The Evolving Agricultural Marketplace: Selected Results and Implications for the West from the Laboratory

Marketing,

SUPPLY AND DEMAND RISKS IN LABORATORY FORWARD AND SPOT MARKETS: IMPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE

Laboratory experimental methods are used to investigate the impacts of supply and/or demand risks on prices, quantities traded, and earnings within forward and spot market institutions. Random demand and/or supply shifts can be as much as 25 percent of the expected equilibrium outcome. Nevertheless, results suggest that the spot or forward trading institution itself has a greater influence on market outcomes than the presence of risk within the trading institutions. Sellers tend to have relatively higher earnings in a spot market than buyers, regardless of the risk. Total surplus, however, generally is greater in a forward market.laboratory markets, forward market, spot market, supply and/or demand risks, Demand and Price Analysis, Marketing,

Out With the Old, In With the New: Are Western Commodity Producers Ready for Buyouts?

Agricultural and Food Policy,

Unilateral and Exclusionary/Strategic Effects of Common Agency: Price Impacts in a Repeated Common Value English Auction

The business justification for multiple principals to hire a common agent is efficiency. Our empirical study demonstrates that the creation of the common agent unilaterally depresses winning bids. Additionally, the common agent was not only observed to be the dominant bidder but also paid significantly lower prices than fringe competitors (price/quantity differential). The observed price/quantity differential is consistent with the almost common value English auction theory developed by Rose and Kagel (2008) in which a cost advantaged bidder is able to reduce competition by credibly raising the costs of disadvantaged rivals associated with the winner’s curse.Common Value Auctions, Common Agency, Antitrust, Industrial Organization, D44, K21, K23,

Helping Russian Students See the Invisible Hand

Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession,

SUPPLY AND DEMAND RISKS IN FORWARD AND SPOT MARKETS: IMPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE

Laboratory methods are used to investigate the impacts of supply and/or demand risks on prices, quantities traded, and earnings within forward and spot market institutions. Results suggest that the spot or forward trading institution itself has a greater influence on market outcomes than supply/demand risks within the institution.Marketing,

Is Agricultural Policy Decoupling against Human Nature? Experimental Evidence of Fairness Expectations’ Contributions to Payment Incidence

The objective of this research is to measure individuals’ fairness expectations and relate them to their market behavior in a private-negotiation institution. By doing this, we may inform model parameterization of field data and increase understanding of payment incidence causation. We hypothesize agents will change both their market and UG behavior when the tenant/proposer receives a subsidy following a successful negotiation. We also hypothesize that agents’ market behavior does relate to their fairness expectations in the UG. Two economic experiments were developed to test our hypotheses, a market and an ultimatum bargaining game experiment. We recruited 106 undergraduate students and conducted the experiments in an experimental laboratory using a computer based market mechanism. Our findings suggest fairness expectations need to be considered as a possible constraint on agents’ profit maximization behavior in land markets. The experimental evidence indicates market sellers or landlords demand higher land rental prices when tenants receive per-unit subsidies. Their ability to obtain a higher price appears to be more formidable in markets with limited matching opportunities. We conclude fairness expectations may constrain individuals’ profit-maximization behavior in the land market and, in turn, affect payment incidence in this market.Agricultural and Food Policy,

Decoupled Programs, Payment Incidence, and Factor Markets: Evidence from Market Experiments

We use laboratory market experiments to assess the impact of asymmetric knowledge of a per-unit subsidy and the effect of a decoupled annual income subsidy on factor market outcomes. Results indicate that when the subsidy is tied to the factor as a per-unit subsidy, regardless of full or asymmetric knowledge for market participants, subsidized factor buyers distribute nearly 22 percent of the subsidy to factor sellers. When the subsidy is fully decoupled from the factor, as is the case with the annual payment, payment incidence is mitigated and prices are not statistically different from the no-policy treatment.laboratory market experiments, agricultural subsidies, subsidy incidence, land market, ex ante policy analysis, Agricultural and Food Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Q18, D03, C92,

INEL test plan for evaluating waste assay systems

A test bed is being established at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC). These tests are currently focused on mobile or portable radioassay systems. Prior to disposal of TRU waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), radioassay measurements must meet the quality assurance objectives of the TRU Waste Characterization Quality Assurance Program Plan. This test plan provides technology holders with the opportunity to assess radioassay system performance through a three-tiered test program that consists of: (a) evaluations using non-interfering matrices, (b) surrogate drums with contents that resemble the attributes of INEL-specific waste forms, and (c) real waste tests. Qualified sources containing a known mixture and range of radionuclides will be used for the non-interfering and surrogate waste tests. The results of these tests will provide technology holders with information concerning radioassay system performance and provide the INEL with data useful for making decisions concerning alternative or improved radioassay systems that could support disposal of waste at WIPP

Host government impact on the logistics performance of international humanitarian organisations

Host governments severely impact international relief operations. An openness to assistance can lead to the timely delivery of aid whereas a reluctance to receive assistance can have devastating consequences. With lives at stake and no time to lose in humanitarian crises, understanding the host government's impact on the logistics performance of international humanitarian organisations (IHOs) is crucial. In this paper, we present an in-depth multiple-case study that explores this aspect. Results show that host government actions are explained by their dependency on IHOs and the levels of tensions between their interests (i.e., conflicting strategic goals). In addition, a host government's regulatory and enforcement capabilities are important for ensuring that they can safeguard their interests. We derive four stances that host governments can adopt in regulating logistics-related activities: non-restrictive, opportunistic, selectively accommodating and uncompromising. Each of these has different implications for the logistics performance of IHOs