Bence Nanay, Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016

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Your Tongue Here (Or Not): On Imagining Whether To Take a Bite (Or Not)

Inspired by recent visits to the Disgusting Food Museum (DFM) in Mälmo, SE and “FOOD: Bigger than Your Plate” (2019) at the Victoria & Albert in London, UK, this article explores the saliency of “disgust” given its role in the “attention economy,” hipster allure and emotional encoding. Initially appalled by the DFM’s demonizing national delicacies as disgusting, the author soon realised that doing so has a “silver lining” in terms of attention. One aspect that remains under-explored is the connection between imagination and attention. The relationship between taste and disgust grants us a vehicle for working this out, since human beings are wired for disgust, yet what disgusts is learnt. Unlike basic emotions for which we have salience and/or memories, we deploy our imagination to anticipate disgust. To defeat disgust’s alarmist ploys, “food adventurers” must block their imagination. “Disgusting food” not only grabs people’s attention, but it tends to deceive

Aesthetics is the Philosophy of Our Wordless World

For too long, philosophers have tried to force our world to comport to the ‘linguistic turn,’ made famous by Richard Rorty’s 1967 anthology of the same name. And as time marches on, we seem to have even fewer tools at our disposal to carve out alternative views, even though philosophers as varied as Gilbert Ryle and Maurice Merleau-Ponty once discerned our world quite differently. Aesthetics remains the philosophical field where language need not occupy center court. For this reason, Aesthetics matters more than those Realists, who are prone to dismiss non-evidential views, might admit.

What's so authentic about restoration?

When shown two identical works of art, and told that one is the original and the other an artist-sanctioned copy, most viewers claim that they prefer the ‘original’, precisely because they imagine that something of the artist’s hand remains. Knowing full well that most everything that is old, yet still exists, has undergone some form of restoration, we are surprised that some philosophers still share viewers’ preference for some original over its sanctioned copy, as if they too believe that something of the artist’s hand remains, even if paint molecules have chipped off or surfaces have been (unbeknownst to them) routinely reworked. As the contributors to this volume of Aesthetic Investigations reiterate, restoration and its multiple variants, which range from preservation (preserving as is) to conservation (preventing further deterioration), is a fact of the matter

What’s so authentic about restoration?

When shown two identical works of art, and told that one is the original and the other an artist-sanctioned copy, most viewers claim that they prefer the ‘original’, precisely because they imagine that something of the artist’s hand remains. Knowing full well that most everything that is old, yet still exists, has undergone some form of restoration, we are surprised that some philosophers still share viewers’ preference for some original over its sanctioned copy, as if they too believe that something of the artist’s hand remains, even if paint molecules have chipped off or surfaces have been (unbeknownst to them) routinely reworked. As the contributors to this volume of Aesthetic Investigations reiterate, restoration and its multiple variants, which range from preservation (preserving as is) to conservation (preventing further deterioration), is a fact of the matter

Freedom and Neighbourhood: Reflecting on the Example of Fred Dewey

Content Private and Public Memories of Fred DeweyRafael KasperGeneral Public - A Fable of SanctuaryFred DeweyGeneral Public – Eine Fabel von einem (un-)geschützen OrtFred DeweyFred und wirWolfgang HeuerFred and usWolfgang HeuerMemoriesSue SpaidErinnerungenSue SpaidMemoriesJF PaquayMemoriesRenée PetropoulosThe Twelve Mortal MenPilar Petropoulos-WhiteHannah Arendt on Being Human and Political PowerJerome Kohn‘Touch With Your Hands His Things’Fergal GaynorIn memoriam Fred DeweyHelgard Mahrd

The Kinship Model: why biodiverse cities matter

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Biodiversity: Regarding Its Role as a Bio-indicator for Human Cultural Engagement

After wondering why environmental aestheticians tend to undervalue biodiversity as an indicator of nature’s well-being, I discovered that Philosophy and Science are in a face off regarding biodiversity’s utility. For the most part, philosophers meet science’s confidence regarding biodiversity with skepticism. Rather than get bogged down in technical disagreements between scientists and philosophers over the possibility of measuring and utilizing biodiversity, this paper sidesteps that conflict by turning to the relationship between biodiversity and cultural engagement. By describing: the link between spoken languages and species diversity, the significance of cultural differences, the role of cities and remote communities in encouraging and safeguarding biodiverse habitats, and the heterogeneous nature of difference itself when determining biodiversity; I effectively demonstrate how human beings who value their own culture protect nature, which reveals the most important reason to value biodiversity. Biodiversity may be impossible to track, extremely difficult to measure, and shares no correlation with stability, yet no other yardstick indicates cultural proliferation. This paper surveys three ways in which biodiversity can serve as a bio-indicator for human cultural engagement, just as lichens are bio-indicators for air pollution, ozone depletion, and metal contamination

