Drug cue reactivity involves hierarchical instrumental learning: evidence from a biconditional Pavlovian to instrumental transfer task

This is the final version of the article. Available from Springer Verlag via the DOI in this record.RATIONALE: Drug cue reactivity plays a crucial role in addiction, yet the underlying mechanisms are poorly understood. According to the binary associative account, drug stimuli retrieve an expectation of the drug outcome, which, in turn, elicits the associated drug-seeking response (S-O-R). By contrast, according to the hierarchical account, drug stimuli retrieve an expectation that the contingency between the drug-seeking response and the drug outcome is currently more effective, promoting performance of the drug-seeking response (S:R-O). METHODS: The current study discriminated between these two accounts using a biconditional Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) task with 128 alcohol drinkers. A biconditional discrimination was first trained in which two responses produced alcohol and food outcomes, respectively, and these response-outcome contingencies were reversed across two discriminative stimuli (SDs). In the PIT test, alcohol and food cues were compounded with the two SDs to examine their impact on percent alcohol choice in extinction. RESULTS: It was found that alcohol and food cues selectively primed choice of the response that earned that outcome in each SD (p < .001), and this effect was associated with participants' belief that cues signalled greater effectiveness of that response (p < .0001). CONCLUSIONS: The alcohol stimulus could not have selectively primed the alcohol-seeking response through binary S-O-R associations because the drug outcome was equally associated with both responses. Rather, the alcohol stimulus must have retrieved an expectation that the response-alcohol contingency available in the current context was more likely to be effective (S:R-O), which primed performance of the alcohol-seeking response.The work was supported by an ESRC PhD scholarship to Lorna Hardy

Evidence of a Goal-Directed Process in Human Pavlovian-Instrumental Transfer

© 2017 APA, all rights reserved). Cues that signal rewards can motivate reward-seeking behaviors, even for outcomes that are not currently desired. Three experiments examined this phenomenon, using an outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) design and an outcome devaluation procedure. In Experiment 1, participants learned to perform one response to earn crisps points and another response to earn popcorn points. One outcome was then devalued by adulterating it to make it taste unpleasant. On test, overall response choice was biased toward the outcome that had not been devalued, indicating goal-directed control. Stimuli that signaled crisps and popcorn also biased instrumental response choice toward their respective outcomes (a PIT effect). Most importantly, the strength of this bias was not influenced by the devaluation manipulation. In contrast, Experiment 2 demonstrated that when stimuli signaled equal probability of the two outcomes, cue-elicited response choice was sensitive to the devaluation manipulation. Experiment 3 confirmed this conclusion by demonstrating a selective avoidance of the cued, devalued outcome. Together, these data support a goal-directed model of PIT in which expected outcome probability and value make independent contributions to response choice. (PsycINFO Database Recor

Pretesting boosts recognition, but not cued recall, of targets from unrelated word pairs

Attempting to retrieve the answer to a question on an initial test can improve memory for that answer on a subsequent test, relative to an equivalent study period. Such retrieval attempts can be beneficial even when they are unsuccessful, although this benefit is usually only seen with related word pairs. Three experiments examined the effects of pretesting for both related (e.g., pond-frog) and unrelated (e.g., pillow-leaf) word pairs on cued recall and target recognition. Pretesting improved subsequent cued recall performance for related but not for unrelated word pairs, relative to simply studying the word pairs. Tests of target recognition, by contrast, revealed benefits of pretesting for memory of targets from both related and unrelated word pairs. These data challenge popular theories that suggest that the pretesting effect depends on partial activation of the target during the pretesting phase

The propositional basis of cue-controlled reward seeking

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Selective effects of errorful generation on recognition memory: The role of motivation and surprise.

The current research examined the effects of errorful generation on memory, focusing particularly on the roles of motivation and surprise. In two experiments, participants were first presented with photographs of faces and were asked to associate four facts with each photograph. On Generate trials, the participants guessed two of the facts (Guess targets) before those correct facts, and another two correct facts (Study targets), were revealed. On the remaining Read trials, all four facts were presented without a guessing stage. In Experiment 1, participants also ranked their motivation to know the answers before they were revealed, or their surprise on learning the true answers. Guess targets were subsequently better recognised than the concurrently presented, non-guessed Study targets. Guess targets were also better recognised than Read targets, and recognition of Study and Read targets did not differ. Errorful generation also increased self-reported motivation, but not surprise. Experiment 2 showed that the results of Experiment 1 can outlive a 20-minute delay, and that they generalise to a more challenging recognition test. Together, the results suggest that errorful generation improves memory specifically for the guessed fact, and this may be linked to an increase in motivation to learn that fact

Automaticity and cognitive control: Effects of cognitive load on cue-controlled reward choice

