From the big screen to the streets of Kaunas

Le 18 mai 1972, environ 2 000 jeunes ont participé à une manifestation à Kaunas, en Lituanie soviétique. Cette protestation de masse faisait suite aux obsèques de Romas Kalanta, un jeune de 19 ans, qui s’était immolé le 14 mai. Les descriptions officielles des manifestations semblent présenter un discours stagnant sur les bonnes valeurs du communisme et une condamnation de l’influence des pratiques culturelles occidentales sur la jeunesse soviétique. Cet article avance, au contraire, qu’elles révèlent les failles des négociations entre les autorités et la jeunesse sur les limites acceptables des pratiques culturelles de la jeunesse soviétique et sur ses responsabilités sociales à la fin des années 1960 et au début des années 1970.On May 18, 1972, approximately 2,000 young people participated in a street demonstration in Kaunas, Soviet Lithuania. The mass protest followed the funeral of nineteen‑year‑old Romas Kalanta, who immolated himself on May 14. Official descriptions of the street demonstrations appear to present a stagnant discourse of proper communist values and a condemnation of the influence of Western cultural practices on Soviet youth. This article argues that, instead, they reveal the fault lines of negotiations between authorities and youth over the acceptable boundaries of Soviet youth’s cultural practices and social responsibilities in the late 1960s and early 1970s

Global age-sex-specific mortality, life expectancy, and population estimates in 204 countries and territories and 811 subnational locations, 1950–2021, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic: a comprehensive demographic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2021

Background: Estimates of demographic metrics are crucial to assess levels and trends of population health outcomes. The profound impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on populations worldwide has underscored the need for timely estimates to understand this unprecedented event within the context of long-term population health trends. The Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study (GBD) 2021 provides new demographic estimates for 204 countries and territories and 811 additional subnational locations from 1950 to 2021, with a particular emphasis on changes in mortality and life expectancy that occurred during the 2020–21 COVID-19 pandemic period. Methods: 22 223 data sources from vital registration, sample registration, surveys, censuses, and other sources were used to estimate mortality, with a subset of these sources used exclusively to estimate excess mortality due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 2026 data sources were used for population estimation. Additional sources were used to estimate migration; the effects of the HIV epidemic; and demographic discontinuities due to conflicts, famines, natural disasters, and pandemics, which are used as inputs for estimating mortality and population. Spatiotemporal Gaussian process regression (ST-GPR) was used to generate under-5 mortality rates, which synthesised 30 763 location-years of vital registration and sample registration data, 1365 surveys and censuses, and 80 other sources. ST-GPR was also used to estimate adult mortality (between ages 15 and 59 years) based on information from 31 642 location-years of vital registration and sample registration data, 355 surveys and censuses, and 24 other sources. Estimates of child and adult mortality rates were then used to generate life tables with a relational model life table system. For countries with large HIV epidemics, life tables were adjusted using independent estimates of HIV-specific mortality generated via an epidemiological analysis of HIV prevalence surveys, antenatal clinic serosurveillance, and other data sources. Excess mortality due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021 was determined by subtracting observed all-cause mortality (adjusted for late registration and mortality anomalies) from the mortality expected in the absence of the pandemic. Expected mortality was calculated based on historical trends using an ensemble of models. In location-years where all-cause mortality data were unavailable, we estimated excess mortality rates using a regression model with covariates pertaining to the pandemic. Population size was computed using a Bayesian hierarchical cohort component model. Life expectancy was calculated using age-specific mortality rates and standard demographic methods. Uncertainty intervals (UIs) were calculated for every metric using the 25th and 975th ordered values from a 1000-draw posterior distribution. Findings: Global all-cause mortality followed two distinct patterns over the study period: age-standardised mortality rates declined between 1950 and 2019 (a 62·8% [95% UI 60·5–65·1] decline), and increased during the COVID-19 pandemic period (2020–21; 5·1% [0·9–9·6] increase). In contrast with the overall reverse in mortality trends during the pandemic period, child mortality continued to decline, with 4·66 million (3·98–5·50) global deaths in children younger than 5 years in 2021 compared with 5·21 million (4·50–6·01) in 2019. An estimated 131 million (126–137) people died globally from all causes in 2020 and 2021 combined, of which 15·9 million (14·7–17·2) were due to the COVID-19 pandemic (measured by excess mortality, which includes deaths directly due to SARS-CoV-2 infection and those indirectly due to other social, economic, or behavioural changes associated with the pandemic). Excess mortality rates exceeded 150 deaths per 100 000 population during at least one year of the pandemic in 80 countries and territories, whereas 20 nations had a negative excess mortality rate in 2020 or 2021, indicating that all-cause mortality in these countries was lower during the pandemic than expected based on historical trends. Between 1950 and 2021, global life expectancy at birth increased by 22·7 years (20·8–24·8), from 49·0 years (46·7–51·3) to 71·7 years (70·9–72·5). Global life expectancy at birth declined by 1·6 years (1·0–2·2) between 2019 and 2021, reversing historical trends. An increase in life expectancy was only observed in 32 (15·7%) of 204 countries and territories between 2019 and 2021. The global population reached 7·89 billion (7·67–8·13) people in 2021, by which time 56 of 204 countries and territories had peaked and subsequently populations have declined. The largest proportion of population growth between 2020 and 2021 was in sub-Saharan Africa (39·5% [28·4–52·7]) and south Asia (26·3% [9·0–44·7]). From 2000 to 2021, the ratio of the population aged 65 years and older to the population aged younger than 15 years increased in 188 (92·2%) of 204 nations. Interpretation: Global adult mortality rates markedly increased during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, reversing past decreasing trends, while child mortality rates continued to decline, albeit more slowly than in earlier years. Although COVID-19 had a substantial impact on many demographic indicators during the first 2 years of the pandemic, overall global health progress over the 72 years evaluated has been profound, with considerable improvements in mortality and life expectancy. Additionally, we observed a deceleration of global population growth since 2017, despite steady or increasing growth in lower-income countries, combined with a continued global shift of population age structures towards older ages. These demographic changes will likely present future challenges to health systems, economies, and societies. The comprehensive demographic estimates reported here will enable researchers, policy makers, health practitioners, and other key stakeholders to better understand and address the profound changes that have occurred in the global health landscape following the first 2 years of the COVID-19 pandemic, and longer-term trends beyond the pandemic

