and not be able to remain ensconced in tradition? How ought one to be motivated from the practical affairs of the pre-scientific human towards a real universal and radical striving for knowledge directed towards true being and truth seeking to ground knowledge in its pure consistency only through knowledge? How should one sustain oneself in and through the motivation of pure doxic evidence not in any way allowing emotional motives and untested traditions to assist in this endeavour?

27 She sees herself as the practical centre of a surrounding world that extends endlessly outwards from her. It seems clear that this sphere of effects does not extend infinitely and not everything enters into consideration in relation to her pleasures and pains. Not everything is knowable and in so far as it is not, it cannot be considered practically. It could determine her proximate surroundings "accidentally" as an unknowable knowledge of what is possible. The questions that result from this attitude are: 1) What is my surrounding world prior to my question of value, the being of what surrounds me considered in pre-evaluative manner? 2) What is the axiological status of the world? 3) What can I now do, what is to be done in order to give the world the proper axiological form for me? If life's exigency drives me, even if it is the one that springs from a universal overview instead of the needs of the moment, I still cannot evaluate and engage in theoretical study *in infinitum*. I must end [my theoretical endeavours]. Exigency urges: Even if I am moved out of a general love of humanity and reflect upon the possibility of emancipation and its ways as a whole for myself and my fellowmen, I "must" come to an end of my endeavours.

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A pure and authentic so-called theoretical interest is an interest in thoroughgoing "grounding," thoroughgoing methodological progress until truth is given in evidence in such a way that its ultimate validity is assured.[28]

A theoretical life can be called *autonomous* in so far as it permits nothing other than doxic evidential grounding in the content of its judgement, to put it better:[29] in so far as it is a life of judgement that consistently proceeds towards pure satisfaction. A pursuit directed towards judgement is however purely satisfied in the ultimate truth as its telos. It is purely satisfied, if what is judged is itself given in evidence and given in such a way that its not-being is excluded in apodictic certainty. A theoretical interest can also be called "autonomous" in so far as the subject considers a consistent search for the truth in the sense of ultimate validity as an absolute value that can exist in practice, perhaps not as the only value, but in any case as one that is sought purely for its own sake and to be aspired to not merely as a means to other absolute values.

There is a difference whether one presupposes another absolute value besides science and demands that science subjugate itself to it, establishing thereby a theoretical interest and require that it be treated as a consistent professional interest; or whether one simply pursues such an interest without regarding science as a means to another and still higher absolute value. <79b> In the second instance, the will to knowledge has its foundation in the sphere of knowledge itself, in the first instance it has the its foundation outside of itself in another will.

One can call a will autonomous, which is based on the insight into the absolute practical truth of its goal and is determined exclusively through this insight w.r.t. its worth.[30] The Indian has a practical autonomous attitude as does the Greek in his own way, when he aspires to the ultimate truth and by means of this truth founds an autonomous total praxis. The Indian is in the universal practical attitude.[31] He asks: is our practical life of the will a life of the universally consistent will, a life in which every decision is consistently held, carried out and willingly affirmed for the long term after it has been carried out? Or what is the same: is the practical life of the will a life such that the willing 'I' in every moment of its life has and can have its will satisfied in such a manner that it can willingly approve of its past decisions and actions instead of nullifying them as something mistaken. Furthermore, in looking ahead can it be certain that in the future it will be precisely so? No! Is a practical life of the will of this kind possible *at all*, is it possible in a new, higher life of deliberation, whose will's focus is the individual universal life which in its volitions and actions is to be directed and reformed in such a manner that it corresponds to this idea of a universal life. Such an idea would thus be the form of a new life that from the past comprises a thoroughgoing

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28 On the other hand, it is not impossible that the universal science of pure theoretical interest is precisely that which is needed by the universal will to reach a satisfying life (individual life and life of the community). In any case, it is certain at the outset that a universal philosophy in its theoretical attitude encompasses all questions of life. However, it is at the same time not clear whether and to what extent the universal practical attitude of indulging in life's questions leads to science and how much such an attitude can need science.

