License prices for financially constrained firms

It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit service deployment. We investigate this claim under the extreme case of financially constrained bidders. If demand is just slightly elastic, auctions maximize consumer surplus if consumer surplus is a convex function of quantity (a common assumption), or if consumer surplus is concave and the proportion of expenditure spent on deployment is greater than one over the elasticity of demand. The latter condition appears to be true for most of the large telecom auctions in the US and Europe. Thus, even if high auction prices inhibit service deployment, auctions appear to be optimal from the consumers’ point of view

How do women at increased, but unexplained, familial risk of breast cancer perceive and manage their risk? A qualitative interview study

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The perception of breast cancer risk held by women who have not had breast cancer, and who are at increased, but unexplained, familial risk of breast cancer is poorly described. This study aims to describe risk perception and how it is related to screening behaviour for these women.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Participants were recruited from a population-based sample (the Australian Breast Cancer Family Study - ABCFS). The ABCFS includes women diagnosed with breast cancer and their relatives. For this study, women without breast cancer with at least one first- or second-degree relative diagnosed with breast cancer before age 50 were eligible unless a <it>BRCA1 </it>or <it>BRCA2 </it>mutation had been identified in their family. Data collection consisted of an audio recorded, semi-structured interview on the topic of breast cancer risk and screening decision-making. Data was analysed thematically.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>A total of 24 interviews were conducted, and saturation of the main themes was achieved. Women were classified into one of five groups: don't worry about cancer risk, but do screening; concerned about cancer risk, so do something; concerned about cancer risk, so why don't I do anything?; cancer inevitable; cancer unlikely.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>The language and framework women use to describe their risk of breast cancer must be the starting point in attempts to enhance women's understanding of risk and their prevention behaviour.</p

Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment

This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product market. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of RJV-participating firms, which is also necessary and sufficient for a decrease in consumer welfare. Using information from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust evidence that large networks between direct competitors – created through firms being members in several RJVs at the same time – are conducive to collusive outcomes in the product market which reduce consumer welfare. By contrast, RJVs among non-competitors are efficiency enhancing

Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers:evidence from EC merger cases

The purpose of this paper is to identify empirically the implicit structural model, especially the roles of size asymmetries and concentration, used by the European Commission to identify mergers with coordinated effects (i.e. collective dominance). Apart from its obvious policy-relevance, the paper is designed to shed empirical light on the conditions under which tacit collusion is most likely. We construct a database relating to 62 candidate mergers and find that, in the eyes of the Commission, tacit collusion in this context virtually never involves more than two firms and requires close symmetry in the market shares of the two firms