Sequential Location under one-sided Demand Uncertainty

By entering new market, firms face uncertainty about their potential demand. We depart from the usual Hotelling duopoly model with sequential entry. Firms can locate outside the city and market conditions are common knowledge. Then we introduce one-sided demand uncertainty. It results that demand uncertainty can be seen as a diferentiation force when the first entrant faces demand uncertainty and as an agglomeration force when it is the second entrant. Finally, firm 2's imperfect information implies higher welfare losses.

Merger Remedies at the European Commission: A Multinomial Logit Analysis

This paper aims to build and empirically evaluate a discrete choice model of merger remedies as a basis for policy analysis. The database consists of 229 merger cases accepted in Phase I or Phase II of the European merger process between 1990 and 2005. We focus on the following question: Which merging firms' characteristics lead the European Commission to decide whether to require conditional acceptance? Although a lot of empirical studies have been carried out these last years, ours is distinguished by at least two original features. First, we explore determinant factors of the Commission's decisions with a neural network model differentiating cases accepted with or without remedies (either structural or behavioral). Secondly, we implement three multinomial logit models. We find that variables related to high market power lead more frequently to a remedy outcome, whatever the phase. Innovative industries such as energy, transportation and communications positively affect the probability of a behavioral remedy. Lastly, former Competition Commissioner Mario Monti's policy appears to be pro-remedy, i.e. seeking concessions from merging parties.Merger Remedies ; Antitrust ; European Commission ; Discrete Choice Models ; Self-Organizing Maps

Merger Remedies at the European Commission: A Multinomial Logit Analysis

This paper aims to build and empirically evaluate a discrete choice model of merger remedies as a basis for policy analysis. The database consists of 229 merger cases accepted in Phase I or Phase II of the European merger process between 1990 and 2005. We focus on the following question: Which merging firms’ characteristics lead the European Commission to decide whether to require conditional acceptance? Although a lot of empirical studies have been carried out these last years, ours is distinguished by at least two original features. First, we explore determinanting factors of the Commission’s decisions with a neural network model differentiating cases accepted with or without remedies (either structural or behavioral). Secondly, we implement three multinomial logit models. We find that variables related to high market power lead more frequently to a remedy outcome, whatever the phase. Innovative industries such as energy, transportation and communications positively affect the probability of a behavioral remedy. Lastly, former Competition Commissioner Mario Monti’s policy appears to be pro-remedy, i.e. seeking concessions from merging parties.

Nomenclature de produits et concordance dans le temps. Procédure de correction et analyses de sensibilité

Dans cet article, les auteurs présentent un algorithme permettant un suivi des statistiques de production ou d’échange d’un produit donné, malgré les actualisations fréquentes des nomenclatures officielles. L’intérêt de cette procédure est démontré à travers une application sur les données des douanes françaises sur les exportations et importations des produits agroalimentaires. Sans l’application de cette procédure, les gains aux échanges liés à l’introduction de nouvelles variétés peuvent être surestimés

Spatial Competition in the French Supermarket Industry

This papers develops a structural model of spatial competition to analyzethe competition intensity among large grocery stores at geographical marketlevel. The model is estimated for a metropolitan area of South of Franceand uses a cross-sectional household survey containing detailed informationon stores visited for the main food product categories. Using estimates ofdemand parameters and assuming a particular pricing rule, we recover bothstores’ marginal cost and margin. The results point out that on the wholeretailers exert a significant local monopoly power due to important differentiationforces, especially for the hypermarket format. We then performcounterfactual policy simulations based on propositions formulated by theCompetition Authority that aim to restore effective competition in this industry.We show that imposing a hypermarket divestiture to a dominantretailer is always beneficial to consumers whatever the purchaser identity

Spatial competition in the French supermarket industry

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom on the competitive grocery retail sector in France. To that end, I develop a structural model of spatial competition that accounts for (i) market geography on consumers' preferences, and (ii) differences in their shopping list. The demand estimates are used to recover stores' price-cost margin under alternative pricing strategies. I select the best pricing model by applying non-nested tests and show that retailers noticeably distort their offer in highly concentrated markets. Finally, I perform counterfactual experiments to quantify the expected gain of an additional store on consumer welfare and retail prices

Bilan et déterminants de la compétitivité des filières françaises de produits animaux

Depuis le début des années 2000, les filières animales françaises ont vu leur part de marché se dégrader,tant au niveau mondial qu'au sein de l’Union européenne, alors que certains États membres de l’UE ontconnu des trajectoires opposées. Afin d'identifier les facteurs à même d’expliquer ces évolutions, et plusgénéralement d'analyser la compétitivité des filières animales, un projet de recherche piloté par l'UMRSMART-LERECO de l'INRA, et financé par le ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Alimentation, a été conduitentre la mi-2017 et la fin 2018. Cette note présente les principaux résultats de ce travail

Market Structures, Political Surroundings, and Merger Remedies: An Empirical Investigation of the EC's Decisions

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Merger Remedies at the European Commission: A Multinomial Logit Analysis

This paper aims to build and empirically evaluate a discrete choice model of merger remedies as a basis for policy analysis. The database consists of 229 merger cases accepted in Phase I or Phase II of the European merger process between 1990 and 2005. We focus on the following question: Which merging firms' characteristics lead the European Commission to decide whether to require conditional acceptance? Although a lot of empirical studies have been carried out these last years, ours is distinguished by at least two original features. First, we explore determinant factors of the Commission's decisions with a neural network model differentiating cases accepted with or without remedies (either structural or behavioral). Secondly, we implement three multinomial logit models. We find that variables related to high market power lead more frequently to a remedy outcome, whatever the phase. Innovative industries such as energy, transportation and communications positively affect the probability of a behavioral remedy. Lastly, former Competition Commissioner Mario Monti's policy appears to be pro-remedy, i.e. seeking concessions from merging parties

Merger Remedies at the European Commission: A Multinomial Logit Analysis

This paper aims to build and empirically evaluate a discrete choice model of merger remedies as a basis for policy analysis. The database consists of 229 merger cases accepted in Phase I or Phase II of the European merger process between 1990 and 2005. We focus on the following question: Which merging firms' characteristics lead the European Commission to decide whether to require conditional acceptance? Although a lot of empirical studies have been carried out these last years, ours is distinguished by at least two original features. First, we explore determinant factors of the Commission's decisions with a neural network model differentiating cases accepted with or without remedies (either structural or behavioral). Secondly, we implement three multinomial logit models. We find that variables related to high market power lead more frequently to a remedy outcome, whatever the phase. Innovative industries such as energy, transportation and communications positively affect the probability of a behavioral remedy. Lastly, former Competition Commissioner Mario Monti's policy appears to be pro-remedy, i.e. seeking concessions from merging parties