29 [Editor's note: The sentence "so far as it" to "is excluded" replaces the following passage that has been cancelled out: "Then theoretical interest and a life that proceeds theoretically in infinitum are *eo ipso* autonomous (analytic proposition)."]

30 A will is autonomous when it is based on the insight that to will differently or not to will at all is excluded in an apodictic-practical way as an impossibility of the will, as practically wrong, as practically null and void.

31 He is attuned towards universal autonomy in praxis.

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revaluation of past volitions and deeds. These actions and volitions combine with a new future life of the will in a harmony that leads to the universally harmonious satisfaction of the will? <80a>

The Indian believes himself to have the insight that this goal is an impossible one. He believes that the idea of such a positive life of the will, such a positive praxis is nonsensical. From the very essence of a life of the will, related as it is to a world of accidents, illness, fates of many kinds, death and other such things, it behoves us to rise above the life of the will itself as such. The will strives towards *fulfilment*, which is supposed to be bliss [*Glückseligkeit*]. Individual fulfilments are but temporary, bereft of any ultimate satisfaction. Only in the universal finality of what is posited by the will is there a finality of satisfaction and such a finality is nonsensical.

The finality of individual values and the individual positing of wants are in a certain sense not denied. But the practical realization of an individual absolute value only results in a relative practical good and a relative good is only relatively final, if we accept the abstraction that nothing new is willed and that the new volition will make one unhappy through its inadequacy. The good will of the past has made one momentarily happy but the new unhappiness [*Unseligkeit*] is positive and nullifies the old momentary happiness [*Seligkeit*] or even the satisfaction arising from the memory and the inner recognition of satisfaction. But how is this [unhappiness] possible if life were to continue from satisfaction to satisfaction within its limits and who knows through which accidents? However, the very unrest of the life of the will is an unhappiness [*Unseligkeit*] in itself, which is forever open to the possibility of accident, hostile fates, death, disease and is forever something unfulfilled and as long as it is so, he who strives is unhappy (Schopenhauer).

Now this presentation needs clarification and improvement.

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1) The idea of a final validity of the will (the truth of the will) and the possibility of a life of the will under the idea of a practical finality. <80b> This in the light of the "relativity" of practical truths and their mere "subjectivity." Disregarding the additional possibility of practical errors and the question of how an ultimate practical truth can reside in this relativism of proof and possible correction.

If theoretical interest was an interest in judgements to be established in their finality, in the ultimate truths of judgement whose correlate is: an ultimate being or a being in itself – then "*ethical* interest" is an interest in the decisions of the will to be established in their finality, whose correlate is: the ultimate practical good, the good in itself. If *scientific* life was life consistently directed towards the ultimate truth as a whole, namely, towards universality, consequently towards practically constituting a universal science, then *ethical* life is a life consistently directed towards universal practical truth as a whole. It is thus a life directed towards the realization of the universality of practical truth. In both cases there is single line of progress towards that which can only be satisfied by the idea of finality. In the one case of science, *every judgement* stands under the principle of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle. So we can ultimately resolve every judgement into a truth or a falsity. If the parallel is appropriate then, ethically speaking, everything posited by the will (intended by the will) can be resolved and stands under an analogue of the principle of non-contradiction. *The universality of ethics (ethical praxis) encompasses the universality of science as one praxis among many.* Every truth of knowledge corresponds to a practical truth, if it is right that every judgement, as a practical activity, when directed towards truth, is a practical truth. In any case the question of how far this goes and thus to what extent scientific striving has

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"ethical" truth is an ethical question. <81a> Conversely: any statement about the truth of the will and therefore ethics must be true as knowledge. Only if the activity of practical deliberation takes place in the realm of true judgements of knowledge and ends in true judgements of the kind that express practical truth can practical truth itself be practically possible.

