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Revisiting Egyptian Foreign Policy towards Israel under Mubarak: From Cold Peace to Strategic Peace
This article is the first academic study of Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel under Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011). It challenges a deeply entrenched conventional wisdom that Egypt pursued a cold-peace foreign policy towards Israel throughout this period. We demonstrate that Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel was dynamic – comprising cold peace (1981–91), a hybrid foreign policy of cold peace and strategic peace (1991–2003), and a pure strategic peace posture (2003–11). We also use the case of Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel as a heuristic to develop a conception of a new type of peace, strategic peace, as an intermediary analytical category between cold and stable peace
De Bandoeng à Moshi: contribution à l'étude des conférences afro-asiatiques, 1955–1963 by Paul F. Smets Bruxelles, Institut de Sociologie de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1964. Pp. 154. 195 FB. - Bandoung Ct le réveil des anciens colonisés by Odette Guitard Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1965 (‘Que sais-je?’, no. 910). Pp. 126. 5s.
Legal Aspects of East African Boundaries - International Boundaries of East Africa. By A. C. McEwen. Oxford University Press: Oxford Studies in African Affairs, 1971. Pp. 321. Maps, appendixes, bibliography, index. £3.50.
The Art of the Possible: Diplomatic Alternatives in the Middle East. By Michael Reisman. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970. Pp. 161. $6.00.)
Relative Rebel Strength and the Onset and Outcome of Civil War Mediation
To what extent does the relative strength of a rebel movement impact upon the likelihood of a peace settlement in civil conflict? This paper argues that relatively stronger rebels are more likely to overcome the strategic bargaining problems that can prevent the resolution of war. Relatively strong insurgents are better equipped to significantly challenge core government interests, and fundamentally threaten the survival a regime. The incumbent’s fear of future violence therefore makes mediation more likely to be undertaken in high-stakes conflicts between states and strong rebel groups. Relatively strong insurgencies are also those with the greatest leverage to negotiate enforcement mechanisms, and the best equipped to defend themselves in the event that the government reneges on an agreement. This reduces the scale of the commitment problem and increases the probability of relatively strong rebel groups agreeing to a settlement with an incumbent. This argument is tested using dyadic data that captures the relative position of insurgents in civil war from 1946 to 2004. This represents an important methodological shift within the mediation literature, which has in the past largely relied upon aggregate country-level data. The results suggest that relatively stronger insurgents are more likely to force the state to open a mediation process and eventually concede some form of settlement. This is further evidence of the need to capture the dyadic relations between actors with fine-grained disaggregated data