Pricing Rules Comparisonin the Context of Bandwidth Trade, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2010, nr 2

In this paper we compare two pricing rules in the context of bandwidth trade. Allocation and pricing rules, together with a set of signals received from independent agents, constitute a market mechanism. In the paper we analyze two pricing rules: well known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves rule (VCG) and the parametric pricing rule (PPR).We apply these pricing rules to the allocation rule specified by the balancing communication bandwidth trade model (BCBT)

Auction Models SupportingEnd-to- End Connection Trading, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2012, nr 2

The paper concerns bandwidth allocation problem on the telecommunication market where there are many sellers and buyers. Sellers offer the bandwidth of telecommunication links. Buyers are interested in the purchase of the bandwidth of several links that makes up an end-to-end connection between two nodes of telecommunication network. We analyze three auction models supporting such a bandwidth exchange: NSP (network second price), BCBT (model for balancing communication bandwidth trading) and BCBT-CG which is a modification of BCBT that applies column generation technique. All of these models concern divisible network resources, treat bandwidth of telecommunication links as an elementary commodity offered for sale, and allow for purchasing bandwidth along multiple paths joining two telecommunication nodes. All of them also aim at maximizing the social welfare. Considered auction models have been compared in the respect of economic and computational efficiency. Experimental studies have been performed on several test instances based on the SNDlib library data sets

Multicommodity Auction Model for Indivisible Network Resource Allocation, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2008, nr 4

In this paper we present the multicommodity auction model BCBT-I that allocates indivisible network resources among bidders. The approach can be considered as a generalization of the basic multicommodity model for balancing communication bandwidth trade (BCBT). The BCBT model assumes that offers concerning inter-node links and point-to-point bandwidth demands can be realized partially. However, in the real-world trade there might be a need to include capacity modularity in the market balancing process. Thus we state the model for balancing communication bandwidth trade that takes into account the indivisibility of traded bandwidth modules. This requires to solve a mixed integer problem and increases computational complexity. Furthermore, the pricing issue appears nontrivial, as the dual prices cannot be longer used to set fair, competitive market prices. For clearing the market, we examine the multicommodity pricing mechanizm based on differentiation of buy and sell market prices

A Framework for Evaluationof Communication Bandwidth Market Models, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2010, nr 2

The article presents a method of analysis of market-based models for resource allocation in communication networks. It consists of several stages: classification of a market model, generation of input data, data adaptation to a tested model, test calculations and, finally, presentation and interpretation of results. A set of general criteria to assess various models has been proposed. Tests are run using dedicated computer applications, data is stored in open XML-based format originated in the multicommodity market model. Network topologies are derived from the SNDlib library

Model for Balancing Aggregated Communication Bandwidth Resources, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2009, nr 3

In this paper we present a multicommodity bandwidth exchange model for balancing aggregated communication bandwidth resources (BACBR) that allows us to aggregate similar offers. In this model offers submitted to sell (or buy) the same, similar, or equivalent network resources (or demands for end-to-end connections) are aggregated into single commodities. BACBR model is based on the balancing communication bandwidth trade (BCBT) model. It requires much less variables and constraints then original BCBT, however the outcomes need to be disaggregated. The general model for disaggregation is also given in the paper

Bandwidth Trading: A Comparison of the Combinatorial and Multicommodity Approach, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2010, nr 2

Since the telecommunication market becomes more complex and dynamic, a strong need for a new, efficient and flexible bandwidth trading mechanisms appears. We believe that good mechanisms, that allow effective and fair allocation of bandwidth between market participants will help to develop the real competitive bandwidth market. In this paper we compare two different double-sided bandwidth auction mechanisms, that seem to be well suited approaches for trading indivisible units of bandwidth: combinatorial auction c-SeBiDA and multicommodity mechanism BACBR-I. The c-SeBiDA mechanism considers two types of commodities: inter-node links and paths consisting of particular links. Market partici- pants may bid a single link, or a bundle of links, constituting a specific path. The BACBR-I mechanism is a multicommodity exchange model, that allows bidders to place buy offers not only for individual or bundled links, but rather for end-to-end connections. Therefore, it is the decision model that allocates the most efficient links to connections. We run a large set of experiments to test the allocation and computational efficiency obtained under both approaches