2) Another kind of attitude concerns the question of bliss [*Glückseligkeit*]. A striving after bliss [*Glückseligkeit*], as an "ethical" striving, is another kind of striving. A life of thoroughgoing theoretical consistency is a life in constant theoretical satisfaction or in the satisfying certainty that theoretical fulfilment, authentication [*Bewahrheitung*]* is possible and methodological, even attainable through progress.[32] It is the same for a life lived in thoroughgoing practical consistency, ordered under the idea of practical truth. Theoretical fulfilment (= authentication [*Bewahrheitung*]), practical fulfilment (authentication [*Bewahrheitung*]) is "satisfying," it is valuable, the theme of a purely fulfilled or fulfillable value, if it contains finality within itself. An entire life in the sense of finality includes dissatisfactions that have been "rectified" (only if these dissatisfactions are present within the framework of a life such as this, can they be borne by the certainty of finality and for a life that is ordered in accordance to this finality these dissatisfactions are something to be reconciled with and possibly something to be necessarily reconciled with). [Translator's note: Husserl uses the two nouns *Bewahrheitung* and *Bewährung*, both of which I translate as authentication. We must bear in mind that both words stem from the same root *wahr* meaning truth. Such a life is an *absolute value* within which all values are relativized and sublated.][33] But if such a life is an *idea*, which only abstracts from the relative sublations of value, disorders such as accidents, fates etc. that are intertwined with it are does not satisfy them and the necessity that belongs to them, then a higher level is opened up, which concerns the question of absolute demands, the categorical imperative and the question of God. Here perhaps emerges a "salvation" in divine security that transcends all such satisfactions in their relativity towards the irrational and yet does justice to them. <81b>

The Indian says: harmony of the will may all be well and good, but it does not give to life that towards which it strives. Without harmony and finality we certainly cannot achieve that. However, we must see to it that there are no irrationalities in the will. This means that the will not only restrains them from time to time but can simply overcome them. In the practical realm a pure subjectivity satisfying itself is given to no irrationalities that make it possible for its best-directed efforts, which are also methodologically sound in their application, to turn out badly. The idea of science is related to the idea of a cultural life in which a consistent scientific progress is realized. Science loses its practical sense, if it clings to accidental things, even if it remains in a state of becoming. This is because science is what it is only in infinite becoming and as a result a possible practical goal becomes an absolute value. Furthermore, a universal practical truth or a life aspiring to universality in the ethical sense is such that this life or the 'I' belonging to it strives towards universality in the ethical sense. Such a life succeeds and can succeed in shaping its surroundings into a good world, "perfecting" itself into such a

32 A satisfaction of pleasure, which springs from consistent authentication [*Bewährung*], out of the realization of the ultimate truth.

33 An apodictic value, were it to be expressed in our terminology.

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world in the subjective relationship to this world, particularly with regard to its position as that which itself absolutely is and wants and must want. But we can see in advance that we cannot make absolutely sure of this given that irrationality lurks over everything as a destructive power. I will what I absolutely ought to if I follow this call to a life of universality. What I will is absolute and I will that it is absolute and if it is not then it is not only unpleasant but also intolerable as an "absurdity" in being as "*the senselessness of being*." <82a>

In contrast to the "rationalism" of Greek science and an ethics, which in a way grounds philosophical life in philosophical knowledge and consequently in science and does not thereby redress the irrational in its principle meaning, the gaze of the Indian is rather transfixed on the irrational. He is offered a way out in transcendentalism. The world is a mere phenomenon in subjectivity. The (individual) subject cannot really eliminate the course of phenomena and the world phenomenon but it can avert its gaze away from it, it can inhibit the absolute positing of the being of the world, it can stop setting its feet on the ground of this world. In each and every praxis of natural worldly life the world is posited absolutely and the will wills itself as a part of it, wills to shape it. It is in this world that one is supposed to reach peace and happiness. The 'I' can however exercise the epoché "theoretically" as well as practically, in so far as its world is practical. But then all oppositions between the rational and the irrational disappear, the 'I' lives, turned into itself, in the state of a volitional loss of will, in theoretical and practical renunciation of the world.

In this line of thought the hedonistic motive, the striving towards happiness in the sense of constant comfort, constant desire, is put out of play. Naturally for such an Indian attitude worldly science is no goal and the knowledge of the world has significance only as a knowledge directed towards proving the transcendental standpoint, namely, the world as phenomenon. Furthermore, this knowledge is directed towards the most general essence of the universal life of the will and the possible sense of its purpose [*Zielsinn*].

