Prevention of intention invention in the affect misattribution procedure

The affect misattribution procedure (AMP) is one of the most promising indirect measures, showing high reliability and large effect sizes. However, the AMP has recently been criticized for being susceptible to explicit influences, in that priming effects tend to be larger and more reliable among participants who report that they intentionally responded to the primes instead of the targets. Consistent with interpretations of these effects in terms of retrospective confabulation, two experiments obtained reliable priming effects when (a) participants lacked meta-cognitive knowledge about their responses to the primes and (b) participants’ attention was directed away from response-eliciting features of the primes. Under either of these conditions, priming effects were unrelated to self-reported intentionality, although self-reported intentionality was positively related to priming effects under control conditions. The findings highlight the contribution of meta-cognitive inferences to retrospective self-reports of intentionality and suggest an effective procedure to rule out explicit influences in the AMP

Being in front is good—but where is in front? Preferences for spatial referencing affect evaluation

Speakers of English frequently associate location in space with valence, as in moving up and down the “social ladder.” If such an association also holds for the sagittal axis, an object “in front of” another object would be evaluated more positively than the one “behind.” Yet how people conceptualize relative locations depends on which frame of reference (FoR) they adopt—and hence on cross‐linguistically diverging preferences. What is conceptualized as “in front” in one variant of the relative FoR (e.g., translation) is “behind” under another variant (reflection), and vice versa. Do such diverging conceptualizations of an object's location also lead to diverging evaluations? In two studies employing an implicit association test, we demonstrate, first, that speakers of German, Chinese, and Japanese indeed evaluate the object “in front of” another object more positively than the one “behind.” Second, and crucially, the reversal of which object is conceptualized as “in front” involves a corresponding reversal of valence, suggesting an impact of linguistically imparted FoR preferences on evaluative processes.publishedVersio

Assessing children’s implicit attitudes using the Affect Misattribution Procedure

In the current research we examined whether the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne et al., 2005) could be successfully adapted as an implicit measure of children’s attitudes. We tested this possibility in three studies with 5 to 10 year old children. In Study 1 we found evidence that children misattribute affect elicited by attitudinally positive (e.g., cute animals) and negative (e.g., aggressive animals) primes to neutral stimuli (inkblots). In Study 2, we found that, as expected, children’s responses following flower and insect primes were moderated by gender. Girls (but not boys) were more likely to judge inkblots as pleasant when they followed flower primes. Children in Study 3 showed predicted affect misattribution following happy as compared to sad face primes. In addition, children’s responses on this child-friendly AMP predicted their self-reported empathy; the greater children’s spontaneous misattribution of affect following happy and sad primes, the more children reported feeling the joy and pain of others. These studies provide evidence that the AMP can be adapted as an implicit measure of children’s attitudes and the results of Study 3 offer novel insight into individual differences in children’s affective responses to the emotional expressions of other

Truth feels easy: Knowing information is true enhances experienced processing fluency

Information is more likely believed to be true when it feels easy rather than difficult to process. An ecological learning explanation for this fluency-truth effect implicitly or explicitly presumes that truth and fluency are positively associated. Specifically, true information may be easier to process than false information and individuals may reverse this link in their truth judgements. The current research investigates the important but so far untested precondition of the learning explanation for the fluency-truth effect. In particular, five experiments (total N = 712) test whether participants experience information known to be true as easier to process than information known to be false. Participants in Experiment 1a judged true statements easier to read than false statements. Experiment 1b was a preregistered direct replication with a large sample and again found increased legibility for true statements-importantly, however, this was not the case for statements for which the truth status was unknown. Experiment 1b thereby shows that it is not the actual truth or falsehood of information but the believed truth or falsehood that is associated with processing fluency. In Experiment 2, true calculations were rated as easier to read than false calculations. Participants in Experiment 3 judged it easier to listen to calculations generally known to be true than to calculations generally known to be false. Experiment 4 shows an effect of truth on processing fluency independent of statement familiarity. Discussion centers on the current explanation for the fluency-truth effect and the validity of processing fluency as a cue in truth judgments