Választókörzetek igazságosan? = Fair apportionment of voting districts in Hungary

Az új választási törvény egyik célja a korábbinál igazságosabb választási körzetek kialakítása. Ezt a Velencei Bizottság választási kódexében megfogalmazott ajánlásokhoz hasonló, bár azoknál némileg megengedőbb szabályok révén biztosítja. A szabályok rögzítik a körzetek számát, illetve hogy a körzetek nem oszthatnak ketté kisebb településeket, és nem nyúlhatnak át a megyehatárokon. Tanulmányunkban belátjuk, hogy a szabályok betartása mellett a körzetek kialakítása matematikailag lehetetlen. Javaslatot teszünk a probléma optimális megoldására elvi alapon is, vizsgáljuk a módszer tulajdonságait, majd az általunk megfogalmazott hatékony algoritmussal, a 2010. évi országgyűlési választások adatainak felhasználásával meghatározzuk a körzetek megyék közti elosztásának legjobb megoldását. Végül kitérünk a demográfiai változások várható hatásaira, és több javaslatot teszünk a korlátok hosszú távú betartására: javasoljuk a választási körzetek számának körülbelül 130-ra növelését; egy-egy felülvizsgálat alkalmával a választási körzetek számának megváltoztathatóságát; illetve a körzetek megyék helyett régiók szerinti szervezését. _______ One of the aims of the new electoral law of Hungary has been to apportion voters to voting districts more fairly. This is ensured by a set of rules rather more permissive than those put forward in the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters issued by the Venice Commission. These rules fix the size of the voting districts, and require voting districts not to split smaller towns and villages and not to cross county borders. The article shows that such an apportionment is mathematically impos-sible, and makes suggestions for a theoretical approach to resolving this problem: determine the optimal apportionment by studying the properties of their approach, and use the authors efficient algorithm on the data for the 2010 national elections. The article also examines the expected effect of demographic changes and formulates recommendations for adhering to the rules over the long term: increase the number of voting districts to about 130, allow the number of voting districts to change flexibly at each revision of the districts, and base the districts on regions rather than counties

Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission’s recommendation

Abstract The Venice Commission in its Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters specifies that (single-seat) constituencies should be drawn so that the size difference of a constituency’s size from the average should not exceed a fixed limit while its borders must not cross the borders of administrative regions, such as states or counties. Assuming that constituencies are of equal size within each of the administrative regions, the problem is equivalent to the apportionment problem, that is, the proportional allocation of voting districts among the administrative regions. We show that the principle of maximum admissible departure is incompatible with common apportionment properties, such as monotonicity and Hare-quota. When multiple apportionments satisfy the smallest maximum admissible departure property we find a unique apportionment by the repeated application of the property. The allotment such that the differences from the average district size are lexicographically minimized can be found using an efficient algorithm. This apportionment rule is a well-defined allocation mechanism compatible with and derived from the recommendation of the Venice Commission. Finally, we compare this apportionment rule with mainstream mechanisms using data from Hungary, Germany and the United States

The impact of Nord Stream 2 on the European gas market bargaining positions

We investigate the impact and the possible consequences of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. We model the European gas network as a cooperative game between regions as players over the pipeline network. Our model offers several novelties compared to earlier cooperative studies. Firstly, we focus on cost saving rather than on the profits of cooperation. Secondly, we introduce liquefied natural gas as a player. Thirdly, we apply an iterative linear program to account for the long term bilateral contracts that still drive the gas market. This modelling technique also allows us to identify individual gas flows. We focus on the change of influence of the players in three different scenarios. We investigate how the power of the agents shift when the Nord Stream pipeline is expanded, when the Ukrainian pipeline is shut down and finally when both of these happen. Our calculations show that when Nord Stream 2 is operational, Russia and Western Europe improve their position compared to the base scenario, while other suppliers, notably Norway, together with Central Easternand Southern Europe suffer losses, especially when the Ukrainian route is dismissed. The results highlight that both the supporters and adversaries of Nord Stream 2 are governed by self-interest and solidarity and trust, the values proclaimed by the EU and the Energy Union, remain but a slogan