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The world has "sense" – this is the correlate of the fact that the human life of the will has "sense" and this again means that there exists in it the finality of the will. <82b> The opposition of "worldviews" or better stated, of the universal practical attitudes towards natural life as a worldly life, is determined through the problem of practical truth as finality and the conflict regarding its grounding. Every will directed towards absolute values, every will, if its purpose has the character of the absolutely willed, is ultimate and must be ultimate despite all the irrationalities and contradictions present in it. It thus appears to overcome the practical failure of its purpose. *The finality of the will* [is] not only the fact that we can prove the worth of past volitions and the actions realized through them in relation to the will but also the fact we can prove the worth of every fragmented volition and worth of the necessity that it had to have been so willed. Even if I myself know that irrationalities will finally deny me the achievement, I *must* want what absolutely ought to be done. If I am a scientist by profession, I pursue science in a pure disposition and do not question whether universal science in which I work will really survive *in infinitum* or whether or not the earth could not go to pieces and with it all culture and everything that speaks to humans as an absolute demand. So we have the *European point of view* in *its* transcendental form in contrast to the *Indian*, for which there is only one will, which is absolutely final and has genuine truth, the will to universal world renunciation. Every positive categorical imperative, every absolute ought signifies for us an absolute finality and has at the same time religious-metaphysical

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significance. For the Indian spirit no such imperative is *really* categorical. The Indian spirit is invested in the devaluing of all worldly motives and all particular wants. Only one imperative remains – *the categorical imperative of renunciation*.

It is, first of all, from our position that even science acquires a sense and along with it the belief underlying science in a true being of the world: this is a regulative idea just like the idea of an ethical community of humanity and the idea of myself as the ethical 'I.'[34]

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34 [Editor's note: Compare with older notes. It is not clear, to which manuscripts these remarks relate – he possibly means the *Kaizo* articles.]

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20 In Memoriam: Lester Embree (1938–2017)

Cleavis Headley and Michael Barber

Professor Lester Embree, Ph.D., passed away on January 19, 2017 at the age of 79. Professor Embree held the William F. Dietrich Eminent Scholar in Philosophy Chair for over 25 years at Florida Atlantic University. He worked tirelessly to promote, disseminate, and sustain the growth and practice of phenomenology. Accepting the basic definition of phenomenology as the study of the structures of consciousness as experienced from a first-person point of view, Embree cultivated a preference for certain types of phenomenological investigations: transcendental constitutive phenomenology and naturalistic constitutive phenomenology. With intellectual roots deep in phenomenology, Embree repudiated the excesses and overreaching of positivism. Embree believed that phenomenology provides important theoretical and methodological resources for illuminating the constitutive features of the socio-cultural world.

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Embree earned his Ph.D. from the New School for Social Research in 1972. The New School for Social Research was affectionately known as the German University in Exile. It became the American home for scholars trained in the phenomenological tradition who desired to continue their work in phenomenology after having been forced to abandon their native countries.

Embree's career was distinguished, among other things, by his extraordinary intellectual pedigree, having studied with some of the major phenomenologists who themselves had a direct line of intellectual descent back to the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. Embree completed his doctoral work with Aron Gurwitsch and took classes with Dorion Cairns. His genealogical connection to phenomenology also includes the influential role he performed in setting up the archives for the papers, manuscripts, photocopies, and files of major figures in phenomenology, among others, Alfred Schutz, Aron Gurwitsch, Herbert Spiegelberg, Winthrop Bell, and Dorion Cairns.

Consistent with his direct link to the founders of phenomenology, Professor Embree became the global ambassador of phenomenology because it became clear to Embree that in order for phenomenology to have become an enduring reality, it must become a tradition, a project that is taken up and remains alive by being enacted over and again by persons across generations.

