On the endogenous determination of the degree of meritocracy in large cooperatives

We consider a cooperative formed by a large number of workers differentiated by their initial endowment of wealth, which is both primary input (labor) and consumption (leisure). The cooperative is characterized by its wealth distribution, and produces a consumption good from labor, which allocates among workers according to a convex combination of the Proportional and the Egalitarian rule. In the first stage, workers decide this combination by simple majority. In a second stage, they choose how much labor to provide to the cooperative. We find that when in the cooperative’s wealth distribution, the median wealth is lower (higher) than the average, the degree of meritocracy chosen by workers is lower (higher) than that of the optimum, and coincides with it when both statistics coincide. This choice has similar consequences on the cooperative’s labor–output, since it increases with respect to the degree of meritocracy

Measurement and evolution of nationalist identity in Spain

Mediante la utilización del método propuesto por Herrero y Villar (2012) en el que se evalúan y ordenan múltiples distribuciones de datos categóricos, este trabajo estudia la evolución de la identidad nacionalista en España a partir de las encuestas de opinión sobre el estado de las Comunidades Autónomas españolas que realiza el CIS desde el año 1998. En el trabajo construimos dos índices a partir de los vectores de valor del método Herrero-Villar que describen la evolución de la identidad nacionalista en cada Comunidad Autónoma, respecto del resto de Comunidades en cada una de las encuestas, y respecto de sí mismas a lo largo de todas las encuestas.Using the method proposed by Herrero and Villar (2012), in which multiple distributions of categorical data are evaluated and ordered, we study the evolution of nationalist identity in Spain based on opinion surveys regarding the state of Spanish Autonomous Communities (AC) carried out by Spain’s Centre for Sociological Research (CIS, acronym in Spanish) since 1998. We construct two indices based on the value vectors of the Herrero-Villar method that describe the evolution of nationalist identity in each of Spain’s ACs, with respect to the rest of the ACs in each of the surveys, and with respect to their own AC across the surveys

Two extensions of consumer surplus

We study consumer surplus in a single market when (a) there is a lower bound in the consumption of the outside good and (b) the weights in the social welfare function given to consumers and firms are different. We assume quasilinear utility. When the lower bound constraint on the consumption of the outside good is binding, income effects arise in demand. In some cases, Cournot equilibrium output is below equilibrium output without this constraint because the constraint makes demand less elastic.When the weights given to consumers and firms are not identical, social welfare is not necessarily concave and profits might be negative at the unrestricted optimum. We characterize social welfare optimum with a bound on maximum losses in a class of utility functions. We offer a formula to find the percentage of welfare losses due to oligopoly in this case

Financing a nationalized monopoly: Coase's versus hotelling-lerner's solution

Coase (1946) rejected the superiority of Hotelling-Lemer solution upon average-cost pricing in face to fmance a nationalized monopoly due to taxes being distortionary. In this paper, we show that this conjecture is not general1y true. According to the utilitarian criterion, we find a distortionary Hotelling-Lel'l1er tax policy which improves upon the average cost pricing. Coase (1946) rechazó la superioridad de la solución de Hotelling-Lemer sobre el equilibrio precio-coste medio debido a la distorsión causada por los impuestos. En este trabajo se muestra que esta conjetura no es cierta en general. Encontrando que, de acuerdo con el criterio utilitarista, es posible una política fiscal Hotelling-Lel'l1er distorsionante que mejora el equilibrio precio-coste medio.Imposición distorsionante, Impuestos de capitación, equilibrio precio-coste medio, optimo subsidiario Distortionary taxation, lump-sum taxation, optimal taxation, price-average cost equilibrium, second-best

Competencia imperfecta, multiplicador con presupuesto equilibrado e imposición distorsionante

Dixon (1987) and Mankiw (1988) using a non-competitive general equilibrium model with Cobb-Douglas preferences, constant marginal costs and lump-sum taxes, found that the Balanced Budget Multiplier is monotonic increasing with market power, reaching the textbook unitary value in the limiting case of monopoly. This conc1usion has been interpreted as a Keynesian feature with fully flexible prices. Using the same model and considering labour supply tax rates, 1 show counter-examples and opposite conclusions to the Dixon-Mankiw monotonicity result. Dixon (1987) Y Mankiw (1988) utilizando un modelo de equilibrio general no competitivo con preferencias Cobb-Douglas, costes marginales constantes e impuestos no distorsionan tes, encuentran que el multiplicador con presupuesto equilibrado es monótono creciente con el poder de mercado, alcanzando el valor unitario de los libros de texto en el caso límite de monopolio. Conclusión que es interpretada como un alegato en favor de las políticas keynesianas expansivas aún cuando los precios son flexibles. Utilizando el mismo modelo, en este trabajo discutimos la robustez de este resultado considerando impuestos sobre la renta, encontrando contraejemplos e incluso conclusiones opuestas.Competencia imperfecta, multiplicador con presupuesto equilibrado, imposición distorsionante Imperfect competition, balanced budget multiplier, distortionary taxation

