Testing near-rationality using detailed survey data

This paper considers the evidence of “near-rationality,” as described by Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (2000). Using detailed surveys of household inflation expectations for the United States and Sweden, we find that the data are generally unsupportive of the near-rationality hypothesis. However, we document that household inflation expectations tend to settle around discrete and largely fixed “focal points,” suggesting that both U.S. and Swedish households gauge inflation prospects in rather broad, qualitative terms. Moreover, the combination of a low-inflation environment and an inflation target in Sweden has been accompanied by a disproportionately high proportion of Swedish households expecting no inflation. However, a similar low inflation trend in the United States, which does not have an explicit inflation target, reveals no such rise in the proportion of households expecting no inflation. This observation suggests that the way the central bank communicates its inflation objective may influence inflation expectations independently of the inflation trend it actually pursues.Inflation (Finance) ; Rational expectations (Economic theory)

Testing near-rationality using detailed survey data

This paper considers the evidence of “near-rationality,†as described by Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (2000). Using detailed surveys of household inflation expectations for the United States and Sweden, we find that the data are generally unsupportive of the near-rationality hypothesis. However, we document that household inflation expectations tend to settle around discrete and largely fixed “focal points,†suggesting that both U.S. and Swedish households gauge inflation prospects in rather broad, qualitative terms. Moreover, the combination of a low-inflation environment and an inflation target in Sweden has been accompanied by a disproportionately high proportion of Swedish households expecting no inflation. However, a similar low-inflation trend in the United States, which does not have an explicit inflation target, reveals no such rise in the proportion of households expecting no inflation. This observation suggests that the way the central bank communicates its inflation objective may influence inflation expectations independently of the inflation trend it actually pursues.inflation expectations, rationality, inflation targeting, Phillips curve, Bryan, Palmqvist

Marketing mix conception (4P, 5P, 7P)

The diagnosis of gastrointestinal graft versus host disease (GI-GVHD) is based on clinical symptoms and histological findings. In clinical practice, it is often difficult to decide whether abdominal symptoms in an allogeneic transplant recipient are caused by GVHD or other disorders. Endoscopic biopsies are helpful in establishing the diagnosis, but endoscopy is not always possible to perform due to poor general condition of the patients. No biomarkers are routinely used to predict GVHD. The aim of fecal calprotectin and alpha-1 antitrypsin testing in our study was to find out whether determination of the concentrations of these proteins may be used as a screening method for enteric GVHD. We studied prospectively 51 patients, 8 of whom developed GI-GVHD. Our data demonstrate that elevated fecal calprotectin levels were significantly associated with presence of GI-GVHD. We found a positive association between high F-calprotectin and severe gastrointestinal GVHD. In bivariate analysis, only calprotectin but not alpha-1 antitrypsin was independently associated with GI-GVHD. Testing for fecal calprotectin after allogeneic stem cell transplantation may be a useful screening tool

Rapid Qualitative Urinary Tract Infection Pathogen Identification by SeptiFast® Real-Time PCR

Background Urinary tract infections (UTI) are frequent in outpatients. Fast pathogen identification is mandatory for shortening the time of discomfort and preventing serious complications. Urine culture needs up to 48 hours until pathogen identification. Consequently, the initial antibiotic regimen is empirical. Aim To evaluate the feasibility of qualitative urine pathogen identification by a commercially available real-time PCR blood pathogen test (SeptiFast®) and to compare the results with dipslide and microbiological culture. Design of study Pilot study with prospectively collected urine samples. Setting University hospital. Methods 82 prospectively collected urine samples from 81 patients with suspected UTI were included. Dipslide urine culture was followed by microbiological pathogen identification in dipslide positive samples. In parallel, qualitative DNA based pathogen identification (SeptiFast®) was performed in all samples. Results 61 samples were SeptiFast® positive, whereas 67 samples were dipslide culture positive. The inter-methodological concordance of positive and negative findings in the gram+, gram- and fungi sector was 371/410 (90%), 477/492 (97%) and 238/246 (97%), respectively. Sensitivity and specificity of the SeptiFast® test for the detection of an infection was 0.82 and 0.60, respectively. SeptiFast® pathogen identifications were available at least 43 hours prior to culture results. Conclusion The SeptiFast® platform identified bacterial DNA in urine specimens considerably faster compared to conventional culture. For UTI diagnosis sensitivity and specificity is limited by its present qualitative setup which does not allow pathogen quantification. Future quantitative assays may hold promise for PCR based UTI pathogen identification as a supplementation of conventional culture methods

Why Central Banks Announce their Objectives: Monetary Policy with Discretionary Signalling

This paper analyzes the use of announcements of objectives or intentions, announcements which are common in implementation of monetary policy. To analyze such announcements, this paper uses a model in which there is asymmetric information over the central bank’s objectives. This informational asymmetry is represented by a stochastic in‡ation target, upon which only the central bank can condition its actions. Thus, the scope is set for signalling, and the use of announcements can be seen as a way for a central bank to signal its type. This paper assumes that a central bank can signal at its own discretion and shows that while central banks with high in‡ation targets never use announcements, central banks with low in‡ation targets occasionally, but not always, will choose to reveal their private information through an announcement. A …rst …nding is that, contrary to what a cheap-talk equilibrium suggests, the announcements may be more precise the larger the central bank’s news. Moreover, this paper shows that the frequency of announcements is unambiguously increasing in the magnitude of the central bank’s news, something that goes well in line with what is typically found in actual implementation of monetary policy

Social-engineering ett hot mot informationssäkerheten?

Den här rapporten tar upp ett annorlunda hot mot informationssäkerheten, som inte hårdvara eller mjukvara kan stoppa. Detta hot kallas för social-engineering, och det som gör detta hot farligt är att de anställda och chefer i en organisation, kan hjälpa utövaren av socialengineering utan att de själva vet om det. Det går inte att förhindra att dessa attacker sker, men man kan förhindra de negativa konsekvenserna av en sådan attack. Denna rapport tar upp hur man ska göra för att en organisation ska kunna fortsätta med sin verksamhet, efter en attack av social-engineering. I värsta fall kan en attack av social-engineering innebära att ett företag aldrig återhämtar sig. Detta kan bero på att organisationen har förlorat alla sina kunder, förlorat marknads andelar, eller för att de ansvariga och viktiga personerna i organisationen har blivit dömda för oaktsamhet och sitter i fängelse. Denna rapport ska informera och få er att vara uppmärksamma och medvetna om dessa hot, som ni kanske inte vet finns. Ni ska få kunskap och lära er känna igen de olika förklädnaderna en utövare av social-engineering antar.This paper discusses a different threat against information security, which can not be prevented by either hardware or software. This Threat is called social engineering and the main issue that makes this threat so dangerous is that the victims, like executives and the employees in an organization are not aware that they actually helps the practician of social engineering. These attacks can not be avoided, but there is a way to prevent negative consequences of such an attack. This paper discusses how an organization can manage to continue with the activity, despite an attack of social engineering. In worse case the scenarios of an attack of social engineering can mean that an organization never fully recovers. The different scenarios of this can be as following. The organization could lose all the clients, they could have lost market share or the responsible important people in the organization could be convicted and sent to jail. This paper will make you aware of these threats that you might even don’t know exists. You will be given the knowledge to be able to recognize de different disguises a practician of social engineering can assume