Mapping economists’ belief spaces using survey data

Most survey research on the beliefs of economists has focused on measuring consensus within the profession. Researchers have given less emphasis to other aspects of the organization of economists’ belief systems. This paper shows using representative survey data for the first time that economists’ beliefs on an important subset of policy-relevant beliefs are ideologically aligned, despite moderately high levels of agreement on these issues. The analysis does not support the existence of a second dimension of alignment capturing a Keynesian/anti-Keynesian split on macroeconomic stabilization topics. Going beyond conventional methods, the paper also reports the results of belief network centrality and correlational class analyses, methods motivated by recent developments in cognitive science and cultural sociology. This analysis suggests that beliefs including those relating to inequality and redistribution, the level of government spending, environmental regulation, and the minimum wage play a generative role in economists’ belief systems. The results also indicate that the main source of heterogeneity in economists' belief systems is between ideologically aligned and less ideologically aligned subgroups. There is limited evidence of qualitatively distinct patterns of construals of relations between beliefs. Finally, although the analysis is tentative, I fail to find evidence supporting the hypothesis of a decrease in ideological alignment since the 1970s

Book review: Gregory W. Fuller: The Political Economy of Housing Financialization

No abstrac

Gregory W. Fuller: The Political Economy of Housing Financialization

No abstrac

Are economists overconfident? Ideology and uncertainty in expert opinion

Economics frequently serves as an advisory discipline to policymakers, bolstered in part by its claims to a unified intellectual framework and high disciplinary consensus. Recent research challenges this perspective, providing empirical evidence that economists' professional opinions are divided by ideological commitments to either free markets on one hand or state intervention on the other. We investigate the influence of ideology in economics by examining the relation between economists' ideological commitments and the certainty with which they express their expert opinions. To examine this relationship, we analyze data from the Initiative on Global Markets Economic Experts Panel, a unique survey of 51 economists at seven elite American universities. Our results suggest that economists with ideologically patterned views report higher levels of certainty in their opinions than their less ideologically consistent peers, but this boost in confidence is limited to topics that closely pertain to the free market versus interventionism divide

The inversion of the ‘really big trade-off’:Homeownership and pensions in long-run perspective

The hypothesis of a trade-off between homeownership and welfare state provision, first proposed by Jim Kemeny around 1980, is a foundational claim in the political economy of housing. However, the evidence for this hypothesis is unclear at both macro and micro levels. This paper examines the link between welfare and homeownership at the macro level using new long-run data and a multilevel modelling approach. It shows that the negative cross-sectional correlation between homeownership and public welfare provision observed in the earliest available data disappears and becomes neutral by the 1980s and possibly positive subsequently. Within-country trajectories vary, but are significantly positive in more countries than significantly negative, suggesting that in some contexts welfare and homeownership are complements rather than competitors. The paper posits a dual ratchet effect mechanism in both pension benefits and homeownership capable of producing this inversion, and further suggests that rising public indebtedness and the debt-stabilising effects of welfare states may account for the emergence of complementarity in the pension‒homeownership relationship. The latter supports the hypothesis that some countries have avoided the trade-off by ‘buying time’ on credit markets.Abstract Literature and theory Data and methods The trade-off in the long run: descriptive findings Multivariate analysis Country trajectories: buying time? Conclusion Supplemental material Reference

Washington dissensus:Ambiguity and conflict at the international monetary fund

During the 1990s, the International Monetary Fund failed to develop clear exchange rate policy norms for developing countries, despite the fact that oversight of the international monetary system is central to its mandate. Explaining this behaviour requires revising theories of autonomous agenda-setting and ‘ceremonial conformity’ in international organizations (IOs). I argue that IOs often adopt a posture of strategic ambiguity when confronted with a combination of divisions among major member states and a lack of consensus in the profession that provides the organization's source of expert legitimacy. However, while the ambiguity helps avoid conflict in the short run, it undermines organizational governance capacity in the medium run, resulting in coordination failures. The empirical analysis relies on internal records of Fund meetings on the exchange rate issue, interviews with former IMF officials and analysis of the organization's governance role during currency crises in Mexico, Russia, Brazil and Argentina

Cohesion, consensus, and conflict:Technocratic elites and financial crisis in Mexico and Argentina

Observers of economic policy-making in developing countries often suggest that consensus and cohesion within technocratic policy elites facilitate the implementation and consolidation of reforms, but have not clearly defined these terms or the relationship between them. Likewise, political sociologists argue that social networks account for elite cohesion, but have not adequately specified the relevant structural properties of these networks. This article argues that structural network cohesion facilitates elite consensus formation by enabling cooperation, while fragmented networks promote competition between factions and hence conflict. I support this hypothesis empirically by examining two cases in which elite consensus was severely challenged by financial crises: Mexico and Argentina. Mexican policy elites sustained consensus throughout the crisis, whereas conflict plagued the Argentine elite. Likewise, while the Mexican technocratic elite is highly cohesive, the Argentine elite is fragmented and factionalized. I document this hypothesis using a mixed-methods approach that embeds an analysis of elite networks within a comparative analysis of policy-making patterns drawing on extensive fieldwork in both countries

Are economists overconfident? Ideology and uncertainty in expert opinion

Economics frequently serves as an advisory discipline to policymakers, bolstered in part by its claims to a unified intellectual framework and high disciplinary consensus. Recent research challenges this perspective, providing empirical evidence that economists' professional opinions are divided by ideological commitments to either free markets on one hand or state intervention on the other. We investigate the influence of ideology in economics by examining the relation between economists' ideological commitments and the certainty with which they express their expert opinions. To examine this relationship, we analyze data from the Initiative on Global Markets Economic Experts Panel, a unique survey of 51 economists at seven elite American universities. Our results suggest that economists with ideologically patterned views report higher levels of certainty in their opinions than their less ideologically consistent peers, but this boost in confidence is limited to topics that closely pertain to the free market versus interventionism divide