A Death Transformed: The Political and Social Consequences of Romas Kalanta's Self-Immolation, Soviet Lithuania, May 1972

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2013"A Death Transformed: The Political and Social Consequences of Romas Kalanta's Self-Immolation, Soviet Lithuania, 1972" explores Soviet and post-Soviet interpretive narratives and political practices in response to two days of street demonstrations that followed the 1972 suicide of a nineteen-year-old man in Soviet Lithuania. My analysis reveals that Communist authorities and participating youth viewed the demonstrations as a struggle over the acceptable boundaries and content of modern Soviet youth culture. Despite extensive evidence that by 1972 youth were actively negotiating the boundaries of what were acceptable activities, Communist authorities and young people operated within an ideological framework that denied young people's capacity to express discontent with the Soviet system. In post-Communist Lithuania, social and political elites constructed narratives of May 1972 that reclaimed agency by representing the demonstrations alternatively as nationalist dissent, civil resistance or Sixties-style youth protest. The diversity of narratives reflected on-going debates about the nature of post-Communist Lithuanian identity. This work seeks to make significant contributions to the historiography of the Soviet Union and to scholarship on the politics of memory and European integration. It contributes to current scholarship that is re-conceptualizing the Brezhnev period in the Soviet Union, looking beyond stagnation to the dynamic relationships between Communist ideology and everyday life by revealing how political and social practices contributed to Soviet youth's identity formation. My analysis counters an entrenched scholarly consensus that Kalanta's self-immolation and the ensuing demonstrations are explained by Lithuanian nationalism. My project also contributes to research on the politics of memory and European integration. While most work in this area has focused on the role of externally-imposed universalist values as a result of East European EU accession, my analysis of narratives of May 1972 in popular media and official commemorations reveals that internal debates about the form of post-Communist society have equally disrupted nationalist narratives

Nuo asmeninės aukos iki pilietinio pasipriešinimo: nacionalinė ir pilietinė tapatybė skelbiant gegužės 14-ąją atmintina diena