Publications

Embree was a prolific and diligent scholar, having published five book-length investigations, 94 book chapters, 89 interpretive essays, 46 edited books, and 31 edited works by other authors. His works have been translated into several languages including Castilian, Japanese, Russian, Polish, Romanian, and Chinese. Embree found his

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distinctive phenomenological voice in his volume *Reflective Analysis*. Favoring the experience of engaging in original phenomenological investigations, while eschewing more text-based analysis, Embree conceived phenomenology as essentially reflective analysis. Accordingly, Embree held the view that "The basic contention of *Reflective Analysis* is that phenomenology is most fundamentally an approach, rather than a set of texts or concepts: phenomenologizing involves modes of observation and analysis that we can learn to perform better," as is stated on the cover of the 2011 edition of his volume.

In addition to his own original scholarly efforts and, as part of his mission to spread phenomenology, Professor Embree actively facilitated the establishment of venues for publishing work in phenomenological philosophy. Working with other members of the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology (CARP), Embree played an important role in establishing the 'Series in Continental Thought' with the Ohio University Press and the series "Current Continental Research" that was co-published with the University Press of America. While he was president of CARP, CARP established the series "Contributions to Phenomenology" (CTP) with William McKenna as the founding editor of that series with Nijhoff Academic Publishers (later Kluwer and now Springer Verlag). This series, now with over 84 volumes, has since served as one of the most important series for current research in phenomenology since its inception in 1998; it also includes 15 volumes in which Embree served as editor or co-editor.

Perhaps the crowning achievement of Embree's publication efforts was the publication of the *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology* in 2007 in the CTP series. Among other things, this comprehensive volume is noted for the diversity of entries on topics and prominent figures in the phenomenological tradition, and also for numerous entries detailing the state of phenomenology in over 22 countries.

In addition to his contribution to phenomenology through publishing, Embree also worked tirelessly to organize and host numerous conferences. These conferences provided a forum for gathering young scholars and more advanced scholars to pursue studies in phenomenology. In the many scholarly conferences he attended, he could be counted on to regularly provide illuminating comments on the views of authoritative phenomenologists, particularly those of the New School; to offer encouraging compliments and insightful criticisms; and to occasionally indulge in instances of clichéd humor.

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Organizations

One of Embree's great services was to foster the growth of phenomenological organizations worldwide, and he was frequently involved in the beginnings of such organizations. He served on the boards of 35 phenomenological societies and belonged to 20 philosophical societies He was an active member of the Merleau-Ponty Circle and coordinated some of its meetings. He was also a member of the Husserl Circle. Not one to be restricted by artificial disciplinary boundaries, he was a founding member and served on the Executive Committee of the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences (SPHS). Being a member of the most active society for the study of phenomenology, the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), Embree established the CARP's annual Aron Gurwitsch Memorial Lecture. The lecture series has featured some of the most notable and outstanding scholars in phenomenology from around the world.

As a graduate student, he was instrumental in establishing the CARP. Most recently, Embree was active in various international settings, facilitating the founding of such

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organizations as: the Organization of Phenomenological Organizations (OPO), the Círculo LatinoAmericano de Fenomenología, the Central and European Conference in Phenomenology (CEECOP), the Nordic Society for Phenomenology (NoSP), Phenomenology for the East Asia Circle (PEACE), Réseau Euro- Méditerranéen de phénoménologie pour le Dialogue Intercultural (REM), the Cícul LatinoAmericano de Fenomenología (CLAFEN), and the International Alfred Schutz Circle for Phenomenology and Interpretive Social Science.

Professor Lester Embree was, unquestionably, a great impresario for phenomenology, always imagining and realizing new phenomenological projects and setting up new organizations. His service to phenomenology included encouraging the practice of phenomenological method, fostering multidisciplinary engagement, mentoring a generation of younger phenomenology scholars, and helping the tradition of phenomenology to flourish across cultures and intellectual traditions. Embree proudly advocated for scholars to actually engage in the joys of doing phenomenological investigations and not settle for scholarship on texts about doing phenomenology. For him, phenomenological investigation is an actual, viable mode of philosophical practice. With Lester's passing, phenomenology has lost one of its great animating and visionary spirits.

Clevis Headley, Florida Atlantic University
Michael Barber, Saint Louis University

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