The world worth making : Implementing care aesthetics to boost well-being

In treating care as a moral imperative, the ethics of care aims for normativity, yet its normativity is thrown into jeopardy by the fact that standards of care vary dramatically among care-givers. To counter the limitations of care ethics, I propose care aesthetics, whose success reflects measurable metrics. Rooted in ameliorative practices, care aesthetics stresses the well-being of the cared-for, whereby flourishing entails both capacity and access. Thus, care aesthetics and care ethics are distinct, since the former treats the well-being of the cared-for as proof of the "sign that our caring has been received". To demonstrate the measurable features of well-being, I offer two concrete examples: one proposed by landscape architect Joan Iversson Nassauer and another focused on curatorial practice (curare is Latin for care). To explain why philosophers have overlooked the role of well-being in signalling the success of care, I describe how concepts such as balance, harmony, order and unity, which were originally characterised as material, became immaterial aesthetic concepts by the 20th Century. I then circle back to connect well-being to epistemology and ethics, before discussing how the goal to enhance the well-being of cared-fors and care-givers alike stands to enrich quotidian experiences.En tractar les cures com un imperatiu moral, l'ètica de la cura té com a objectiu la normativitat, però la seva normativitat es veu amenaçada pel fet que els estàndards d'atenció varien dràsticament entre els cuidadors. Per contrarestar les limitacions de l'ètica assistencial, proposo una estètica de cures, l'èxit de la qual reflecteix mètriques mesurables. Arrelada en les pràctiques milloratives, l'estètica de les cures posa l'accent en el benestar de les persones ateses, per la qual cosa florir comporta tant capacitat com accés. Així, l'estètica de la cura i l'ètica de la cura són diferents, ja que la primera tracta el benestar de les persones ateses com a prova del «signe que la nostra cura ha estat rebuda». Per demostrar els trets mesurables del benestar, n'ofereixo dos exemples concrets: un de proposat per l'arquitecte paisatgista Joan Iversson Nassauer, i un altre centrat en la pràctica curatòria (curare en llatí vol dir tenir cura). Per explicar per què els filòsofs han passat per alt el paper del benestar a l'hora d'assenyalar l'èxit de les cures, descric com conceptes com ara l'equilibri, l'harmonia, l'ordre i la unitat, que originalment es caracteritzaven com a materials, es van convertir en conceptes estètics immaterials al segle XX. A continuació, connecto el benestar amb l'epistemologia i l'ètica abans de discutir que l'objectiu de millorar el benestar dels cuidadors i les cuidadores és enriquir les experiències quotidianes.Al tratar los cuidados como un imperativo moral, la ética del cuidado tiene como objetivo la normatividad, pero su normatividad se ve amenazada porque los estándares de atención varían drásticamente entre los cuidadores. Para contrarrestar las limitaciones de la ética asistencial, propongo una estética de cuidados cuyo éxito refleja métricas medibles. Arraigada en las prácticas ameliorativas, la estética de los cuidados hace hincapié en el bienestar de las personas atendidas, por lo que florecer comporta tanto capacidad como acceso. Así, la estética del cuidado y la ética del cuidado son diferentes, puesto que la primera trata el bienestar de las personas atendidas como prueba del «signo de que nuestro cuidado ha sido recibido». Para demostrar los rasgos medibles del bienestar, ofrezco dos ejemplos concretos: uno propuesto por el arquitecto paisajista Joan Iversson Nassauer, y otro centrado en la práctica del cuidado (curare en latín significa tener cuidado). Para explicar por qué los filósofos han pasado por alto el papel del bienestar a la hora de señalar el éxito de los cuidados, describo cómo conceptos como el equilibrio, la armonía, el orden y la unidad, que originalmente se caracterizaban como materiales, se convirtieron en conceptos estéticos inmateriales en el siglo XX. A continuación, conecto el bienestar con la epistemología y la ética antes de discutir que el objetivo de mejorar el bienestar de los cuidadores y las cuidadoras es enriquecer las experiencias cotidianas