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from SAGE Publications via the DOI in this recordThe extent to which human outcome-response (O-R) priming effects are automatic or under cognitive control is currently unclear. Two experiments tested the effect of cognitive load on O-R priming to shed further light on the debate. In Experiment 1, two instrumental responses earned beer and chocolate points in an instrumental training phase. Instrumental response choice was then tested in the presence of beer, chocolate, and neutral stimuli. On test, a Reversal instruction group was told that the stimuli signalled which response would not be rewarded. The transfer test was also conducted under either minimal (No Load) or considerable (Load) cognitive load. The Non-Reversal groups showed O-R priming effects, where the reward cues increased the instrumental responses that had previously produced those outcomes, relative to the neutral stimulus. This effect was observed even under cognitive load. The Reversal No Load group demonstrated a reversed effect, where response choice was biased towards the response that was most likely to be rewarded according to the instruction. Most importantly, response choice was at chance in the Reversal Load condition. In Experiment 2, cognitive load abolished the sensitivity to outcome devaluation that was otherwise seen when multiple outcomes and responses were cued on test. Collectively, the results demonstrate that complex O-R priming effects are sensitive to cognitive load, whereas the very simple, standard O-R priming effect is more robust

Goal-directed control in Pavlovian-instrumental transfer

The current article concerns human outcome - selective Pavlovian - instrumental transfer (PIT), where Pavlovian cues selectively invigorate instrumental responses that predict common rewarding outcomes. Several recent experiments have observed PIT effects that were insensitive to outcome devaluation manipulations, which has been taken as evidence of an automatic “associative” mechanism. Other similar studies observed PIT effects that were sensitive to devaluation, which suggest s a more controlled, goal - directed process. Studies supporting the automatic approach have been criticised for using a biased baseline, while studies supporting the goal - directed approach have been criticised for priming multiple outcomes attest. The current experiment addressed both of these issues. Participants first learned to perform two instrumental responses to earn two outcomes each (R1 - O1/ O3, R2 - O2/ O4), before four Pavlovian stimuli (S1 - S4) were trained to predict each outcome. One outcome that was paired with each instrumental response (O3 and O4) was then devalued, so that baseline response choice at test would be balanced. Instrumental responding was then assessed in the presence of each individual Pavlovian stimulus, so that only one outcome was primed per trial. PIT effect s were observed for the valued outcomes , t s > 3.99, p s < .001, but not for the devalued outcomes , F < 1 , BF 10 = 0.29. Hence, when baseline response choice was equated and only one outcome was primed per test trial, PIT was sensitive to outcome devaluation. The data therefore support goal - directed models of PIT

The Benefits of Impossible Tests: Assessing the Role of Error-Correction in the Pretesting Effect

Relative to studying alone, guessing the meanings of unknown words can improve later recognition of their meanings, even if those guesses were incorrect - the pretesting effect (PTE). The error-correction hypothesis suggests that incorrect guesses produce error signals that promote memory for the meanings when they are revealed. The current research sought to test the error-correction explanation of the PTE. In three experiments, participants studied unfamiliar Finnish-English word pairs by either studying each complete pair, or by guessing the English translation before its presentation. In the latter case, the participants also guessed which of two categories the word belonged to. Hence, guesses from the correct category were semantically closer to the true translation than guesses from the incorrect category. In Experiment 1, guessing increased subsequent recognition of the English translations, especially for translations that were presented on trials in which the participants’ guesses were from the correct category. Experiment 2 replicated these target recognition effects while also demonstrating that they do not extend to associative recognition performance. Experiment 3 again replicated the target recognition pattern, while also examining participants’ metacognitive recognition judgments. Participants correctly judged that their memory would be better after small than after large errors, but incorrectly believed that making any errors would be detrimental, relative to study-only. Overall, the data are inconsistent with the error-correction hypothesis; small, within-category errors produced better recognition than large, cross-category errors. Alternative theories, based on elaborative encoding and motivated learning, are considered

Learning from failure: Errorful generation improves memory for items, not associations

Potts and Shanks (2014) recently reported that making mistakes improved the encoding of novel information compared with simply studying. This benefit of generating errors is counterintuitive, since it resulted in less study time and more opportunity for proactive interference. Five experiments examined the effect of generating errors versus studying on item recognition, cued recall, associative recognition, two-alternative forced choice and multiple-choice performance. Following Potts and Shanks (2014), participants first attempted to learn the English definitions of either very rare English words or Euskara nouns. During encoding, participants either guessed the definition (and almost always made an error) before the correct definition was revealed, or simply studied the words for an equivalent period. Experiments 1–4 used rare English words. In these experiments, generating errors led to better subsequent recognition of both the cues and targets compared with studying (Experiments 1 and 3). Tests of cued recall and associative recognition, by contrast, revealed no significant benefit of generating errors over studying (Experiments 1–3). Generating errors during encoding also improved performance on a two-alternative forced choice test when the correct target was presented with a novel foil, but not when the familiarity of the target and the foil was matched (Experiment 4). In Experiment 5, a different set of materials – Euskara nouns – and a different (intermixed) encoding procedure was adopted. Here, guessing improved target recognition (performance was improved on a multiple-choice test with unfamiliar foils), but impaired cued recall performance. These results suggest that, when learning word pairs that do not have a pre-existing semantic association, generating errors strengthens the cues and targets in isolation, but does not strengthen the cue-target associations