In the LEED: Racing to the Top in Environmental Self-Regulation

Does voluntary participation in eco-certification become more substantive over time, or less? Although past research on voluntary programs suggests that later participants are more likely to greenwash by only symbolically adopting voluntary standards, theories of regulatory competition suggest a possible “race to the top.” We argue that participation in voluntary programs can facilitate competition that enables a race, and we advance a theory of self-regulatory competition to explain dynamics of participation in voluntary environmental programs. Under this perspective, environmental self-regulation may facilitate a race to the top, despite possibilities for purely symbolic adoption. Analyzing data from a voluntary green building certification program in the United States, we introduce a methodology to distinguish propensities for symbolic certification from more substantive environmental performance. Data demonstrate that later adopters invest additional resources to attain higher certification, becoming greener and suggesting a race to the top in a voluntary greenbuilding certification program

Introduction to the Special Section on Business and Climate Change

We are pleased to present this special section of Management Science on 'Business and Climate Change'. We launched the call for papers in 2019 to draw more scholarly attention to the major risks and opportunities that climate change poses for a wide array of companies and industries and for society at large. In the four years since then, we have seen a growing number of examples o the physical manifestations of climate change that scientists had been forecasting for decades, including intensive heat waves, wildfires, hurricanes, and floodin

Making Self-Regulation More than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment

Using data from a sample of U.S. industrial facilities subject to the federal Clean Air Act from 1993 to 2003, this article theorizes and tests the conditions under which organizations’ symbolic commitments to self-regulate are particularly likely to result in improved compliance practices and outcomes. We argue that the legal environment, particularly as it is constructed by the enforcement activities of regulators, significantly influences the likelihood that organizations will effectively implement the self-regulatory commitments they symbolically adopt. We investigate how different enforcement tools can foster or undermine organizations’ normative motivations to self-regulate. We find that organizations are more likely to follow through on their commitments to self-regulate when they (and their competitors) are subject to heavy regulatory surveillance and when they adopt self-regulation in the absence of an explicit threat of sanctions. We also find that historically poor compliers are significantly less likely to follow through on their commitments to self-regulate, suggesting a substantial limitation on the use of self-regulation as a strategy for reforming struggling organizations. Taken together, these findings suggest that self-regulation can be a useful tool for leveraging the normative motivations of regulated organizations but that it cannot replace traditional deterrence-based enforcement

Corporate Social Responsibility Strategies of Spanish Listed Firms and Controlling Shareholders’ Representatives

This article aims at analyzing how controlling shareholders’ representatives on boards affect corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies (disclosing CSR matters) in Spain, a context characterized by high ownership concentration, one-tier boards, little board independence, weak legal protection for investors, and the presence of large shareholders, especially institutional shareholders. Furthermore, among controlling shareholders’ representatives, we can distinguish between those appointed by insurance companies and banks and those appointed by mutual funds, investment funds, and pension funds. The effect of these categories of directors on CSR strategies is, therefore, also analyzed. Our findings suggest that controlling shareholders’ representatives have a positive effect on CSR strategies, as do directors appointed by investment funds, pension funds, and mutual funds, while directors appointed by banks and insurance companies have no impact on CSR strategies. This analysis offers new insights into the role played by certain types of directors on CSR strategies

Responding to public and private politics: Corporate disclosure of climate change strategies.

The challenges associated with climate change will require governments, citizens, and firms to work collaboratively to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, a task that requires information on companies ' carbon risks, opportunities, strategies, an