The meaning of Romas Kalanta’s self-immolation is not that clear and stable as could be assumed from the anniversary of his death commemorated annually. Amid efforts to memorialise Kalanta’s act and to announce a memorial day, religious, social and medical interpretations of the suicide raised doubts over the propriety of his behaviour as a political protest. An increasingly stressed civil resistance in Lithuania’s discourse put the specificity of Kalanta’s self-immolation in the shade. Seimas debates on the meaning of Kalanta’s act reflected the wider society’s discussions about the place and role of his suicide in Lithuania’s national narrative. Kalanta’s act as a testimony of the civil resistance discords with the public discussion on the role of adaptation in everyday life in the Soviet period. After replacing the day of Romas Kalanta’s sacrifice with the Day of Civil Resistance, the Lithuanian Parliament expressed concern over religious values and public concern, thus complicating the nationalist narrative of the events of May 1972. Focus on civil identity competed with nationalist interpretations of the resistance to Soviet authorities. Applying the concept of Rogers Brubaker, the author argues that Lithuania’s efforts to institutionalise the public memory of Kalanta’s self-immolation demonstrate that civil identity can overcome competitive internal narratives of identity: extend possibilities for political leaders and create a common national narrative instead of a narrow nationalist narrative of Lithuania’s identity

Chuliganai, hipiai ir nesubrendęs jaunimas : aptariant komunistų partijos 1972 m. gegužės 18 d. Kauno įvykių komentarus

Po 1972 m. gegužės demonstracijų Kauno gatvėse komunistų partijos vadai sukūrė tokį įvykių paaiškinimą, kuris sumenkino nacionalizmo ar politinio nepritarimo įtaką neramumų kilimui. Iš pradžių sovietų valdžia kaltino „visuomeninės tvarkos pažeidimo“ kurstymu marginalinius visuomenės elementus – chuliganus ir hipius. Vis dėlto dalyvių kilmės įvairovė vertė partijos vadovus paaiškinti, kodėl jauni žmonės, kurie buvo studentai, tarnautojai ir net komjaunimo nariai, išėjo į gatves su tokiais šūkiais kaip „Laisvę Lietuvai“ ar „Laisvę hipiams“. Dėl to komunistų partija surado paaiškinimą, kad tai buvusi nesėkmingo tikrųjų ideologinių vertybių diegimo sovietiniam jaunimui pasekmė, atvėrusi kelią „priešiškiems elementams“ manipuliuoti jaunimu. Šitaip partijos lyderiai pasinaudojo politine savikritikos praktika, kuri leido 1972 m. gegužės įvykius vertinti pagal priimtiną ideologiją. Vis dėlto savo silpnumo pripažinimas nesustabdė Lietuvos komunistų partijos nuo kaltinimų tėvams, mokykloms ir kultūrinėms organizacijoms, kurie esą nesugebėjo tinkamai išauklėti sovietinio jaunimo. Ir nors kultūrinės bei intelektualinės organizacijos buvo tik vieni iš kaltininkų dėl jaunimo politinės nebrandos ir jų imlumo blogoms įtakoms, būtent jos labiausiai nukentėjo nuo sovietų valdžios smūgių, prasidėjusių po gatvių demonstracijų. Lietuvos komunistų oficiozai sugebėjo pasinaudoti sovietų ideologijos naratyvais, siekdami apsisaugoti nuo kritikos ir pašalinti jiems keliančius grėsmę kultūros ir intelektualinius lyderius Kaune. Reikšminiai žodžiai: Komunistų partija; Ideologija; Sovietų Lietuvos jaunimas; Demonstracijos; Communist Party; Ideology; Soviet Lithuanian youth; DemonstrationsIn the aftermath of the street demonstrations in Kaunas in May 1972, Communist Party leaders developed a narrative of the events that downplayed nationalism or political dissent as motivating factors for the unrest. Initially, Soviet authorities blamed marginal elements in society, specifically hooligans and hippies, for instigating what they called a "disturbance of public order". However, the demographics of participants forced Party leaders to explain why young people who were students, workers and even Komsomol members would take to the streets shouting slogans such as ‘freedom for Lithuania’ and "freedom for hippies". As a result, the Communist Party focused on the failure to inculcate Soviet youth with proper ideological values, making them susceptible to manipulation by "hostile elements". In doing so, Party leaders were able to use the political practice of self-criticism to keep the events of May 1972 within acceptable ideological bounds. However, the recognition of its own weaknesses did not stop the Lithuanian Communist Party from blaming other groups, such as parents, schools and cultural organizations, for failing to provide a proper upbringing for Soviet Lithuanian youth. Although cultural and intellectual organizations were only one of the factors blamed for the political immaturity of youth and their susceptibility to corrupting influences, they were the ones to suffer the consequences of the Soviet authorities’ crackdown after the street demonstrations. Through a process of applying and discarding various discursive options, Lithuanian communist officials were able to use Soviet ideological narratives to protect themselves from criticism and to eliminate disruptive cultural and intellectual leaders in Kaunas