Balanced budget multiplier, imperfect competition and indirect taxation

This paper presents a counter-example to sorne new-Keynesian features. In particular, by considering indirect tax rates, 1 obtain a negative and monotonically non-increasing relation between the magnitude of both the balanced budget and the welfare multipliers with respect to the market-power. Este artículo presenta un contraejemplo a algunas propiedades neo-keynesianas de los modelos de equilibrio general con competencia imperfecta. En particular, para el caso de impuestos indirectos, se obtiene una relación negativa y monótona no-creciente para los multiplicadores con presupuesto equilibrado y del bienestar respecto del poder del mercado.Multiplicador con presupuesto equilibrado, competencia imperfecta, impuesto indirecto Balanced budget multiplier, imperfect competition, indirect taxation

Efectos macroeconómicos de una sustitución de un específico por IVA bajo competencia imperfecta: una aproximación

The effect of ad valorem and specific taxes has been studied in a partial equilibrium context. It has been found that under imperfect competition ad valorem tax dominates specific in terms of production, revenue, profits and consumers' surplus. Using Caminal's (1990) model and the Dellipalla and Keen' s (1992) tax reform, this paper extends earlier results to a general equilibrium framework, providing in addition a macroeconomic interpretation for this kind of reforms. La incidencia de los impuestos ad valorem y específico ha sido estudiada en equilibrio parcia, con la conclusión de que bajo competencia imperfecta el impuesto ad valorem domina al específico en cuanto a producción, recaudación, beneficios, excedente del consumidor. En este trabajo, utilizando el modelo de Caminal (1990) y el concepto de reforma fiscal de Dellipalla y Keen (1992), extendemos este estudio al equilibrio general, obteniendo además una interpretación macroeconómica de este tipo de reformas.Competencia imperfecta, imposición indirecta, reforma fiscal Imperfect competition, indirect taxation, tax reform

The gender-job satisfaction paradox through time and countries

Much has been written about the so-called gender-job satisfaction paradox, derived from the fact that a significant number of empirical studies found that women reported higher levels of job satisfaction than their male counterparts, although they had what were considered ‘worse’ jobs in terms of pay and other nonmonetary working conditions. In this article, we use a procedure to compare the relative performance of groups when their achievements are described by distributions of outcomes over an ordered set of categories, the Balanced Worth Vector (BWV), to analyse whether women consistently report to be more satisfied at work than men in different periods of time and countries. The BWV offers a cardinal, complete and transitive evaluation that is based in the likelihood of getting better results. In our setting, the BWV methodology provides a complete ranking of the countries covered by the European Working Conditions Survey according to the relative levels of job satisfaction with working conditions that women and men in each country report. Our results indicate a decreasing gender differential over time and substantial differences across countries, proving that the gender-gap paradox cannot be considered a widespread phenomenon

The Education-Job Satisfaction Paradox in the Public Sector

We compare the self-reported satisfaction of workers, employed in the private and the public sectors across European countries, with their working conditions and pay and have reached a controversial conclusion. Although we have found there are more educated workers in the public sector than in the private sector, higher-educated workers report lower levels of satisfaction with their working conditions and income when employed in the public sector, which was the opposite for less educated workers employed in this same sector. In contrast, we found a positive association between education and job satisfaction for workers employed in the private sector

Altruismo y exclusión social

[ES]Este proyecto va dirigido al estudio de los conceptos y los patrones de la exclusión social desde una perspectiva económica. Desde el punto de vista teórico, se pretende plantear modelos que analicen las implicaciones del altruismo en relación a la lucha contra situaciones de pobreza y exclusión social, profundizando en el estudio con las herramientas que proporciona la economía experimental. Desde el punto de vista empírico, se analizan los factores que han llevado a retrocesos en la dimensión de pobreza y exclusión social de la estrategia Europa 2020. Los indicadores AROPE se basan únicamente en el recuento de excluidos y, en consecuencia, no incorporan el grado de intensidad de la exclusión que es la base de los indicadores multidimensionales de la pobreza como el IPM. Por ello, se plantea dar definiciones alternativas de medidas que permitan caracterizar la sensibilidad de los indicadores de pobreza y exclusión social, integrando en la medición la proporción de excluidos con la intensidad de la exclusión. Se pretende identificar patrones de exclusión y grupos de especial riesgo, estudiando la contribución de los posibles factores causales