167 research outputs found
Az önismeret határa
ĂŤme, egy Ă©rv az Ă©szlelĂ©s diszjunktĂv elmĂ©lete ellen. (1) A diszjunktĂv elmĂ©let
szerint a hallucináciĂłk más tĂpusĂş mentális esemĂ©nyek, mint az azoktĂłl
szubjektĂv perspektĂvábĂłl nĂ©zve megkĂĽlönböztethetetlen valĂłsághű Ă©rzĂ©ki
tapasztalatok. (2) Ha kĂ©t Ă©rzĂ©ki tapasztalat szubjektĂv perspektĂvábĂłl nĂ©zve
megkülönböztethetetlen egymástól, akkor a két érzéki tapasztalat ugyanazzal
a fenomenális karakterrel rendelkezik. (3) Ha két érzéki tapasztalat ugyanazzal
a fenomenális karakterrel rendelkezik, noha kĂĽlönbözĹ‘ tĂpusĂş mentális esemĂ©nyek,
akkor súlyosan sérül az önismeret: introspekciónkkal nem férünk hozzá
azokhoz a tényezőkhöz, amelyek meghatározzák a kérdéses mentális események
tĂpusát.
Tanulmányom első részében az önismeret problémáját rekonstruálom, ahogyan
az a diszjunktĂv elmĂ©let nĂ©zĹ‘pontjábĂłl felmerĂĽl, a második rĂ©szĂ©ben megmutatom,
hogy a fentebbi, az önismeret sérülésére hivatkozó érv nem működik
a diszjunktĂv elmĂ©lettel szemben
Physicalism and the Privacy of Conscious Experience
The aim of the paper is to show that the privacy of conscious experience is inconsistent with any kind of
physicalism. That is, if you are a physicalist, then you have to deny that more than one subject cannot undergo
the very same conscious experience. In the first part of the paper we define the concepts of privacy and
physicalism. In the second part we delineate two thought experiments in which two subjects undergo the same
kind of conscious experience in such a way that all the physical processes responsible for their experiences are
numerically the same. Based on the thought experiments and their interpretations we present our argument for
the inconsistency of the privacy of experience with physicalism in the third part of the paper. In the final part
we defend our argumentation against some objections
Rolling back the Rollback Argument
By means of the Rollback Argument, this paper argues that metaphysically robust
probabilities are incompatible with a kind of control which can ensure that free actions are not a matter of chance. Our main objection to those (typically agent-causal) theories which both attribute a kind of control to agents that eliminates the role of chance concerning free actions and ascribe probabilities to options of decisions is that metaphysically robust probabilities should be posited only if they can have a metaphysical explanatory role but probabilities can explain anything only if chance has a role. First, we reconstruct the Rollback Argument. Second, we criticize the standard ways of reconciling non-chancy control with metaphysically robust probabilities. Finally, we respond to those worries that are related to the thought experiment of the Rollback Argument
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