Moratorium on the Death Penalty for Juveniles

Streib offers a sketch of the sentences and actual executions in the juvenile death penalty system for the past quarter-century. The ABA\u27s moratorium calls for the complete prevention of the execution of offenders under age 18 at the time of their crimes

Capital Punishment of Children in Ohio: They\u27d Never Send a Boy of Seventeen to the Chair in Ohio, Would They?

This article presents first an overview of the national legal environment and actual executions in American history and then a focused, in-depth analysis of Ohio as a reasonably representative American jurisdiction. Each of the nineteen verified and documented Ohio cases are examined in some detail to determine, so far as is possible, the reasons they were selected for capital punishment. The cases are discussed within the context of the legal environment existing at the time they were decided

The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment of Juveniles

The practice of imposing the death penalty for crimes committed while under the age of eighteen has occurred sporadically but persistently throughout American history. It gives every indication of continuing in this mode under current law and practice. Greatly differing approaches are followed by the various states as to the authorization and imposition of capital punishment for juveniles. This article explores the existence of a constitutionally-mandated minimum age below which the states may not venture in carrying out this practice. If such a nationwide minimum age exists or should exist, its justification can be found in current interpretations of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. As the next section of this article documents, the practice of capital punishment of juveniles has been rare but not so rare that it can be ignored. The remainder of this article considers, point by point, the factors deemed important by the United States Supreme Court in determining whether capital punishment is prohibited by the eighth amendment. A fundamental theme is the mistake of uncritically transferring constitutionality conclusions from adult capital offender cases to juvenile capital offender cases. Justice Frankfurter\u27s observation pervades this analysis: Children [have] a very special place in life which the law should reflect.” Thus, when examining the law and practice of capital punishment, juveniles traditionally have not been, and should not be, treated the same as adults for this or any other legal purpose

From Gault to Fare and Smith: The Decline in Supreme Court Reliance on Delinquency Theory

The Supreme Court\u27s reliance upon research and scholarly commentaries which examine the sociological factors that contribute to delinquent behavior has declined considerably during the last fourteen years. The author, in an effort to explain this decline, analyzes the seven major juvenile cases which have been considered by the Court since 1966. He conducts this analysis by focusing upon the subject matter of each decision, the importance of the issues arising therein and the author of each opinion. While some similarities appear, no consistent pattern emerges from this analysis. The article concludes that while juvenile law is an area which is particularly susceptible to sociological jurisprudence\u27 the Court has, in recent years, placed declining emphasis on the evidentiary value of social delinquency research and has increasingly turned to legalistic conclusions as a basis for their holdings in juvenile cases

Academic Research and Advocacy Research

Research is something we all do. Some research is a necessary evil, some a delightful passage, some unmitigated drudgery. Our general concern this evening is to hone the concept of legal research, at least as it is manifested by law professors and lawyers. More specifically, how does academic research and advocacy research differ in the world of law and what unique obligations might such differences suggest for the law professoriate? The general issue is the difference, perhaps conflict, between research aimed primarily at discovering truth and expanding knowledge versus research aimed primarily at mounting an argument to achieve victory for a client or some law reform goal. Academic research permits the researcher to define the topic and the important points to be studied, and encourages the researcher to report everything found of any value to the field. Advocacy research typically begins with a narrowly drawn topic and issue, and the researcher is encouraged to report only the findings which bolster the advocate\u27s primary argument, either greatly discounting or remaining conveniently silent about conflicting evidence

Academic Research and Advocacy Research

Research is something we all do. Some research is a necessary evil, some a delightful passage, some unmitigated drudgery. Our general concern this evening is to hone the concept of legal research, at least as it is manifested by law professors and lawyers. More specifically, how does academic research and advocacy research differ in the world of law and what unique obligations might such differences suggest for the law professoriate? The general issue is the difference, perhaps conflict, between research aimed primarily at discovering truth and expanding knowledge versus research aimed primarily at mounting an argument to achieve victory for a client or some law reform goal. Academic research permits the researcher to define the topic and the important points to be studied, and encourages the researcher to report everything found of any value to the field. Advocacy research typically begins with a narrowly drawn topic and issue, and the researcher is encouraged to report only the findings which bolster the advocate\u27s primary argument, either greatly discounting or remaining conveniently silent about conflicting evidence