Application of open multi-commodity market data model on the communication bandwidth market, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2007, nr 4

In the paper the market model for balancing communication bandwidth trade (BCBT) is analyzed in the form of multi-commodity market data model (M3). The distinguishing feature of BCBT model is that it assumes that market players can place buy offers not only for isolated network resources – inter-node links, but also for end-to-end network paths of predefined capacity, that is, every offer concerns a point-to-point bandwidth connection between a pair of specified locations in a communication network. The model enables effective balancing of sell and buy offers for network resources in a way which maximizes global economic welfare. The open multi-commodity market data model provides efficient and clear mechanisms, which support the environment of auctions and multi-commodity exchanges, especially when the trade is constrained by the infrastructure resources. Thus the model may be used in designing open information systems for market balancing and clearing in the context of multicommodity trade in various network infrastructure sectors

Multi-Objective Approach for Managing Uncertain Delivery from Renewable Energy Sources within a Peer-to-Peer Energy Balancing Architecture

On the energy markets, conscious customers may exist who are not only interested in minimising the cost of energy purchase, but, simultaneously, in optimising some other quality criteria (arising from ecological concerns, or social responsibility of the energy producers). In this paper, we develop both a mathematical optimisation problem and a market framework for balancing a power system in a peer-to-peer market setup, where product differentiation can be considered directly on the market. Thus, origins of energy may be clearly identified, and product quality characteristics can be understood by various actors (including households). We derive a multi-objective (mixed-integer) linear programming optimisation problem for balancing the energy system in a peer-to-peer energy trading environment, where not only the cost but also other additional quality criteria are considered. We have identified many possible actors to be present within the proposed market setup. They include consumers, producers, brokers and flexible prosumers with storage. The approach was tested on the IEEE 30-bus standard test system, over three different scenarios, by analysing the impact of various actors/peers activities and different extensions. It has been shown that a multi-objective energy balancing scheme may be developed through crafted optimisation problem and that each type of studied peers may bring some added value to the power system balancing

Mechanizm rozliczeń oparty na rekompensatach do zastosowania na rynkach z ofertami nieliniowymi

A compensation-based pricing scheme is a market clearing mechanism that may be applied when a uniform, linear pricing scheme cannot support equilibrium allocations in the auction markets. We analyze extensions of our previously proposed pricing scheme [14] to include various possible representations of bids that reflect some non-convex costs and constraints. We conclude with a discussion on directions for future research.Rozważany w pracy model rozliczania obrotu oparty na rekompensatach jest odpowiednim narzędziem wyceny na rynkach giełdowych w sytuacji, gdy nie można wyznaczyć jednolitych cen równowagi. Sytuacja taka ma miejsce np. na bilansującym rynku energii elektrycznej, gdy w procesie bilansowania rynku są uwzględniane indywidualne ograniczenia i nieliniowe koszty jednostek wytwórczych. W pracy rozważono model wyceny opracowany przez autorów w [14], analizując jego właściwości istotne z perspektywy projektowania mechanizmów rynkowych (indywidualna racjonalność, neutralność finansowa, efektywność). W głównej części pracy przedstawiono szersze zastosowania modelu do różnych typów ofert (schodkowe, przedziałami liniowe) oraz wprowadzanych ograniczeń (czasy rozruchu i odstawienia, koszty rozruchu i odstawienia, koszty stałe). Ważnym obszarem zastosowań mechanizmu mogą być również giełdy energii dopuszczające składanie ofert blokowych. Pokazano schematy modelowania zadania rozliczania obrotu w postaci zadania MILP dla różnych typów rynków. Poszczególne mozliwośći zastosowania zilustrowano na przykładach. W podsumowaniu zaprezentowano dalsze kierunki rozwoju badań nad modelami wyceny na rynkach z ograniczeniami