Phenotype MicroArray (TM) in the metabolic characterisation of Salmonella serotypes Agona, Enteritidis, Give, Hvittingfoss, Infantis, Newport and Typhimurium

The Phenotype MicroArray (TM) (PM) technology was used to study the metabolic characteristics of 29 Salmonella strains belonging to seven serotypes of S. enterica spp. enterica. Strains of serotypes Typhimurium (six strains among definite phage types DTs 1, 40 and 104) and Agona (two strains) were tested for 949 substrates, Enteritidis (six strains of phage type PT1), Give, Hvittingfoss, Infantis and Newport strains (two of each) were tested for 190 substrates and seven other Agona strains for 95 substrates. The strains represented 18 genotypes in pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE). Among 949 substrates, 18 were identified that could be used to differentiate between the strains of those seven serotypes or within a single serotype. Unique metabolic differences between the Finnish endemic Typhimurium DT1 and Agona strains were detected, for example, in the metabolism of d-tagatose, d-galactonic acid gamma-lactone and l-proline as a carbon source. Thus, the PM technique is a useful tool for identifying potential differential markers on a metabolic basis that could be used for epidemiological surveillance

Habit: Time, Freedom, Governance

This article investigates the place that habit occupies in different 'architectures of the person', focusing particularly on constructions of the relations between habit and other components of personhood that are marked by time. Three such positions are examined: first, the relations between thought, will, memory, habit and instinct proposed by post-Darwinian accounts of 'organic memory'; second, Henri Bergson's account of the relations between habit, memory and becoming; and, third, the temporal aspects of Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus understood as a set of hereditable dispositions. These different 'architectures of the person' are considered with regard to the role they accord habit in trans-generational mechanisms of inheritance; the historicised forms of embodied personhood that they propose; and the manner in which they account for the emergence of a capacity for freedom that can (partially) offset the weight of the inherited past. It is argued that the imputation of such a capacity to some forms of personhood, but not others, is both shaped by and provides the conditions for the operation of liberal forms of government. The manner in which the conduct of those who exhibit such a capacity for freedom is brought under the direction of varied 'authorities of freedom' is given particular consideration